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Abstract 
This thesis looks at an aesthetics and politics of audience participation in immersive 
theatre. It asks what it means to be affected by immersive theatre as an audience 
member and what it means to perceive risk as a participating audience. Moreover, it 
considers how affect production and risk perception among participating audiences 
might be approached as aesthetic characteristics that are, at the same time, 
profoundly political. Inspired by, but departing from, the writing of political 
philosopher Jacques Rancière, the argument considers whether a politics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre might be derived from an aesthetic core, a core 
that emerges from affect production and risk perception and that fundamentally 
impacts on how participation takes place and how participants are to take their place.  
Immersive theatre is initially identified as a theatre style that surrounds 
participating audiences in a coherent aesthetic world. I ask, on the one hand, what 
might constitute a productive participant and how such a productive participant 
might contribute to the coherence of an aesthetic world. On the other hand, I ask how 
these productive participants might also be implicated in its rupture. Drawing 
especially on the broad disciplinary spectrum of affect studies and risk perception 
research, new terminology is introduced to frame productive participation based on 
narcissism and entrepreneurialism. Significantly, points of aesthetic and political 
alignment are charted between immersive theatre, the value system heralded under 
neoliberalism and the profitable production of experiences within a growing 
‘experience economy’. Through analyses of work by Ray Lee, Lundahl & Seitl, 
Punchdrunk, Shunt, Theatre Delicatessen and Half Cut, this thesis suggests that 
immersive theatre’s most valuable political work might be derived from an aesthetics 
of audience participation that frustrates such points of alignment, unearthing into an 
affective zone the political consequences and compromises of productive 
participation.  
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Introduction 
8 February 2013. Winter Storm Nemo was in full swing over New York City and my 
coat had turned from grey to white under the weight of a thick blanket of falling 
snow. I knew where I needed to be – 530 West 27th Street, between 10th and 11th 
Avenues – but the blizzard made it difficult to see much beyond a couple of meters. 
The refuge of Ovest Pizzoteca & Bar provided warm and welcome respite.  
On the wall by the bar were three white, beaked masks with large, hollowed 
out eyes. I had seen these before and the sign was encouraging. These were the 
trademark masks given to audiences in Sleep No More (2011-), the first international 
commercial venture of the British theatre company, Punchdrunk, reviving a 2003 
London premiere and a revisited 2009-10 run in Boston. The performance, at the 
time of writing, is still running in New York thanks to co-production with the United 
States production company, Emursive. With runs extending every few months, the 
show demonstrates that most valuable of theatre ambitions: persistence.  
Punchdrunk have become synonymous with a kind of theatre that has come 
to be referred to, especially in the United Kingdom and the US, as immersive theatre. 
This is a theatre style in which participating audiences enter the world of a coherent 
aesthetic space that surrounds them fully, usually sharing the space with at least one 
actor. In Punchdrunk’s particular breed of large-scale immersive theatre, audiences 
are mostly free to move around typically vast spaces and tend to be masked with 
something like the masks that were hanging on the wall in front of me at Ovest 
Pizzoteca.  
12 
 
Pointing to the masks, I asked the barman if the venue was nearby. It was 
only meters away, so I took the liberty of delaying exposure to Nemo and asked him 
if he had been to Sleep No More. He called over his colleague, who had been twice. 
‘I’m outgoing’, said the colleague. ‘It suits me. Others get a bit freaked out by it. It 
asks too much of them’.  
When I mentioned that I had flown from London on a research visit to see the 
show he seemed surprised, at first. But, after a pause, he asked if I had heard of the 
repeat attenders. These ‘superfans’ of the performance incessantly attend tens of 
times, sometimes twice a night thanks to an additional late night slot on Friday and 
Saturday evenings. At the time I was in email correspondence with one of them. His 
name is Evan Cobb, a.k.a Scorched the Snake and author of the blog, They Have 
Scorched the Snake… but not killed it, bitches. As of 29 November 2012, Cobb had 
attended the performance forty one times… and counting: a performance, 
incidentally, that costs between $75 and $105.  
I was already familiar with Punchdrunk’s work and had formed ideas as to 
what it might be that encourages audiences to attend performances like Sleep No 
More many times over. I also agreed with the barman that this kind of work asks 
plenty of audiences and specifying what this might be, exactly, is one task of the 
pages that follow. Escape, thrill, perceived risk and the rewards that might come with 
exercising ingenuity and opportunism offer audiences a hedonistic and opiate-like 
chance to be satiated by exploratory activity that embraces and celebrates excess: an 
enormous set of spaces that eludes being fully mastered, but encourages mastery in 
spite of that elusion; intensely personal interactions existing within the performance 
that, for the most part, are only available to the few and thrive on that lack of 
availability; tasks and hidden challenges that befuddle even the most committed 
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superfan, but nonetheless spur persistence; and an overwhelming, meticulous, awe-
inspiring and addictively mesmeric level of scenographic detail. This is what I had 
come to expect of Punchdrunk’s large-scale performances and what I supposed 
might kindle the commitment of their superfans. 
So it was a short walk from the pizzeria to the place where these expectations 
and suppositions might be challenged or supported: a vast former warehouse block 
and nightclub that, since the Punchdrunk-Emursive occupation, has come to be 
known as The McKittrick Hotel. The McKittrick has five floors, though some 
bloggers lay claim to having accessed an elusive sixth floor – a floor that, for me, 
remained blocked by a masked usher when I attended Sleep No More. Inside The 
McKittrick, masked audiences might stumble across a taxidermist’s, bloodied 
bathtubs, a cemetery, a maze and a number of other atmospheric and immensely 
detailed environments that make either overt or tangential reference to the ambience 
and character psyches of William Shakespeare’s Macbeth: a play that forms a point 
of departure for this primarily silent performance and from which Cobb derives the 
title of Scorched the Snake, ‘bitches’ aside.1 Performers danced or meandered their 
way through the vast set of spaces, performing energetic choreographed sequences, 
or selecting single audience members for intimate one-on-one performances that 
primarily took place behind locked doors. Jazz ballads and Bernard Herrmann scores 
hovered amid dry ice and ambient lighting. The music seemed in keeping with the 
Manderley bar, both in a duplicated, desolate form inside the main performance 
space and as a place of partial entry into and exit out of this world: a liminal space 
where masks could be removed, drinks purchased and feet tapped to a three piece 
                                                 
1
 ‘We have scotcht the snake, not kill’d it’ (Shakespeare III.ii: 870). In Sleep No More, the line is 
delivered by Banquo, not Macbeth, in a one-on-one performance within the performance (Cobb, email 
interview).  
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band and vocalist, betwixt and between the blizzard on West 27
th
 Street and the 
escapist anonymity of The McKittrick Hotel.  
 Sleep No More typifies an aesthetics and politics of audience participation 
that is premised on maximising the best possible experience. Audiences must 
discover the various spaces of The McKittrick and take advantage of the 
opportunities presented to those savvy enough to discover them, such as the one-on-
one performer-audience interactions that take place within the performance. It is very 
difficult to secure these opportunities, which are perhaps their main allure, but that 
process is helped by knowing the participatory ropes: not following crowds of 
participants, finding lonesome actors and sticking close to them as they weave their 
way through looped performance cycles. Such acts of discovery and opportunism 
ultimately determine a surplus of aesthetic experience available to some audience 
members, but not others. In other words, the one-on-one performances within a 
performance operate as a potential aesthetic surplus to the The McKittrick and the 
choreographed sequences that take place within it. This environment – or, rather, an 
agglomeration of synergised installations in a number of rooms that, taken together, 
make up The McKittrick – are certainly engaging in their own right, as are the larger 
scale group performances that take place at carefully timed and choreographed 
points in a looped performance cycle, such as a banquet scene on the bottom floor 
where Macbeth despairs at the arrival of Banquo’s bloodied apparition. But the more 
risk-laden, intimate interactions with performers that are craftily unearthed by 
audience members with a more entrepreneurial disposition are by far and away the 
more experientially intense. It is these experiences that provide an aesthetic surplus 
for those able to secure them.  
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To clarify, briefly and as a prelude to a fuller engagement with aesthetics in 
chapter one: the kind of aesthetics that this thesis engages with refers specifically to 
aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience will be understood along lines broadly 
compatible with John Dewey’s Art as Experience: ‘[t]he sensory satisfaction of eye 
and ear, when [a]esthetic, is so because it does not stand by itself but is linked to the 
activity of which it is the consequence’ (50). While drawing on a wider range of 
sensory experiences than sight and sound in what follows, I share Dewey’s interest 
in treating aesthetic experience as being thoroughly bound up with a given 
environment, particularly an immersive theatre environment. Moreover, for Dewey, 
the producer of an artwork embodies the attitude of a perceiver while making the 
work (50), where a special kind of perception, aesthetic perception, regulates artistic 
creativity (51). As such, producers and receivers of artworks share a common 
aesthetic link in a perceptive mode and it is this mode, a mode that I refer to as 
‘creative perception’, which promotes aesthetic experience. In other words, by 
drawing on Dewey, I am advocating a view of aesthetic experience that factors into 
definition both that which is produced and that which is perceived, leaving space to 
underscore the audience’s perception of an immersive theatre space as being itself 
productive, at least for the audience member. While, in what follows, I digress from 
Dewey’s insistence on the immediacy of aesthetic experience, as that which must 
elude the entrance of a recalled past into an experienced present (127), I nonetheless 
find it useful to think about aesthetic experience in relational terms, where the 
audience’s attention is fixed ‘upon the way things bear upon one another, their 
clashes and unitings, the way they fulfil and frustrate, promote and retard, excite and 
inhibit one another’ (139). An examination of aesthetic experience can therefore be 
seen as an examination of interactivity, not just between elements within a formal 
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artistic composition, but also the interactivity between one who perceives and what 
is perceived. The challenge, then, is to enquire into the possible peculiarity of an 
immersive theatre participant’s productivity, asking on what terms they might be 
identified as a productive participant.  
In a performance like Sleep No More, the inherent productivity and creativity 
of the receiving subject is necessarily tied into their participatory dispositions and 
capacities. In other words, an aesthetics of audience participation in this performance 
seems to be tied into its politics, where the participatory dispositions of audience 
members affect their participatory capacities. Some will be more disposed than 
others towards maximising the best possible experience in the immersive theatre 
event. To recall the Ovest Pizzoteca barman, some participants may ‘get a bit 
freaked out’ by Sleep No More as ‘it asks too much of them’. Of course, such an 
exclusionary barrier to equitable participation is likely to plague almost any artwork, 
particularly theatre events. But testing the peculiar terms of such exclusion as it 
manifests in the political, through a participatory aesthetic, seems a worthwhile 
investigation. Why might audiences get freaked out by immersive theatre? In what 
ways might it ask too much of them? Are there ever instances where such 
exclusionary characteristics might be subverted?  
To begin introducing an approach to these questions, it is worth probing a 
little deeper into one of the sparks behind my research visit to New York: the 
superfan. It seems likely that Cobb has acquired a degree of participatory expertise 
relevant to the performance by virtue of his repeat attendance. If such participatory 
expertise can indeed be established, through satisfactory theorisation, then audience 
participation can be seen to become something that can be practised, rehearsed and 
even mastered. This would raise the prospect of being able to participate better, 
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implying that Cobb and participants like him are not just paying to watch theatre 
events like Sleep No More; rather, it suggests a possible demand for a spectator 
willing to invest time, energy and money into a theatre event that is not simply 
presented, but rather encourages the cultivation of participatory skills. In other 
words, it suggests that participatory capacities might be nurtured by attending to 
participatory dispositions. 
It is not unusual for a fan to celebrate the merits of a given performance 
online, nor is it unusual for audiences to participate in performance; what is unusual, 
though, is for a forum to emerge that offers strategies for audience participation in 
the theatre. On his blog, Cobb shares his participatory expertise by responding to 
questions asked by visitors to the site, although he usually avoids offering specific 
instructions on securing the much sought-after one-on-one performances within the 
production. The blog is used to exchange trivia about the performance and this 
exchange is accompanied by personal reflections on what it was like to participate on 
a given evening. But Cobb goes one step further: he offers cryptic advice on how to 
participate. This advice includes mappings of the performance space to help with 
accessing parts of the performance that might otherwise be difficult to find, as well 
as tips on discovering notable prop items, such as an Ouija board or Hecate’s 
engagement ring (apparently a Holy Grail for superfans of the production).
2
 The 
offering of participatory tips underlies an assumption that there are right and wrong 
ways to set about participating in Sleep No More, or at least that there are better or 
more effective modes of participation to be exploited. This suggests that audience 
participation can be meritocratic if premised on privileging particular ideals, such as 
                                                 
2
 For more on superfans of Sleep No More, see Silvestre, ‘Punchdrunk and the Politics of 
Spectatorship’. Cobb also specifies the search for Hecate’s ring as a particularly fanatical pursuit of 
superfans (email interview).  
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the cultivation of participatory skills and/or the valorisation of participatory 
dispositions premised on opportunism and entrepreneurialism.  
I find this notion of bettering participation fascinating in its own right, 
particularly with regard to a politics of participation in immersive theatre. But 
Scorched the Snake encourages reflection on another set of implications pertinent to 
Cobb’s repeat attendance. In an email interview, Cobb openly and frankly articulates 
an ‘infatuation’ with Sleep No More. He talks about getting ‘hooked’ and discusses a 
persistent attempt to recapture the ‘lost magic’ experienced on first encountering 
their work (email interview). These turns of phrase attribute narcotic-like qualities to 
the performance. As with narcotic consumption, there seems to result a comparable 
perception of warped reality and escape, thrill and disorientation. His reflections on 
compulsive attendance suggest a yearning to retrieve the intensity of a first hit: an 
intensity that seems unlikely to be fully reiterated, but might nonetheless be 
approximated through strategically mastering the best way to participate. He writes 
about feeling ‘a sense of genuine danger’ when first experiencing intimate 
interaction in Sleep No More, even though this sense diminished with repeat 
attendance and familiarity. The will to retrieve the feeling of that ‘first hit’, though, 
reveals a fetishisation of risk that perseveres despite this familiarity. Securing these 
risky, affectively charged and addictive hits seems to become a goal of participation. 
Taken together, the various posts on Cobb’s blog suggest that Sleep No More asks 
something of its audiences: to collude in the establishment of self-made participatory 
opportunity, whether they like it or not. It seems to suggest an addictive quality to 
the work characterised by the alluring presence of perceived risk, the seductive 
pleasures of thrill and disorientation and attempts to ensure that these are not only 
experienced, but maximised. Audiences, then, are immersed in the aesthetic world of 
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Sleep No More, but an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre 
seems to involve much more than this. It seems to involve a very close relationship 
between a politically charged privileging of participatory modes and the securing of 
surplus aesthetic experiences that add to those inscribed in the immersive 
installations. In short, the aesthetics and politics of audience participation at stake in 
Sleep No More seem to be mutually constitutive.  
The primary task of this thesis is to deal with what this might mean for 
immersive theatre as a theatre style. Does something comparable take place in other 
immersive theatre performances? If so, what implications emerge for an 
understanding of the aesthetics and politics of audience participation in immersive 
theatre?  
The exchange of strategies of participation documented on superfan blogs 
like Scorched the Snake also raise a number of other questions about the kind of 
audience participation promoted in this kind of work. What does it mean for a 
participant to participate better in immersive theatre and how else might this 
bettering be established? Listings on Scorched the Snake suggest that participation is 
something to be learned and rehearsed and that such entrepreneurial endeavour 
procures rewards. With this in mind, just how freeing is it to make audiences a 
participatory offer? If participation is revealed to privilege a particular kind of 
participant, then who gets left behind?  
Cobb’s discussion of Sleep No More, both on his blog and through the email 
interview recounted here, alongside my introductory observations about the 
performance, provides a point of departure to start thinking about audience 
participation in immersive theatre. If this commentary is read at face value, then 
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immersive theatre productions like Sleep No More can be seen to privilege a 
participant predisposed toward entrepreneurialism, risk-taking and enjoying the 
affective thrills of participation. In such a framework, participatory experience, as a 
skill, is rewarded with aesthetic experience, as a source of pleasure, intrigue, or 
challenge. But in what ways might this observation be applied to and evaluated 
against immersive theatre productions more generally? I am interested in how affect 
production and risk perception, in particular, might usefully be treated as deeply 
political mechanisms of power, as well as central aesthetic characteristics of 
audience participation in immersive theatre. Treated as such, immersive theatre 
might be revealed as demanding a participant that is either predisposed towards risk-
laden participatory opportunities and their affective rewards, or willing to strive to be 
that kind of participant. But is it right to think about immersive theatre in these 
terms? How might affect production and risk perception function as mechanisms of 
power? What is a mechanism of power in immersive theatre and why is this relevant 
for a politics of participation? In what ways might affect and risk allure and engage 
audiences? Which audiences? And is immersive theatre alone in promoting such 
forms of engagement?  
 
What is Immersive Theatre? 
Immersive theatre, as a term referring to a distinct theatre style, emerged in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century following the emergence of Punchdrunk in 2000. 
It was not addressed in theatre studies scholarship until 2008, to the best of my 
knowledge, following the publication of Sophie Nield’s short article, ‘The Rise of 
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the Character Named Spectator’.3 Immersive theatre refers to a style of theatre that 
surrounds audiences within a coherent theatre aesthetic, usually sharing that space 
with at least one actor. Nicola Shaughnessy suggests that immersive theatre ‘refers to 
theatre and performance events that are all-encompassing, that submerge the 
spectator in an experiential environment where conventional boundaries between 
fiction and reality, performer and spectator are destabilized’ (188). Such experiential 
environments, I suggest, might make use of mise en scène, lighting, sound and music 
(occasionally through headphones), smell, tactility, the deprivation of sight, or the 
integration of consumable substances, such as food and alcoholic drinks. As such, 
immersive theatre tends to be multi-sensory. Audiences are frequently, but not 
always free to move or interact within an immersive environment and tend to be 
framed either as a character within the performance, or, by virtue of their freedom to 
move or interact in aesthetic space, as a heightened form of themselves. Demands 
might also be made of them during the performance by performers, or by other 
audience members. These demands might include dialogue, the performance of tasks 
or challenges, or intimate interaction.  
In immersive theatre, audiences usually end up as both receivers and 
producers and it seems to me that this rendering is an important and defining feature 
of its aesthetics of participation, as well as its politics. By this, I mean that 
participating audiences observe and experience the performance, as well as 
contribute to the creation of it – an important basis for the term ‘productive 
participants’ that forms the title of this thesis – although the degree of 
                                                 
3
 Baz Kershaw offers an early application of immersion to performance in The Radical in 
Performance, looking in particular at the Living Theatre (195-99). However, his concern is not so 
much with identifying an immersive theatre aesthetic, as defined in this thesis, as it is in studying 
audience participation’s immersive qualities. Furthermore, conceptual distinctions from Virtual 
Reality performance, occasionally referred to in terms of audience immersion, will be offered below. 
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efficaciousness arising from that creation may be fairly minor. This is meant not just 
in the sense of an artwork being ‘open’ (Eco, The Open Work), or through 
announcing the death of an authorial subject behind the artwork (Barthes, ‘Death of 
the Author’), but in the sense of audiences co-producing whatever it is that ends up 
being received. It is not just about treating acts of reception as being creative or 
productive, so much as regarding productive acts – such as interaction, or free 
roaming – as potentially generating material to be received by both individual 
participants and the performers and broader audience present.  
 Another important feature of immersive theatre is its tendency to aestheticise 
experience. The audience experience, particularly affective and risky experience, 
will be treated in this thesis as being integral to the immersive theatre event, to the 
point of defining a major part of what it is that ends up being received by 
participating audiences. There is something both introspective and projective about 
audience participation in immersive theatre: introspective, because aesthetic 
attention is turned inwards towards affective experience and projective, because 
attention is also turned outwards towards an immersive environment and the fruits of 
one’s own participatory labour within it. I like to think of this double-edged feature 
as being fundamentally narcissistic, as in both its introspective and projective forms 
the participating audience is receiving something that exists within or emerges from 
them. This will develop into a key idea of this thesis, manifesting in a neologism of 
my own: narcissistic participation. This model of participation will be detailed and 
examined in chapter one, but explored throughout.  
It should be noted here that the aestheticisation of experience, as an 
experience drawn out of productive subjects and tied into aesthetic objects, has 
already been touched upon by Michael Fried, albeit in different terms and from 
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another context. Immersive theatre shares the same ‘theatrical literalness’ that Fried 
notoriously affiliates with minimalist sculpture, or what he calls ‘literalist art’: 
‘[l]iteralist sensibility is theatrical because, to begin with, it is concerned with the 
actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters literalist work. [...] 
[Following the minimalist artist Robert Morris], the experience of literalist art is of 
an object in a situation – one that, virtually by definition, includes the beholder’ 
(125, original emphasis). Likewise, in immersive theatre you have no choice but to 
participate once you enter the performance space; even walking out establishes its 
own participatory act of rejection. But the crux defining this determined participation 
is, I believe, experience.  
Fried defines the encounter with literalist sculpture in terms of extortion 
(127). Immersive theatre can also be seen to extort participation, for the participant is 
drawn into the theatre event and this drawing in, as I hope to demonstrate, is 
achieved through the production of experience within an environment far more akin 
to literalist sculpture than theatre auditoria, maximising the degree of productive 
participation. I will be arguing that the pursuit of experiences among participating 
audiences, which might be hedonic, challenging, erotic or otherwise affectively 
engaging, might reveal something about immersive theatre’s aesthetics of 
participation. If particular experiences can be produced, then in what ways might 
audiences be seen to submit to participation and forfeit at least a degree of personal 
autonomy? What political implications emerge from considering participation as 
something submitted to? And is the participating subject really just an aesthetic 
medium, or is there something more individual, more personal, about this aesthetics?  
Key terms such as ‘submission’ and ‘autonomy’ call to mind an important 
issue in contemporary theatre studies and fine art discourse, as well as political 
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philosophy. The fact that audiences tend to be free to move or interact in some way 
is an important one, for it brings into play themes such as choice, responsibility and 
activity, all of which might contribute to a politics of some kind. But it would be a 
mistake to equate freedom of movement to empowerment, just as it would be a 
mistake to equate diminished movement with disempowerment. Participatory 
agency, particularly in relation to so-called ‘active’ (moving and interacting) and 
‘passive’ (seated) audiences – troublesome terms indeed – has emerged in political 
philosophy and fine art and theatre discourse as a point of dispute, especially in the 
light of claims proposed by Jacques Rancière, Claire Bishop, Grant Kester, Shannon 
Jackson, Helen Freshwater, Baz Kershaw and others. As Rancière influentially 
asserts in ‘The Emancipated Spectator’, the opposition between viewing and acting 
fails to hold ‘once we understand that viewing is also an action’, for the spectator 
‘participates in the performance by refashioning it in her own way’ (13). In short, it 
has become unfashionable to align sedentary spectatorship with passivity, just as it is 
regularly rehearsed that spectatorship is an implicitly participatory activity (Bennett, 
S. 206; Freshwater 17; Fischer-Lichte 50; Bayly 42). But it seems to me that there is 
more to say about audience participation in immersive theatre, especially with regard 
to the particular breeds of participation that are asked of audiences. 
With the concession acknowledged that watching theatre is implicitly 
participatory, it is perhaps worth remembering also that different kinds of 
participation are likely to procure different aesthetics and politics of participation. 
This thesis looks at audience participation in immersive theatre. Acts of participation 
will not be assumed to be emancipatory: quite the contrary. Rather, by examining 
particular immersive theatre performances, the invitation to participate will be 
considered as being potentially exclusionary. This can be seen to echo a concern of 
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Bishop’s, who suggests that ‘[i]t is no longer enough to say that activating the viewer 
tout court’ is subversive in and of itself, or that it enables co-authorship in an 
inherently positive way (‘Antagonism’ 78). However, I intend to approach this 
concern from a different perspective, by challenging the participatory demand on 
grounds of exclusion and inequality. This is not to reduce or equate politics with 
ethics – a reduction or equation that both Bishop and Rancière are especially wary of 
– but it is to emphasise how capacities, dispositions and privileging, as potential 
sources of unequal participatory opportunity, might affect an identification, analysis 
and evaluation of politics. It is worth calibrating agency: how is power distributed, 
not just between performers and audiences in immersive theatre, but also among 
audience members? And what are the political implications of experience production 
being nested at the centre of an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive 
theatre? 
The definition of immersive theatre offered in this section, alongside these 
introductory thoughts on participating within it, will be explored by analysing and 
evaluating several immersive theatre performances and events performed or curated 
in the UK by British, or UK-based artists and companies primarily, but not 
exclusively, over the three year course of my PhD research: Ray Lee’s Cold Storage 
(2011) (chapter one); Lundahl & Seitl’s Rotating in a Room of Images (2011) 
(chapter two); Punchdrunk’s The Masque of the Red Death (2007-08) and The Black 
Diamond (2011) (chapter three); the performances and curation of Shunt (chapter 
four); and Theatre Delicatessen’s curation of immersive theatre performances at 
Theatre Souk (2010) and the Bush Bazaar (2012) (chapter five). This selection is the 
consequence of my own exposure to these performances and events and is a response 
to the key role that British institutions and theatre companies seem to be playing in 
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the promotion and development of immersive theatre. The British focus includes 
Lundahl & Seitl, who are Swedish born, but based in London.  
An aesthetics and politics of audience participation will be addressed in each 
chapter, but the thesis is split into three parts. This enables an examination of 
audience participation from three different, but related perspectives, each with 
different emphases and depths of engagement, cumulatively working towards an 
uttering of aesthetics and politics in the same breath. Part one will look at an 
aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre, establishing why both 
affect (chapter one) and risk (chapter two) might be of relevance when analysing 
audience participation in immersive theatre and how both might exert influence over 
an audience’s capacity to act, in relation to their being acted upon. Both these 
chapters will engage with how aesthetic experience ends up being produced in 
immersive theatre, elaborating the definition just offered and introducing some 
political implications surrounding experience production in performance. Part two 
looks much more explicitly at a politics of audience participation in immersive 
theatre. Part two shifts critical focus away from the isolated theatre event and 
towards political contexts that either directly impact on, or inform, how such an 
event might be critically addressed. In part two, I consider first of all how the 
participatory values emerging from audience participation in Punchdrunk’s work 
align with those of the neoliberal ethos (chapter three). I then look at how an 
aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre might align with the 
‘experience economy’, where experience production is identified as a contemporary 
genre of economic output (chapter four). In both cases, the observations made in part 
one are re-evaluated in directly political terms. Part three considers aesthetics and 
politics together, drawing on, but departing from, the philosophy of Rancière. Part 
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three identifies how the production of experience among participating audiences, 
particularly affective experience, might reveal otherwise inchoate structures of 
manipulation and control, particularly as they relate to an audience’s participatory 
expectations or anticipations (chapter five and the conclusion). Part three synergises 
the preceding two parts and puts forward the primary argument of this thesis: that a 
politics of audience participation in immersive theatre is fundamentally tied into its 
aesthetics.  
Before concluding this section of the introduction, it may be useful to offer 
one final comment on the choice of case studies. Cold Storage, Rotating in a Room 
of Images and many of the performances on offer at Theatre Souk and the Bush 
Bazaar were one-on-one theatre performances, otherwise referred to as one to one 
performance, one to one encounter, 1:1s, individual performance, or performance for 
an audience of one. My preference for the term ‘one-on-one’ arises from an element 
of confrontation between performer(s) and audience that I see as an implicit, if latent 
element of the participatory encounter. As my account of Sleep No More suggests, 
immersive theatre may integrate one-on-one theatre performances – henceforth one-
on-one performance – within a theatre event involving many audience members. 
However, even outside the context of immersive theatre performances for larger 
audiences, one-on-one performance fits under the immersive theatre umbrella: 
audiences tend to be surrounded by an aesthetic, even if the coherence of that 
aesthetic is punctured by an uncontrolled environment, such as an outside space; 
they are often free to move within, or interact with the work; experience is frequently 
multi-sensory; audiences are often cast as something other than an audience, even if 
that something other is an idealised form of self; and, significantly, one-on-one 
performance tends to be premised on the production of experiences, especially 
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intimate experiences. As noted in my remarks above, this aligns with how I define 
immersive theatre. As such, it seems justifiable to consider one-on-one performances 
that ally with this definition as constituting immersive theatre. What is more, one-on-
one performance pares down the theatre encounter to a simple configuration. While 
there may well be more than one performer, the onus tends to be on the relationships 
that take place between one performer and one audience member at a time. In the 
case of Cold Storage, the audience, for the most part, is completely alone. This 
simplification of the theatrical scenario affords an opportunity to establish more 
clearly some important qualities of experiencing immersive theatre practise. I will be 
considering how these qualities are affected by the presence of other performers and 
audience members in chapter three, especially. However, even there the notion of an 
audience-as-community will not pull focus, so much as a profoundly individualistic 
mode of experiencing theatre, despite a shared space. 
The remainder of this introduction is split into four sections. The next section 
addresses how my definition of immersive theatre and participation within it 
intervenes in the context of relevant theatre and performance studies discourse. The 
section after that defines the key terms of the thesis and outlines how those terms 
will be theorised and applied. This is followed by a brief section on methodology, 
concluding with a more detailed map of the thesis. 
 
Positioning Participation 
The trouble with a neologism like ‘immersive theatre’ is conceptual slipperiness. 
Neologisms invite qualification regarding their need. Is immersive theatre really all 
that different from site-specific/-sympathetic/-generic performance? Does it stand 
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apart from promenade theatre? Perhaps not: immersive theatre may or may not be 
promenade and it may or may not relate to site in any number of different ways. The 
definition of immersive theatre offered above is broad in both respects. But as far as 
audience participation within aesthetic space goes, it will help to pin down why the 
term ‘immersive theatre’ – and the definition just offered – might be useful, or 
appropriate. If the term is to be granted credence, the first thing to establish is what it 
is, exactly, that audiences are immersed within.  
 
Drowning Audiences 
A ball floats in a swimming pool on a windy day. Water surrounds the ball and as 
gusts of wind ripple the surface of the pool, the ball becomes intermittently 
submerged, bobbing beneath and on top of the water’s surface. The ball is mobile. It 
is not of the pool, but it is in the pool and it affects, however minutely, the sloshing 
about of the water. Gareth White thinks about audience immersion in immersive 
theatre in just this sort of way, where the metaphorical nature of the term 
‘immersive’ retains a likeness to something like the ball I have just described; it 
implies that ‘we move within the artwork, intimately close to it, but still distinct 
from it. To be immersed is to be surrounded, enveloped and potentially annihilated, 
but it also is to be separate from that which immerses’ (228). The ball, like the 
audience, is not reducible to the immersive world in which it finds itself. This is 
where the immersive metaphor falls apart, for White, as it implies a subject-object 
divide (228). The audience, unlike the ball, holds a vital clue for him as to where 
immersion takes place; it takes place within the audience. As he remarks: ‘the 
spectator is not inside the work [...], but the work is inside the spectator’ (228).  
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It is this observation that prompts White to describe the immersive metaphor 
as a ‘faulty term to describe the phenomena it currently designates’, as it does not 
create ‘either fictional or imaginative interiors in a way that is different in kind than 
in more conventionally structured audience arrangements’ (233). W. B. Worthen 
also articulates points of comparison and similarity between an immersive 
epistemology and a more conventional view of dramatic performance (83), noting 
especially immersive theatre’s capacity for replicating fourth-wall realism (94-95). 
But if the term is faulty, as these authors suggest, then how else might we describe 
this style of theatre that fully surrounds audiences within aesthetic space? 
Where ‘experiential theatre’ has been used by UK scholars as an alternative 
to ‘immersive theatre’ (Adams), the ‘theatre of experience’ has emerged in the 
Flanders context as a means of describing experience-driven theatre styles that might 
otherwise be dubbed immersive theatre (Groot Nibbelink 416). Both terms certainly 
allude much more directly to the experience-centred aesthetics of participation in 
immersive theatre, but they also beg a question: what theatre is not a theatre of 
experience? What is more, music festivals, raves, the circus and countless other 
cultural forms might be considered, on this basis, as being immersive theatres of 
experience: spaces of cultural performance that provide coherent spaces that 
surround audiences and participants that are aesthetically set apart from the 
everyday. Indeed, Nicholas McInerny considers the giddy participatory celebrations 
of the Burning Man Festival in Nevada as a ‘template’ for considering immersive 
theatre and the demands it makes of audiences (246). What needs to be established, 
if the need for a neologism is to be accepted, is what makes immersive theatre 
qualitatively different from its cultural counterparts. 
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 I agree with White, to a certain extent. Audiences do not drown in immersive 
environments, breathing in an elusive immersive substance so that they end up fully 
subsumed. Nonetheless, I would add an important qualification; humans affect their 
environments in ways that a ball does not. The details of this claim will be reserved 
for the following chapter; suffice to say that audiences are able to both creatively 
perceive an immersive environment, as well as project out into it, subsequently 
perceiving the fruits of their own participatory labour. Books can be moved, cheeks 
kissed, dances danced and routes explored. Audiences have the capacity to affect an 
immersive environment and people within it, albeit a capacity that may be limited 
and reliant on disposition. Perhaps the notion of theatre’s inherent eventfulness 
makes something like this assertion applicable to all theatre, as, indeed, others have 
argued.
4
 But the aesthetic onus on experience production in immersive theatre seems 
to at least be amplified in a way that it is not in many other theatre forms and this 
amplification, I believe, impacts on the potential relevance of a clearly defined 
notion of immersion. This is where narcissism, as a model of audience participation 
and a critical concept, will be deployed most fruitfully in this thesis; on the knife 
edge between introspection and projection, an environment can be said to immerse 
audiences insofar as they become productive participants who mediate an 
environment, via perception, that they are also able to alter, however minutely. This 
does not detract from White’s observation that a subject-object divide persists in the 
‘immersive’ term, but it does qualify that observation with a defence of ‘immersive 
theatre’ as appropriate terminology. The term describes highly active acts of 
productivity, projecting participatory endeavour out into a space, as well as creative 
perception, practised by participating audiences who immerse themselves within an 
                                                 
4
 See especially Erika Fischer-Lichte’s theorisations of autopoiesis and feedback loops between 
audiences and performers in The Transformative Power of Performance (38, 50, 165). 
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aesthetic environment that surrounds them completely. This does not tend to happen 
in theatre auditoria, where the two emphasised parts of this claim fail to integrate. 
 
Playing Audiences 
What does it mean to practise highly active acts of productive participation? This 
notion of practising being an audience member may call to mind Erving Goffman’s 
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, particularly with regards to the 
presentation of oneself in a coherent cultural habitat. Roles might be played in 
immersive theatre, just as they might be outside of an immersive theatre 
environment. So might aspects of oneself be selected for presentation over and above 
others. However, in immersive theatre, an awareness of being offered either a clear 
or ambiguous role, even if that role is the role of a performing audience, seems 
considerably stronger. When a discrepancy occurs between interpellation and 
identification in immersive theatre, the results can be confusing and chaotic. In ‘The 
Rise of the Character Named Spectator’, Nield reflects on her personal dissuasion 
from attending immersive theatre given the embarrassment it tends to provoke once a 
participatory offer is made. Re-formulated in the terms of this thesis, she is 
describing the centrality of affect. Not only that but, drawing on Nicholas Ridout, 
she describes this centrality as generating ‘an uncomfortable sense of our own 
inappropriate presence’ (533; cf Ridout 72-73). In defining immersive theatre, I was 
clear to point out how it often casts audiences, even if that casting is an idealised 
form of self. Using audience accounts of Punchdrunk’s Faust (2006) and The 
Masque of the Red Death, Nield looks at how audiences tend to be cast as a 
generically defined Spectator: an ambiguous presence, masked and cloaked, that is at 
33 
 
once an audience and a role played within an immersive world. It is this ambiguity 
that produces, for Nield, drawing on Ridout, an audience’s sense of their own 
inappropriate presence. Those masks hanging on the wall at Ovest Pizzoteca were 
immediately identifiable as Punchdrunk masks. They were traces of the performance 
happening further along West 27
th
 Street and testament to a temporarily inhabited 
character, defined both anonymously and generically. These masks partly unify an 
audience by replacing distinguishing facial features with uniform indices of Sleep No 
More. This does not eradicate the individuality of each spectator, but it does present 
audiences with a generically defined identity as it appears, visually, to others.  
The architectural presence of the hanging masks at the pizzeria are also 
suggestive of how this visual apparatus might be aesthetically characterised. For 
Josephine Machon, who is fast becoming an authority on immersive theatre, 
spectators of Punchdrunk performances choreograph themselves ‘into beautiful 
carnivalesque sculptures. These masked, still bodies looking on, literally become 
part of the architecture’ (‘Space and the Senses’ n.p.). Immersive theatre aspires to 
mark boundaries between the world of the theatre event and the world outside of it. 
However, by virtue of the audience’s being there, these boundaries are rarely fully 
formed (cf Mervant-Roux, ‘The Great Resonator’). As with Nield, Machon 
recognises how audience members are not just audience members, but are at least 
partially inscribed as a part of the world of the performance. Of course, short of 
drowning the audience, the important word in this claim is ‘partially’. However, 
from this, it is possible to propose that audiences of immersive theatre are something 
at once akin to participant, individual, individual-as-spectator, individual-as-(part 
of)-audience and Machon’s ‘architecture’. But these observing co-creators are more 
like an active architecture: a thinking, feeling, moving architecture. In light of this, 
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Nield’s concern about the ambiguous positioning of immersive theatre audiences 
seems justified; the roles of the audience tend to be both numerous and complex.  
When performers directly ask from their audience a contribution of some 
kind, participants are confronted by the challenge of recognising who it is that they 
are meant to be: an audience, a character, or an audience playing a character. As 
Nield writes, ‘we appear on the outside, facing the theatre, as a theatrical character, 
the character named Spectator, coherently in and of the theatrical world. But we do 
not necessarily appear so to ourselves’ (535). Facing theatre as a character imposed 
by a performance, a character that may be only loosely defined, can produce 
embarrassment, exposure and vulnerability, particularly when handled in such a way 
that the offer to participate is unclear. At the same time, participating in immersive 
theatre can also be challenging, empowering and rewarding. These ideas will 
repeatedly emerge in the chapters that follow. The point to be taken for the time 
being is this: immersive theatre may never be able to fully sever its spaces from the 
outside world; most of the time, however, it aspires to do so. In this aspiration, a 
space is shared between actors and audiences who are cast within and are frequently 
treated as being part of a theatrical world either by live performers, or by a designer 
that anticipates the audience’s being there. This casting may be a role, but it might 
just as well be a kind of hyper-self, an individual performing his or her own identity. 
And this casting might render the audience vulnerable, particularly once we ask who 
else might have a vested interest in the parts to be played. What happens, for 
instance, when immersive theatre is utilised to market a product? Who does the 
audience then become? In responding to these questions, it is worth asking how a 
participatory aesthetics might be co-opted and what political implications this co-
optation might have for participating audiences.  
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Entrepreneurial Audiences 
Audiences do not drown in immersive theatre, but they do immerse themselves. 
Audiences may also play a role in immersive theatre, but they might just as well play 
a heightened form of themselves. Both these claims rely on a more fundamental 
hypothesis that immersive theatre audiences are productive audiences, producing in 
excess of creative perception. Establishing the basis of this hypothesis will provide 
one corner stone from which a study of an aesthetics and politics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre might stem.  
The incessant return of Cobb and his fellow superfans to Sleep No More 
betrays an addiction, or at least an absorbing fascination with the performance. I 
wonder whether this might have something to do with the potential capacity to be 
master of one’s own actions within a coherent world that at the same time stands 
paradoxically astride an escapist sacrifice of autonomy: a mastery based on 
practising risk, but potentially rewarded with stimulating experiences. Analogies 
might well be drawn here with pipes, pills and powders, where risky acts of 
consumption might be reciprocated with a pleasurable or challenging shunting of the 
perceptive faculties away from daily experiences and towards the aesthetically 
distinct.  
Within the aesthetic spaces of immersive theatre events like Sleep No More, a 
participatory aesthetics emerges that draws on both affect production and risk 
perception: two elements of an experience-driven aesthetic form. I propose that one 
of the reasons why the production of affect can be so strong in immersive theatre is 
because of the audience’s rendering as a potential producing receiver, or productive 
participant. Being confronted by the possibility of creation, particularly in the 
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presence of others, can be either intensely exciting or crushing: what if I do 
something wrong? When am I meant to participate and how? What if I come across 
to others as too reserved, or too keen? The notion of and desire for ‘bettering’ 
participation makes sense in the light of these concerns. For David Jubb, artistic 
director of the Battersea Arts Centre (BAC: a leading London immersive theatre 
venue), these kinds of concern are of paramount significance. For Jubb, the higher 
the perceived risk for audiences, the more brilliant artists need to be in navigating the 
relationship between chaos and order, care and trust; it is up to the artists to be clear 
on participatory protocols (personal interview). But, I believe, audiences are also 
encouraged to take risks, to be outgoing, to accept participatory offers and to take it 
upon themselves to be the kind of participant they are asked to be.  
I suggest that where these inputs are present in immersive theatre, audiences 
are encouraged to be entrepreneurial. This is what leads me to introduce a second 
model of participation that will be explored in most detail in chapter three: 
entrepreneurial participation. An aesthetics of audience participation in immersive 
theatre might involve not just narcissism, but entrepreneurialism as well. 
Approached in tandem, this aesthetics is then revealed to be profoundly political. 
Provided the entrepreneurial capacity is exercised, audiences might enjoy a more 
fulsome aesthetic experience – but this provision is contingent either on disposition 
or aspiration and that, consequently, involves exclusivity.  
Entrepreneurialism is clearly not for everyone. The sense of the audience’s 
own inappropriate presence results, for Nield, in ‘awaking to the actor’s nightmare of 
being on the stage, and not knowing the play’ (535). This sense of one’s own 
inappropriate presence might also transfer to entrepreneurial participation. And 
entrepreneurial participation might also feed into how affect is produced among 
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participating audiences in immersive theatre. This production, then, is partly about 
protocol: of knowing how to participate and of being rehearsed enough so that the 
actor’s nightmare remains at a distance, allowing for the generation of affects arising 
from self-made opportunity; or of aiming to bring it closer, as an edgy and affective 
thrill. But it is also about being attentive to an event unfolding in the presence of 
others, as both observer and the observed.
5
  
 
Exclusions 
To sum up: this thesis intends on positioning audience participation in immersive 
theatre by focusing on experience production among audiences as a fundamental 
aspect of its aesthetics, particularly as it manifests in affect production and risk 
perception. This fundamental aspect will also be approached as tying into a politics 
of participation in immersive theatre, insofar as a participatory mode might be 
privileged, at an aesthetic level, which partly determines how aesthetic experiences 
are to be engaged with and secured. In positioning participation, it now remains to 
clarify what will not fall within the remit of this thesis.  
Applied theatre, community theatre and forum theatre are relevant for study 
of audience participation, but less relevant to the specific study of immersive theatre. 
These practises have a different kind of aesthetics, politics and ethics at their heart 
that must be alert to the demands of place and context and the sensitivities of 
participants. Content tends to be explicitly political and elicitation of audience 
involvement, at least in its idealised form, fundamentally concerned with ethical 
                                                 
5
 Kershaw describes something comparable to this proposition as the ‘paradox of performance’: ‘one 
is, often simultaneously, subject and object, active and passive, performer and spectator’ (191). I 
perhaps digress from Kershaw in believing that such simultaneities are as likely to occur within 
theatre buildings as outside of them. 
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engagement. In contrast, as I hope to demonstrate most explicitly in part two, 
immersive theatre is susceptible to corporate and commercial ventures. It is a highly 
marketable style of theatre. The same degree of marketability is considerably less 
likely for applied, community or forum theatre settings. Secondly, while the 
demands of place and context and the sensitivities of participants may well be the 
concern of immersive theatre makers, immersive theatre performances tend to be 
oriented much more towards aesthetic coherence and the production of experience 
and away from ethical interaction and education, at least in such an explicit fashion. 
Bishop persuasively argues that the ‘social task’ of socially engaged art often takes 
precedence over ‘equally important artistic gestures’, thus constructing an opposition 
between ethical working practises and aesthetic concerns in constructing an artwork 
(Artificial Hells 13, original emphasis). Applying this observation to the current 
discussion, we might also assert that for applied, community and forum theatre, 
broadly speaking, the social task of theatre tends to take precedence over aesthetic 
considerations, with the possible exception in recent discourse advocating an ‘end of 
effect’ in applied practises (Thompson 5-6, 34). For immersive theatre, however, the 
artistic gesture tends to come first, epitomised in the production of hedonic or 
challenging aesthetic experiences. Finally, content is rarely political in quite the 
same way for immersive theatre as it is with these other practises, which is not to say 
that the work itself is not political. Although making work politically may not be a 
stated aim of most of the immersive theatre makers considered in this thesis, there 
remains scope to recognise and theorise participation as being acutely political in the 
work they produce as a consequence of whatever aesthetic order is put into play. The 
aesthetics and politics of participation explored may well have some relevance for 
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applied, community and forum theatre settings, but is only considered here as a 
possible area for future research.  
 With this in mind, it also proves useful to distinguish socially engaged art 
and relational art from immersive theatre. Nicolas Bourriaud uses the term 
‘relational’ not to link artists by ‘style, theme, or iconography’, but instead to refer to 
a shared ‘practical and theoretical horizon: the sphere of inter-human relations’ (43). 
This broad definition might suffice for socially engaged art as well, provided we 
understand that the latter tends to place greater onus on provoking ‘reflection on the 
contingent systems that support the management of life’ (Jackson 28). Interactivity 
tends to be central to both and both tend to aspire towards political idealism. 
However, the frequent prioritisation of the ethical over the aesthetic in socially 
engaged art again marks it out as being distinct from immersive theatre, for the 
idealisation of transparent social relations frequently bars the capacity for immersion 
to arise. This is an interesting point, as immersive theatre is certainly capable of 
working with this kind of idealisation. In fact, in chapter five, I make the point that 
both Theatre Souk and the Bush Bazaar do precisely this – but only at the expense of 
troubling immersion. So socially engaged art has the potential to be a close ally of 
immersive theatre, but nonetheless seems aesthetically distinct from it. There are 
also points of crossover between immersive theatre and relational art, but 
interactivity tends to remain enshrined in the latter as a political goal in and of itself 
in a way that it is not, at least so explicitly, or commonly, in most immersive theatre 
performances. Nonetheless, my interest is in how immersive theatre might still 
render political relations apparent, despite immersion, or through affect production. 
This rendering is therefore much less explicit in immersive theatre, or at least much 
harder to pin down. It should be noted that the experience of a participatory aesthetic 
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in immersive theatre tends to take precedence over any overt ethical or political 
intervention, as a clear intention, even if such an intervention might be critically 
examined as emerging from an aesthetics of participation in immersive theatre.  
 It is worth clarifying this point, as it will grow into an important argument in 
part three. To watch and participate within theatre is to be sensitive to registering 
‘something of what determines relations of power’ (Kelleher 43). Whether this be 
through theatrical representation breaking down through some kind of failure 
(Ridout 168), or through the ‘cogs of the machinery’ of theatre continuing to spin 
(Kelleher 43), it is through the very doing of theatre that politics has the potential to 
emerge most clearly within and through an aesthetic order.  
One final range of practises that might be inappropriately confused with the 
immersive theatre practises explored in this thesis are those loosely identified as 
digital performance, or performances set within, or using virtual reality (VR). There 
are justifiable claims for thinking about VR performance in terms of immersion 
(McKenzie 86; Smith et al.; Slater and Usoh; Coomans and Timmermans). However, 
there are starkly contrasting aesthetic considerations between VR performance and 
immersive theatre, as I have defined it, not to mention demands made of 
participating audiences. While comparable notions of escape into other worlds 
certainly exist, they are of a different nature. For VR performance, these worlds 
provide interactive landscapes defined under the rubric of a computer programme; 
for immersive theatre, these worlds are tangible and not subject to the same 
mediation between a human user and digital interface. While immersive theatre 
performances may include some form of digital mediation, such as the audience’s 
wearing of headphones, there are different aesthetics at stake in wholly digital 
environments – different means of generating immersion – and these different means 
41 
 
should mark VR performance and immersive theatre as distinct. As such, while the 
performances explored in part one of this thesis both involve participating audiences 
wearing headphones, the environments that they move, or are contained within, are 
not digital. The relations between a participating audience and these non-digital 
worlds will pull focus in part one, especially with regard to how experiences might 
be aroused through those relations and how audiences can be seen to creatively 
receive non-digital environments, as productive participants.  
In concluding this section, it is important to briefly acknowledge the field of 
audience research. In studying an aesthetics and politics of audience participation, 
my subject of study is, in one, important respect, the audience. Especially since the 
1980s, audience research has grown into a vast discursive field in theatre and 
performance studies, following a number of trends from semiotics, to 
phenomenology, cognitive science and studies of the theatre event. Methodologies 
range from qualitative and quantitative empirical studies, to engagements with the 
material conditions of receiving theatre and social constructionism. I have already 
noted that affect production and risk perception among participating audiences are 
central to experience production in immersive theatre; both inputs, of course, relate 
to the audience’s encounter with performance and might consequently be seen to 
constitute a theoretical branch of audience research. But, I contend, it is the social 
sciences that prove most fruitful in providing appropriate theoretical resources, along 
with a number of theatre and performance scholars who, it seems, would tend to 
agree.  
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Theorising Participation 
Now that an approach to audience participation in immersive theatre has been 
positioned, it remains to map the critical terrain and theoretical horizons of the 
thesis. Near the outset of my PhD research, I set up a series of Google Alerts: 
automated keyword searches that scan the web on a daily basis before dropping 
notifications in your email inbox. Audience participation, affect and immersive 
theatre occasionally bear fruit, but by far and away the big hitters have been risk and 
immersive experience. Risk usually throws up medicinal trials and findings and 
tends not to relate so much to risk perception. Immersive experience, on the other 
hand, frequently betrays a potentially shared aesthetics between immersive theatre, 
other components of the cultural industries and the creative industries: computer 
games consoles that project immersive gaming environments into your room at 
home; home cinema systems; live zombie combat experiences in a dilapidated 
shopping centre or mansion; corporate cocktail parties hosted by 1920s flappers; and, 
if I’m lucky, the odd theatre event. Immersing people: whether it occurs in railway 
arches, warehouses, flagship stores or zombie mansions, immersive experiences 
seem to have entered a growing number of industrial sectors and their persistent 
renewal suggests impact at the levels of both demand and supply.  
 Even as an aesthetic attribute, audience immersion is not peculiar to 
immersive theatre. Immersive theatre shares its participatory aesthetics with other 
industries and this sharing must surely impact on how it is approached, examined 
and evaluated, not least if immersive theatre’s politics of participation is to be 
addressed adequately. In this section, I introduce the importance of establishing 
conceptual and critical shifts across the three parts of this thesis, shifts that might be 
encapsulated in three correlated questions: how might an aesthetics and politics of 
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audience participation in immersive theatre be theorised? What happens to that 
theorisation when we take on board uses of immersion and participation outside of 
the theatre? And where do we go from there? In what follows, the key terms and 
themes of the thesis will be specified and their relevance for an aesthetics and 
politics of audience participation in immersive theatre will be introduced.  
 
Aesthetics and Politics 
In defining immersive theatre, I was clear to point out that it tends to aspire towards 
the formation of coherent aesthetic worlds that fully surround audiences. However, 
this thesis will also come to look for points of aesthetic slippage, rupture and 
frustration in immersive theatre that would seem to place this definition in jeopardy. 
Immersive theatre is a term that remains in infancy. That means it is especially 
malleable. As with any theatre style, there emerge performances that encourage us to 
question the stability of conceptual terrain and canons and immersive theatre is no 
exception. This does not necessarily debunk the right usage of a term like immersive 
theatre, but it does keep those who use the term on their toes.  
Earlier in this introduction, I specified that the kind of aesthetics that this 
thesis engages with refers specifically to aesthetic experience, particularly as it arises 
between a creatively perceiving perceiver and his or her environment: i.e. an 
immersive theatre environment. It remains to define the second key term that appears 
in the subtitle of this thesis: namely, politics. Stefan Collini defines politics as ‘the 
important, inescapable, and difficult attempt to determine relations of power in a 
given space’ (qtd. in Kelleher 3). As Joe Kelleher elucidates, ‘[b]y the phrase 
“relations of power” we might understand that power – or powerlessness – is nothing 
44 
 
in itself and only ever meaningful in terms of the distribution of power across social 
relations, among different groups or classes or interests that make up, however 
momentarily, a social body. It goes without saying that this distribution of power is 
often unequal’ (3). We might tie into this definition how value is attributed to some 
things and qualities and not others within a given social space and how that 
attribution affects who is able to exercise power. What kind of person is valued and 
how does that valuing impact on their capacities, or play to their dispositions, in a 
given space? Politics, then, might be defined as the distribution of power among 
people, or anything that has a stake in those relations of power.  
This thesis culminates in a synergised consideration of aesthetics and politics. 
This decision is significantly influenced by the philosophy of Rancière, who 
forcefully argues that there is an aesthetic core to politics, as well as a politics of 
aesthetics. In Rancière’s approach to aesthetics and politics, the availability, or lack 
of availability, of something to perception and understanding also impacts on one’s 
political capacities. Part three will be looking at Rancière’s writing in detail, before 
moving away from strict adherence to his thought in favour of a more affect-oriented 
conception of the politics of aesthetics. This may seem an odd point in the thesis to 
introduce and explore the work of a thinker who provides an important point of 
departure for thinking about aesthetics and politics together. However, I regard it as 
a necessary delay. It makes sense to define and critique what an aesthetics and 
politics of participation in immersive theatre might look like before their synergies 
are addressed, for without a clear appreciation of what makes them distinct it seems 
likely that an understanding of those synergies will be somewhat cloudy; indeed, it 
makes sense to think about the elements that comprise a synergy before approaching 
how they might complement, or grow out of one another.  
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In the subsections that follow, approaches to both aesthetics and politics will 
be considered as they relate to the key themes of the thesis. These subsections mirror 
the order in which they will appear in the chapters that follow. The intention is to 
signal at this stage how these themes build on one another, gradually mapping a 
means of approaching audience participation in immersive theatre that attends to the 
details as a gateway into a fuller, more comprehensive appreciation of aesthetics and 
politics in immersive theatre.  
 
Affect  
Affect moves audiences and it is intensely political. Theorising affect production in 
immersive theatre means thinking through an audience’s capacity to control, in 
relation to their being controlled; it means thinking about the capacities of audiences, 
as well as their dispositions; and it means constructing critical space to help theorise 
autonomy. First and foremost, however, it means thinking about how aesthetic space 
triggers, or plays into affect production.  
Chapter one deals with defining affect in detail, where important distinctions 
will be made between affect and emotion, alongside crucial discursive positioning 
among a wide range of scholarly approaches to affect. For now, though, it need only 
be suggested that affect arises from a number of inputs, including, but not limited to, 
biological, cultural, psychological and sociological inputs, as well as memory. Affect 
refers to responses and movements toward, or away from something, or someone. 
Those responses and movements, which are relational – i.e. they imply some kind of 
link between at least one subject and one object, or another subject – involve an 
orchestration of cognitive and bodily responses. Borrowing from Sara Ahmed, affect 
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will be viewed in this thesis as a kind of testimony to the interrelationship of the 
social and the personal, relating as much to being acted upon as being driven to act. 
Brief reflections on bodily and cognitive approaches to affect will prove useful, but 
an address of affect’s social inputs will take critical precedence. I will be focusing 
especially on affect as it relates to risk perception in immersive theatre and the key 
questions underlying my enquiry into affect production ask: how might affect 
impact, politically, on a participant’s thought, behaviour and feeling? How does 
affect relate to aesthetics? And how might affect reveal something about the 
relationships between aesthetics and politics in immersive theatre? 
Machon introduces ‘(syn)aesthetics’ as a term indicating both a performance 
style and a critical approach to performance, with particular regard to the audience 
experience.
6
 She uses the term as a means of approaching the ineffable as it 
manifests for audiences in performance. Usefully, for present purposes, she includes 
what might now be called immersive theatre within the remit of her study. For 
Machon, experience production frequently and paradoxically involves an 
inarticulable but meaningful bodily experience that simultaneously eludes and 
demands a cognitive appraisal. She describes (syn)aesthetic performance as a 
visceral performance style loosely premised on ‘the recreation of visceral 
experience’ aroused in audiences, an arousal that ‘places emphasis on the human 
body as a primary force of signification’ ((Syn)Aesthetics 1). As Rachel Fensham 
rightly suggests, watching theatre per se is an embodied activity and this 
embodiment implies a visceral engagement with theatre (To Watch Theatre 11). But 
                                                 
6
 There is some productive cross-over between Machon’s notion of (syn)aesthetics, as it applies to a 
mode of encounter, and film theorist Vivian Sobchack’s notion of the ‘cinesthetic subject’: ‘the 
cinesthetic subject both touches and is touched by the screen, able to commute seeing to touching and 
back again without a thought and through sensual and cross-modal activity able to experience the 
movie as both here and there rather than clearly locating the site of that cinematic experience as “on-
screen” or “off-screen”’ (qtd. in Wik 38, original emphasis). 
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to say that all theatre is premised on the ‘recreation of visceral experience’ is not the 
same as saying that all theatre might induce it. What is more, there may well be 
contrasting means of inducing such experience, depending on the theatre style, as 
well as contrasting forms of experience. 
What Machon encourages is an acknowledgment of visceral experience – 
read corporeal, or bodily experience – as a valid aesthetic zone. And this 
encouragement arises from an acknowledgment of how bodies, especially what takes 
place within them, engage with, or are engaged by, performance. In this respect, 
Machon’s approach to aesthetics draws near to what Hans-Thies Lehmann has 
influentially called ‘postdramatic theatre’: ‘a theatre that feels bound to operate 
beyond drama’, without dismissing dramatic heritage (27). In Punchdrunk’s work, 
for instance, backs are not turned on the dramatic text; rather, to take Sleep No More 
as an example, the narrative text is eliminated in primarily speechless performance, 
but Shakespeare’s Macbeth still provides a point of departure for the creation of an 
aesthetic world that is to be entered into by audiences. Perhaps, as Worthen 
maintains, that world remains cohesive and ultimately dramatic (94-95). But then 
again, as Fensham argues, immersive theatre companies like Punchdrunk invite ‘a 
new kind of spectator, one who participates in the process and meaning of the event, 
or situation’ (‘Postdramatic Spectatorship’ n.p.). The question then is what this 
might mean for an understanding of cohesive dramatic worlds, thus challenging the 
unifying functioning of drama. And an important part of that challenge, I suggest, 
might come from an appreciation of affect production as a contributing party to 
immersive theatre’s aesthetics of audience participation. I support Machon’s view 
that ‘sense (semantic “meaning making”)’ and ‘sense (feeling, both sensation and 
emotion)’ might usefully function as ‘a double edged rendering of making-
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sense/sense-making’ in performance ((Syn)aesthetics 14, original emphasis). In part 
three, adapting work by Rancière, I will be advocating an argument that regards 
making-sense, as understanding, and sense-making, as creative perception, as 
aesthetic characteristics of affect production in immersive theatre, but in a way that 
is fundamentally tied into politics. In other words, I will be working towards an 
argument that sees the experience of affect in immersive theatre as a vitally 
significant political factor that impacts on and, in certain cases, uncomfortably 
reveals how participatory capacities and dispositions are unevenly distributed, 
marking a significant change of emphasis away from Machon’s study of audience 
reception and performance style and towards an examination of a politics of 
participation. This will involve considering how affect operates outside of theatre 
spaces, exploring how affect production in immersive theatre ties into increasingly 
established economic frameworks of experience production.  
 
Risk 
Audience numbers soon grew at staggered intervals after first entering The 
McKittrick Hotel, so I headed to a largely deserted bottom floor. I found a lonesome 
Duncan in a small passageway and followed him into a bedroom where a ticking 
sound was emanating from inside a trunk. He opened the trunk and pulled out a 
metronome. The ticking stopped. He took me into a much larger space: what can 
only be described as a ghostly ballroom, complete with stage and balconies housing 
a grand piano. Duncan stared at me, moved closer, and whispered into my ear 
something I only vaguely remember about the body being a holy temple, perhaps a 
reference to Macduff’s description of Duncan in Shakespeare’s Macbeth on 
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discovering his death: ‘Most sacrilegious murder hath broke ope / The Lord’s 
anointed temple, and stole thence / The life o’th’building’ (II.iii). This moment was 
incredibly intimate and felt rewarding not so much because I had been selected, for 
there was no one else there, but because I had discovered him. But in order for this to 
happen, an initial risk had to be taken not to follow the crowd and to venture forth, 
alone, in the hope of finding something special. Although I knew that the likelihood 
of physical harm was slim to none while we were together, our being alone in the 
deeper recesses of The McKittrick nonetheless felt risky.  
 Exposure, vulnerability, accountability, responsibility, investment, trust and 
affect might all pose risks for participating audiences, provided that distinctions are 
made between the likelihood of physical harm and perceived risk, particularly as it 
relates to affect. The theoretical approaches to risk perception discussed in this thesis 
draw largely on social and cultural studies of risk-taking, as practises, looking 
especially at how such practises end up being idealised or fetishised. But it is 
important to underscore here the subjectivity of risk perception. The psychometric 
paradigm is a psychological branch of risk perception research that ‘encompasses a 
theoretical framework that assumes risk is subjectively defined by individuals who 
may be influenced by a wide array of psychological, social, institutional and cultural 
factors’ (Slovic xxiii). When reading the social and cultural approaches to risk that 
are drawn on in what follows, it is important to keep in mind a theoretical framework 
that makes this important assumption of subjective definition. What this assumption 
opens up is an opportunity to discuss experiences of uncertainty in audience 
participation and how those experiences might affect audiences in deeply political 
ways. Via affect, risk perception can impact on how audiences participate. It can be 
intimidating, just as it can be exhilarating.  
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Distinguishing between risk perception and a more ‘objective’ understanding 
of risk is particularly important in the theatre. It is possible to assert that immersive 
theatre, if it invokes risk at all, invokes the simulacra of risk; after all, more often 
than not, it takes place in a risk-assessed theatre space. Simulacra, following Jean 
Baudrillard, is understood as a wholesale substitution of the signs of the real for the 
real (Simulacra 2). From this perspective, risk is not something produced, or even 
reproduced in aesthetic space, but is something where the signs which render risk 
identifiable, the signs which constitute risk as something meaningful, are wholly 
replaced by an imitation that no longer relates to its origin. There is nothing at risk 
for audiences, according to this point of view, in immersive theatre. However, risk is 
a phenomenon sometimes related to, but distinct from harm (Jaeger et al 171). As 
Gerda Reith notes, risk ‘is defined by and through temporality: the notion of “risk” 
expresses not something that has happened or is happening, but something that might 
happen’ (59, original emphasis). There is a tendency in theatre and performance 
discourse to limit application of risk research to the primarily self-imposed risks of 
artists (Welchman, Aesthetics of Risk; MacDonald, ‘On Risk’). But on the 
understanding of risk just introduced, one must ask: what about the audience?  
In concluding Postdramatic Theatre, Lehmann makes the following 
suggestion: 
it falls to the theatre to deal with extremes of affect by means of an aesthetics 
of risk, extremes which always also contain the possibility of offending by 
breaking taboos. This is given when the spectators are confronted with the 
problem of having to react to what is happening in their presence, that is as 
soon as the safe distance is no longer given, which the aesthetic distance 
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between stage and auditorium seemed to safeguard. (186-87, original 
emphasis) 
In immersive theatre, taboos may very rarely be broken and audiences very rarely 
offended: but they might be bored, frustrated, annoyed and embarrassed, just as they 
might feel elated, joyous, or exhilarated. The collapse of an aesthetic distance 
between stage and auditorium takes place in a very literal way in immersive theatre 
and something like the ‘aesthetics of risk’ that Lehmann touches on can be seen to 
take place once risk perception, as a subjectively defined phenomenon, is identified. 
What is more, if the relationships between affect production and risk perception can 
be properly established, as aesthetic phenomena, then they might also be regarded as 
politically charged. While perhaps not to the same degree as Lehmann hopes for in 
his conclusion, an aesthetics of risk in immersive theatre, as it relates to affect 
production, might still hold the potential to provide an aesthetic rupture that either 
re-orders points of entry into an aesthetic framework, or at least renders a lack of 
perceptual accessibility or cognisance as a potentially politically praiseworthy point 
of frustration. 
 
Neoliberalism 
It was my thinking around risk that helped to foster an interest in the kinds of value 
that many immersive theatre performances seem to herald. Where else might these 
values be seen to operate? In Sleep No More, for instance, risk, entrepreneurialism, 
individualism, personal participatory responsibility and privacy, with audiences 
shielded behind masks, all seem to be valorised. These same attributes also closely 
align with the neoliberal ethos. In brief, neoliberalism is a political theory and 
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economic order that emerged most prominently in the UK and US in the 1980s and 
continues to persist through government policy and in the economy. Neoliberalism 
defends the free market and advocates a shift of responsibility from the shoulders of 
government onto risk-taking and risk-bearing individuals (Harvey, Neoliberalism 2; 
see also Hacker 6; Abbott et al 244; Baker and Simon 3-4). For Louise Owen, in her 
doctoral study of the relationships between theatre making and neoliberalism, ‘the 
objective of neoliberalisation is to institutionalise the global free market economy 
and a form of enterprising, risk-taking and risk-bearing subjectivity as a general 
principle for action’ (323). This objective is typified in the writing of Anthony 
Giddens – a key architect of New Labour ideology – who regards risk as an 
‘energising principle of a society’ (Third Way 63), which ‘is often beneficial both to 
the individual and to the wider society’ (116). An example here would be the 
entrepreneurial banker who supposedly draws money into the country from abroad 
through risky ingenuity on the stock market, as well as the labourer forgoing benefits 
in favour of employment (116). As far as risk is concerned, there will always be 
winners and losers.  
This thesis culminates in an agreement with Lehmann that an aesthetics of 
risk might prove a valuable point of exploration for contemporary (immersive) 
theatre makers. However, in order to make that argument on political grounds, I will 
be reflecting on how risk and other elements of the neoliberal ethos have been put to 
work over the past three decades and at what political costs. In considering how an 
aesthetics of risk, via affect production, might tie into a politics of participation, I 
will be mapping a critical journey in part two that takes us outside of the theatre, into 
the terrain of marketing and political economy, before heading back into the theatre 
again. This return will culminate in an evaluation of how an aesthetics of audience 
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participation might be re-assessed on political terms that are responsive to the 
neoliberal ethos.  
 
Experience Economy 
But what of the live zombie combat experiences and corporate cocktail parties? I 
opened this section with a brief comment on the rising prominence of immersive 
experiences across different industries that potentially challenge the aesthetic purity 
of immersive theatre. Nield rightly suggests that immersive theatre follows in the 
footsteps of experimental museum curators through the 1980s and 1990s who 
‘increasingly positioned the visitor inside an “experience” rather than at an 
exhibition – within a tricked-out space, with props as well as artefacts, perhaps 
infused with smells, sounds, and even containing heritage actors playing Vikings, 
servants or famous people’ (531). This is a useful observation to make, for the 
immersion of audiences within aesthetic space has received insightful attention in 
curation studies (Griffiths, Shivers; Lorentz, ‘Immersive Experience’). I will be 
picking up on this in chapter four when I engage a comparative analysis of the 
London Dungeon, as an immersive pseudo-museum, and the work of Shunt. For 
now, though, it is necessary only to signal where the aesthetic centrality of affect 
production and risk perception in immersive theatre might find their counterparts; it 
seems to me that those counterparts extend throughout the experience economy. 
Immersive theatre’s aesthetics of audience participation is neither pure, nor singular. 
As such, an examination of that aesthetics – especially if the imbrication of 
aesthetics and politics is ultimately to be taken into consideration – ought to pay 
attention to these counterparts, thinking through how the operation of experience 
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production in the experience economy might usefully inform theorisation of 
experience production in immersive theatre.  
It is important to flag existing acknowledgment of how corporate business 
initiatives have become increasingly adept at co-opting theatre and performance 
techniques to help market goods (Wickstrom, Performing Consumers). What this 
alludes to is an awareness that experience sells, an awareness that helped to foster 
recognition of an emerging experience economy in the closing years of the twentieth 
century. The experience economy names a paradigm shift, identified in B. Joseph 
Pine and James Gilmore’s book, the Experience Economy, away from the production 
of goods and services in contemporary economic production and toward the 
production of experiences. This shift has in part been instigated by the global rise of 
neoliberalism. But if it is fair to say that the experience economy is becoming adept 
at utilising theatre and performance, the question then should be: how does this 
impact on theatre and performance? In chapter four, I will be addressing how 
immersive theatre might fit into the experience economy and what implications this 
fitting might have for an aesthetics and politics of audience participation in 
immersive theatre. In other words, I will be questioning the implications of a shared 
aesthetics between immersive theatre and the experience economy, a questioning 
that, ultimately, will lead to a search for points of aesthetic slippage, rupture and 
frustration.  
 
A Methodological Aside 
As far as audience participation in immersive theatre goes, the ‘I’ of the researcher is 
not a dirty word, but a point of departure. As a researching audience member, this ‘I’ 
55 
 
becomes immersed within a world of experience production and if the performance 
is to be adequately analysed, from the inside out, then the limitations of individuality 
must be recognised as limitations, but ultimately used to one’s own advantage. As 
Liesbeth Groot Nibbelink writes of one-on-one theatre: ‘there is only a personal 
insiders’ perspective to depart from and no opportunity to fall back on a shared point 
of reference such as a clear plot or narrative’ (413). This will undoubtedly be 
applicable to my own analyses of one-on-one theatre, but it also seems relevant to an 
address of immersive theatre events with larger audiences. Given its reliance on 
experience production among participating audiences and given the inevitable 
contingency of those experiences, it seems to me that the personal perspective of the 
insider provides the clearest point of reference for the researcher. With this in mind, I 
hope to echo Groot Nibbelink’s suggestion, drawing on Mieke Bal, that a ‘critical 
intimacy’ might be implemented that approaches performance ‘from a position of 
engagement’ (413).7  
Specific case studies will be drawn on in each chapter: performances that I 
have attended as a participating audience. Helen Freshwater proposes that discussion 
of performance drawn from one’s own engagement ought to be nuanced by 
qualitative and quantitative audience research (5-6). But perhaps a political theory of 
participation that directly engages the individual might provide space to theorise that 
politics as malleable. This is about establishing a methodology suited to the peculiar 
demands of a research project. In this case, subscribing to qualitative and 
quantitative audience research might do more to hinder the construction of a 
theoretical approach to performance analysis than aid it. After all, this thesis is not 
about audience response; it is about establishing how participating audiences are 
                                                 
7
 See also Heddon, Iball and Zerihan, who coined the acronym SPaR to signal ‘Spectator-
Participation-as-Research’ (122).  
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figured in the production of aesthetic experiences in immersive theatre and how that 
figuring relates to a politics of participation. This will involve looking at how 
immersive theatre makers invite participation and how participatory modes might 
end up being privileged through that invitation. The focus, then, prioritises an 
examination of participatory protocol and experience production over and above the 
manifold responses which might be elicited from audiences.  
However, this does not bar the potentially insightful mining of personal 
experience as a point of reference for analysing experience production. It seems 
justifiable to make use of anecdote as a means of documenting and illustrating case 
studies, particularly as it can be seen to work with or against the ambitions of the 
artists and producers behind each of the performances addressed in this thesis, 
expressed either in email interviews or personal interviews. While the means of 
experience production might be regarded as being subjectively identified by the 
researcher, the fact remains that these means are open to be identified as such and 
consequently theorised as a contributing party to the establishment of a mutually 
constitutive aesthetics and politics of audience participation. One of the strengths of 
utilising anecdote is the opportunity to ground theory in the materiality of a 
performance event. Anecdote, if used appropriately, has the potential to deter 
abstraction. Departing from a position of engagement and framing discussion by 
documenting that position seems to me a fair and frank means of approaching 
audience participation in immersive theatre, especially when it will be argued that 
individuality is inscribed at the very heart of the audience experience in such work. 
To this end, first-hand descriptions of case studies are considered as a vital part of 
constructing a theoretical approach to performance analysis, especially if the 
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production of experience plays such an important role in an aesthetics and politics of 
audience participation in immersive theatre. 
Special emphasis, then, will be placed on the production of experience 
among participating audiences. This will not entail an explicitly phenomenological 
study of the experience itself, but I will be making reference to my own experience 
of the case studies considered to illustrate how experience might be produced in 
immersive theatre. I will be looking specifically at the means of experience 
production and especially at the dynamics between participating audiences and these 
means. In addressing such dynamics, studies of affect production and risk perception 
will be granted special attention, particularly with theoretical regard to how 
audiences contribute to the production of experiences. The integration of affect 
studies and risk perception research, as part of a theoretical methodology, opens up 
space to analyse and evaluate the means of aesthetic experience production which, in 
this thesis, are understood to include relations between subjects. In other words, a 
primary means of producing experience in immersive theatre will be framed as being 
social, even if that sociality relates to imagined states of affairs or to an objectified 
self. It then becomes necessary to ask how this theoretical methodology might be 
nuanced by a shift in critical attention away from the theatre to the contexts that 
might inform it, such as neoliberalism and the experience economy. To this end, 
theories of political economy and marketing provide a valuable touchstone to help 
consider how an aesthetics of audience participation might be re-evaluated in 
political terms. What then remains to be accounted for is a more thorough 
theorisation of how aesthetics and politics might interrelate and inform one another: 
this account is the purview of part three, where an address of Rancière’s 
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philosophical approach to aesthetics and politics encourages a final turn back to the 
theatre, concluding the thesis in a more hopeful mode of enquiry.  
 
Thesis Map 
The three part structure of this thesis provides different orientations toward 
immersive theatre and each orientation attempts to shed new light on how the 
aesthetics and politics of audience participation might operate: the first part looks at 
an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre and treats it primarily 
(although not absolutely) in isolation from a political or economic context outside of 
coherent immersive worlds; the second part re-assesses and re-evaluates the 
observations and conclusions arising from the first, but in the light of the neoliberal 
ethos and the experience economy; and the third part looks at how an aesthetics and 
politics of audience participation in immersive theatre can be seen to grow out of one 
another, offering a more optimistic evaluation of these claims and some concluding 
reflections on what they might mean for productive participants.  
 Part one is comprised of two chapters, both of which discuss important 
theoretical material pertinent to an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive 
theatre, as well as some brief reflections on the political positioning of audiences. 
Chapter one looks at Ray Lee’s Cold Storage and establishes reasons why affect 
production is so central to an aesthetics of audience participation. Affect will be 
theorised and distinguished from emotion. In this theorisation, a number of 
approaches will be touched on to aid conceptual and terminological clarity, broadly 
split between body-, mind- and social-centred approaches to affect. The notion of 
narcissistic participation will be explored most fully here and the individualistic 
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possibilities of participation in immersive theatre will be introduced. Although Cold 
Storage is for an audience of one, the claims established in this chapter will be 
revisited in the remaining chapters as pertaining to performances with larger 
audiences. One reason for this is because of the political functioning of affect: its 
capacity to both spur and deter action, as well as the appeal of its hedonic or 
challenging qualities.  
 Chapter two looks at an aesthetics of risk perception in Lundahl & Seitl’s 
Rotating in a Room of Images. Drawing on risk research in the social sciences, risk 
will be defined in detail and risk perception will be identified as an inherently 
subjective and contingent phenomenon. Aesthetic relationships between affect and 
risk will be explored by looking at the operation of complete darkness as an 
immersive trope. The participatory acts of imagining and anticipating risk will be 
framed as being potentially productive of affect and affect will be addressed as a 
potential risk for audiences given its politically charged potential to promote 
‘towardness’, or ‘awayness’ from something, or someone, especially as they are 
imagined. An examination of trust, individualism, isolation and privacy in this 
performance will be used as a concluding means of bridging part one and part two.  
 Part two looks at immersive theatre in the context of neoliberalism and the 
experience economy. Chapter three – the first chapter in part two – looks at the work 
of Punchdrunk, paying special attention to The Masque of the Red Death and their 
corporate performance for Stella Artois Black, The Black Diamond. The chapter 
begins with a definition of neoliberalism and an account of its emergence and 
growing hegemony. I then identify a neoliberal value set, or what I refer to as the 
neoliberal ethos, and address how this same value set can be seen to operate in the 
kinds of participation expected of audiences in The Masque. This is where I 
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introduce and explore the notion of entrepreneurial participation. I then turn to The 
Black Diamond and consider the political implications of participating audiences 
being co-opted as unpaid marketers of a product placed in performance. A fresh 
consideration of how affect and risk operate in immersive theatre is also offered, 
with a politics of participation in immersive theatre framed as being deeply 
connected to a political and economic context outside of an immersive world that 
aspires to be separated from it.  
 Chapter four looks at the work of Shunt, in particular Money (2009-10) and 
The Architects (2012-13), as well as their curatorial project, the Shunt Lounge (2006-
10). The chapter offers a definition of the experience economy as a genre of 
economic output and explores how affect, in particular, although risk is also touched 
on, has become instrumentally integrated within the experience economy. Immersive 
theatre is framed as correlating with exponents of an experience industry and the 
kinds of audience engagement expected of participating audiences as aligning with 
experiential marketing strategies. The Shunt Lounge, Money and The Architects are 
then each explored in turn as a means of illuminating this context, comparatively 
analysing the first two, especially, in relation to the London Dungeon. But this is 
with an eye towards appreciating how immersive theatre might also productively 
treat affect production as a problematic, frustrating aspect of audience engagement. I 
will be working towards an understanding of experience production in this chapter 
that is less skeptical towards a politics of participation in immersive theatre and more 
appreciative of the potentially subversive potential of affect production against the 
context of an experience economy that increasingly seems able and willing to co-opt 
it.  
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 Part three begins with chapter five, continuing in this more optimistic vein by 
considering two curatorial events by Theatre Delicatessen: Theatre Souk and the 
Bush Bazaar. Drawing on, but departing from, the philosophy of Rancière, this 
chapter considers how aesthetics and politics might informatively be addressed as 
being bound up with one another. Affect production, in relation to risk perception, 
will be considered as a potential vehicle for revealing to audiences power dynamics 
that might be in operation between participating subjects within an immersive 
environment. A politics of audience participation will consequently be seen to 
emerge from an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre, especially 
as they relate to political and economic contexts outside of the performance space. 
The thesis concludes with an assessment of the implications arising from the 
observations and theorisations put forward in the foregoing chapters: in particular, 
the implications of immersive theatre’s aesthetics and politics of participation 
aligning with those of the experience economy and neoliberalism. But it also builds 
on chapter five, offering some concluding reflections on how immersive theatre 
might playfully engage with this alignment. Frustration, boredom, annoyance and 
embarrassment, residing on the cusp between affect and risk, might just provide a 
political battleground that immersive theatre can use to its own advantage.  
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Aesthetics: Affect and Risk  
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Chapter One: The Production of Affect in Ray Lee’s 
Cold Storage 
A nurse greets me and opens up a body-sized box against the back wall of a small 
room, somewhere inside the Battersea Arts Centre. Her faux smile is nonetheless 
inviting and overcomes an instinctual resistance against entering the box. I climb 
inside the white padded chamber and put on a pair of headphones. The lid is closed 
and I relax and savour the isolated peacefulness. The only thing visible is my 
reflection from the shoulders up in a half-transparent mirror, lit from inside the box, 
set against what appear to be stars. A voice recording says that I am to be frozen for 
thousands of years. Cold air is pumped inside. At first it feels pretty good, but then I 
begin to tremble and then to shake. I watch myself quivering in the mirror with 
increasing violence and this watching seems to magnify how cold I feel. Heartbeat 
quickens. The box’s sides seem to press against my body. Several thoughts spring to 
mind: ‘is it meant to be this cold? What if there’s a fire? What if nobody lets me out? 
Why the hell am I doing this?’  
 
The above documents my experience of Ray Lee’s Cold Storage, a one-on-one 
performance first performed at the Battersea Arts Centre’s One-on-One Festival in 
2011. Ray Lee is an award-winning sound artist and composer. He is best known for 
his bizarre installations of ‘kinetic sound machines’ that respond to the movements 
of audiences, or the movements of Lee himself. Cold Storage took a different tack, 
far more explicitly immersing audiences in a world enclosed by headphones, 
retaining the essential sound element in his work, but also in a very small, very cold 
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box. The isolation produced in this work resonated as deeply comforting once the 
outside world and any pressures and anxieties consciously associated with it became 
temporarily distracted with the closing of the box’s lid. But the performance 
nonetheless featured voluntary incarceration, solitary confinement and unnerving 
bodily convulsions prompted by an uncannily cold and claustrophobic chamber. The 
shivering prompted by the steady inflow of cold air undoubtedly places substantial 
restrictions on the ability to exercise autonomous movement, but is this all there is to 
say about the audience’s role as a creative and productive participant? How might 
the elicitation of particular kinds of experience impact on a participant’s thought and 
action and what role does the audience have in this elicitation? As a piece of 
immersive theatre, there are clearly significant restrictions on the audience’s capacity 
to interact or roam freely in Cold Storage. But might these restrictions help to reveal 
something about an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre? 
This chapter proposes and examines two primary hypotheses about Cold 
Storage that may help to elucidate a more general engagement with immersive 
theatre in later chapters: firstly, that one fundamental aspect of this performance’s 
aesthetics is the production and experience of affect; secondly, that this element of 
the performance is significant for articulating a politics of participation. How does 
affect get produced and what implications are there in this production for a 
participating audience? Is affect production really all that important in immersive 
theatre and if so, why? 
 Affect might refer to a noun (a biological and psychological state), a verb (to 
affect something) or an adjective (describing how something or someone is 
influenced, or affected, by something or someone else). This chapter engages with 
all three of these understandings of affect by asking what affects are produced in 
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Cold Storage, who or what affects and who or what is affected. The first half of this 
chapter is primarily theoretical and is designed to offer a definition of affect, 
traversing its noun, verb and adjective forms, as a basis for an aesthetics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre. This will take time, for there are innumerable 
definitions of affect arising from a wide range of disciplines and fields, each with 
ramifications for the present study. The next section places affect in philosophical 
context, charting two broad, but influential philosophical traditions that continue to 
impact on how affect is understood across such an incongruous definitional field: the 
Spinozist and dualist, or rational actor traditions. Affect will be established as a 
heterogeneous term and a means of thinking about affect will be introduced, drawing 
on Sara Ahmed, which might potentially traverse these two traditions by shifting 
emphasis away from the body-mind relationship and towards relationality. The 
section after that distinguishes affect from emotion for conceptual specificity. This 
section provides an opportunity to nuance the preceding discussion while minimising 
the potential for confusion to arise in my deployment of key terms. The third section 
engages with Ahmed’s work in more detail and establishes theoretical horizons for 
an understanding of affect to be deployed in this thesis: one that acknowledges 
evolved, dispositional components of both affect and emotion, but underscores how 
such components are significantly impacted on by autobiography. The section titled 
‘Affect, Atmospheres and Aesthetics’ looks at how affect production might be seen 
to function in aesthetic space, accounting for reasons why affect might rightly be 
viewed as an aesthetic characteristic of immersive theatre. 
The chapter then turns to Cold Storage, where the important definitional 
positioning and approach to affect gradually unpacked in the chapter’s first half will 
be applied to an immersive theatre performance, focusing especially on the 
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production of affect in the live theatre event. This section is split into three 
subsections: the first introduces how immersive theatre can be thought of as 
narcissistic, providing a means to think about affect production as being central to 
Cold Storage’s aesthetics of participation; the second looks at affect in terms of both 
possession and kinesthesia, offering the necessary details to make this claim; and the 
third looks at what makes affect function aesthetically in the performance.  
The penultimate section, titled ‘Affect and Authenticity’, reflects on the 
notion of affect as an aesthetic ‘site’ for an audience’s attention. This section is 
important if the riskiness of affect is to be established later in the thesis, for what I 
will be approaching as the necessary ‘authenticity’ of experiencing affect, even if 
stimulated by representational means, retains a comparable effect that might also be 
produced outside of aesthetic space. The final, concluding section figures the 
authenticity of affect as an ‘irruption of the real’ in theatre, to borrow from Hans-
Thies Lehmann. This will bring discussion much closer towards an understanding of 
a politics of audience participation that emerges from an aesthetics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre.  
 
Affect in Philosophical Context: Descartes, Kant and Spinoza 
Affect studies has incorporated a host of different disciplines including philosophy, 
political theory, anthropology, behaviourism, psychoanalysis, psychology, 
physiology, biology, cognitive science (including neuroscience), cultural geography, 
pedagogy and sociology, not to mention the various disciplinary strands that lead 
into and/or out of these. Despite the number of different approaches to affect, the 
western philosophical tradition profoundly influenced how those approaches have 
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been and, in many instances, still are practised. There are two primary streams in this 
tradition that tend to be drawn upon, to varying extents: the first of these finds its 
clearest roots in Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics and the second with René Descartes’s 
Discourse on Method and Immanuel Kant’s Critique corpus.  
Descartes famously argued that philosophy’s point of departure must stem 
from distinguishing between mind and body, asserting mind as the sole harbinger of 
truth: in particular, the act of thinking itself. This distinction between mind and body 
is most commonly referred to as dualism and privileges the activity of mind and 
reason over and above corporeal or body-centred knowledge.  
This privileging, although not strictly Cartesian dualism, found an influential 
interlocutor in Kant. Gemma Corradi Fiumara highlights the importance of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism for the emerging theoretical concern with affect towards the 
end of the nineteenth century. Fiumara looks towards a passage in Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason, in which he describes the rational mind as an island ‘surrounded by a 
wide and stormy ocean, the true home of illusion, where many a fog bank and ice 
that soon melts away tempt us to believe in new lands’ (Kant qtd. in Fiumara 4; cf 
Kant 251). She is interested in the formation of a post-Kantian episteme in the West, 
whereby the ‘higher’ sphere of the mind’s rational pursuit of knowledge is prioritised 
over materialistic and earthly interaction with the world around us (see also 
Redding).  
The tradition spawned by this episteme has been dubbed the Rational Actor 
Paradigm (RAP). Proponents of RAP argue that immediate bodily sensations and 
perceptions, such as the experience of affect, can only be examined and understood 
by means of rational consideration. This paradigm, typified in Kant’s Critiques, 
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pitches rationality as the guiding principal of individual actors; though rooted in 
Renaissance Italy, it ‘remains a central legacy of Western thought. It pervades our 
culture at all levels’, from worldviews to theories (Jaeger et al 22-23).  
Dualism and RAP are relevant for affect studies, particularly regarding the 
ethics and politics of affect, because of their coupling of a reasoning mind with 
subjectivity. An agentic subject is posited as being capable of autonomously 
affecting something or someone as the product of a choice, especially reasonable 
choice. RAP, more explicitly than dualism, inputs morality into affect: 
accountability, responsibility and culpability all arise as being applicable to subjects 
as thinking, reasoning beings. So in affecting others, the rational subject directly 
engages with both politics, by entering into a negotiation of power, and ethics, as a 
consequence of having a responsibility, moral or otherwise, for the affected subject’s 
welfare.  
The other influential stream on contemporary approaches to affect finds its 
most important roots in Spinoza’s Ethics. Instead of a reasoning mind being heralded 
under RAP and dualism, ideally presiding over the distracting demands of the human 
body, Spinoza suggested that mind and body are best configured in more holistic 
terms (71). He put forward an understanding of affect as a constant interplay of 
motions between people and things, disagreeing with the idea that affect must arise 
from thinking (71). In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Spinoza’s 
Ethics, along with the writing of Gilles Deleuze, had a profound impact on 
philosophical, sociological, geographical and political approaches to affect 
(Massumi, Parables 15; Thrift 13; Clough and Halley; Gregg and Seigworth, Affect 
Theory). Jane Bennett, for instance, considers affect as being unspecific to human 
bodies. She regards affect as something impersonal and ‘intrinsic to forms that 
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cannot be imagined (even ideally) as persons’ (Bennett, Ja. xii). Adapting Spinoza’s 
discussion of affecting and affected bodies, this is part of an anti-humanist project 
that seeks to attribute agency to things (see also Massumi, Parables 15). According 
to Bennett, all things have the capacity to demonstrate vitality, manifested in their 
openness to being changed and potentially changing other things within a context of 
heterogeneous subjects mutually impacting on one another (Bennett, Ja. 23).  
I draw on these two philosophical traditions to underscore the fact that affect 
is itself a heterogeneous term. In its Spinozist articulation, ‘[a]ffect arises in the 
midst of in-between-ness: in the capacities to act and be acted upon’ (Gregg and 
Seigworth, ‘Inventory’ 1, original emphasis). It is important to note that this 
understanding of affect might be applied to both humans and non-humans, because 
affect is figured as a flow of movements and influences. Particularly in Jane 
Bennett’s Spinozism, agency is not strictly attributable to any one subject, but 
instead belongs to a network of things and people, all affecting and being affected. 
By contrast, according to dualism, or RAP, affect must be treated as impacting, or 
tending to impact, on a typically human mind and body. It may even be framed as 
arising from the activity of a human mind, examples being, as I go on to 
demonstrate, cognitive appraisal and evaluation.  
It would seem fair to assume that these two philosophical traditions are 
incompatible. There have been important and increasingly influential shifts, 
particularly in the cognitive sciences since the 1980s, towards the notion of an 
‘embodied mind’ that can be seen to trouble both Spinozist and RAP approaches to 
affect.
8
 However, in the following sections I will be working towards an account of 
                                                 
8
 For neurologist Antonio Damasio, in Descartes’ Error, the brain and body are thought of as 
indissociable, ‘integrated by means of mutually interactive biochemical and neural regulatory circuits 
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affect that leaves behind, to a certain extent, debates as to the relationships between 
mind and body in the production of affect. What interests me more is how affect 
might function both aesthetically and politically. That being said, given the nature of 
this conflicted field of study, it nonetheless proves necessary to take a position on the 
mind-body debate, albeit a position that refrains from sitting in either the Spinozist 
or RAP camp.  
Sara Ahmed distinguishes between a sociological and psychological account 
of emotion that sheds light on this task, but, in making this reference, important 
distinctions between affect and emotion must be temporarily suspended. Broadly 
speaking, for the psychologist (as, indeed, for the cognitive scientist), emotions 
occur within the individual and are later manifested and externalised through 
emotional expression. Ahmed calls this the ‘inside out’ model of emotions (Cultural 
Politics 8-9), although we might also describe it as a RAP perspective. In contrast, 
the sociologist, not unlike the Spinozist, tends to view emotion as first and foremost 
a social form that becomes internalised, thus constituting an ‘outside in’ model of 
emotions (9). However, in the model of emotion explored in Ahmed’s The Cultural 
Politics of Emotion: 
emotions create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us 
to distinguish between an inside and an outside in the first place. So emotions 
are not simply something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have. Rather, it is through emotions, or 
how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made: 
                                                                                                                                          
(including endocrine, immune, and autonomic neural components)’ (xxvii). This perspective 
participates in recent theoretical shifts toward the notion of an ‘embodied mind’ (see Lakoff and 
Johnson 37-38; Johnson, Body in the Mind xiii; Johnson, Meaning of the Body 1). This argument does 
not reduce mind to brain, but, rather, attempts to argue that mind is the product of a brain which is in a 
symbiotic relationship with a body. 
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the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ are shaped by, and even take the shape of, contact with 
others. (10) 
This understanding of emotion, then, allows one to maintain that an emotion may 
well happen inside of us, but in a way that is in constant relation to an outside, 
prompting ‘towardness’, or ‘awayness’, from something, or someone. It is in this 
sense that Ahmed describes her approach to emotion as ‘relational’ (8). This 
perspective provides scope to think of emotion as something that may be projected 
out into the world by an individual, potentially affecting that world and impacting on 
how emotion might be felt by others. But it also allows for a consideration of such 
projections as impacting on how emotions are felt as emotions in the first place. 
Within this model of emotion, it is possible to examine and evaluate the 
psychological (or cognitive) components of emotion and its social presence. The 
same, I believe, though perhaps controversially, can be said of affect. But in order to 
make this assertion, it proves necessary to mark clear distinctions between both 
affect and emotion before testing the assertion’s validity.  
 
Affect and Emotion 
Affect and emotion, not to mention feeling, passion, mood and sentiment, are 
frequently, but not always used to indicate the same thing, although this collapse of 
different terms into one another can be misleading. Throughout Affect Imagery 
Consciousness, for instance, psychologist Silvan Tomkins approaches disgust, fear 
and anger as affects. Paul Ekman, a psychologist mentored by Tomkins, consistently 
uses these same terms to label emotions in his book Emotions Revealed. If affect is 
going to be explored as an aesthetic and political theme, not just in this chapter, but 
72 
 
throughout the thesis, then clear conceptual positioning is necessary that attends, 
especially, to affect and emotion.  
 
Affect and Emotion: Distinctions 
The role of cognition and mind in the production and experience of affect has proved 
a bone of contention in studies of affect, particularly in psychology.
9
 On the one 
hand, reminiscent of the Spinozist tradition, are those like Robert Zajonc, who argue 
against the influence of cognition over the initial production and experience of 
affective states (Zajonc; see also James 120); on the other, fitting within the RAP 
tradition, are those like Richard Lazarus, who embrace the role of cognition as being 
primary in relation to bodily response (Lazarus). The questions at the forefront of 
debate surrounding affect throughout the twentieth century can be put quite simply: 
is it a phenomenon of the mind, the body, or both? Or might affect relate to 
something non-human, without mind, or even physiological body?  
I find it useful to think of visceral processes as potential affective elements 
that might be involved in affective experience, without fully encapsulating affect. 
Viscera, writes Damasio, refers to ‘blood vessels, organs in the head, chest and 
abdomen, the skin’, as well as endocrine secretions (such as glandular activity) 
(Descartes’ 86). Visceral activity might include a quickening heartbeat and faster 
blood-flow, sweating and piloerection (a wonderfully esoteric term for goose 
bumps). For Tomkins, for these individual visceral effects to become a given affect, 
they must act in a particular synergy (151). However, as will become clear, given the 
                                                 
9
 As Chris Brewin defines the term, cognition denotes ‘the representation within an organism of 
information about itself or its environment or, alternatively, the processes whereby incoming 
information is categorised, stored, integrated with knowledge that is already present, and subsequently 
retrieved and used’ (380). 
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important role played by cognition in producing these affective attributes, affect is 
not, in my eyes, reducible to visceral processes. As far as humans are concerned, to 
be affected is to be acted upon in such a way that both brain and body are engaged.  
For a human being to be affected, then, is to be influenced by someone or 
something: to be made to move, think, feel or act in a way that may not be fully at 
the subject’s command. But why is it that a given stimulus affects some, but not 
others, or affects us in one time and place, but not another (see Lehmann, A. 37)? 
The predominant commonality of visceral processes among humans would seem to 
imply a universality to affect that does not equate, exactly, with personal experience 
and observation, especially where the frequently diverse affective responses of 
theatre audiences are concerned. An attempt to assert universality of all affective 
responses is incongruent with the observation of affects in oneself and others in 
relation to a potentially shared source, such as a theatre performance. Whilst 
universality may well be applicable with regard to something like startle, for 
instance, affects associated with an emotional state like jealousy appear varied 
depending on autobiography. What this suggests is that the personal and the social 
are inscribed both in what is perceived as an affective stimulus and in how affect is 
felt to be (Damasio, Descartes’ 124; Blair 20; Shaughnessy 32-33).  
This crucial acknowledgment is supported by Magda B. Arnold’s cognitive 
research into ‘affective memory’, research that will prove a valuable touchstone in 
this chapter. Arnold asks her readers to consider a rider once thrown by their horse. 
Should they see the horse again, the act of perception may cause ‘immediate 
apprehension in the unlucky rider. These reactions can only be based on the 
remembered joy or pain’ (Arnold 174; see also Brewin 381). This notion of affective 
memory testifies to the potential for affect to be both persistent and lasting, 
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underscoring the ways in which affect is at least partly defined by previous 
experience. It stands in subtle distinction from what Machon calls ‘corporeal 
memory’, or an intuitive form of knowledge arising from the body’s production and 
appreciation of its own language ((Syn)aesthetics 5-6). In Arnold’s account of 
affective memory, there is a much greater emphasis on cognitive acts of 
remembrance (not entirely absent in Machon’s commentary on corporeal memory): 
as something relating to embodiment, of course, but in a way that gives greater 
credence to mindfulness, as opposed to the Deleuzian idea of affect being 
‘immediately conveyed in the flesh through the nervous wave or vital emotion’ 
(Deleuze 33; cf Shaughnessy 234).
10
  
Arnold’s research into affective memory opens up space to think relationally 
about affect. In some respects, it encourages thinking about affect in its Spinozist 
form, as a state of in-between-ness linking both human and non-human bodies, even 
over time, but it also encourages thinking about affect in terms of RAP, as something 
impacting on a human’s capacity to think, feel and act. This means of thinking about 
affect is especially useful for the present study, for it encourages reflection on the 
imbrication of particular participants within an immersive theatre setting. One 
problem that I see with purely Spinozist or Deleuzian approaches to affect is a 
tendency to couple the production, transmission and reception of affect with cause 
and effect. Indeed, in Jane Bennett’s work this acknowledgment arises as a cause for 
concern and defensive framing (33). Bennett thinks of objects and things acting on 
one another as an ‘assemblage’: that is, a collection of objects and things that 
                                                 
10
 See also Damasio’s notion of the somatic-marker hypothesis. For Damasio, emotion relates to 
embodied learning stretching as much into the past as the present. It also relates to processes of 
cognition and evaluation that are marked by it (Damasio, Descartes’ 173; see also 185, 196). This 
latter is what Damasio dubs the ‘somatic-marker hypothesis’: a technical term that, I contend, might 
usefully add to Arnold’s notion of affective memory. Damasio’s somatic-marker hypothesis looks at 
how a feeling body affects cognition (173). Damasio’s research, then, suggests that emotion impacts 
on what we think, how we think and consequently how we think of ourselves as a discrete self. 
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mutually influence the meanings and even statuses of each other across relationship 
networks (23-24; cf Deleuze and Guattari 4). But I am wary of collapsing these kinds 
of cause-effect relationships into the definition of affect being eked out here. There 
may well be a large number of inputs pertaining to any given affect or set of affects. 
However, to remove outright the potential to observe and attribute agency to any one 
subject who might, despite this, play a key role in affect production, is to run the risk 
of sacrificing political and ethical accountability wrought through the absolution of 
attributing agency to a thinking, feeling and potentially acting subject. This removal 
just does not seem to chime with observation and personal experience, particularly 
the kinds of observation and experience on which the analyser of participatory 
performance relies. My interest is with a politically engaged consideration of 
audience participation in immersive theatre: one that does not entirely do away with 
the ethical considerations of responsibility and accountability.  
For audience participants in immersive theatre, then, the production of affect 
can be seen to involve some element of being moved to think, act or feel by someone 
or something. In that sense it is political, as it establishes relations of power. But this 
condition of being moved is likely to involve both visceral and cognitive activity, 
providing plenty of scope for the personal to become integrated within affect 
production. As such and with Ahmed in mind: rather than subscribing to either an 
‘inside out’ or ‘outside in’ model of affect, it may prove useful to consider how it 
traverses both, how both the personal and the social impact on an individual’s 
perception of affective sources and how affect is subsequently produced.  
However, in drawing on Ahmed to make this claim, it is important to specify 
what might be left out, or lost in translation, when applying her theorisation of 
emotion to a theorisation of affect. Emotions, such as fear, joy, shame and disgust, 
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might be understood as that which enters into the broad schema of mental activity 
after the more ‘primary’ phenomenon of affect, as a cognitive ‘high road’ to affect’s 
‘low road’ (Plantinga 57). Perhaps this entrance marks the terrain of feeling, but 
feeling might instead be thought of in terms of a metaphorical spotlight of 
consciousness focusing in on this entrance (Blair 68; Damasio, Descartes’ 159).  
For Arnold and J. A. Gasson, emotion ‘can be considered as the felt tendency 
toward an object judged suitable, or away from an object judged unsuitable, 
reinforced by specific bodily changes according to the type of emotion’ (203, 
original emphasis; cf Damasio, Descartes’ 139). Significantly, for these authors, 
emotion is caused by judging a given object as suitable or unsuitable and this 
judgment is cognitive. What is more, the subject is positioning her or himself in 
relation to that object, appraising its significance for self, an appraisal which impacts 
on the judgment and consequently on the inducing of a given emotion and its 
accompanying affects. As such, all emotions have an affective component, but not 
all affects have an emotional component. It is possible to have thought or action 
affectively influenced by someone without becoming emotional. But this is not to 
say that the personal is somehow eradicated from affect. Affect still involves 
cognition and is impacted on by autobiography, especially in the light of the 
affective memory thesis. As such, while there is a cognitive distinction between 
affect and emotion, with the latter narrowing affect’s conceptual horizons, I believe 
it is feasible to consider how Ahmed’s critique of emotion might apply to affect. 
What this invites is a consideration of how the personal and the social might be 
bound up with one another in affect production, a binding that I will be framing in 
terms of the autobiographical.  
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Affect, Emotion and Autobiography 
So far, I have been underlining the place of the personal, or autobiography, in the 
production and experience of both affect and emotion. However, Damasio, as with 
many other cognitive scientists, especially neuroscientists, stresses that this does not 
tell the whole story (Feeling 51). In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals, Charles Darwin became interested in what it was that makes animals and 
humans express emotion. He regarded emotional expression as ‘innate or inherited; 
and such cannot be said to depend on the will of the individual’ (323). For Darwin, 
while autonomous expressions of will must at first have proved significant for such 
expressions to develop, these might soon, by means of habit and inheritance over a 
period of many generations, become innate. The volitional self no longer needs to 
intervene where the body acts of its own accord, even if acting no longer serves its 
original purpose of aiding the survival of a species by means of natural selection. 
The point is that there is a strong and prosperous tradition of considering both affect 
(Tomkins) and emotion (Ekman) as inherited dispositions, which would seem to be 
at odds with the onus on autobiographical influence that I have been representing in 
this chapter so far. I am not looking to dispel the convincing assertion that there exist 
affects, such as startle, or primary emotions, that are largely the product of 
disposition (Damasio, Descartes’ 177), but I am suggesting that autobiographical, or 
learned inputs significantly contribute to what might be apprehended as an affective, 
or emotional stimulus and how those affects or emotions end up being felt (Damasio, 
Feeling 51; Saville 895-96).  
There is an important point of clarification to be made at this point. 
Autobiography and the autobiographical are terms that will appear frequently in this 
thesis. Deirdre Heddon acknowledges that a central concern of contemporary 
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feminist theorists is ‘the inevitability of the “self” that lies in all acts of production, 
both creative and theoretical [...]. Creative practices are always informed by who we 
are, as subjects embodied in time and space, with our own cultures and histories’ (7). 
In one manifestation, this has been famously abbreviated in the dictum ‘the personal 
is political’. I have something similar in mind when speaking of a participant’s 
autobiographical contribution to an immersive theatre performance: the inevitability 
of the self that lies in an audience member’s participatory acts of production in the 
theatre, whether this refers to the production of affect, as is currently being 
discussed, or the perception of risk, as will be encountered in the next chapter.  
Valorising the autobiographical in spectatorship has been popularised in 
theatre and performance studies by Rancière in ‘The Emancipated Spectator’ (13). 
What I want to do, in both this chapter and the next, is study how such valorisation 
takes place when participating in immersive theatre by focusing on affect production 
and risk perception. A point that will be frequently argued in this thesis is that 
audience participants bring with them to acts of participation a unique life-story and 
this life-story – or autobiography – impacts not only on what is identified as a locus 
of attention in an immersive theatre environment, but also on how that locus affects 
both thought and behaviour.  
Much of the foregoing discussion has been oriented toward definitional 
clarity. I have also underscored how individuality is of profound significance to the 
production of both affect and emotion. Now that affect and emotion have been 
defined and distinguished, I want to turn to Ahmed’s The Cultural Politics of 
Emotion, looking to justify why the research arising from that book has relevance for 
an approach to affect production adopted in this thesis. It is this resource, informed 
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by those already touched upon, that seems to speak most clearly to the production of 
affect in immersive theatre.  
 
Finding Affect in The Cultural Politics of Emotion 
In Cultural Politics, Ahmed theorises the relationship between affecting and affected 
subjects and the environments in which they find themselves. For Ahmed, emotions 
are constitutive of both personal and collective identities. They are something that 
we all ought to have a vested interest in, for our capacities to both affect and be 
affected have consequences for how identities come to be.  
The relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ in Ahmed’s formulation of 
emotion is important. When considering the sensational, or affective qualities of 
emotions like pain, joy, or shame, for instance, there is a demand for more than an 
account of a bleeding finger, smile or hung head. As Ahmed explains:  
how the feelings feel in the first place may be tied to a past history of 
readings, in the sense that the process of recognition (of this feeling, or that 
feeling) is bound up with what we already know. [...] It is not just that we 
interpret our pain as a sign of something, but that how pain feels in the first 
place is an effect of past impressions, which are often hidden from view. The 
very words we then use to tell the story of our pain also works to reshape our 
bodies, creating new impressions. (Cultural Politics 25, original emphasis) 
In the previous section’s discussion of affective memory, affect was also framed as 
involving associative histories peculiar to each individual. As Arnold writes: ‘[w]e 
remember what has happened to us in the past, how this thing has affected us and 
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what we did about it. Then we imagine how it will affect us this time and estimate 
whether it will be harmful. This estimate or evaluation may be reflective but need 
not be. In emotional reactions, it rarely is’ (174, original emphasis). For scholars 
such as Ahmed and Arnold, despite their different disciplines, recognising an 
affective or emotional stimulus is at least partly bound up with what we already 
know. Recognition has a personal history that is impacted on by socially inscribed 
ideals. Recognising a stimulus as affective entails imagination and what amounts to 
projection onto that object, inscribing on that object a part of oneself.  
It seems appropriate to illustrate what this might mean with reference to John 
Hurt’s portrayal of John Merrick (based on the true story of Joseph Merrick) in 
David Lynch’s film, The Elephant Man (1980). The surgeon Frederick Treves 
(played by Anthony Hopkins) saves the badly deformed Merrick from a Victorian 
freak show. As a consequence of how others have treated him, with insults and 
physical attacks (one imagines as a consequence of his ‘otherness’), Merrick appears 
in a constant state of shame and humiliation in the early stages of the film. He is 
wary of all social interaction. At the slightest movement, he flinches in fear. With the 
support and tutorage of Treves, Merrick is gradually raised to a state of dignity, even 
winning the affections of Queen Victoria who sponsors his accommodation in 
Treves’s hospital.11 However, at the hands of a vile night porter, Merrick finds 
himself once again subjected to the most obscene practises of voyeurism even within 
what was meant to be the safe haven of the hospital. He is eventually kidnapped by 
his old freak-show master and again subjected to ill-treatment, with his old affects 
returning. Nonetheless, he manages to escape and returns to London, where again he 
falls victim to the taunts, glares and insults of others – this time in Liverpool Street 
                                                 
11
 Words like ‘dignity’ and being ‘raised’ to it must be approached with caution. This is a dignity 
constructed in the specific logic of the film. 
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Station. This victimisation operates as the film’s climax, at which point he screams ‘I 
am not an animal! I am a human being!’ 
Merrick’s behaviour, expressed through a shame and fear partially 
manifested in those flinches from contact that are so unbearable to watch, is 
indicative of an almost constant state of affectation when in the presence of others. 
Each flinch and hanging of the head refers to a history of the grossest ill-treatment, 
or what we now might call affective memory. While the flinch appears immediate 
within any given situation, it is social in origin – an origin preceding that situation, 
but to which that situation will contribute in its memorised form. Each act of abuse 
functions as a constitutive part of his behaviour and identity, neither of which is 
fixed in the film. Treves manages to stimulate in Merrick joy, excitement and love. 
These positive emotions, upon accumulation, end up having a profound impact on 
who Merrick is, both as he sees himself and as others see him. When regarded as a 
shameful human being, he is treated as one and becomes shameful. When regarded 
as one capable of expressing joy and love, others come to treat him with both, even if 
with trepidation at first. This is not to outlaw the return of shameful treatment, as 
prejudice carries an affective value which is significant and more than capable of 
overriding this joyful contagion. What the depiction of Merrick in The Elephant Man 
shows is how affect, and the emotions that it may or may not promote, has a social 
and relational history. And this history is nothing if not autobiographical, where 
autobiography is revealed as dynamically relating to other people and things that are 
bound up in the memory of past experiences. To reiterate Ahmed: ‘how pain feels in 
the first place is an effect of past impressions’.  
In the light of this, when Ahmed refers to her approach to emotion as 
relational, she refers to a given individual’s relationships with other people, objects, 
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situations and environments in one time and place and within different times and 
places and how these relationships help to constitute or mediate emotional responses. 
It is such relationality that I believe might usefully inform an approach to analysing 
affect production in immersive theatre. Affect has a social as well as a natural 
history. It might traverse both time and place. Our affects might influence others, just 
as those of others might influence ourselves through the production of affect. But it 
is still a socially situated individual that plays a vital role in the production of both 
affect and emotion.  
To sum up: in what follows, when I speak of emotion I will place particular 
emphasis on the affective component of emotion. I will also be looking at affect as 
something that does not just take place within an individual, but nonetheless depends 
on individuals. Affect then emerges as that which might reveal the boundaries 
between a discrete self and the social influences that impact upon it. Given the 
capacity for affect to exert power and influence over the person or thing affected, it 
seems worthwhile and important to consider who or what might be responsible. With 
this vital approach to affect production illuminated, it is now possible to turn to the 
meat of the matter: an aesthetics of affect production in immersive theatre.  
 
Affect, Atmospheres and Aesthetics 
Anne Sheppard rightly notes that the notion of ‘disinterest’ has been at the heart of 
traditional aesthetics, especially since the eighteenth century and most notably 
through the writing of Kant. Broadly speaking, disinterest refers to the ‘pure’ 
contemplation of aesthetic objects, appreciated for their own sake as ends in 
themselves and detached from the preoccupations, or ‘interests’, of the individual(s) 
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apprehending them (Sheppard 68; cf Hegel 64). At the heart of this notion is the idea 
of a distance existing between the perceiver and her or his interests in the perceived 
that allows for critical contemplation and reflection, especially with regard to the 
formal components of an aesthetic object. However, if experience can itself be 
aestheticised, then this distance would appear to collapse. In this section, I ask: to 
what extent can one’s own experience be aestheticised, particularly in the moment of 
its happening? An aesthetic attitude towards an experience that is itself aestheticised 
is a difficult thing to grasp, not least because of its schizophrenic nature, implying as 
it does a split between a self that is simultaneously experiencing and aesthetically 
attending to that experience. However, the fact that one is experiencing something 
does not exclude the possibility of reflecting on that experience and what might have 
contributed towards its production, especially if this more reflective process is 
interspersed among periods of absorption within an experience.  
Gernot Böhme is right to suggest that aesthetics has canonically been 
associated with judgment: ‘that is, it is concerned not so much with experience, 
especially sensuous experience – as the expression “aesthetics” in its derivation from 
the Greek [aisthesis] would suggest – as with judgments, discussion, conversation’ 
(114). He suggests that this ‘central place of judgment in aesthetics’, particularly as 
it relates to the social function of aesthetic theory and the articulation of positive or 
negative responses to artworks, has ‘led to a dominance of language and to the 
present dominance of semiotics in aesthetic theory’ (115). For Böhme, the fact that 
this dominance exists does not render the word or the sign as an essential part of an 
artwork. He suggests that aesthetic judgment has clouded critical and theoretical 
approaches towards the perception of artworks that exist, first and foremost, as 
objects of perception that are independent of the kinds of meaning that aesthetic 
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criticism seeks to apprehend. This is what leads him to call for ‘a new aesthetics’ that 
concerns itself with the production and reception of atmospheres, where atmospheres 
are defined as spaces that are ‘“tinctured” through the presence of things, of persons 
or environmental constellations’ (121): both ‘thinglike’, ‘belonging to the thing in 
that things articulate their presence through their qualities’ and ‘subjectlike’, 
‘belong[ing] to subjects in that they are sensed in bodily presence by human beings’ 
(122). This sensing, he contends, includes ‘the affective impact of the observed’, 
hence the notion of ‘affective atmospheres’ (125). Interestingly, then, in what might 
be framed either as paradox or synthesis, or even as a reorientation of Dewey’s 
relational approach to aesthetic experience, Böhme regards atmospheres as 
transcending, or traversing, objective and subjective status and fixity. Aesthetic 
production and reception are consequently pitched as interrelating in the moment of 
an artwork’s being encountered; in particular, the encountering of an artwork’s 
atmosphere. In Böhme’s terms: ‘[a]tmosphere is the common reality of the perceiver 
and the perceived’ (122).  
By focusing on sensuous experience over and above judgment in aesthetic 
interest, the new aesthetics, or, rather, a new aesthetics, invites critical reflection on 
how that experience sits in relation to whatever it is that is being represented to a 
perceiver. What if sensuous experience, or affective experience, becomes 
incorporated within an art work, such as an immersive theatre event? Friedrich 
Schiller, in an influential series of letters on aesthetics, argues that ‘no real 
connoisseur will be likely to deny that [art]works [...] are all the more perfect 
according as they respect the freedom of the spirit even in the greatest storm of 
emotions’ (106). This respect towards the freedom of the spirit presupposes an 
interrelationship between aesthetic object and aesthetic reception. Incidentally, the 
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latter, for Schiller, is split into free play, or ‘reciprocal action’ (73), between 
sensuousness and reason (64-66). This free play is itself productive and underscores 
the creativity of aesthetic reception. But where a departure might take place from this 
traditional approach to the philosophy of art is with a much more direct embrace of 
the ‘storm of emotions’ within which ‘the freedom of the spirit’ might operate, at 
least as this storm relates to the production of affect.  
Immersive theatre’s participatory aesthetics seems to thrive on play as it 
exists in the space between aesthetic environment (object) and audience participant 
(subject), for it is the participant that engages not just creative perception, but 
aesthetic production within an immersive environment. Sensuous experience, as a 
notion implied in the term ‘aesthetic experience’, is apt to be heightened for 
participating audiences confronted by the potentially pleasurable, thrilling or 
challenging fact of uncertainty that accompanies participatory activity. But sensuous 
experience might itself take receptive precedence over whatever stimulates it. 
Feeling thrilled or feeling affected in some other way might become a participatory 
goal and an incentive to attend immersive theatre performances, just as it might with 
any theatre performance. But where a play text or scenography, for instance, might, 
through judgment, provide an aesthetic source for thrill – and an aesthetic end in 
itself – that end seems ripe for reorientation in immersive theatre. This is not to say 
that scenography or a play text cannot be marvellous, or otherwise profoundly 
engaging; rather, it is to suggest that sensuous experience, or an encounter with an 
affective atmosphere, might just as well gear these means towards a less judgmental 
and more sensuous end.  
At first glance, this view might be associated with theorists of the aesthetic 
such as Roger Fry and Clive Bell, writing over a century ago. This is typified in 
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Bell’s suggestion that ‘[t]he starting point for all systems of aesthetics must be the 
personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The objects that provoke this emotion we 
call works of art [...]. This emotion is called the aesthetic emotion’ (107). But what I 
am considering is not necessarily, or just, an aesthetic emotion, understood as an 
emotion provoked by a work of art; what I am considering is an aestheticised 
experience. The audience experience in immersive theatre, I contend, is itself 
aestheticised within environments that seem to invite this aestheticisation. Aroused 
experience, then, ends up forming its own aesthetic site to be engaged with in 
immersive theatre. Indeed, the honing of aesthetic attention on aroused experience is 
one of immersive theatre’s most ‘immersive’ characteristics.  
 
The Production of Affect in Ray Lee’s Cold Storage 
With the necessary critical framework constructed, I now turn to the production of 
affect in Cold Storage. This section is split into three subsections. The first 
introduces why affect is so central to an aesthetics of audience participation in Cold 
Storage by elaborating on the theoretical considerations of affect production 
explored in the previous sections. In the light of Ahmed’s work, in particular, a 
model of ‘narcissistic participation’ is put forward that seeks to elucidate the 
imbrication of particular individuals in identifying affective stimuli and producing 
affect. As such, neither the Spinozist nor RAP approaches to affect will be fully 
adhered to: rather, affect will be treated as something emerging at the intersection of 
an imaginative and creative participant and the immersive world entered into. The 
second subsection clarifies the nature of affect production in immersive theatre 
against two relevant critical approaches to embodiment among audiences: a 
87 
 
possessive approach to affect and kinesthetic approaches to embodiment. This is 
important if the centrality of affect to the immersive theatre aesthetic in Cold Storage 
is to be properly accounted for in the detail it demands. The final subsection 
specifically addresses how affect might be experienced as an aesthetic phenomenon.  
 
Narcissistic Participation  
Cold Storage promises a special experience for one audience member at a time. 
Participants climb into a body-sized box, the lid is closed and cold air is pumped 
inside. This produces a sensory experience that forces audiences to respond to the 
cold. While some responsiveness, especially shivering, is inescapably imposed on 
audiences, the specific experiential terms of that responsiveness are nonetheless 
contingent on the particular audience member. Akin to Böhme’s new aesthetics, this 
sensory responsiveness to a very cold aesthetic environment, which can be seen to 
impact on thought, action and feeling, might just as well be called affect. In fact, the 
production of affect seems central to an aesthetics of audience participation in Cold 
Storage. But what are these specific experiential terms and what relevance do they 
have for aesthetics?  
Participants are positioned in such a way that they must invest something of 
themselves in the performance. I mean this in two ways: first of all, audiences 
aesthetically attend to their own experience; secondly, they create for themselves 
something to be perceived. In other words, audiences aesthetically render their 
experience of affect in an environment that invites that rendering and they also 
project into a participatory environment, through bodily expressiveness, for instance. 
This ought to be distinguished from the narcissism involved in what Nicholas 
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Abercrombie and Brian Longhurst identify as a self-conscious presentation of 
oneself to an audience, either real or imagined (95-96). I coin the term ‘narcissistic 
participation’ to describe a double-edged quality of attending to experience and 
projecting out into a participatory environment something that might subsequently 
be aesthetically received. Whether locked in a box or roaming freely in a warehouse, 
the possibility for narcissistic participation to contribute to an aesthetics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre is ever-present, as later chapters suggest. But, for 
the time being, what can Cold Storage tell us about this participatory model?  
 In Ovid’s account of the myth of Narcissus and Echo, Echo, a nymph, falls in 
love with a proud male youth called Narcissus. Along with many others, Narcissus 
rudely rejects Echo’s advances, claiming that he would rather die than yield to her. 
Narcissus is damned for his pride and brashness by the goddess of retribution, 
Nemesis: ‘[s]o may he love – and never win his love!’ (Ovid 63). Narcissus ends up 
falling in love with his own reflection in the shimmering surface of an isolated pool 
– a love so strong that his self-image holds him fatally enrapt. Narcissus dies by the 
pool, overcome by the grief of an impossible union.  
Psycho-analytic theorisations of narcissism draw on this myth to describe 
character disorders derived from self-absorption (Lowen; Morrison), particularly in 
sexual development (Freud). A sense of self, bound up with either self-
aggrandisement or vulnerability, tends to be framed in this discourse as conflating 
with the world, in opposition to inter-subjectivity and community (Houlcroft, Bore 
and Munro 274).
12
 Esteem, entitlement and a sense of power are commonly 
attributed to this character disorder as narcissistic motives affecting an engagement 
with the world and with others (Gebauer et al.). While I make no claim to an 
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 For recent contestations of this formulation, see Gebauer et al. 
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authentic reading of the myth, appropriating it to my own satisfaction, it nonetheless 
seems worthwhile flagging such clinical approaches to narcissism, as a disorder, if 
only to set distance between these clinical appropriations of the myth of Narcissus 
and a very specific understanding of narcissism as it uniquely appears in this thesis – 
an understanding that warrants autonomous definition in distinction from this 
literature.  
While drawing on clinical understandings of narcissism, Richard Sennett’s 
persuasive study of an ever-increasing fetishisation of intimacy and displays of the 
personal in The Fall of Public Man provides scope to begin thinking about 
narcissism outside the confines of a character disorder. Sennett describes narcissism 
in terms with much wider applicability, as an incessant desire to feel more: ‘[t]he 
most common form in which narcissism makes itself known to the person is by a 
process of inversion: If only I could feel more, or if only I could really feel, then I 
could relate to others or have “real” relations with them. But at each moment of 
encounter, I never seem to feel enough’ (9). Sennett then adds to this the suggestion 
that narcissistic feelings ‘often focus themselves on obsessive questions of whether I 
am good enough, whether I am adequate, and the like’ (11). A desire to feel more, to 
maximise feelings toward or even away from something, as Ahmed understands 
emotion and I understand affect, seems to be attended to by the supply of immersive 
experiences. Performances like Cold Storage contribute to an immersive theatre 
landscape of experience providers. And these experience providers seem to promote 
reflections on participatory rightness. To borrow from Sennett, the obsessive 
questions of narcissistic participants might be ‘whether I participate well enough, 
whether I participate adequately, and the like’. The feeling ‘I’ can be seen to 
predominate in a participatory aesthetics once the pursuit of experience takes 
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precedence over the reading of signs, or aesthetic judgment of an environment. And 
that precedence ties into Böhme’s notion of a ‘new aesthetics’.  
The ‘danger’ of narcissism, for Sennett, is not so much ‘the evils of self-love’ 
as ‘the danger of projection, of a reaction to the world as though reality could be 
comprehended through images of self’ (324). Dangers and evils aside, an aesthetics 
of audience participation in Cold Storage seems to invite just such a reaction to an 
immersive world premised on comprehension through a sense of self, but that 
comprehension seems to derive not just from images of the self, but from affective 
experience as well. This clarifies why narcissistic participation is not just about a 
self-conscious presentation of oneself. Affect becomes something to be at once 
latched onto, as an aesthetic site, and something which colours perception of and can 
even physically alter an immersive environment: that is, as a projection into it.  
Narcissism tends to imply negativity. My model of narcissistic participation, 
however, is not intended to prescribe a positive or negative value; rather, it is merely 
intended to describe a mode of aesthetic engagement. Nonetheless, there may well be 
instances where negativity is applicable to narcissistic participation. An important 
point of Sennett’s is that narcissism denotes ‘the search for gratification of the self 
which at the same time prevents that gratification from occurring’ (220). It involves 
an incessant search for gratifying a desire that cannot be satiated. ‘The narcissist is 
not hungry for experiences’, writes Sennett, ‘he [sic] is hungry for Experience’ 
(325). And the result: ‘one drowns in the self – it is an entropic state’ (325). But even 
here, I wonder whether the value of a negative or positive judgment might be 
temporarily evacuated from Sennett’s observation, instead pursuing it as a line of 
enquiry: what does it mean to drown in the self? In the introduction, conceptual 
limits were placed on the descriptors ‘immersion’ and ‘immersive’, alongside the 
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inappropriateness of describing audiences as drowning within, or being permeated 
by, immersive environments. This juncture in the thesis presents an opportunity to 
consider this in more detail. While audiences cannot be said to drown in immersive 
theatre, they might nonetheless be said to drown in themselves, through a narcissistic 
participatory encounter.  
 
Possession and Kinesthesia 
Responding to this hypothesis involves unpacking how affect might work on, from, 
with or through audience participants. For instance, is it right to speak of being 
possessed by affect? In this subsection, I will be critiquing one understanding of 
affect as ‘possessing’ individuals. Building on the theory explored in this chapter so 
far and introducing the concepts of kinesthetic sympathy and kinesthetic empathy, 
this subsection further justifies the significance of recognising affect’s 
autobiographical components. It addresses how these autobiographical components 
function in the production of affect in Cold Storage. Furthermore, it theorises what it 
means to imaginatively project onto something in immersive theatre. This should 
help in describing the creative process of how a participating audience contributes to 
the production of affect in as specific a way as possible in the context of a theatre 
event.  
The notion of being possessed by affect has been explored in relation to 
participatory arts practise by Christopher Braddock. He suggests that ‘objects 
perform the person; that is, they [the person] become contaminated to the point that 
they become the thing’ (100, original emphasis). However, I have been describing, 
after Ahmed, how the affective components of an emotion like fear only temporarily 
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reside in a perceived object, as the product of imaginative projection. In my 
experience of Cold Storage, I was affectively possessed by the reflected image of my 
own, objectified and reflected shivering, only to the extent that this was perceived to 
be strange, uncanny and even fearful. The shiver response itself was an autonomic 
response to the cold and is different from the affectively distressing, but curious act 
of watching myself shiver so violently. The shiver itself did not possess me with 
fear; rather, the objectified and uncanny reflection of that shivering in the mirror was 
subsequently perceived to be affectively engaging. This is an important distinction, 
for it dissolves the potentially problematic rendering of a given object, or even 
another subject, as already possessing an intrinsically fearful attribute.  
This critique of treating affect in terms of possession is granted critical 
weight when read alongside approaches to the embodied experience of watching 
theatre: in particular, by presenting a comparative analysis of kinesthetic sympathy 
and kinesthetic empathy. Hanna Järvinen describes kinesthesia as being ‘independent 
of sight, hearing and touch’, while exceeding the sense of balance alone; it is 
‘delimited by sensations that are of relevance to the body position and the movement 
of the body in space, as opposed to false feelings about the body and its movement 
such as vertigo’ (74). Kinesthesia, then, is about feeling movement through the body. 
For Järvinen, kinesthetic sympathy describes how, ‘in the absence of words written 
or spoken’, meaning might be transmitted to spectators of theatrical dance (76). Her 
claim is that ‘movements made on stage kindle certain sensory experiences in the 
bodies of spectators because the spectators unconsciously sympathize with the 
bodies they witness’ (76, original emphasis). If sympathy is understood to mean 
fellow-feeling, or feeling for another premised on judging that other in relation to 
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self-perception, then Järvinen’s model of kinesthetic sympathy seems to position 
sensory experience as the crux on which such feeling and judgment is based.  
There is clearly a strong connection here between sympathy and my 
discussion of possession, as distinct from Braddock’s, for there appears to be the 
same onus on projection into the artwork; this is not the same thing as the 
experiencing subject somehow becoming the art object, as Braddock would have it, 
but more a question of existing with the artwork and opening up to a state of 
kinesthetic possession, where that possession is itself the product of imaginatively 
projecting oneself onto the perceived artwork. This latter qualification is, for some, 
the very thing which characterises empathy, not sympathy. For Bruce McConachie, 
mental simulation, which runs close to what I have been calling imaginative 
projection, is precisely this defining quality of empathy (66). I will return to this 
below. For now, it is necessary only to acknowledge that this kind of projection, or 
mental simulation, far from rendering the subject possessed by a foreign object, is an 
insular, autopoietic kind of possession. Autopoiesis refers to how the elements of a 
given system, such as the relationship between subject and imagined object currently 
being discussed, ‘are produced within the network of the system’s elements, that is, 
through recursions’ (Luhmann Art as a Social System 49; cf Carlson 7). The 
experiencing subject is not possessed by an object; the experiencing subject is 
possessed by their imagining of that object, hence, the subject is possessed by their 
own creative and productive act of perception (see Fischer-Lichte 150; Shaughnessy 
36). It is this self-possession that is autopoietic.
13
 In Cold Storage, it is as if this 
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 A similar observation has been noted by Jean-Paul Sartre in his Sketch for a Theory of the 
Emotions. Sartre figures emotion in terms of belief, specifying a comparable act of creative projection 
of consciousness upon the world, transfiguring that world in the eyes of the beholder: ‘consciousness 
is caught in its own snare. Precisely because it is living in the new aspect of the world by believing in 
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tendency is directly confronted by Lee’s decision to place a mirror in the box. It is as 
though he is confronting narcissistic participation. By having the mirror so close to 
the audience’s face, the participant – short of shutting their eyes throughout the piece 
– has no choice but to engage with their own reflection and acknowledge their own 
status as one who watches and one who is watched, albeit as someone watching him 
or herself. The participant consequently has their status as both producer and 
receiver explicitly revealed as such. 
This model of kinesthetic sympathy is perhaps best read alongside the more 
commonly articulated notion of ‘kinesthetic empathy’, first put forward by Deidre 
Sklar, but more recently explored in Susan Leigh Foster’s Choreographing Empathy. 
According to Foster, for the German aestheticians who invented the term in the 
1880s, einfühlung, or empathy, described ‘a kind of physical connection between 
viewer and art in which the viewer’s own body would move into and inhabit the 
various features of the artwork’ (10). Foster also defines sympathy as fellow-feeling 
(154), but distinguishes this from empathy, where empathy is  
the distinctly human ability to move into and feel anything in the observable 
world [...], to enter into their dynamic state and experience its uniqueness. 
[...] Rather than receiving a picture of the other and replicating it in one’s 
own mind, the observer now grasped the other through a simultaneous 
moving into and melding with the substance of the other. (154, my emphasis) 
I have reservations about this notion of moving into an other, melding with 
it/him/her. This is what Brecht might have called ‘crude empathy’: ‘a feeling for 
another based on assimilation of the other’s experience to the self’ (Bennett, Ji. 10). I 
                                                                                                                                          
it, the consciousness is captured by its own belief, exactly as it is in dreams and hysteria’ (80, original 
emphasis).  
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also feel that Järvinen’s understanding of kinesthesia allows more space to figure the 
personal in a relational approach to affect and how the personal might taint 
perception of an object of aesthetic appreciation. Not only that, but I find the notion 
of moving into and inhabiting something or someone strangely akin and prone to the 
problematics of possession, at least in Braddock’s account of it. This is not the same 
as suggesting that empathy is not possible; rather, it is a case of challenging the 
model of empathy just accounted for.  
If empathy is to be employed as a term, I find it useful to think of it as a 
‘wish feeling’, to borrow from Ahmed, ‘in which subjects “feel” something other 
than what another feels in the very moment of imagining they could feel what 
another feels’ (Cultural Politics 30). Or, as Jill Bennett writes, empathy is 
characterised by ‘a distinctive combination of affective and intellectual operations, 
but also by a dynamic oscillation, “a constant tension of going to and fro,” as Nikos 
Papastergiadis has put it, “of going closer to be able to see, but also never forgetting 
where you are coming from”’ (10).  
Strangely enough, Sklar, who coined the term ‘kinesthetic empathy’, would 
seem to agree. Sklar considers kinesthetic empathy as a ‘capacity to participate with 
another’s movement or another’s sensory experience of movement. [...] It is a matter 
of re-cognizing kinesthetically what is perceived visually, aurally, or tactilely. [...] 
[I]t is a translation capacity’ (15). According to Sklar’s model, then, kinesthetic 
empathy is precisely not a question of entering into another, but of translating the 
perception of another’s movement on the basis of personal discrimination (hence 
translation), which is itself the product of ‘education, cultural preferences, and 
practice’ (16).  
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The place of the personal and the significance of the personal in the 
production of affective experience is lost in the state of complete possession which 
seems to be hit on by both Foster and Braddock. In contrast, considering narcissism 
as a kind of mirroring which preserves the personal through the encounter with an 
aesthetic object, by means of imagination and self-projection, leaves plenty of space 
to account for the personal in the production of affective experience in aesthetic 
appreciation. It is this sympathetic sense (or even empathetic, in Sklar’s account) that 
leaves more room to factor in the place of the personal in the production of affect.  
The sympathetic model of kinesthesia preserves the experiencing subject as 
something distinct from the object perceived, but in such a way that the threat of 
being possessed by that object might still be confused with what is actually 
happening: i.e. autopoietic possession. In my experience of Cold Storage, it was the 
otherness of my reflected shivering body that set an unsettling distance between a 
discrete sense of self and what I was watching in the mirror. The perceived threat to 
self implied in this objectification, which shall remain a threat short of psychological 
collapse, might then be realised as a productive source of affect.  
 From the foregoing, it is clear to see that an aesthetics of immersive theatre 
participation in Cold Storage refers not just to the placing of an audience within a 
performance environment, but also to the experiential qualities of perceiving objects 
within that environment. To feel theatre is to feel objects of aesthetic perception as 
they are channelled through the personal. Immersive theatre does not possess the 
body; what is taken to be possessive in immersive theatre turns out to be the result of 
a complex interplay between imaginative engagement, self-projection, narcissism 
and affect, all intertwined and mutually enforcing. In my analysis of Cold Storage, it 
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was demonstrated how this kind of imagining can itself be affectively charged, 
rendering affect a crucial element of the immersive theatre experience.  
 Narcissistic participation – the turning inwards of attention towards 
experience and projecting outwards into an immersive theatre world – need not be 
limited to Cold Storage, nor even immersive theatre more generally. However, the 
example of Cold Storage illustrates how aesthetic attention might be shifted from the 
stage to experience itself in immersive theatre. The stimuli of a given experience 
seem to matter much less than the encounter with those stimuli in an affective field 
of production: hence, immersive theatre’s promotion of the narcissistic participant.  
This may seem reminiscent of G. W. F. Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on 
Aesthetics, but his focus there, or at least part of his focus, is firmly on the reasons 
why an artist might want to express something: ‘[t]he universal need for expression 
in art lies, therefore, in man’s [sic] rational impulse to exalt the inner and outer world 
into a spiritual consciousness for himself, as an object in which he recognizes his 
own self’ (36). What I am suggesting here, however, is that a comparable 
consciousness of oneself is at work in an aesthetics of audience participation in 
immersive theatre, alongside an opportunity to recognise the self. The subject who 
potentially experiences this consciousness and realisation is not an isolated artist, but 
a participating audience. On the one hand, then, I am echoing a point that has 
provided an important cornerstone in the history of aesthetic theory. However, on the 
other, I am calling for an embrace of sensuousness and an address of the audience 
experience as an aesthetic site: both in its introspective and projective forms. As 
such, if this onus on the production of affective experience holds, an aesthetics of 
audience participation in performances like Cold Storage are revealed as having a 
peculiarly narcissistic quality.  
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 In sum, I depart from theorisations of audience engagement and affect 
production conceptually premised on possession, as the source of affect is likely to 
come from an individual projecting onto what only seems to be an originating source 
of affect. That is not to deny that an object, environment or person might influence 
perception of each as being potentially affective. Immersive theatre environments 
present potential affective stimuli, but they are only actualised as such if perceived to 
be affective and that act of perception depends on the participant. So the production 
of affect in an immersive theatre work like Cold Storage, as with Ahmed’s model of 
emotion, can be seen to come from both within the participant and an immersive 
world which is perceived by the participant.  
 
Affect and ESTHETIC DELECTATION 
So far I have been addressing the production of affect in Cold Storage, in particular 
how the experience of being locked inside the box drew more attention than the box 
itself. An experience of affect became central to an aesthetics of audience 
participation in Cold Storage, both as an introspective turning inwards of attention 
and as an expressive projection outwards into the confined interior of the box: i.e. 
narcissistic participation. What I wish to do now is explore why this drawing of 
attention onto affect is best described in terms of aesthetics. What is it about Cold 
Storage, exactly, that makes affect function aesthetically?  
Without the participation of a spectator, Cold Storage would be in a constant 
state of incompleteness, for an integral aesthetic locus would not yet have entered the 
scene. The piece exists for an audience, because the piece is the audience. I mean 
this in a number of ways: firstly, as addressed in the two previous subsections, the 
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way in which the piece is apprehended is creative and constitutive; secondly, 
immersive theatre environments, whilst they might have outstanding aesthetic merit, 
seem to function more as a vehicle, or technology, for the production of experience, 
particularly affective experience, which becomes the primary focus of the theatre 
event. In Cold Storage, the box and the cold air constitute the technologies which 
help to produce this, but eventfulness does not become so until the spectator begins 
some kind of interaction with the box. The box and cold air function as ‘feeling 
technologies’, to borrow from Erin Hurley: ‘mechanisms that do something with 
feeling’ (28). And these technologies, in many respects, serve the aesthetic 
experience of participating audiences.  
Within the world of immersive theatre performances like Cold Storage, a 
world entered into with an eye predisposed towards aesthetic engagement, affect 
becomes aestheticised in a way that it perhaps would not be outside of aesthetic 
space. Marcel Duchamp’s readymades, though perhaps not initially intended as 
objects for ‘ESTHETIC DELECTATION’ (Duchamp 141, original emphasis), 
demonstrate how our encounters with a given object morph once placed in an 
environment geared towards aesthetic appreciation. A urinal placed in an art gallery 
is subjected to an aesthetic surplus, even if that surplus is unintended. It gains a 
special kind of resonance and demands a special kind of attention. As the Russian 
Formalists would have it, it is made strange and granted a kind of autonomy and 
individuality not usually afforded outside of aesthetic space or fictional narrative. 
Comparably, discussing the work of Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio, Bryoni Trezise uses 
the word ‘sensationship’ to describe how audiences might focus on feeling feeling 
(208). I contend that the same is true for the experience of affect in immersive 
theatre; it becomes aestheticised as a consequence of the environment in which it is 
100 
 
experienced. And by virtue of that aestheticisation, it is possible to attend to affect. 
This does not detract from the ‘reality’ of affective experience; rather, affect is 
granted a special kind of attention afforded by its entry into aesthetic space.  
If a urinal is placed in an art gallery, in some respects it ceases to be just a 
urinal; it becomes an art object. It may never again capture urine, transforming its 
operative qualities into a receptacle for an indefinite number of meanings and 
purposes which might be read into it. Once aestheticised, does affect function 
similarly? Does it become qualitatively different from affect as it might irrupt 
outside of aesthetic space? What might an experience of affect be said to represent in 
immersive theatre? The next section looks at the difference between feigning affect 
by mimicking affective expression and affect itself. Previous research within theatre 
studies has focused on this in relation to acting emotion, most notably in the work of 
Peta Tait. Taking Tait’s work into consideration, I will focus instead on the 
impossibility of audiences experiencing unauthentic affect in the theatre. Although 
representational strategies might be employed to contribute towards the production 
of affect, it will be argued that the experience of affect – as distinct from its display – 
is not mimetic. One reason for engaging with this notion of an ‘unauthentic affect’ is 
to prepare theoretical ground for approaching the perception of risk in immersive 
theatre in the next chapter, for if affect has a hand in the perception of risk, then the 
perception of risk becomes more than just a perception; it becomes something 
experientially knowable, or at least feelable, producing a threat for audiences defined 
at the level of affect. What is more, establishing the authenticity of affective 
experience means re-thinking how politics might function in an aesthetic space 
otherwise connoting idealism, fiction, possibility and even utopia; it is to establish an 
affective politics of participation founded in an aesthetic encounter.  
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Affect and Authenticity 
In the foregoing, I accounted for how Cold Storage at least partly shifts an aesthetic 
‘site’ of performance from an immersive environment to the participant’s affective 
experience of the work. This experience relates to a perceived immersive world, as 
well as a unique history brought into that world by a participant. What this 
encourages is reflection on the representational status of immersive theatre’s 
aesthetics of participation. Are the affects produced in Cold Storage and work like it 
representational?  
It seems to me that this particular aesthetic element of immersive theatre is 
not about doubleness, or mimesis. That affect has become an object of aesthetic 
appreciation is not the same as suggesting that it is mimetic; it might be granted a 
special kind of attention, or made strange, but that does not equate to mimesis. The 
affect produced is not not an affect; it is an affect which is experienced as such, 
despite its aestheticisation. As Shaughnessy suggests, the here-and-nowness of 
immersive theatre ‘equates to a form of authenticity which is unreproducible – even 
if we experience it again’ (189). The hub of this here-and-nowness is experience, or, 
it seems to me, the experience specifically of affect.
14
 Whilst the environment which 
has a hand in triggering affective experience may well look to represent something, 
to provide an immersive landscape situating its audience in a given world, the affect 
itself does not represent anything other than affect, even though it might draw 
attention to why a particular affective state might have been produced. As Trezise 
has suggested, drawing on Hans-Thies Lehmann, affective spectatorial experience is 
ripe to occur despite the fact that it is triggered in a world of representation (213). As 
                                                 
14
 My focus on affect marks a move away from Shaughnessy’s observation. She prefers to look 
instead at Walter Benjamin’s notion of ‘aura’ as a means of elucidating the authenticity of this here-
and-nowness (189-90). 
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such, there is a literalness to the experience of immersive theatre. Like Fried’s 
literalist art object, the experience of affect in immersive theatre does not ‘signify, or 
allude to anything’ (Fried 143). Consequently, I propose that there is no such thing 
as an unauthentic affect. It seems to me that the audience’s experience of affect in 
the theatre, particularly in immersive theatre, is beyond representation and cannot be 
mimetic.
15
 The realm of the real is not something that performance can claim as its 
own and mark off from theatre; an aesthetics of audience participation derived from 
affect production opens up access to this realm, albeit within cohesive aesthetic 
worlds that are distinctly other. 
In Cold Storage, an experience of fear or isolated peacefulness is not 
representational of fear or peacefulness; it is fear or peacefulness. It makes no 
difference to the authenticity of affect if it is perceived to be trivial in relation to 
more intense experiences, nor does it matter that the stimulus which helped to 
produce that response was looking to mimetically represent something. In fact, that 
seems to have been Lee’s intention in Cold Storage (Lee, email interview). The 
intention seemed to be to place the audience in a position where they might 
experience, by means of imagination and representation, a state of suspended 
animation for many, many years, waking up at some point in the distant future. In 
my experience, this was not the important part of the performance at all, despite the 
apparent intentions of the artist; rather, this performance was about relocating where 
an important aesthetic site of theatre can be seen to sit. And that reorientation 
impacts on how theatre can be said to function representationally.  
                                                 
15
 As an aside and to clarify: I am distinguishing between what affects audiences and the affect itself. 
As such, my claim is not to be confused with the subject of Colin Radford’s bewilderment in his 
article, ‘How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina’. For Radford, being moved to tears 
by the fate of a fictional character is nothing other than incoherent (Radford and Weston 78). My 
focus, in contrast, is not on what might move an audience, but the movement itself: i.e. the state of 
being affected in the theatre, as a state that becomes aestheticised.  
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  ‘Certainly, performance of emotions are theatrically constructed’, writes 
Peta Tait, ‘which suggests also that a display of emotions can be manipulated within 
a social context’ (3). Tait appears to be separating emotion from its performance, 
thus implicating the idea, after Judith Butler, that the social component of emotion, 
at least, conforms to a stylised repetition of acts, rehearsed and repeated. The onus 
on the display of emotion which is so important within a social context, wherein we 
might also situate the theatre, is consequently constitutive of emotion ‘norms’, 
according to this model, which are typically gendered and bound to specific cultures 
and periods.
16
 Demonstrating her commitment to Butler, this point is illustrated by 
Tait as follows: ‘[i]f participation in miming or enactment reproduces the feminine in 
social languages, it follows that miming emotions as feminine brings them into 
existence through and as gendered states’ (158). The appearance of separation 
between emotion and its display in Tait’s writing, then, is only an appearance, for the 
separation of ‘inner and outer bodily spaces’ which this implies does not necessarily 
take place (8). Tait is effectively giving experiential and visceral weight to Butler’s 
theory of the performativity of gender by taking a comparable theoretical model and 
applying it to the rehearsal and repetition of emotions as stylised acts. This 
challenges the supposed naturalness of the emotions by looking to underline their 
status as structured phenomena without an authentic original.  
Ahmed’s relational model of emotion and, it might be argued by extension, 
of affect which has been put forward in this chapter, defends how even dispositional, 
evolved and inherited affective states might be nuanced and adapted by a stylised 
                                                 
16
 For an alternative historicisation of the emotions, see Roach’s The Player’s Passion (see especially 
218). For an ethnographic account of the cultural construction of emotion as mediated by emotional 
display, see Benedicte Grima’s The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women. For an opposing 
discussion of emotion as an imposition undermining a more general performance of self, after Erving 
Goffman, see Harré and Parrott’s ‘Embarrassment and the Threat to Character’, particularly their 
discussion of a dramaturgical account of embarrassment (45-46).  
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repetition of acts famously discussed by Butler and applied specifically to the 
emotions by Tait. The point, as I see it, and which consequently diverges from Tait, 
is not that these inherited affective dispositions are somehow unauthentic; they are 
authentic insofar as they are adapted, or even produced by autobiography. 
Acknowledging plurality need not bar conceiving of affect and emotion as being 
authentic for the experiencing subject, even if both are regarded as cumulatively 
structured on the grounds of personal experience over the course of a lifetime. The 
bone of contention, then, is not with Tait’s theoretical engagement with emotion as a 
socially structured phenomenon; rather, the bone of contention is with labelling that 
structured phenomenon as being void of authenticity. Whilst normativity might be 
rehearsed and reproduced along the lines outlined by Butler and Tait, the 
peculiarities of one’s autobiography render what is perceived to be an affective or 
emotional experience as being contingent on the personal. Thus, it is important to 
recognise the means by which affect might be rehearsed and reproduced, particularly 
in cultural representations on the stage, while also acknowledging that the inner 
experiences of affect and emotion are potentially inscribed with social meaning (Tait 
145). However, it might also be noted that the relationality of affect that Ahmed 
draws attention to is something impacted on by a number of inputs which are 
dependent on individuality and this renders the total hegemonic potential of affect 
and emotion as limited, for the very reason that the number of these inputs is so vast.  
In sum, Tait suggests that ‘[e]motions are recognisable because they are 
performable conditions. [...] It is in their performance, either as imagined and/or 
displayed, that emotions assume social meanings’ (170). In this formulation, the 
display of emotion performed by an actor becomes constitutive of emotion through 
its rehearsal and repetition. However, I think it is important to distinguish between 
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how such an act can become constitutive of emotion through its contribution to a 
cultural milieu, as an act of cultural expression performed in front of an audience or 
audiences and consequently rehearsed and repeated over time and what that actor is 
experiencing in the moment of expression. Despite the observation of Ekman and 
others that emotional display is critical not just to the recognition of emotion in 
others, but also to the socially managed experience of emotion, or ‘display rules’ 
(Ekman 4; cf Goleman 113-14) and despite the interesting applications of Ekman’s 
work to actor training made by those within neuroscience and the theatre studies 
discipline,
17
 it seems pertinent to acknowledge that one can give a convincing 
performance of emotion or affect without being affected. This is the point famously 
defended in Denis Diderot’s The Paradox of Acting (see in particular 16-17, 74, 
108). Not only this, but the performance of emotion without affectation can produce 
its own kind of contagion, presenting an audience with stimuli that may well produce 
a given affect or emotion (again, a point made by Diderot).  
This is best exemplified in a famous exchange between Dustin Hoffman and 
Laurence Olivier on the set of Marathon Man (1976). The method-trained Hoffman 
stayed awake all night to portray a sleep-deprived character. Olivier, noticing his 
dishevelled appearance on set the next day, responded with the quip: ‘Why don’t you 
try acting?’ (Esch 46). For Hoffman and other method actors, contra Diderot and 
Olivier, convincing display of emotion or affect in the theatre can be produced by 
trying to evoke stimuli which will reliably induce an affective or emotional state in 
the actor, thus coupling the display of affect with affect itself. Behavioural 
                                                 
17
 There are some within the theatre studies discipline, as well as neuroscientists like Susana Bloch, 
that defend how mimicking emotional expression can produce emotion in the actor. ‘ALBA emoting’ 
takes Ekman’s findings at face value and applies them to actor training in an effort to develop an 
acting technique which allows for controllable emotion (see Bloch, ‘ALBA EMOTING; Rix, ‘ALBA 
EMOTING’).  
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psychologists would no doubt sympathise with this.
18
 However, for Diderot and 
Olivier, all that is necessary to arouse sympathy in the audience is to convincingly 
adopt the display of affect by means of mimesis.
19
 In neither case is an unauthentic 
affect produced in the actor. In the first instance, an affect is or is not produced 
which results or does not result in affective display; in the second, affect is not 
produced at all, only its mimicked display.  
I suggest that this same logic should apply to audiences. The display of 
affect, particularly as subject to the display rules of Ekman, is perhaps not as 
pertinent for audiences watching theatre in a darkened space, despite the corporeality 
of feeling: for instance, changes in facial expression as a source of personal pleasure 
or displeasure. In immersive theatre, on the other hand, audiences are rendered 
performing subjects who frequently perform in the presence of other subjects who 
also both perform and spectate. In Cold Storage, the audience is the only performing 
subject, a subject forced to stare at their own reflection in the backlit mirror of the 
cold box. The display of affect, of one’s own affective state, is aesthetically 
rendered; should one so wish, it would be possible to heighten or even mimic 
affective expression. Whilst this might potentially serve as an amplifier for affective 
experience, it is not reducible to that experience. Either one is affected by the 
performance and all that is brought into that performance at a subjective level, or one 
is not. In sum, whilst it is possible for affective display to be performed without 
                                                 
18
 Rhonda Blair usefully charts the influence of the behaviourist school on Stanislavski and those he 
influenced, including founders of the Method school of acting in the US, in The Actor, Image, and 
Action.  
19
 Joseph Roach records a wonderful anecdote which helps illustrate the discrepancy between display 
and affect in the theatre: ‘[t]he name of one Perkins, hair-dresser and wig-maker, enters into the 
history of the eighteenth-century stage on the strength of a technical contribution to David Garrick’s 
Hamlet. The actor employed his services to enliven the Prince’s first encounter with his father’s ghost 
[...]. When other spectators marvelled that Hamlet’s hair actually seemed to stand on end as the ghost 
appeared, they testified to a fact. The ingenious Perkins had engineered a mechanical wig to simulate 
the precise physiognomy of mortal dread. On the line “Look, my lord, it comes”, the hairs of this 
remarkable appliance rose up obligingly at the actor’s command’ (58). 
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being affected, it is not possible for affect to be unauthentic, even if it is recognised 
that affect and emotion are at least partially subjected to social structuring.    
 
Conclusion: The Irruption of the Real 
The observation that affect cannot but be authentic ought to at least acknowledge 
that authenticity might still be subject to degrees. For McConachie, the mind is not 
taken in so easily by figurative or representational stimuli. For him, the thing 
invested in as an affective stimulus, whilst it may be productive of affect, is of a 
lesser order than a comparable stimulus outside the world of make-believe: 
Within theatrical play, humans can almost always distinguish between a 
stimulus of fear or panic emanating from the stage and a stimulus that 
directly threatens their lives. Spectators may vicariously experience Blanche 
Dubois’ panic within the make-believe of [A] Streetcar [Named Desire], but 
if the scenery catches on fire and people are rushing for the exits, the 
perceived threat to life and limb will put an abrupt end to play time. (51) 
What this perspective presupposes is that the real cannot irrupt within the aesthetic, 
but may only do so as an imposition from outside of it. However, to borrow from 
Lehmann’s Postdramatic Theatre, the ‘closed fictional cosmos’ (99) assumed in this 
perspective has for quite some time been intentionally opened up by numerous 
directors and theatre companies, such as Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio and Forced 
Entertainment, as well as having remained an often unintended risk inscribed in 
theatrical representation itself. Such unintended risks have also been explored by 
Ridout, where realness is revealed as an implicit part of the machine of theatrical 
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representation once that machine begins to break down: through actors ‘drying’, for 
instance, or ‘corpsing’ (168).20  
The intentional deployment of an irrupting real is also exemplified in the 
work of Extant, in particular Sheer (2012), where a company of blind actors perform 
for an audience in pitch black. Their blindness is not representational, for they are 
blind, and neither is the darkness enveloping the audience, for the darkness which 
envelops them and the sight which it consequently deprives them of does precisely 
that; it does not represent the deprivation of sight. The representational frame, as a 
totalising, enclosing frame, is consequently ruptured by that which is not just 
representing blindness, but presenting blindness as a presence partly shared between 
blind actors and a temporarily blinded audience in the pitch black. 
 I want to consider the irruption of the real – a term borrowed from 
Lehmann’s Postdramatic Theatre (99-104) – as something that is produced among 
participating audiences, not as a consequence of theatre failing, but as a consequence 
of how affect gets produced in the theatre, especially in immersive theatre.
21
 
Catherine Bouko is right to suggest that ‘postdramatic performance rejects the 
convention of illusion and reinforces the manifestation of a concrete experience, here 
and now’ (30). For me, though, an important root of this here-and-nowness can occur 
in spaces of illusion, or even in spite of illusion. The irruption of the real is an 
                                                 
20
 An example of a different ilk to the instances of corpsing, drying and the like studied by Ridout is 
Finbar Lynch’s playing of the Cardinal in a production of John Webster’s The Duchess of Malfi at 
London’s Old Vic (2012). The actor broke his arm in a motor cycle accident towards the end of the 
rehearsal period, evidenced by his wearing of a black sling in performance. For one critic, this 
unintended irruption of the real made a welcome entrance to the aesthetic of the play (Lawson). 
21
 Ridout comes close to voicing a comparable opinion in his account of Samuel West catching his 
eye in a production of Richard II, whereby embarrassment accompanies acknowledgment of the 
actor’s labour conditions (70-81). Ridout’s focus, however, is drawn more to the material conditions 
of theatrical production and the dissolution of theatrical representation. It should also be noted that I 
depart, slightly, from Lehmann’s specific instance on the self-reflexive use of the real in postdramatic 
theatre (103). Affect production, as an irruption of the real in immersive theatre, may, or may not be 
self-reflexively intended by immersive theatre makers – it may just as well be coincidental.  
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implicit part of affect production among theatre audiences. The panic that an 
audience might empathetically share with Blanche Dubois is not not panic. Even 
though the stimulus might reside in the world of make-believe, the affect does not. 
Whilst the scenery catching fire might produce a more intense affective experience, 
the engagement with character just described is not somehow rendered unauthentic. 
The spectator is, as Marie-Madeleine Mervant-Roux maintains, borrowing from Elie 
Konigson, a ‘guardian of reality’ (231). For Mervant-Roux, the spectator is ‘firmly 
anchored in social reality’ whilst investing in ‘the poetry of the stage’ (232). This 
reality, whilst it is social, also has an affective element and it is this element which 
serves as an irruption of the real, perhaps even reminding the audience of their 
anchoring within reality.  
 Figuring the spectator as a guardian of the real serves to underline the theme 
of responsibility which has been steadily introduced in this chapter, but from an 
inverse perspective. Mervant-Roux seems to suggest that this responsibility anchors 
and roots the poetry of theatre in the context of a material social reality. It is in this 
sense that the spectator, as a guardian of the real, functions as an intermediary. So, in 
Cold Storage, where affect functions as an aesthetic site for the theatre event, the 
participating spectator becomes a vessel through which theatre passes and is realised. 
This vessel is not solely of the theatrical world, for the audience functions as a 
guardian of the real and retains coherence as a distinct personality, nor does the 
theatrical world absorb or take over the audience-as-vessel; rather, as medium, the 
affected participating subject, through projection and imagination, personalises that 
theatrical world. And this ultimately designates an aesthetics of audience 
participation, as well as the profound productivity of participating audiences in 
immersive theatre.  
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 This chapter has argued that affect plays a central role in an aesthetics of 
audience participation in Cold Storage. The next chapter sees how this might apply 
to Lundahl and Seitl’s Rotating in a Room of Images, where a second cornerstone of 
this aesthetics will be introduced: risk perception. In what follows, affect production 
and risk perception will be approached as elements of an aesthetics of audience 
participation that are thoroughly bound up with one another.  
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Chapter Two: The Perception of Risk in Lundahl & 
Seitl’s Rotating in a Room of Images 
A woman in blue stands to my left and gestures for me to sit down. She approaches 
and covers my ears with headphones and hangs a sling containing an MP3 player 
across my shoulder. The lights fade to black. A young female voice asks me to stand 
up and in doing so I make the first of many stumbles. The lights fade back up and the 
orientation of the room has shifted 90 degrees to form a long, white corridor: a trick 
made possible by the use of fabric drapes to mark the space’s boundaries. The lights 
fade back to black. The voice asks me to reach out my hand before another hand 
gently touches mine. Despite its gentleness, the touch comes as a shock. The hand 
guides me through the darkness. Somehow this person can see. This is the hand that 
will appear from above, below, in front of and behind for me to find as the stumbling 
and fumbling continues. The lights fade up. The dimensions of the room have 
changed again. Like a game of hide-and-seek, this goes on. I soon find myself facing 
myself; a camera protrudes from a fabric wall in front of me and I am writ-large 
around it. I look behind. Nothing. I look back at the projection, but this time a man 
and a woman appear in shot, walking towards me: a couple seemingly plucked from 
a Baroque painting. After more searching through the dark, I find the couple and the 
woman in blue performing a ritual of some kind behind a set of open doors. The 
voice in my headphones asks me to approach. When I draw near, a performer stands 
in my path. We look into each other’s eyes. The door is closed.  
 
112 
 
This describes my experience of Rotating in a Room of Images by Christer Lundahl 
and Martina Seitl: a performance programmed the same year as Cold Storage at the 
BAC’s One-on-One Festival. Rotating revisited and revised Recreational Test Site 
(2007), also performed at the BAC, which itself shared some stylistic and 
technological techniques with an even earlier manifestation, My Voice Shall Now 
Come from the Other Side of the Room (2006). These three performances chart an 
important part of Lundahl & Seitl’s on-going aesthetic interest in sensory deprivation 
and limitation. All three performances limit vision, or deprive audiences of sight 
altogether, either through white-out goggles, or by fading the lights to black at 
intermittent intervals. Much like Cold Storage, headphones are also placed over the 
ears of participants to provide narrative and blot out any unwanted audio spill, 
promoting a highly controllable sense of aesthetic cohesion. In other words, sensory 
deprivation or limitation is used to turn aesthetic attention inwards, towards an 
experiencing self that searches, feelingly, in a coherently perceived immersive 
world. Coherence need not necessarily refer to an ease of understanding; it might just 
as well refer to synergised aesthetic qualities that may or may not appear fully 
cognisable. In these performances, techniques of sensory deprivation and limitation 
end up deployed as an immersive medium and I want to address what that medium 
can tell us about an aesthetics of audience participation.  
Audiences have experienced darkened theatre auditoria at least since André 
Antoine’s 1888 production of La mort du Duc’d’Enghien, after the advent of highly 
controllable electric lamps in 1879. However, Ridout argues for ‘much earlier 
attempts to achieve a dark auditorium in the case of the theatre of San Giovanni 
Crisostomo (1677) in Venice’ (48-49). Watching theatre from within a darkened 
space has become an assumed fact of experiencing many theatre events, albeit one 
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that, some claim, only started to gain widespread traction following suit from cinema 
in the early twentieth century (Welton, ‘Possibility of Darkness’ 9). Perhaps also in 
debt to Richard Wagner’s pursuit of the gesamtkunstwerk, or total artwork, 
blackening the immediate space outside of a theatre stage focuses audience attention 
on a world of representation on the stage. This can be seen to promote immersion by 
engrossment, despite the separation existing between the world on stage and the 
sedentary space of the auditorium inhabited by an audience. But the origins of 
darkened auditoria and their overwhelming dominance in contemporary theatre 
contexts is perhaps less relevant to a study of darkness in Rotating than a 
consideration of how the pitch-black, specifically in immersive theatre, affects 
audience participation. There is an important difference between watching theatre in 
the dark while seated in an auditorium and participating in the dark while moving 
through a space. That difference, I believe, relates to the perception of risk. What the 
veil of pitch-black bestows on a performance, from an audience’s point of view, is 
uncertainty. This chapter addresses why this is so, why this might be important for 
an address of participatory aesthetics and how that aesthetics might relate to a 
politics of audience participation.  
 
Pitch-Black Theatre 
Pitch-black theatre and installation art events have been performed with increasing 
frequency over the past ten years. Most famous, perhaps, is Miroslaw Balka’s 
installation How It Is (2009) at Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall: a simple, but effective 
container in which individuals could be immersed and move in total blackness. 
ThisNowThis’s Anemone (2011) at Camden People’s Theatre involved audiences 
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being prodded and poked from all angles amid occasional shards of light beaming 
from hand-held torches. As touched on in the previous chapter, Extant’s Sheer 
(2012) at Stratford Circus was performed by a company of blind actors in pitch-
black. Sound&Fury’s Going Dark (2012), performed at London’s Young Vic, made 
audiences share in the deprivation of sight endured by the performance’s protagonist 
as he slowly went blind. Though seated, audiences were encouraged to look all 
around them, especially upwards, straining to see whatever light sources punctuated 
the darkness. Another Sound&Fury work, Kursk (2010), also made use of pitch-
black at the Young Vic to great effect and their earlier performance, The Watery Part 
of the World (2003), performed at Battersea Arts Centre, has received critical 
acclaim for its employment of total darkness. With a brief prologue aside, the 
entirety of David Rosenberg and Glen Neath’s Ring (2012-13) took place in the pitch 
black and used binaural sound recordings played through headphones to deceive 
audiences into thinking that characters were really whispering into their ears, in 
addition to the recorded sound. This three dimensional sound recording technology 
has reached a zenith in recent years and despite having experienced many such 
performances in the past, I was still tricked into collapsing the virtual into the actual 
in a pitch-black performance space where such distinctions could not be visually 
verified and where uncertainties prevailed.  
Depriving audiences of sight has also been approached by theatre makers in a 
number of other guises aside from blacking out theatre spaces and these other guises 
introduce a highly charged eroticism to the live participatory encounter. This is 
especially true of Ontroerend Goed’s The Smile Off Your Face (2007) at C SoCo in 
Edinburgh, where audiences were blindfolded, with their wrists bound, forced to 
submit to the control of the performers. Bad Physics’s adaptation of Louis de 
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Bernières’s Sunday Morning at the Centre of the World (2011) at the Southwark 
Playhouse used blindfolds toward less erotic ends, treating the blindfold as a device 
to focus the audience’s attention on senses other than sight. It is also worth 
mentioning the use of hoods covering the entire head in recent theatre events, 
particularly those purporting to ‘kidnap’ or hold audience members hostage, such as 
Lucien Boujeily’s 66 Minutes in Damascus (2012) at Shoreditch Town Hall and the 
second part of Punchdrunk’s corporate performance for Stella Artois Black, The 
Black Diamond (2011).  
Depriving audiences of sight, then, has been frequently deployed by theatre 
and performance makers over the past few years. It seems worth asking what is so 
special about immersing audiences in the pitch-black to warrant such prominence. 
This chapter engages with Rotating as a specific iteration of a more sweeping 
contemporary aesthetic interest in darkness, approaching the deprivation of sight as 
an instrument of immersion. Total darkness surrounds audiences within a constant 
and indefinite pool of blackness. But what might the use of pitch-black in immersive 
theatre, as an instrument of immersion, tell us about the production of affect for a 
participating audience member? And how might this instrument of immersion 
impact on theorising an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre? 
In this chapter, I will be focusing on those moments in Rotating that take 
place in complete darkness. Taking my own experience of the dark in this 
performance as a point of departure, this chapter addresses, first and foremost, the 
perception of risk. Why did the gentle touch of an unseen hand seem shocking, at 
least initially? The hypothesis explored in this chapter proposes that the perception 
of risk has a fundamental role to play in affecting an audience’s attitude, thought and 
behaviour in immersive theatre, taking my own experience of darkness in Rotating 
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as a case in point, emblematised in my reaction to the touch of an unseen other. As 
such, I will be enquiring into the relationships between affect production and risk 
perception, particularly as both might relate to an aesthetics of audience 
participation. As the chapters that follow look to demonstrate, this hypothesis asserts 
that risk perception is not just derived from an experience of darkness; rather, it 
asserts that the experience of darkness, as an affectively resonant instrument of 
immersion, renders abundantly clear an aesthetic facet of audience participation in 
immersive theatre that is partly derived from the audience’s perception of risk.  
The suggestion is, then, that the presence of affects and sensations as 
contributing inputs to and possible results of the perception of risk are not novel to, 
but nonetheless are especially clear in the pitch-black and even clearer when 
audiences are invited to move in the pitch-black. In the midst of this dyad, between 
affect production and risk perception, is a subject who thinks, feels and imagines: 
that is, an authorial subject. Affected audiences desire, fantasise and worry, 
projecting out into a space a number of possibilities of what could be lurking 
somewhere in the unseen (Bleeker 18). But how might an experience of and 
movement within the dark amplify this intrinsic facet of spectatorship, in excess of 
Rancière’s urge to regard viewing as an authorial action (‘The Emancipated 
Spectator’ 13)? Watching theatre attests to more than the act of looking and thinking; 
it is a creative, imaginative and embodied act that is distinct from receiving some 
rigidly defined entity with a sovereign and stable meaning. But how might moving 
and watching, especially in darkness, send such acts into overdrive? What then 
happens to the political figuring of a participating audience?  
The scope for audiences to be rendered creative subjects in pitch-black 
theatre, the scope for audiences to participate by means of imaginative projection, is 
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wide. Maaike Bleeker acknowledges that ‘we always see more or less than what is 
there’ and that seeing is imbued ‘with ideals, values, presuppositions, fears, and 
desires’ (18). This perspective shares a great deal with Ahmed’s writing on emotion, 
for there is a comparable onus on pitching the individual subject as the harbinger of 
something productive, be it productive of emotion, or productive of what is seen. In 
both cases the subject’s productivity does not occur in isolation, but in dynamic 
relation with an outside: the emphasis is on co-production. Another goal of this 
chapter is to unpack what might be meant by this dynamism. It seems to me that this 
particular reading of the audience’s creative status is granted a degree of credence 
when read in terms of risk perception. The participant’s status as a creative co-
producer can be both observed and examined and this has implications for that 
participant’s political status.  
The remainder of this chapter is split into three sections: the first places risk 
in theoretical context, exploring important distinctions between risk as a measurable 
uncertainty and subjectively defined risk perception, assessing the significance of 
these distinctions through an analysis of Rotating; the second, ‘Affect and Risk in 
the Dark’, looks at the various ways in which affect production and risk perception 
interrelate in Rotating; a final, concluding section sums up the claims arising in the 
chapter, before looking at how risk perception relates to trust, isolation and privacy. 
This concluding shift of attention towards trust introduces the significance of a 
critical shift deployed in the next part of the thesis, where the arguments arising in 
part one will be re-assessed in the light of immersive theatre’s political context, 
especially as that context relates to economics.  
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Risky Thinking, Risky Practise 
In a forthcoming chapter in Affective Performance and Cognitive Science: Body, 
Brain and Being, ‘(Syn)aesthetics and Immersive Theatre’, Machon recalls her own 
experience of Rotating. For Machon, this was a gentle, trusting performance. Risk is 
not mentioned in her chapter, implying that, for Machon, it was either not perceived, 
or did not warrant reflection. In contrast, my recollection of Rotating recounted 
above illustrates a very different response: one permeated by a sense of anxiety, as 
well as thrill, manifested in the shock accompanying the first gentle touch of an 
unseen hand in the dark. Far from being antagonistic, these divergent responses to 
the work are testament to the rootedness of experience in particular individuals. But, 
despite this rootedness, I believe it is still possible to suggest that risk is an implicit 
part of experiencing much immersive theatre – an implicit part of its aesthetics of 
audience participation – and that this implicit part is rendered most clear in pitch-
black theatre.  
Responses to the integration of risk within the immersive theatre style are 
likely to be divergent; for instance, as the above illustrates, an engagement with risk 
might just as well result in the positive experience of gentility as it might in the 
challenging experience of trepidation. But the plurality of possible affective 
responses to risk perception does not alter the possibility that risk is there to be 
identified in immersive theatre, provided that clear definitions of risk and the 
operation of risk perception are offered. It is to this task that the chapter now turns.  
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Defining Risk 
In the introduction, I suggested that risk is a phenomenon sometimes related to, but 
distinct from harm (Jaeger et al 171). I drew on Reith to help elucidate how risk ‘is 
defined by and through temporality: the notion of “risk” expresses not something 
that has happened or is happening, but something that might happen’ (59, original 
emphasis). In other words, risk necessitates an engagement with something that is 
unknown. An influential voice in risk research, the twentieth century economist 
Frank Knight, was at pains to distinguish uncertainty from risk. For Knight, where 
uncertainty signals something which cannot be measured, risk can be measured. 
What this perspective defends is that risk can be objectively identified from any 
subject position. For Knight, the distinction between risk and uncertainty provides 
the basis upon which profits might be made in the broader context of a market of 
actors (19-20). But once risk is extended outside of a purely economic context, 
without forgetting that context, the place of uncertainty in risk seems integral and 
becomes, I believe, its defining attribute (see Luhmann, Risk 28; Jaeger et al 17). As 
Owen rightly points out regarding an approach to risk analogous to that of Knight, 
uncertainty is not something that can be evacuated from the notion of risk without 
fundamentally altering what it stands for; risk’s remainder in the face of 
measurement – that is, uncertainty – ‘introduces dynamism, the possibility for 
disruption and the potential for gain or loss’ (39). Risk might then be broadly defined 
as an engagement with an uncertain future in the present, treating uncertainty as its 
most important attribute, no matter how honed the techniques to quantify and 
measure risk. Engagement with risk necessitates processes of imagination, 
anticipation or expectation, not to mention possible experiences of affect and 
emotion, as to what could possibly happen at some future point. To engage with risk, 
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then, is to engage with possibility. This section will be working towards an 
understanding of risk that is at odds with Knight’s definition, culminating in the 
subsection on risk perception. In that subsection, risk will be explored as something 
subjectively identified and defined, in relation to a broad range of influences.  
Charting the history of risk’s emergence, as a concept and practise, has 
achieved a degree of consensus in sociology, although varying etymological roots 
have been foregrounded. Reith looks toward the seventeenth century Anglo-French 
risqué to underscore the ways in which time and uncertainty can be seen to 
complement one another (64). In the contemporary British context, the meaning of 
the word risqué has accumulated semiotic baggage and tends to be used to describe 
something or someone as edgy, controversial, erotic, potentially dangerous or 
morally questionable, but nonetheless hedonistically inviting. Peter Bernstein prefers 
to approach risk as deriving primarily ‘from the early Italian risicare, which means 
“to dare”’ (8). These etymological inputs might both be treated as informing a 
contemporary understanding of risk today.  
Sociological consensus tends to couple the emergence of risk with the 
devolving power and influence of religion in the European Enlightenment: a 
devolution partly inherited from the Calvinist valorisation of worldly endeavour in 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (Bernstein 1; Luhmann, Risk 13; Lyng, 
‘Sociology of the Edge’ 21; Reith 59). This emergence might also be figured within 
the concurrent rise of RAP explored in the previous chapter, especially with regard 
to Knight’s understanding of risk as a measurable uncertainty. My dismissal of this 
perspective contributes to the ways in which multiple understandings of risk, as a 
concept and a practise, have evolved and are likely to continue doing so, even across 
different contemporaneous contexts.  
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A growing number of sociologists are subscribing to the view, most famously 
promulgated by Ulrich Beck, that risk has been playing an increasingly significant 
role in the lives of citizens in countries all around the world. Comparable, but not 
reducible to RAP, this view frames risk as something that paradigmatically pervades 
culture at all levels (Jaeger et al 22-23). But unlike typical RAP perspectives, this 
pervasion can be rooted as much in feeling, particularly affective and emotional 
feeling, as it can in reasoning. Speaking primarily about Europe and the US, Frank 
Furedi labelled the 1990s as promoting a ‘culture of fear’, in a book of the same 
name. This labelling hit upon the affective and emotional side of risk as something 
permeating even our innermost selves, troubling Knight’s understanding of risk as a 
measurable uncertainty.  
So how did this pervasion of risk come about? In his seminal 1986 
publication on risk, Risk Society, Beck argues that advances in knowledge and power 
‘from techno-economic “progress” is being increasingly overshadowed by the 
production of risks’ (13; cf Luhmann, Risk 28). The creation or development of 
fertilisers, power sources (especially nuclear power), fuels and the like, have the 
capacity to produce both calculable ‘risks’ (in Knight’s sense of the word) and 
wholly unanticipated consequences, often as the product of technological advances 
(see Taleb). This is what led Beck to earmark the late twentieth century as a ‘risk 
society’: or, in Scott Lash’s terms, a more disordered ‘risk culture’ or set of ‘risk 
cultures’ (47). Although Beck’s concern was mainly ecological, his thesis can be 
extended to account for a much broader range of risks, as many other commentators 
have set out to do (see especially Gardner, D.; Furedi).
22
 Public transport bombings 
                                                 
22
 In doing so, the extent to which the ‘risk society’ might be called a ‘world risk society’ is 
diminished. For more on this, see Beck’s ‘World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society?’ 
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and a host of other terrorist threats (see Merolla and Zechmeister), malnutrition, 
obesity, AIDS, any number of animal flus, recessions, funding cuts… 
Scaremongering is something easily exploited by the mass media to the extent that 
risks of various kinds seem commonplace. It is the commonplaceness of risk that the 
risk society thesis alludes to.  
If risk is going to be pitched as having fundamental relevance to an 
audience’s encounter with immersive theatre, then this discursive context should be 
borne in mind. As this section goes on to demonstrate, risk perception does not occur 
in isolation, but depends on what a subject brings to it and it seems likely that this 
‘bringing with’ will spring from a subject’s personal experience of a very particular 
historical moment. Significantly, the apparent omnipresence of risk has the power to 
hold sway over thought and action: it has political power. As such, to take risks is to 
act politically, while to have risks imposed is to be politically acted upon. It seems 
unlikely that either pole of this binary might be comfortably inhabited, but 
negotiating the pull between risk-taking and risk-bearing is not only possible, but 
profound in our contemporary context. As discussed in the introduction, this is 
precisely what Owen seems to find so compelling about risk. This distribution begs 
some important questions: politically speaking, what does it mean to engage with 
risk today, particularly in the context of immersive theatre? How is risk distributed 
and who ends up better off?  
A useful means of approaching these questions is provided if audience 
participation is conceived as a practise. In a comparable way to theatre makers 
practising the craft of theatre, so might audience participants practise participation in 
immersive theatre. This idea will be explored most fully in part two of this thesis and 
provides a foundation for my notion of entrepreneurial participation. But what the 
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idea of practising participation offers present purposes is a means of thinking about 
engagement with risk in immersive theatre in the light of Owen’s risk-taking and 
risk-bearing subjectivities touched on in the introduction. What does it mean to 
practise risk in immersive theatre, either as a risk-taking, or risk-bearing audience 
participant?  
 
Practising Risk 
Stephen Lyng uses the term ‘edgework’, borrowing from Hunter S. Thompson, to 
refer to the many ways in which risk might be practised and his commentary on 
edgework offers two frameworks to help with thinking through audience 
participation as a risky practise. The first regards edgework practises as a ‘means of 
freeing oneself from social conditions that deaden or deform the human spirit 
through overwhelming social regulation and control’ (‘Risk-Taking Experience’ 10; 
see also Simon, ‘Taking Risks’). Practising risk-taking in the light of this framework 
can be seen as a response to sanitisation, bureaucracy, or a host of other 
governmental processes, particularly, that are perceived to restrict free expression 
and activity. The notion of social regulation and control might also be elucidated if 
risk itself is acknowledged as being structurally embedded in, for example, a 
government’s approach to the welfare state. Although speaking primarily about New 
Labour, Bishop acknowledges the relevance to current coalition government policy 
in the UK of structurally embedded risk, especially through the rhetoric of 
volunteerism: ‘social participation is viewed positively because it creates submissive 
citizens who respect authority and accept the “risk” and responsibility of looking 
after themselves in the face of diminished public services’ (Artificial Hells 14). 
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Likewise, drawing on Pat O’Malley, Owen takes interest in the largely governmental 
institutionalisation of risk as a valorised practise bearing an especially close 
relationship to responsible citizenship (258-60). This is what Jacob Hacker has 
dubbed ‘the great risk shift’, describing the US context (although much the same can 
be said of the UK over the past thirty years): a shift in which citizens undergo ‘a 
massive transfer of economic risk from broad structures of insurance, including those 
sponsored by the corporate sector as well as by government, onto the fragile balance 
sheets of American families’ (6). I will be addressing the political and economic 
context framing risk more thoroughly in the next chapter, but it is necessary at this 
point to introduce what Lyng means when he describes risk-laden social conditions 
in terms of social regulation and control – a point that, once plucked from the clarity 
of its original context, might otherwise end up prone to the vagaries of abstraction.  
Lyng’s first framework addressing edgework practises regards practises of 
risk-taking as subversive responses to a regulatory framework, be it bureaucratic, 
governmental, or work related, among a number of other possible regulatory 
frameworks. Applied to immersive theatre, audience participation might also, 
potentially, be regarded in these terms: as a subversive response to a regulatory 
framework. Viewed as an edgework practise, audience participation in immersive 
theatre might be approached as an attempt to reclaim control of how risk influences 
and operates on thought and behaviour, on however small, or trivial a scale. 
However, as will become clear below, this proposition is certainly contentious. 
Lyng’s second edgework framework refers back, even more explicitly, to the 
risk society in which risk-taking ‘is itself a key structural principle extending 
throughout the social system in institutional patterns of economic, political, cultural 
and leisure activity’ (‘Risk-Taking Experience’ 8). This framework takes a more 
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sceptical view of the socio-economic context just touched upon, expressing 
pessimism toward the possibilities for edgework practises to operate as resistant or 
subversive. This framework regards edgework practises as potentially prompting the 
desire for risky practises in the first place, regarding that desire not as a radical 
intervention against a regulatory system but as an exponent of it. It also regards 
outlets for edgework practises as being, at least potentially, imbricated within a much 
wider and more pervasive network of risk-taking, more often than not allied with a 
sanitisation of risk, or a capitalisation on the desire for risk-taking. An example here 
would be the rise of adventure companies that promise an experience of risk in the 
wild, such as white water rafting, where the most risky part of such an experience 
among expert professionals would be the car journey there (Holyfield, Jonas and 
Zajicek 177). In such a context, risk ends up being both sanitised and potentially 
subject to capitalisation, despite, or because of the potential for thrill to be derived 
from the experience.  
Either of these two frameworks – of aiming to free oneself from the risk 
society’s social conditions, on the one hand, and regarding risk as a structural 
principle affecting risk-taking’s subversive potential, on the other – might usefully 
aid an address of a politics of participation in immersive theatre. Where the first 
might be seen as a political act of resistance against the risk society, the second – and 
this will be addressed in part two – makes space for third parties to exploit that 
potentially political act, deriving profit from the desire which lies at its heart.  
According to the definition of risk explored so far, risk perception among 
immersive theatre audiences might result in feeling just about anything. If the risk 
turns out well, it might promote excitement, thrill, joy or a rewarding sense of 
trusting and being trusted. Drawing on Lyng’s first edgework framework, practising 
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risk in immersive theatre may even have the potential to be subversive in the context 
of the risk society, which may end up promoting a sense of fulfilment, satisfaction, 
or pride – bearing in mind that these consequences may just as well be co-opted 
towards profitable ends by third parties. But a number of challenging alternatives 
might also emerge. An audience might end up feeling exposed, vulnerable, 
accountable, or responsible for something or someone in a way that may be at odds 
with what they want, desire or value. This, too, may be subversive of the risk society 
by virtue of how such feelings might resist profitable co-optation.  
This being said, applying risk as a tool for analysing immersive theatre is not 
as simple as dividing into a binary good and bad responses to a risk scenario. I define 
a risk scenario as any occurrence involving risk perception among one or more 
subjects, either inside, or outside of a theatre space. To illustrate why such a binary 
division is misleading, I refer to some possible encounters with responsibility in 
Rotating. Conceived as a risk that might be practised, responsibility has both positive 
and negative possibilities implied within it. This is what renders responsibility as 
risky; the outcome arising from being responsible for something, such as 
participating in Rotating in a way that does not disturb the artistic integrity of the 
performance, as the artists might be seen to have imagined it, might turn out either 
well, or badly. Responsibility is not fixed as being either good or bad, restrictive or 
freeing. It might even have attributes of both, depending on the particular individual 
caught within the risk scenario. To be responsible for Rotating as a participant – or, 
to be more precise, to be partially responsible, sharing what may be only the tiniest 
part of a network of responsibilities with the theatre makers and the institutions 
housing and funding the event – might result in a sense of empowerment, or a 
pleasing feeling that one is being trusted and respected. But what if a transfer of 
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responsibility is not wanted, no matter how minimal the efficacious implications of 
that transfer? What if even the gesture of a transfer of responsibility onto the 
shoulders of audiences leaves them nervous or anxious in the absence of a clear 
indication of what that transfer entails? Where is the line to be placed between 
participating as a submissive figure and a committed maverick? What if audiences 
end up feeling exposed, vulnerable or accountable for something that they did not 
want to be held accountable for? To complicate the uncertainty of responding to a 
risk like responsibility even further, what if the potential for anxiety to be produced 
in relation to responsibility might in fact be experienced positively, as a thrilling 
challenge?  
In the previous chapter I examined the production of affect in Cold Storage 
and by applying Ahmed’s relational approach to emotion to that examination I 
demonstrated how an individual participant’s autobiography is drawn into the 
performance by means of projection and imaginative engagement. It seems to me 
that if risk is defined as it has been in this chapter so far, then something similar is at 
stake. Participation in immersive theatre involves practising risk, whether or not a 
risk scenario is identified as such and especially if a particular performance is being 
experienced by an audience for the first time. This does not mean that audiences are 
put at threat of physical harm in immersive theatre; rather, it means that audiences 
are being asked to participate in something in which the end points of the 
performance, or means of achieving those end points, are likely to lack certainty for 
the participating audience member. In other words, the aesthetic terms of audience 
participation in immersive theatre, given their relation to uncertainty, relate to an 
encounter with risk. Risk is integrated within the participatory aesthetic, no matter 
what the threat of physical harm might be. Theatre companies and audiences can 
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minimise the scope for this uncertainty to emerge, but that is not to say that risk will 
be rendered null and void for participating audiences. One reason why this is so is 
made apparent once risk, as an objectively and empirically validated quantity, is 
distinguished from risk perception.  
 
Aesthetics of Risk 
When Lehmann calls for ‘an aesthetics of risk’ in his conclusion to Postdramatic 
Theatre, he calls for an engagement with taboo as it resides at the interface between 
theatre making and audience reception. My reading of ‘an aesthetics of risk’ places 
less onus on breaking with taboo and more on how risk gets perceived, as a 
politically charged phenomenon. I agree with Lehmann that ‘[t]he politics of theatre 
is a politics of perception’ (185, original emphasis), but I am especially interested in 
exploring such a politics through the audience’s perception of risk and risk-taking, 
alongside affect production. For me, the terms of perception’s political charging 
relate to how aesthetics and politics can be seen to intertwine – but I reserve an 
explicit account of their mutuality for part three. For now, it is necessary to lay out 
what is meant by risk perception and how it ties into an aesthetics of risk.   
The Oregon Group, comprised of Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah 
Lichtenstein, are pioneers of what has come to be known in risk perception research 
as the ‘psychometric paradigm’. The psychometric paradigm ‘encompasses a 
theoretical framework that assumes risk is subjectively defined by individuals who 
may be influenced by a wide array of psychological, social, institutional and cultural 
factors’ (Slovic xxiii). Significantly, this paradigm recognises just how highly 
dependent risk perception is ‘upon intuitive and experiential thinking, guided by 
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emotional and affective processes’ (xxxi). The psychometric paradigm is based on 
four intentions: 
 to establish ‘risk’ as a subjective concept, not an objective entity, 
 to include technical/physical and social/psychological aspects in risk criteria, 
 to accept opinions of ‘the public’ (i.e. laypeople, not experts) as the matter of 
interest, 
 to analyse the cognitive structure of risk judgments [...]. (Renn and 
Rohrmann, ‘Risk Perception Research’ 17) 
To be clear: my reference to the psychometric paradigm is not intended to flag a 
research method to be applied in this chapter, at least not directly. I refer to it only to 
indicate how risk might be conceived in terms of perception, as something explicitly 
distinct from Knight’s understanding of risk. Two important implications arise from 
this distinction for an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre: 
firstly, it suggests how risk perception might occur in a risk-assessed theatre space; 
secondly, it provides scope for a range of possible responses to an uncertain future, 
thus reconciling the possibilities in Rotating, as a case in point, for divergent 
affective responses to emerge from perceiving a given stimulus, such as the touch of 
an unseen hand. In short, the psychometric paradigm ascribes to risk perception the 
importance of autobiography in an individual’s aesthetic encounter with a live 
theatre event.  
The psychometric paradigm constitutes a major shift from the macro level of 
the risk society to the particularities of how individuals encounter risk. What the 
psychometric paradigm does is ground risk in the mind and body of a thinking, 
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feeling and potentially acting subject. It marries risk to risk perception. Individuals, 
in relation to their social context, are the ones who create the risk society, 
contributing to that society through conversation, blogging and just about any other 
activity or practise that transmits or expresses an individual’s understanding of, or 
engagement with, risk. Individuals remain the seat of risk’s existence. This does not 
bar the possibility that social regulation might affect risk perception, as Lyng 
acknowledges; rather, it provides theoretical grounding for the assertion that such 
social regulation is still mediated through an individual and will consequently be 
thought about and acted upon differently across different subject positions.  
This point is clarified once the multiple sources which might impact on risk 
perception are foregrounded and risk perception is treated as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon (Renn and Rohrmann, ‘Risk Perception Research’ 41). Treated as such, 
various social and cultural affiliations are likely to have a role to play in affecting 
risk perception, as opposed to some monolithic and singular source such as 
government, although such a source may still prove significant. These kinds of 
affiliations are likely to produce similar risk perceptions among those within 
particular social and cultural groups (Douglas and Wildavsky 6-9), but the sheer 
number of contemporary affiliations is likely to promote a fairly complex set of 
contributing inputs to an individual’s risk perception.  
As Ortwin Renn and Bernd Rohrmann suggest, elements of this ‘multi-
dimensionality’ include a number of ‘heuristics that individuals and groups use when 
forming judgments about risks’, ‘cognitive and affective factors that influence the 
perception process’, ‘the social and political framework in which individuals and 
groups operate’ and ‘cultural factors that govern or co-determine’ these other 
dimensions (‘Cross-Cultural’, 221-222; see also Tversky and Kahneman). Risk 
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perception, then, is not simply determined by the macro scale of a society, but is 
imbricated in a considerably more complex process of sociality and cultural 
production. The individual and society are not taken as isolated inputs, but 
interrelated contributors to the multi-dimensionality of the production of risk 
perception. This perspective regards individuals as potentially contributing to the 
framing of risk within a given social milieu: a milieu that will also contribute to how 
risk ends up being perceived, alongside innumerable other inputs such as 
government, the media and the family.  
To sum up: the perception of risk, as something which is subjectively defined 
by an individual and contingent on prior exposure to a host of different inputs, is 
distinct from more objective accounts of risk, such as Knight’s measurable 
uncertainties. Conceived as such, risk perception arises as an important part of an 
aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre as a consequence of 
participation demanding an engagement with largely uncertain end points and means 
of achieving those end points. In other words, to participate in a context of 
uncertainty is to contribute to both the aesthetic production and experience of 
immersive theatre. To participate is to imagine, anticipate, expect, or feel what a 
possible future might hold. Possible futures might involve either good or bad 
experiences of performance, but identifying those experiences as being either good 
or bad will depend on the participant and may even involve elements of both.  
Approaching risk in this way helps to elucidate why I found the gentle touch 
of an unseen hand so shocking in Rotating and why Machon seems to have derived 
such a different set of responses from the performance. I am not suggesting that an 
individual consciously contemplates the experience of darkness mid-performance as 
being risky (although they might, particularly as far as sensationship is concerned, to 
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recall Trezise) and I am not suggesting that an individual treats risk as a measurable 
uncertainty, as Knight would have it. Rather, whether they like it or not, audience 
participants are forced to encounter uncertainty in this work because they are less 
knowledgeable about the world in which they find themselves compared with the 
performers populating that world, especially if the performance is being experienced 
for the first time. It should also be noted that this does not prohibit the possibility of 
bettering participation in relation to other audience members. Previous exposure to 
immersive theatre and especially the work of Lundahl & Seitl is likely to 
counterbalance the extent of this uncertainty – indeed, this is going to be a key 
argument put forward in the next part of the thesis – but the fact remains that the 
audience is likely to be confronted by a situation in which they are asked to 
participate, but of which they might know very little. This openness to possibility is 
what is risky for participating audiences, particularly the perception of various 
possibilities that might arise through one’s participation, despite the capacity for 
efficacious action that may in fact be handed over to audiences: a capacity that may 
be fairly inconsequential. Even if, in hindsight, it is revealed to an audience that they 
had very little control over a performance, there is still plenty of space in the live 
moment of performance to encounter risk as a participating audience. Repeat 
attendance either to the work, or comparable immersive theatre performances, may 
procure a sceptical attitude toward risk perception, but once the notion of risk is 
uncuffed from both physical harm and measurable uncertainty, it arises as a concept 
that might usefully impact on how we understand an aesthetics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre.  
It is worth returning at this point to a vital adjunct: the contingency of an 
aesthetics of risk on particular audiences. For Machon, the gentle touch of an unseen 
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hand in Rotating seemed beguiling, playful and dreamlike; for me, it was not that 
these characteristics were absent from the hand’s tactile invitation to guide, but that 
they were experienced differently. An important stimulus producing experience for 
an audience in such a moment – the touch of a hand in darkness – remains much the 
same for all audiences who experience this work; what changes are the other inputs 
which impact on aesthetic experience, inputs that are contingent on the participating 
audience’s state of mind, their disposition towards participatory work and many 
other contingencies too numerous to list, such as an attitude towards tactility. Is it 
any wonder, then, that the relationships between performers and audiences in 
immersive theatre performances like Rotating are imbued with uncertainty?  
Addressed in the light of risk perception research, what emerges through this 
commentary is a hyperactively creative subject. To borrow from Bleeker, an 
experience of darkness makes apparent how ‘we always see more or less than what is 
there’ and that seeing is shot through ‘with ideals, values, presuppositions, fears, and 
desires’ (18). The perception of risk is contingent on the participant involved and it 
is consequently dependent on the multiple inputs or dimensions pertinent to risk 
perception. As a participant, my perception of risk is likely to be informed by the 
rules of thumb deployed in, for instance, anchoring a particular risk scenario in the 
light of previous and comparable experiences (see Tversky and Kahneman 1128). In 
order for risk perception to occur, then, there must also occur a colouring of 
something as risky. In the terms articulated in the previous chapter, this might even 
be identified as a creative act of projecting onto an object of perception the status of 
its being risky: even an imagined object, such as an unseen hand approaching the 
body of an audience member.  
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There is an assumption that has been underlying this subsection: that acts of 
anticipating or expecting, as acts of imaginative projection into an immersive theatre 
environment, play an important role in the perception of risk. But what justification 
is there that supports this idea of a subject projecting the status of ‘risky’ onto 
something or someone, beyond my account of the psychometric paradigm? Is it right 
to figure participants in this way, as hyperactively creative subjects?  
Some useful justificatory material has indeed arisen from the social and 
cognitive sciences that would seem to support the claims I have been making. The 
promotion of prudency in relation to risk, for instance, where prudency equates to a 
value, testifies to the precautionary principle: a principle that Furedi argues has 
become engrained not just through social and political life (107), but has also 
become absorbed by individuals as the number of professed risks escalates and the 
notion of victimhood becomes all-pervasive (100-01). For Furedi, ‘[t]here exists a 
disposition towards the expectation of adverse outcomes’ (53) and this disposition, 
what he also describes as a ‘pervasive mood’ and ‘free-floating consciousness’, tends 
to attach itself to ‘a variety of concerns and experiences’ (20). A comparable view 
has also been supported in cognitive science. Justin L. Barrett’s research into the 
Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device (HADD) asserts that human beings are 
predisposed to seek out and attribute risk as an evolutionary principle, for it is better 
for survival to assume risk than forego that assumption and end up being harmed 
(189). Taken together, the research of both scholars suggests that projecting onto 
something the state of risky is a very real and identifiable process.  
On a separate, but related note, the discrepancy between the threat to life 
caused by smoking and the potentially more intense, affectively present risk of harm 
through farming and consuming genetically modified foods, for instance, has been 
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commented on by Dan Gardner (12). This discrepancy derives from how degrees of 
risk are attributed to some things, but not others. Roger E. Kasperson et al have 
approached the notion of imaginative projection from the perspective of social 
amplification in the US, responding to data which suggests that ‘[d]espite the 
expenditure of billions of dollars and steady improvements in health, safety, and 
longevity of life, people view themselves as more rather than less vulnerable to the 
dangers posed by technology’ (177). Elsewhere, Sarah Moore and Adam Burgess 
observe how ‘a sense of risk can become attached to an experience or phenomenon 
through the vagaries of the law or the campaigning of individuals’ (1, original 
emphasis). For this to happen, both the law and campaigning, or whatever it might 
be that attaches a sense of risk to an experience, must be experienced and processed, 
either consciously or unconsciously. Either way, risk perception still depends on the 
individual mediating between something like a law or campaign and whatever it is 
that is perceived as risky.  
All of these perspectives leave space to position the individual as a mediator 
of risk perception. Although the seeds of a given risk perception might be socially 
constructed, it still takes the imaginative projection of an individual to render risk not 
just affectively present, as an anxiety, for instance, but present tout court.  
Another useful means of thinking about how risk gets identified comes from 
Ahmed. Although she comments on how someone or something might be rendered 
the subject of an emotional attachment of some kind, it seems to me that there is 
space in her work to consider risk perception as well. Comparable to what I have 
been calling imaginative projection is Ahmed’s notion of ‘stickiness’, described ‘as 
an effect of surfacing, as an effect of the histories of contact between bodies, objects, 
and signs. [...] Stickiness depends on histories of contact that have already impressed 
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on histories of the object’ (Cultural Politics 90, original emphasis). In order for an 
object to become sticky, however, it requires an interlocutor and this interlocutor is 
not some passive recipient of an object which is already sticky; rather, I would argue, 
in the context of risk, that for something to be observed or experienced as sticky it 
requires the observer to render it as such, provided that that rendering is understood 
as being profoundly influenced by the multi-dimensionality of risk perception. So, 
for instance, whilst there may be an instinctual drive to fear the dark in Rotating, the 
‘stickiness’ of that darkness being perceived as risky is likely to relate to a whole 
host of experiences and associations: growing up as a child, watching films, reading 
ghost stories, etc. Such influences impact on why we might encounter the dark as 
risky. They stick to the darkness, as affective residue, but the sticking is done by an 
interlocutor that, in this case, might otherwise be called a participating audience. 
With this in mind, the perception of risk seems best approached in terms of its 
relationality: in terms of what the individual subject projects onto a thing, space or 
person. This is about aligning the personal with social space, testing the ways in 
which risk perception, as with Ahmed’s understanding of emotion, helps us to 
acknowledge the fluidity of the personal, the social and an immediate environment 
(Cultural Politics 70).  
Given its capacity to infuse an environment – a theatre environment, say – 
risk has an immersive quality. Unlike theatre spaces with sedentary auditoria, free-
roaming in immersive theatre, especially, maximises the degree of uncertainty 
unfolding before an audience by amplifying acts of anticipation, expectation and 
imagination as participants walk within and around different spaces. This, in turn, 
maximises the potential for risk to be perceived, felt and acted upon. To speak of 
immersive theatre, then, is to extend an understanding of aesthetics beyond aspects 
137 
 
of theatre such as mise en scène, lighting and even use of multiple spaces; it seems 
that an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre can also refer to the 
imbuing of spaces as risky, via the audience’s perception of risk, consequently 
immersing audiences in risk’s ambience as a product of risk-laden imaginative 
projection. 
What this onus on an imagined, anticipated, expected or felt future in 
Rotating encourages is a revisiting of the claims arising from the previous chapter, 
most notably the proposition that the production of affect plays a fundamental role in 
an aesthetics of audience participation in Cold Storage. I now want to add risk 
perception to that proposition, only this time discussing Rotating, looking at how 
both the production of affect and the perception of risk might interrelate as central 
and integral attributes of this aesthetics. The hypothesis now is that the production of 
affect and the perception of risk might form two components of an important 
bedrock behind an aesthetic experience of immersive theatre performances and that 
these two components might in fact interrelate.  
 
Affect and Risk in the Dark 
Of all of the dimensions to risk perception, one will be granted special attention in 
this section: affect. Renn and Rohrmann are not alone in underlining the significance 
of affect in the promotion of risk perception (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, ‘New Risks’ 
66). As proposed in the previous chapter, affect is, simultaneously, an aestheticised 
site of the audience’s attention in immersive theatre as well as an authentic 
experiential site, despite the representations that may have a hand in co-stimulating, 
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along with perception, the production of affect. But what relevance might this have 
for risk perception in performance? 
This section reflects upon and examines my experience of Rotating with 
several goals in mind; the first subsection addresses reasons why affect production is 
so central to this piece; the second reassesses this centrality in relation to risk 
perception, identifying and analysing the ways in which affect production and risk 
perception might be intertwined in a participant’s live encounter with an immersive 
theatre performance like Rotating; and the third addresses some implications arising 
from this intertwinement on the basis that the authenticity of affect production might 
find its counterpart in the reality of risk perception.  
  
The Production of Affect in Rotating in a Room of Images 
There is something uncanny about staring into the pitch-black, eyes darting within 
their sockets up, down, left and right and yet seeing nothing – something derived, 
perhaps, from vision involving a whole perceptual system and not just an eyeball 
linked to a brain (Gibson 205). Perhaps this uncanniness, as Martin Welton suggests, 
is the product of this perceptual system being set apart from the glaring lights of a 
Debordian spectacle (Feeling Theatre 53). But Welton also suggests that ‘[i]n the 
absence of the touch of any thing, what is felt in or as darkness is the activity of 
feeling itself’ (63, original emphasis). So what can this activity tell us about the 
production of affect in Rotating? 
While the activity of feeling is apt to be recognised here as a locus of the 
participant’s attention in immersive theatre – i.e. sensationship (Trezise) – so might 
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the embodied activity of trying to see be regarded as a potentially affective source. 
What is more, in the absence of touching any thing, as Welton puts it, or of seeing 
any clearly distinguishable things, the audience may project out into the blackness 
something that might disappear were the lights to be switched on. Such an 
imaginative act is all the more likely if, as is the case in Rotating, the participant has 
indeed been touched by an unseen hand in the dark before. Who is it that has this 
capacity to find me? What else are they able to do? So audiences, in seeing more 
than what is there, although perhaps basing that creative process on previous 
experience, make for themselves a number of other potentially affective sources.  
Removing the spectator’s capacity to see, to spectate, is to potentially narrow 
focus on the theatre experience. It encourages participants to think spatially about the 
body. I mean this in the sense not just of a spectating body in space, a space of 
potential obstacles to walk into, but also, and importantly, in the sense of configuring 
attention as being turned both inward and outward: that is, turning attention to space 
within the body in relation to space outside of the body (Sheets-Johnstone 365). This 
narcissistic interplay, between what takes place in the body and mind and how the 
body might take its place, is surely one of the fundamental qualities of experiencing 
theatre: attending to the corporeal fact of being a spectator. But I believe this 
interplay is granted focus when theatre, especially immersive theatre, downplays its 
focus on sight, or eliminates it altogether. Like a miner’s head lamp turned toward 
inner-space, attention becomes focused much more sharply on goings on in the body 
and mind. As Baz Kershaw puts it, an experience of darkness works to displace ‘the 
dominant visual economies of Western cultures [...]; the world as object of 
representation is replaced by the self as subject of investigation’ (209). In terms 
arising from the previous chapter, this might consequently be seen as another 
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instance of narcissism pertaining to the spectator’s experience in such a context: a 
turning inwards of attention towards experience, but a turning inwards accompanied 
by an incessant projection outwards into a pitch-black immersive world.  
In my own experience of Rotating, the double-edged loci of this attention 
was placed on a feeling of vulnerability and trepidation, where feeling here refers to 
the conscious experience of an affective state produced via precisely this kind of 
dynamism between a feeling body and an environment subjected to creative 
projection. As a consequence of attending to both an unknown outside and an 
affected inside, I found myself taking the smallest of steps through the dark when 
asked to do so. With each step, I was convinced that I was inches from some barrier. 
Small movements were characterised by trepidation and a mild exhilaration. The 
state of unknowing brought about by the darkness was certainly enjoyable as a thrill. 
Although feeling mildly vulnerable, it felt good to be so. There was pleasure to be 
found in losing control, in being disoriented and in being dependent on unseen 
others. Darkness was what produced these affective responses, but darkness itself 
was not the enjoyable part of the performance; for me, the enjoyable part of the 
performance was an experience of affect in the dark.  
 Oftentimes, it is only when something is taken away that something else can 
be apprehended most vividly; this is particularly so when that something is, for 
many, commonplace, like sight. The supposed commonplaceness of sight has been 
fruitfully challenged and rendered strange by Extant, as touched on already when 
discussing theatre by blind performers. Nonetheless, while there remains the 
questionable threat of fetishising darkness as a site of potential pleasure, the point to 
be emphasised is that immersion in darkness renders strikingly apparent and feelable 
the interplay between a body’s inside and outside. As the mind’s eye runs wild 
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where the visual sense is hampered, an unknown outside, or an outside brushed up 
against, or bumped into, or imagined to be such an obstructive outside, becomes a 
particularly strong source of affect. Just what could be out there, lurking?  
 This question is a vitally important one. The question presupposes a subject 
that asks it, of course, but a subject concerned with this interplay between the inside 
of an affected body and an outside of potentially affective sources. The word 
‘potentially’ is crucial here, for it brings into play uncertainty and risk. The last 
chapter spent time unpacking reasons why participating audiences have an important 
role to play in the production of affect, defending the view that autobiography has a 
hand not only in identifying affective sources, but also in characterising how affect 
might be felt in the first place. In other words, the concern in that chapter was 
primarily with what goes on in the body, albeit in relation to an environment outside 
the body that is projected into. The next subsection approaches this notion of 
projecting into something in the context of those moments in Rotating that take place 
in the dark; a focus on risk perception provides a means for doing so.  
 
The Mutuality of Affect Production and Risk Perception 
The imagined scenario of threatening things emerging from the pitch-black, or of 
walking into a wall, as risks which could result in some kind of embarrassment, or 
even injury, just as much as they could in pleasure (or even the pleasure of 
embarrassment), find their counterparts in the reality of affected behavioural states 
induced by such imagining: states which have the capacity to become productive in 
performance once action is prompted and acted upon. In addition, expecting, 
anticipating and imagining, as productive acts, seem likely to amplify the affects 
142 
 
produced in the moment of performance, either by maximising the pleasure felt 
when the risk turns out to be positive or maximising the degree of discomfort felt 
when nervousness, or a comparable affect, is felt to be a justifiable presence were 
embarrassment to ensue. An encounter with risk, as an encounter with an uncertain 
future, might well function not just as a productive source of affect, but as a 
productive source of performance. In this instance, at least, the participant’s affected 
contribution is likely to impact on the performance’s creative trajectory, at least as it 
is experienced by the participating subject.  
All this points towards how risk perception might be productive of affect. 
The participant’s perception of risk is also revealed as potentially impacting on the 
creative trajectory of a performance and in that sense might even be seen to align 
with Lyng’s first edgework framework: as a resistant practise. As a consequence of 
how risk perception might produce affect, it emerges as something that potentially 
intervenes within a performance. But the fact that risk perception might produce 
affect opens up the possibility that uncomfortable or unwanted affective states may 
be produced. There is a risk to affect production; there is no guarantee that the 
production of affect arising from risk perception will be thrilling, exciting or 
pleasurable. It might just as well be deeply unsettling, or uncomfortable. Rather, 
affect itself is presented as a potential risk for audiences. Risk perception, then, 
emerges as being potentially productive of affect, just as affect can itself be regarded 
as a risk for audiences. What is more, as the psychometric paradigm asserts, affect 
also functions as one of a number of possible inputs contributing to the perception of 
risk in the first place. In short, affect and risk can be seen to be profoundly 
intertwined, especially so in an immersive theatre production like Rotating. 
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Risk and the Real 
Brian Massumi has usefully articulated how the anticipation of something which 
does not yet exist, or something that might never exist, but would exist if it could, 
can be productive of affect. What this brings into play is how something subjectively 
imagined can bring about verifiable change in the present. To borrow an example 
from Massumi: whilst an object of risk (for example, a suitcase which is suspected to 
be full of anthrax found at an airport) might turn out to be without risk as a danger of 
some kind (a suitcase leaking flour), the affective realities produced within 
individuals (fear, anxiety, terror, etc.) can bring into being their own material 
realities in a given environment (SWAT teams, news helicopters, road blocks, etc.) 
(‘Future Birth’ 57-58). Much the same can be said of risk perception in Rotating. 
Whilst an object of risk (the risk of someone leaping out from the dark, or of walking 
into a wall) might turn out to be without, or with minimal risk as a danger (a group 
of performers and/or stage hands who know where to lead you safely on a pre-
determined path through the space), the affective realities produced within 
individuals (trepidation, vulnerability and nervousness, for instance) can bring into 
being their own material realities in the present (the manner in which the performer-
audience relationship unfolds as well as the routes carved within mapped routes by 
the affected participant). In other words, risk perception and the cognitive, affective 
and imaginative processes that it entails has the potential to render something 
immaterial – a subjectively defined risk that may be known only to the participant in 
question – into something verifiable by sensation and/or perception in what may or 
may not be a shared environment. The participant’s identification of affective or 
risky sources, even and especially as they are imagined, has the potential to alter the 
status of an immersive world and one’s actions within it. As such, the authenticity of 
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affect production is bolstered by the potential for it to produce something outside of 
the bodies in which it might be experienced; not only that, but risk perception might 
also manifest in this world through its consequences, provided that risk perception is 
acted upon. There is a reality to risk perception, just as there is an authenticity to 
affect production, because both have the potential to promote creative production – 
and this not just in the interior world of a participant’s experience, but also in an 
immersive environment in which bodies are placed or move. While a perceived risk 
may only be imagined, the affects accompanying that perceived risk may have 
material results as a consequence of spurred participatory activity. This is what 
marks the potential reality of risk perception.  
This notion of the ‘reality of risk perception’ leads me to introduce the idea 
of the performativity of risk. As far as I am aware, this is something which has 
gained extremely scant consideration, with only the odd exception. Such an 
exception comes from Oliver Kessler: 
Risk is not a perception or a property of an objective reality [...]. Risk is a 
particular mode of reasoning that names the boundary between known and 
unknown [as Niklas Luhmann has observed]. [...] [O]bserving performativity 
of risk is always to engage in second-order observations: we observe how 
risk shapes the way in which others observe the economy, themselves or 
other actors. (114) 
This suggests that observing risk, as an act of recognition, is what creates risk as 
something which can be labelled and systematised. Kessler’s focus is firmly on 
economics, or, more specifically, economic sociology. At the same time, he borrows 
from linguistics, particularly J. L. Austin’s famous notion of performativity (Kessler 
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113-14). Deploying an understanding of risk that I regard as being indebted to 
Knight, Kessler approaches risk as that which is engineered to deal with an unknown 
future. According to this view, risk brings something into being in much the same 
way as a performative utterance, such as the utterance ‘I do’ at a wedding brings 
about an institutionally recognised bond of marriage. It might also be asserted that 
the formation of a performative utterance, or gesture, is not to downplay its impact 
on a given reality; it is merely to recognise the role of a subject, or set of subjects, in 
bringing about a given state of affairs.  
Even when risk is not understood as something deliberately employed to 
handle an uncertain economic future, Kessler’s argument, I think, remains 
persuasive. What I want to add to his brief engagement with the idea of the 
performativity of risk is not only to apply it to the different context of immersive 
theatre, but to factor in affect as an important element in that context. Risk is 
something which only needs to be perceived or affectively felt in order to imbue a 
space with risk as an ambient presence. This ambience can, through imaginative 
projection, make things, spaces and people become risky sources of affective 
stimulation once perceived. Risk does not in the first instance change the material 
reality of a given environment, but it can change the ways in which that environment 
is perceived and consequently interacted with and altered, however subtly.  
In Rotating, audiences anticipate what could possibly (however unlikely) 
appear from the dark, particularly in relation to personal insecurities. Risk demands 
participation within it and infuses the environment in which a subject affectively 
feels it (ambience), but only as a consequence of imaginative projection. An object, 
space or person is only rendered risky once perceived as such, but in such a way that 
the thing perceived is really the projection of an anticipation, or expectation. In other 
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words, for risk to materialise, there must exist either one, or a number of subjects 
who bring risk into being by way of imaginative projection. The assertion ‘risk 
demands participation within it’ is really an autopoietic demand that comes from the 
participant – a participant exposed to risk’s ambience, even if that subject functions 
as a medium between risk as an ambient presence and the object, space or thing 
taken to be imbued with risk – which is then activated as a performative 
phenomenon.  
I have already looked to demonstrate the significance of affect production for 
immersive theatre participants, but it is now possible to further characterise an 
aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre with regard to risk 
perception. In the pitch-black of Rotating, risk is rendered present and diffuse in a 
space. In the dark, there is no visible object which might be encountered as a risk; 
rather, the audience finds themselves confronted by acts of anticipation and 
expectation, imagining walls to walk into (which may have their material 
counterparts behind the white drapes) and threats that might jump out from the 
blackness. In other words, audiences imagine an important part of the artworks they 
experience, making them especially productive participants as far as aesthetics goes. 
The ambience of risk, then, is an immersive quality which permeates the space, but 
only as a consequence of what the audience imaginatively and narcissistically 
projects into that space, complete with their own personal dispositions and 
prejudices. As such, it is possible to assert that alongside affect production, risk 
perception is central to an aesthetics of audience participation in Rotating.  
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Conclusion: Risk, Trust and Submission 
Affect production and risk perception were revealed in this chapter as being 
intertwined in a number of ways: risk perception was treated as being potentially 
productive of affect; affect was considered as feeding into the perception of risk, 
along with a number of other inputs identified in the psychometric paradigm; and 
affective experience was treated as a potential risk for audiences. It was shown that 
the perception of risk is inscribed as a fundamental part of experiencing Rotating, 
despite the fact that a highly personal reflection on the work provided a point of 
departure for the claim. Risk perception, like affect production, was framed as being 
extorted from audiences, but in a way that resonated with the model of narcissistic 
participation explored in the previous chapter: namely, that the participant, by virtue 
of their implicit creativity manifested in acts of imaginative projection, ends up 
drawing from themselves the identification of things and people – either real or 
imagined – as risky. Evidence was collected to bolster the assertion that imaginative 
projection pertains to the perception of risk and this particular aspect of audience 
participation, one also explored in the previous chapter, was granted the further 
attention it demands through more detailed theoretical argumentation as to what the 
process entails. An important part of this theorisation turned again to Ahmed as a 
means of elucidating how something, or someone, might be identified as risky as a 
consequence of how stickiness operates.  
In this chapter, risk was not considered as an objective phenomenon, but as 
something subjectively defined on the basis of multiple sources, both within a theatre 
space and outside of it. This is not to belittle the affective significance of risk: to the 
contrary, there is a reality to risk perception arising not only through the production 
of authentic affect, but also from the activity of the participant perceiving risk. Risk 
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perception is performative insofar as the naming of something as risky, or even 
thinking of something as risky, even if that thinking occurs without being aware that 
one is encountering risk, has the potential to imbue an immersive space with ambient 
risk. Furthermore, audience participation in immersive theatre was considered as a 
practise, especially in the light of a kind of participation that thrives on risk 
perception. In this way, an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre 
can be identified as a kind of edgework practise, but the framework that that practise 
sits within, as either resisting or conforming to the social regulation of risk, is yet to 
be properly identified.  
This chapter clearly opens up a number of new critical demands, most 
notably the need to think through how immersive theatre performances and their 
participatory practises relate to a given context – especially a political context. In 
concluding this chapter and as a bridge to the next part of the thesis, I want to 
consider three more aspects of experiencing Rotating that are relevant to this 
chapter’s discussion of risk perception: the relationships between risk and trust, the 
potential for isolation to be perceived by a participating audience and the potential 
for privacy to be experienced in a theatre space populated by others, seen or unseen.  
First of all, why is trust relevant to the current discussion? The performers in 
Rotating know the ropes; these are performers who can see in the dark with the 
benefit, I found out after the performance, of night vision goggles; these are 
performers that probably know more than the audience about what is going to 
happen, that are always one step ahead and on which the audience are likely to find 
themselves dependent if they are to successfully follow a path through the 
performance which has been tightly choreographed and effectively designed. 
Lundahl & Seitl have experienced dissident reactions from their audiences, most 
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notably in another work, Observatory (2008), where transgression of what the artists 
deemed ‘acceptable’ participatory responses took place. This performance was not 
for an audience of one, but was rather to be experienced in a group of six 
participants. On one occasion, Lundahl remembers an audience member who ‘said 
she had a bit of a flu, maybe fever’ and who moved through the space violently and 
even ‘pulled and grabbed other visitors in a non-pleasant way’ (email interview). 
This expressive act of anarchic autonomy demonstrates the potential for audiences to 
subvert an ordered performance, albeit at the expense of Lundahl & Seitl’s sanction. 
There is certainly space, then, to be a dissident audience member. However, 
audiences attending this kind of work enter into a frequently unspoken bond of trust 
with the performance in general and the performers in particular. This could be for 
any one of a number of reasons, including a respect for the artists involved and a 
desire to achieve the best possible experience.  
The thing to take away from this anecdote, though, is its rarity. When 
questioned about audience dissidence in the same email interview, Lundahl 
emphasised the clear commitment to trust that the work demands of its audiences: 
‘[t]rust is essential in our work, to trust oneself and others. And being able to let go 
of control and not to see that as a passive action but an active one. Letting go of the 
part of the self that takes action in order to give room for another part of the self that 
is experiencing the self and [its] surrounding[s]’ (email interview). What Lundahl 
appears to be underlining here is the potential for submission to an experience to 
procure rewards for audiences and that this submission, despite the autonomy it can 
be seen to sacrifice, is itself a freeing gesture. What it opens up is the need to discuss 
the relationships between the risk of such a sacrifice and the trust which taking that 
risk can be seen to involve.  
150 
 
 Anthony Giddens paraphrases Niklas Luhmann’s articulation of trust as 
follows:  
an individual who does not consider alternatives is in a situation of 
confidence, whereas someone who does not recognise those alternatives and 
tries to counter the risks thus acknowledged, engages in trust. In a situation of 
confidence, a person reacts to disappointment by blaming others; in 
circumstances of trust she or he must partly shoulder the blame and may 
regret having placed trust in someone or something. (Consequences 31) 
For Giddens, however, ‘it is unhelpful to connect the notion of trust to the specific 
circumstances in which individuals consciously contemplate alternative courses of 
action. Trust is usually much more a continuous state than this implies. [...] [Trust is] 
a particular type of confidence rather than something distinct from it’ (32). 
Dependency on a growing number of experts in a growing number of specialist 
practises – a key feature of Beck’s risk society thesis – stimulates the development of 
cultures of trust. Trust, according to Giddens, at least, ‘may be defined as confidence 
in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events’ 
(34). Over and above this, cultures of trust proliferate as society innovates, 
particularly as a heuristic tied into the most menial of tasks, from the water we drink 
to the transport we choose.  
 What I want to draw from this definition is the idea that performers are 
analogous to any given performance’s experts, for they tend to have a pretty good 
idea of how the performance will unfold: as a run progresses; no matter the degree of 
participation expected of an audience; and despite the idealisation of unpredictability 
that artists may claim their work opens up for the performers (setting aside explicit 
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engagements with chance). As Scorched the Snake makes clear, audience 
participation, in certain circumstances, may well be something that can be rehearsed 
alongside the accumulation of expertise in participation and in knowledge about the 
performance; indeed, the next chapter explores this notion in detail. However, for the 
time being, it is clear that participating audiences more often than not commit 
themselves to the authority of expert theatre makers, if we understand an expert, in 
this instance, as one more knowledgeable and practised in whatever performance is 
on offer. From the outset, participating audiences are positioned as less knowing and 
less practised in the particular performance being performed and, as a consequence, 
as potentially vulnerable, though not necessarily as inferior or powerless. It is in this 
sense that participating audiences can be seen to enter into bonds of trust. This 
provides another instance of how audiences can be seen to engage with risk, 
particularly the risk of trusting in a performance or performer(s) so that an encounter 
with uncertainty might be managed. 
The second point I wish to reflect on in this conclusion is how isolation 
might be experienced by a participating audience in Rotating. The immersive 
instrument of darkness in Rotating, as something which engulfs and could 
potentially hide a set of antagonistic forces, threatens trust by placing participants in 
what might be experienced as a state of vulnerability: one which may be 
characterised by isolation and loneliness in the context of a performance for an 
audience of one. It is as though audiences are being asked to trust in a kind of trust 
which, to pluck from a different context, ‘sets out to undo itself’ (Ridout 80). There 
is a sense of courting trust as something which is to be undone, but only if that 
undoing takes place in such a way that one is never really in any danger. In other 
words, the thing invested in is trust, masquerading as trust which undoes itself. This 
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is not to downplay the affective potential of courting this kind of trust, as something 
perceived to be risky. But what this encourages is a concluding discussion of what 
precisely this trust relationship entails. 
Participants in Rotating are not alone. They watch and are watched by 
performers when the space is lit. Once plunged into darkness, participants are still 
not alone, for unseen hands reach out to lead them through the space. And yet, 
despite this, whenever these hands are absent the participant becomes isolated: a 
monad engulfed in apparently endless darkness. In such moments, the participant’s 
status as an individual is made explicit. When some can find their way through the 
dark and others cannot, those who cannot do so – the audience – might find 
themselves in a bond of trust. This bond also extends to the theatre designer, who is 
likely to take into consideration the removal of sharp or protruding objects. It also 
extends to the performers and all those involved with choreographing the handling of 
audiences. Trust in immersive theatre, then, tends to draw together within a risk 
scenario a number of different parties, only some of whom will be present. While the 
participant may end up experiencing isolation, there may well be numerous other 
subjects, both present and absent, that contribute to that state being reached. So the 
experience of isolation in immersive theatre tends to rest on the contributions of a 
disparate community. Paradoxically, it takes a communal effort to experience 
isolation in immersive theatre.  
I find the idea of experiencing isolation in immersive theatre utterly 
fascinating and it opens up space to consider one last point before concluding part 
one. It seems odd that isolation is something that can be experienced at all if we 
recognise that the perception of isolation may not correspond to the audience’s being 
completely alone in a space. The dark provides confidentiality. Whilst the dark can 
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clearly be a site of insecurity and threat, it can also provide security given what it 
hides. It might hide the unknown and thus the potentially threatening, but it might 
also hide what one wishes to be kept unknown from others. The privacy opened up 
through depriving others of sight can be seen as profoundly individualising. 
Stemming from a consideration of isolation, then, comes a need to consider privacy 
as well.  
Privacy relates to a kind of licence permitted by darkness. There is much less 
demand on downplaying affective facial expressions in the dark; it is possible to 
squirm without fearing the condemnation of being seen to squirm. Despite the 
performers wearing night vision goggles, discovered in hindsight, the blanket of 
darkness in the moment of performance felt hospitable to facial expressions and 
movements that, in environments more conducive to sight, would be far less so. 
There is clearly a balance to be addressed in considering the experience of engaging 
with theatre in the dark: firstly, to reiterate, there is this fostering of dependency via 
a bond of trust in both the performance itself and performers within the space; 
secondly, there is space to perceive isolation in what may well be a public space; 
thirdly, as a consequence of perceiving isolation, there emerges the potential to 
experience privacy – even in relation to night-vision-clad performers who, in another 
context, might be seen to jeopardise such privacy as Peeping Toms. It felt as though 
these performers were guardians of your own private experience, free from the 
prying eyes of other audience members. And as guardians of the private, attending to 
your own private experience, these performers enshrine privacy as a value.  
These concluding remarks demand a critical shift from an address of 
immersive theatre as being largely set apart from a political context framing the 
event, to an address of immersive theatre as being tied into such a context. It is now 
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necessary to consider in more depth the kinds of value promoted in immersive 
theatre, as well as the experiential allure of such values. It is this shift of critical and 
theoretical focus onto value that steers discussion much more explicitly into the 
domain of the political. A central concern of this chapter and the last has been an 
establishment of immersive theatre’s aesthetics of audience participation. A politics 
of participation has been touched on, but part two takes this as its main concern. In 
doing so, many of the claims arising in part one will be revisited and, more 
importantly, re-evaluated.  
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Chapter Three: Punchdrunk and the Neoliberal 
Ethos 
As the opening remarks of this thesis suggested, Scorched the Snake is more than 
just a fan blog for Punchdrunk’s Sleep No More. Cobb goes beyond expressions of 
adoration. Scorched the Snake presents Sleep No More as a performance that can be 
mastered. Through his blog, Cobb is positioned as an expert participant – the go-to 
guy in the know. This chapter returns to some of the questions raised in those 
opening remarks: does immersive theatre privilege a particular kind of participant? 
What does it mean to develop participatory expertise? On the basis of an aesthetics 
of audience participation in immersive theatre explored in part one – that is, a basis 
premised on the production of affect and the perception of risk among participating 
audiences – this chapter, the first of part two, approaches these questions with 
reference to another: what are immersive theatre’s values with regard to audience 
participation? To focus on value is to focus on the political, especially when a value 
system is in play that synergises select values over and above alternatives.  
In part one, some vital points were raised that are highly relevant for a 
politics of participation in immersive theatre, such as the necessarily central role 
played by the participant in generating affect production and risk perception, 
premised on unique autobiographical contributions. This should be balanced against 
an alternative set of contributions that might bolster this authorial positioning of the 
participant, on the one hand, while undermining those contributions, on the other. A 
politics of audience participation in immersive theatre is likely to rest somewhere in 
balance between these two sets of contributing inputs, the latter of which encourages 
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a detailed look at the political context which might inform a critical approach to 
immersive theatre.  
 Punchdrunk draw focus in this chapter. The company were formed in 2000 
and claim to be game-changing pioneers of immersive theatre (Punchdrunk.org.uk). 
Their work tends to be site-sympathetic: that is, sensitive to the architectural and 
environmental givens of a particular building or location, without delving into the 
socio-historical specificity of that location. They tend not to perform in theatre 
buildings and have instead performed in a number of appropriated sites, including: 
an empty Victorian school for the first UK run of Sleep No More (2003); a defunct 
Sharwood’s Pickle factory in London’s Oval for The Firebird Ball (2005); London’s 
Wapping Lane Tobacco Dock for Faust (2006-07); the BAC, a former town hall, 
played host to The Masque of the Red Death (2007-08), thus providing an exception 
to the non-theatre venue rule; railway arches behind Waterloo station for Tunnel 228 
(2009); the redundant Manchester offices of the National Probation Service for It 
Felt Like a Kiss (2009); London’s Great Eastern Quay provided space for The 
Duchess of Malfi (2010); and a disused postal sorting office near Paddington station 
for The Drowned Man: A Hollywood Fable (2013). Punchdrunk consequently work 
within loaded spaces: converted municipal buildings and the outmoded vestiges of 
industrialism. As such, their work tends to operate in the cracks of an evolving urban 
landscape.  
 An engagement with architectural relics of social and industrial change is not 
the only way that Punchdrunk tie into a particular socio-economic context. Firstly, 
and in most detail, this chapter focuses on The Masque of the Red Death, 
establishing the various ways in which this performance prioritises a particular kind 
of participation: what I call ‘entrepreneurial participation’. In doing so, I draw 
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comparisons with a neoliberal value set, with neoliberalism broadly defined as a 
theory of political economy that erodes the public sphere to the benefit of private 
enterprise, risk-taking, personal responsibility, individualism and entrepreneurship.  
Secondly, as a bridge toward the next chapter, I will be looking at a second 
set of performance practises that work alongside, or, more accurately, beneath the 
more public face of Punchdrunk: namely, their corporate performances. 
Representatives of Punchdrunk have been creating work for corporate business for 
over a decade. In the early stages of this activity, the corporate face of Punchdrunk 
went by the name of Gideon Reeling: Punchdrunk’s sibling company initially co-
directed by Felix Barrett, Punchdrunk’s artistic director, and Kate Hargreaves, a long 
standing performer-collaborator with Punchdrunk. Barrett no longer co-directs 
Gideon Reeling since they became an independent company. In early life, though, as 
Punchdrunk’s corporate face, Gideon Reeling helped with sourcing funds for 
Punchdrunk performances, an example being Faust. In sourcing funds for Faust, 
Gideon Reeling provided the creative and productive impetus behind Southern 
Comfort’s Fat Tuesday club nights and the funds raised through this corporate 
venture helped to make Faust a realisable project for Punchdrunk (Gardner, L., ‘An 
Offer’). More recently, though, Punchdrunk have outsourced creativity to corporate 
businesses without recourse to Gideon Reeling, although these ventures are not 
always clearly identified as being attributed to Punchdrunk. It tends to be the 
corporate publicity that foregrounds the Punchdrunk brand, not that of the theatre 
company, although information does now appear on the corporate pages of 
Punchdrunk’s website following redevelopment of the site (Punchdrunk.org.uk).  
Punchdrunk were behind the highly lucrative opening of Louis Vuitton’s 
Bond Street store in 2010 and later created a performance to help publicise the 
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release of Sony’s computer game Resistance 3 with And Darkness Descended… 
(2011). The Black Diamond (2011), the second of two productions marketing Stella 
Artois Black created after The Night Chauffeur (2010), will pull focus in the second 
part of this chapter. These performances demonstrate how immersive theatre is 
especially susceptible to absorption within the business practises of entrepreneurial 
marketers. I will be arguing that while the compatibility between the neoliberal ethos 
and the kinds of participation favoured in Punchdrunk’s work are likely to feed into 
this susceptibility, there is perhaps a more covert co-optation of audiences that is at 
stake premised on the lure of Punchdrunk’s affectively resonant work and the 
resulting rendering of audiences as unpaid marketers of a product.  
The aims of this chapter, then, are twofold: firstly, to identify a shared value 
set between neoliberalism and the kinds of audience participation at play in 
Punchdrunk’s work; secondly, to study the ways in which Punchdrunk are 
particularly susceptible to absorption within, or co-optation by, neoliberal business 
enterprise. The purpose is to introduce a set of important political points about 
audience participation in immersive theatre that should impact on how an aesthetics 
of audience participation is evaluated. Consequently, I will be considering how 
affect production and risk perception operate under neoliberalism, paying close 
attention to the politics of that operation and how such consideration might usefully 
impact on developing an understanding of a politics of participation in immersive 
theatre. 
 The chapter begins with a section titled ‘Neoliberalism and the Neoliberal 
Ethos’. This section defines neoliberalism and sketches some key junctures in its 
evolution and institutionalisation. I then go on to identify and examine 
neoliberalism’s core values, before focusing on risk and the relationship of affect to 
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the neoliberal ethos. The section after that looks at how these values apply to 
audience participation in The Masque, opening up space to evaluate what this 
application might mean for a politics of participation. The following section then 
addresses The Black Diamond and considers how the figuring of audiences in 
Punchdrunk’s theatre practise ends up as something prone to co-optation in their 
corporate partnerships. In conclusion, I differentiate between the artistic quality of 
Punchdrunk’s work, which I still consider highly attractive and worthy of the 
company’s international success, and the kinds of quality-as-value promoted through 
the modes of participation that they ask of audiences. I go on to evaluate a politics of 
participation in Punchdrunk’s work as being implicitly exclusionary as a 
consequence of the participatory values attributed to these modes of participation.  
 
Neoliberalism and the Neoliberal Ethos 
This section is split into four subsections: the first puts forward a definition of 
neoliberalism, an account of its origins and its subsequent institutionalisation and 
growing hegemony; the second identifies neoliberalism’s ethos by exploring its core 
values; the third focuses on risk as one of neoliberalism’s core values; and the fourth 
hones in on the appropriation of affect as an effect of the neoliberal ethos. This 
section, then, introduces and explores an economically minded political context to 
help situate an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre as it has 
been established in part one. It begins to construct the basis on which a comparative 
analysis might take place between the core values of neoliberalism and the core 
values that seem to be prioritised in Punchdrunk’s The Masque of the Red Death.  
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What is Neoliberalism? 
As a political theory, neoliberalism has its roots in the late 1930s and, as David 
Harvey writes, it was ‘actively shaped during the 1940s by thinkers such as 
[Friedrich] von Hayek, Lud[w]ig von Mises, Milton Friedman, and, at least for a 
while, Karl Popper’ (New Imperialism 157): key figures who played a vital part in 
the inauguration of the Mont Pelerin Society, an early attempt to group together like-
minded advocates of neoliberal principles. While the Mont Pelerin Society denied 
political affiliation to any political party or orthodoxy, its aims were unquestionably 
political. As Harvey explains, neoliberalism during this time came to stand in 
staunch opposition to ‘communism, socialism, and all forms of active government 
intervention beyond that required to secure private property arrangements, market 
institutions, and entrepreneurial activity’ (157). Such opposition remains influential 
in contemporary neoliberal guises and might be thought of as a defining 
characteristic of neoliberal ideology.  
Following the belated recognition of publications by Mont Pelerin Society 
members in the 1970s, after being largely dismissed, coupled with the generation of 
a sense that profound change was required during what turned out to be an 
economically turbulent period, the ground was set for neoliberal theory to be put into 
practise through government policy. It was Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative party 
that would be the first to take up the governmental baton following a successful 
election in 1979 (157). But what characterised the 1970s as turbulent? What political 
climate helped to promote Thatcher’s successful election campaign? Responding to 
these questions will provide a touchstone to help with defining neoliberalism not just 
as an ideology, but as something practised and as something arising in its 
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institutional form from a very particular set of social, political and economic 
conditions.  
There are a number of very clear and persuasive accounts of how 
neoliberalism is best defined and how it came to be. Among them is the oeuvre of 
David Harvey, but chapter four of David Hesmondhalgh’s The Cultural Industries 
provides another useful touchstone. Hesmondhalgh is extremely cautious throughout 
the book about simplifying a complex interplay of economic and political processes 
that led to sweeping transformations in the cultural industries without also taking on 
board social, cultural and institutional processes which are sometimes misconceived 
as by-products of macro changes (96). He is also wary about overstating the case for 
radical change while continuity in the cultural industries has also been present from 
the post-war period to the present day, to some extent, not to mention the roles of 
contingency and chance in contributing to the evolution of the cultural industries (97, 
257). Nonetheless, there remain key junctures in the evolution of neoliberalism’s 
institutionalisation, in both its various national and international forms, that impacted 
on the acceleration of its influence and increasing hegemony over a range of 
industrial sectors. In the interests of being concise, it is to these key junctures that I 
turn. 
In the early 1970s, after a long post-war boom, ‘advanced capitalist 
economies hit the beginning of a Long Downturn which continued into the 1990s, 
marked by particularly severe recessions in 1974-[7]5, 1979-82 and 1991-[9]5. In the 
G-7 countries between 1970 and 1990 profits fell significantly across all sectors, but 
especially manufacturing’ (Hesmondhalgh 85). This kind of claim ought to be 
approached with caution, as recessions are frequently counter-balanced by financial 
booms – and booms, or bubbles, there undoubtedly were, most notably the so-called 
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Lawson Boom in the late-1980s, stimulated by tax cuts and low interest rates. Luc 
Boltanski and Eve Chiapello likewise remain cautious of capitalism’s supposed 
crises post-1973: ‘[c]ertainly, growth has slowed on a long-term basis, but the 
returns to capital are increasing’ (xxxvi). Nonetheless, Hesmondhalgh is looking to 
underscore a particular financial climate of growing financial insecurity and 
dematerialised working processes following the decline of manufacturing among G-
7 nations, despite confidence bubbles like the Lawson Boom. One consequence of 
this – especially the unemployment which followed the closure of many traditional 
manufacturing institutions – was to undermine faith in capitalist enterprise as it stood 
in the post-war era, peaking in the 1970s: a time also of profound economic change 
on a global level following deep shocks to the Bretton Woods system. This system, 
formed in 1944, was most significantly characterised by the formulation of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help stabilise exchange rates between allied 
nations. But following President Richard Nixon’s decision in 1971 to decouple the 
US dollar from the gold standard, part of what was dubbed the ‘Nixon Shock’, the 
IMF’s capacity to function as a stabilising mechanism metamorphosed as a 
dematerialised money system became liberated from state control (see Harvey, New 
Imperialism 62). Indeed, to place this in the light of more recent turns of events, 
financiers and economists today have become acutely aware of the hurdles and risks 
of a de-stabilised international system of capital flows. This awareness arguably 
reached an apex in the spring of 2009 when the IMF estimated that $50 trillion in 
asset values worldwide had been destroyed in the wake of the 2008 subprime 
mortgage crisis in the US, alongside the global financial crisis that swiftly followed 
suit (Harvey, Enigma 6).  
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This awareness has become coloured by a sense of worry and an acute sense 
of vulnerability, both at the level of individuals concerned about the safety of their 
assets in such a turbulent economic climate and of nations concerned about the 
stability of their political power in the milieu of volatile international capital flows. 
While the contexts of the 1970s and 2000s are of course very different, it is the 
generation of a pervasive sense of insecurity and volatility shared between the 1970s 
and more recent history that might help with relating to that period from a 
contemporary standpoint; it might help with empathetically accessing the climate 
that helped to inaugurate a set of radical and sweeping changes to government and 
the welfare state following democratic government elections. I believe that what 
citizenships wanted was the fulfilment of a promise captured in a word that has come 
to define and typify once again the rhetoric of governments following the elections 
of Barack Obama in the US and David Cameron in the UK – namely, change.  
In the aftermath of the 1974-75 recession noted by Hesmondhalgh – a 
recession which plagued and arguably weakened the 1974-79 Labour party – the UK 
citizenship turned to the Conservatives in 1979, with a majority Conservative vote of 
43.9 per cent, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher (House of Commons n.p.). 
In the US a year and a half later, the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan won the 
presidential election. Although numerous other national capitalist economies soon 
followed suit, such as New Zealand, Thatcher and Reagan came to typify the early 
implementation of institutionalised neoliberal policy. Despite the status of capitalism 
in the 1970s, what these governments stood for and what neoliberalism stood for was 
not a rejection of capitalism, but its metamorphosis.  
Advanced capitalist states like the UK and the US responded to the Long 
Downturn not by seeking to do away with capitalism, but by radicalising how it was 
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to operate.
23
 Labour movements were attacked, most notoriously reaching a 
culmination between 1984-85 when Thatcher took on and overcame dissent from the 
National Union of Mineworkers.
24
 This was accompanied by the elevation, from 
emergency, to permanent measures, of: anti-inflation strategies, ‘cutbacks in public 
spending and the stripping away of regulation by democratically-elected 
governments’ (Hesmondhalgh 87), ‘dismantling or rolling back the commitments of 
the welfare state, the privatization of public enterprises (including social housing), 
reducing taxes, encouraging entrepreneurial initiative, and creating a favourable 
business climate to induce a strong inflow of foreign investment’ (Harvey, 
Neoliberalism 23). While the notion of consent in such a context has been 
characterised as dubious (Chomsky 43-62), Thatcher’s appeal nonetheless lay in the 
cultivation of an expanded middle class ‘that relished the joys of home ownership, 
private property, individualism and the liberation of entrepreneurial opportunities’ 
(Harvey, Neoliberalism 61). These ‘joys’, or values – ownership, privatisation, 
individualism and entrepreneurialism – remain a powerful force in contemporary 
politics. They are values that this chapter will return to frequently and will prove 
significant when exploring a shared value set between neoliberalism and audience 
participation in Punchdrunk’s particular breed of immersive theatre.  
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 It should be noted that Hesmondhalgh challenges the reality, or at least the extent, of this 
radicalisation: ‘[t]he move towards neoliberalism was remarkable and the fact that neoliberalism was 
adopted in so many countries reflects the global interconnectedness of the late twentieth century. But I 
have argued that within the advanced industrial countries, ultimately this represents a shift of 
emphasis within a fairly stable policy system, whereby states regulate on the basis of tensions 
between the interests of citizens/voters and dominant business interests’ (257; cf Harvey, Condition of 
Postmodernity 166-70, 196).  
24
 As a contextual aside, it is worth quoting Keith Laybourn at length: ‘[i]n 1950 the white-collar 
workers represented about 30 per cent of the British workforce; by 1979 the proportion had risen to 
about 52 per cent. Over the same period the proportion of manual workers fell from 64.2 per cent to 
about 45 per cent. As a result, the traditional occupational bastions of Labour Party support have 
declined. In mining and quarrying, for instance, employment has fallen from 880,000 in 1948 to 
629,000 in 1965 and, more recently, to 250,000 in 1984 and less than 30,000 by the end of the 1990s. 
The National Union of Mineworkers has, as a result, shrunk dramatically’ (109). While this was 
paralleled with a rise in white-collar trade union membership (109), Laybourn’s observation 
nonetheless illustrates the declining power and influence of the National Union of Mineworkers that 
influenced Thatcher’s stranglehold victory.  
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But what is so ‘neo’ about neoliberalism? What Thatcher’s social and fiscal 
policy decisions resulted in was, to a limited extent, a rejuvenation of nineteenth-
century economic liberalism that, in short, advocated an unregulated free market.
25
 
While the accuracy of this rejuvenation has been staunchly contested as a 
consequence of decoupling financial risk-taking from responsibility and 
accountability under neoliberal practise (see Harvey, Neoliberalism 29, 69; Chomsky 
19, 39-40), a version of its renewed idealism remains the force behind the coinage of 
neoliberalism (Hesmondhalgh 87), coupled with a shift of emphasis away from 
market exchange and towards market competition (Lazzarato 116-17; cf Foucault 
118). It should also be noted that neoliberalism does not just refer to the policy 
decisions of governments: it also refers to an ideological business practise. However, 
this ideological business practise came to relate closely to government policy, not 
least because of the relative freedoms which neoliberal government policy allowed 
businesses to take advantage of. As Manuel Castells observes, ‘interaction between 
markets and governments’, operating in the wake of the Long Downturn, proved a 
driving force behind the emergence of a new, globally oriented economy, primarily 
fostered ‘by deliberate government policies’ (135). It is this kind of interaction that I 
want to flag as being integral to the emergence of neoliberalism as a dominant 
capitalist ideology, one that, while increasingly abstracted from nations, nonetheless 
relies on the promotion of national and international policies advocating the rights of 
individuals and businesses to trade in as autonomous a way as possible. In short, 
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 Michel Foucault suggests an earlier point of reference around the middle of the eighteenth century, 
arguing that from around that time the ‘reasoning’ of government shifted to focus ‘on how not to 
govern too much. The objection is no longer to the abuse of sovereignty but to excessive government’ 
(13). Note also that Foucault contests the suggestion that neoliberalism arose as a smooth rejuvenation 
of ‘old forms of liberal economics which were formulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’, 
arguing instead for a more fundamental shift in the relations between the state and the market, with 
the former increasingly functioning in subservience to the authority of the latter (117).  
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neoliberalism needs governments to the extent that governments can secure the 
minimisation of their own interference in neoliberal practises.  
What is under discussion, then, is a significant structural – and political – 
shift in the way that economies function. Many contemporary immersive theatre 
makers (and researchers, including me) spent the early years of their life growing up 
while this shift was taking place in the UK. They were either born into, or lived 
through, a very particular and significant moment in the evolution of a social and 
economic landscape under the powerful influence of a charged political context. And 
at the heart of this moment, as I go on to elaborate below, is a valorisation of almost 
unbounded autonomy – an autonomy that, I believe, is likely to prove a valuable 
point of reference when examining immersive theatre practises that advocate 
particularly liberal forms of participation.  
Before identifying some of the key values associated with neoliberalism, it is 
important to express, with Hesmondhalgh, clarification regarding my introduction of 
neoliberalism thus far: ‘[i]n all areas of commercial life governments intervene [...]. 
Even those national economic systems based most on private enterprise, such as the 
USA, are built on a huge foundation of laws concerning competition, tax, contracts, 
the obligations of companies and so on’ (107-08). While it seems counterintuitive, 
under neoliberalism governments do still intervene in the market, especially via three 
policy areas: legislation, regulation and subsidy (108). These policy areas directly 
impact on the freedoms of businesses to exercise autonomy within markets and 
therefore limit the freedoms available to enterprise within a free market. The point is 
not to deny that deregulation received increasing traction following the 
institutionalisation of neoliberal policy in the 1980s; rather, the point is to underscore 
that such measures were not total. It would be dangerous and misleading to over-
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emphasise or hyperbolise deregulation, for instance, for this does an injustice to the 
powers still exercised by government, despite state devolution.
26
 While the state did 
indeed foreground private over public interests, it was not a complete retraction of 
state intervention that occurred during the rise of neoliberal policy initiatives in the 
1980s and 1990s, but, rather, a different ethos was instigated under the governments 
which deployed neoliberal policy strategies. It is in this sense that I will be 
describing a ‘neoliberal ethos’ in what follows.  
 
Neoliberal Values 
‘Ethos’ refers to the characteristic spirit of something. When I refer to the neoliberal 
ethos, I will be making reference to the characteristic spirit of neoliberalism which is 
to be understood here as a system of values. These values include individualism, 
responsibility, opportunism, privacy, entrepreneurship and the taking of risks. Affect 
enters into the neoliberal ethos less as a value and more as an effect of how 
capitalism has come to function under neoliberalism: namely, by rendering affect as 
something co-opted toward profitable ends. This subsection will look at how 
individualism, responsibility and entrepreneurship, in particular, operate as values 
under neoliberalism, while the subsection after that will look specifically at risk. 
Opportunism and privacy arise more as concerns by implication. The concluding 
subsection establishes what it means for affect to be co-opted under neoliberalism by 
exploring two key concepts: emotional labour and affective labour.  
                                                 
26
 As Hesmondhalgh suggests, ‘[s]ome advocates of public interest have argued, in response to this 
use of the term deregulation, that re-regulation is a more appropriate name for changes in media and 
communications policy in the 1980s and 1990s’ (109, original emphasis). 
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Taken together, these subsections outline not only what constitutes the 
neoliberal ethos, but also some of the effects of this ethos on social conduct and 
work practises. This step – from neoliberal value to neoliberal practise – is an 
important one for the present study, as it prepares ground for charting points of 
alignment between neoliberalism and audience participation in immersive theatre. 
My goal is to develop a vocabulary for re-examining my analysis of audience 
participation in immersive theatre in part one, reorienting that analysis towards an 
explicitly political context. It is from within this political context that an 
identification of a politics of participation in immersive theatre might grow, 
beginning with an address of Punchdrunk’s immersive theatre practise. It is not 
without consequence that a set of values and characteristics might be shared between 
neoliberalism and the kinds of audience participation frequently promoted in 
immersive theatre performances like The Masque and Sleep No More and these 
consequences should be factored into an evaluation of immersive theatre’s politics of 
participation. As such, it is worth spending time setting out the contextual field of 
what these values and characteristics are before addressing how they might find their 
counterparts in Punchdrunk’s immersive theatre practise.  
 What Thatcher helped to inaugurate through her policy measures, along with 
Reagan in the US, was a metamorphosed means of figuring society: something 
which Thatcher famously identified as being non-existent compared with the self-
evident fact of individual citizens. For Thatcher, this ideological means of thinking 
about what a nation’s people are and how they may, or may not relate to one another, 
provided the foundation for a politics premised on individualism. As this section has 
looked to demonstrate, this politics was put into practise by reducing the size of the 
welfare state in an effort to let private interests gain influence. But such measures 
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were by no means limited to Conservative governments. In 1997, a new and long-
awaited era of Labour governance came to power following the successful election 
of Tony Blair’s Labour party. This was the dawn of New Labour.  
 New Labourite politics is commonly referred to as the ‘third way’. The UK 
iteration of the third way is largely indebted to a sociologist and its principal 
architect, Anthony Giddens, but third way politics has its roots in New Democrat 
initiatives in the US.
27
 The New Democrats emerged as a Democrat faction 
disheartened by the success of Reagan’s neoliberal republicanism in the 1980s. They 
were determined to rejuvenate the Democrat party by moving toward the political 
centre in an effort to win back what appeared to be a disillusioned electorate. The 
successful 1992 presidential election campaign in the US of the New Democrat Bill 
Clinton ushered in the first wave of third way politics at the level of government, 
later followed by New Labour in 1997 in the UK. For both parties, neoliberalism 
was a point of departure. It was taken as a hegemonic given responded to not by 
expanding the political spectrum in opposition to it, but by contracting that spectrum 
towards the political centre in an effort to work with, not against neoliberal ideology. 
Such were the changes to governance instituted through the international growth of 
neoliberalism that the seeming impossibility of working outside of it, coupled with 
significant blows to the political left during the period of this expansion, rendered the 
third way an appealing political battle ground. However, the consequences of this 
battle ground for approaches to welfare and society had profound implications for 
the continued development of a neoliberal value system on both sides of the Atlantic 
– but it is the UK that firmly pulls focus in what follows.  
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 Giddens concedes that these roots are there to be identified and are indeed valid, but encourages a 
more balanced address of Continental democracy at around the same time (Third Way viii).  
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 Giddens defines the third way (or, at least, defined the third way in the late 
1990s) as ‘a framework of thinking and policy-making that seeks to adapt social 
democracy to a world which has changed fundamentally over the past two or three 
decades. It is a third way in the sense that it is an attempt to transcend both old-style 
social democracy and neoliberalism’ (Third Way 26). It is this transcendence – or, as 
I would have it, convergence – that characterises third way politics as centrist. 
Giddens accepts that the late-twentieth century witnessed the emergence of ‘a new 
individualism’, but dismisses the sole cause of this as arising from Thatcherite policy 
alone. For Giddens, drawing on Beck: ‘[t]he new individualism, in short, is 
associated with the retreat of tradition and custom from our lives, a phenomenon 
involved with the impact of globalization widely conceived rather than just the 
influence of markets’ (36). But as Andy Hewitt elaborates, ‘[i]n Third Way political 
theory, social justice is replaced by ideas of social inclusion. The concept of Third 
Way citizenship then becomes framed in terms of the “individual” in society and 
how effectively one participates in the economic system’ (21-22). In other words, it 
is a form of individualism which is not only accepted, but promoted by government.  
The notion of a new individualism has been alternatively explored by 
Boltanski and Chiapello as a figuring of autonomy as something demanded under 
capitalism, helping to shed light on this retreat of tradition and custom noted by Beck 
and Giddens. While this demand might make welcome relief from slavish working 
weeks and autocratic bosses, Boltanski and Chiapello nonetheless caution against the 
formation of an individualistic worker status that is ‘frequently assessed according to 
their capacity for self-fulfilment, elevated to the status of an evaluative criterion’ 
(429). As such, the clamour of libertarian revolution that might be said to have 
characterised the May 1968 uprisings in Paris and further afield have in many ways 
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been absorbed into a ‘new spirit of capitalism’, as identified by Boltanski and 
Chiapello, resulting in a ‘decline in job security deriving from the new methods of 
utilizing labour (temping, fixed-term contracts) and unemployment’ (429-30). As 
such the oppositional demands for autonomy and responsibility affiliated with those 
uprisings have returned as a threat to individuals in the wake of a new individualism.  
In looking to establish social cohesion in the wake of this new individualism, 
Giddens rejects the top-down authority of the welfare state. At the same time, he 
rejects a retreat to the conservative defence of tradition as well. He argues that ‘[w]e 
have to make our lives in a more active way than was true of previous generations, 
and we need more actively to accept responsibilities for the consequences of what 
we do and the lifestyle habits we adopt’ (Third Way 37). This assertion gets to the 
very heart of third way politics, as articulated by Giddens; third way politics accepts 
the new individualism as a given, but in trying to stoke social cohesion it responds 
not with backing traditional communal values, as might otherwise have been 
associated with the political left, as with attributing values – values that might, 
potentially, be shared – to the new individualism. As such, responsibility and 
accountability, exercised at the level of the personal, emerge as the tools to promote 
social cohesion in third way politics. The notion of ‘active citizenship’ typifies the 
heralding of the individual as a socially responsible figure. What might previously 
have been identified as the responsibility of the state for the welfare of its citizens is 
attributed under third way politics to individuals. In Giddens’s third way, social or 
welfare rights are coupled with social responsibility, an example being the coupling 
of unemployment benefit with the obligation to actively look for work (65).  
However, these characteristics also get to the heart of Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s notion of a new spirit of capitalism, where firms are ‘re-engineered’ 
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through networked systems of suppliers, sub-contractors and temporary personnel, 
all of which place significant pressure on the stability of employment (74) and where 
the nurture of teams and individuals that self-organise and control themselves within 
businesses ends up transferring responsibility for enterprise onto the shoulders of 
workers (80). As such, the ‘active citizen’ in politics might find its counterpart in the 
‘active worker’ that seeks opportunistic and potentially lucrative employment at the 
expense of a long and stable career. Third way politics and the new spirit of 
capitalism are of a kind.  
 A key claim of Giddens’s third way is that the competitive spirit of 
neoliberalism and the celebration of wealth generation attributed to it might be 
profitably merged with government investment ‘in the human resources and 
infrastructure needed to develop an entrepreneurial culture’ (Third Way 99). Arising 
through nineteenth century liberal doctrine, the entrepreneur was defined as a thrifty 
and sharp individual who capitalises on the profitable opportunities afforded by 
enterprise. However, as Owen suggests, neoliberal government recalibrated the 
definitional boundaries of entrepreneurialism as a practise ‘in which all citizens 
should engage’ (258), recruiting civil society, as Maurizio Lazzarato maintains, to 
serve the objectives of a neoliberal transformation of the social (111). While 
entrepreneurialism was implicitly championed under Thatcher as a consequence of 
idealising state devolution in the context of a metamorphosing government ethos, 
Giddens advocates what ultimately amounts to a more solid institutionalisation of 
neoliberalism. For Giddens, the role of the state is not necessarily to be devolved in 
an attempt to free the market, so much as to police and nurture free market enterprise 
as something extending across all social sectors, not just in business. But where the 
Thatcher government matched a comparable policing to the rendering of government 
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as an active force championing privatisation, the third way instead regarded the state 
itself in more explicit terms as a defender of free market enterprise. In the third way, 
the ‘public interest’ is supposedly synergised with the private sector, giving birth to 
what Giddens calls a ‘mixed economy’ (Third Way 99-100). With New Labour’s 
embrace of third way ideology, then, came the enshrinement of a very clear value 
set: a defence of individualism coupled with a public sector geared towards 
promoting it; personal responsibility coupled with personal accountability heralded 
through the rubric of active citizenship; and the institutionalised backing of 
entrepreneurial initiative and opportunism in the free market. Third way 
governments were evolving governments, instigating profound changes in politics 
which, inevitably, meant profound changes for the economy, culture and society. 
The third way government was no longer the harbinger of the welfare state; it was 
the harbinger of the social investment state (Third Way 117). 
 
Neoliberalism and Risk 
There is another, vital neoliberal value that Giddens’s third way advocated: ‘[a]ctive 
risk taking is recognized as inherent in entrepreneurial activity, but the same applies 
to the labour force. Deciding to go to work and give up benefits, or taking a job in a 
particular industry, are risk-infused activities – but such risk taking is often 
beneficial both to the individual and to the wider society’ (Third Way 116). Giddens 
is effectively taking Thatcher’s idealised figure of the risk-taking entrepreneur and 
applying it to the wider society. Again, this signals an acceptance of neoliberal 
hegemony by treating it as a point of departure and extending neoliberal ideology 
across social sectors. This is yet another instance of how the neoliberal ethos ends up 
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being institutionalised. Risk becomes a value that ends up enshrined through policy 
decisions.  
 As my introduction looked to establish with reference to Owen, an effect of 
institutionalising risk in government policy is to interpolate subjects either as risk-
taking, or risk-bearing subjectivities (Owen 323). On the one hand, risk-taking is 
valorised under neoliberalism through the promotion of opportunism and 
entrepreneurialism. On the other hand, risk-bearing subjects, particularly in the 
rhetoric of third way politics, are defined as an excluded or marginalised public that 
need to be redeemed through coupling the affordance of right with the execution of 
obligation, typified in New Labour’s Welfare to Work programme and the journey 
towards social inclusion.
28
 The promotion of both risk-taking and risk-bearing 
subjectivities typifies Hacker’s Great Risk Shift once a transfer of responsibility 
from state to individual is understood as a process entailing great risk potential – 
either for gain or loss, defined in terms of capital accumulation and social prestige, 
or loss of welfare and security, respectively.  
It is this context that, I believe, Lyng was partly commenting on when 
invoking risk-laden social conditions in the contemporary era. One contribution of 
this section so far has been to offer a more detailed account of the context informing 
the operation of Lyng’s edgework practises encountered in the previous chapter, 
either as something rebelling against a stultifying and bureaucratic social system, as 
a reclamation of risk by assertively executing risk on the risk-taker’s own terms (the 
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 As Laybourn explains, ‘[t]he market-led nature of New Labour’s approach […] was of course 
blatantly obvious in [Gordon] Brown’s 1997 Budget [as Chancellor of the Exchequer], particularly in 
the explicitly titled programme of “Welfare to Work”. […] The philosophy behind New Labour 
seems to have been to reduce social need through an alliance between the state and the private sector. 
This was outlined, in some detail, by Tony Blair on 18 March 1999. […] Blair suggested that a 
modern welfare state should be “active, not passive, genuinely providing people with a hand-up, not a 
hand-out”’ (160-61). 
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first framework), or as something that already embeds risk within a social structure 
to such an extent that edgework practises become expressions of a pervasive 
hegemony (the second framework). Risk-taking is not a practise that occurs in 
isolation. It is something that has been allowed to flourish under neoliberalism. I do 
not want to downplay the potential for risk to be rendered a subversive practise – 
through audience participation in immersive theatre, for instance – but I do want to 
echo Owen’s concern that risk has become a condition of everyday life in the UK. 
As such, ‘we should at the very least be wary’ of invoking risk as a positive value 
(Owen 329). What has been eroded through the steady risk-centric policies applied 
by successive governments since 1979 in the UK is security. If the neoliberal ethos 
could be distilled down to a single message, it would probably read: ‘[y]ou are on 
your own’ (Hacker xvi, original emphasis). 
 
Neoliberalism and Affect 
In drawing this section to a close, I wish to draw on an effect of the growing 
hegemony of the neoliberal ethos: the co-optation of affect. Part one, especially 
chapter one, positioned the production of affect as a defining and significant aspect 
of immersive theatre’s aesthetics of audience participation. How might this be 
approached in the light of the context sketched in this chapter so far? In preparing 
responses to this question, I draw on two closely related notions: emotional labour 
and affective labour.  
In their influential book Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri propose: 
‘[i]n the postmodernization of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends ever 
more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life 
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itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and 
invest in one another’ (xiii). What this proposition encourages is a re-evaluation of 
what affect production might mean today. If neoliberalism presides today, how 
might its various effects inform study of affect production, particularly as those 
effects relate to a politics of participation? 
 ‘Biopower’, write Hardt and Negri, ‘is a form of power that regulates social 
life from its interior’ (33). ‘The great industrial and financial powers thus produce 
not only commodities but also subjectivities [...]: they produce needs, social 
relations, bodies, and minds – which is to say, they produce producers’ (32). In 
addressing one iteration of biopower, Hardt and Negri deploy the term ‘affective 
labour’ to describe in-person services or services relying on physical proximity 
between people and the accompanying creation and manipulation of affect to 
accommodate this proximity: it is labour in a bodily mode (292-93; cf Hardt 95-96). 
Affective labour is first and foremost an activity premised on being together. Indeed, 
this onus on togetherness has influenced contemporary understandings of affective 
labour, particularly in the field of art criticism. For instance, in a poetic essay titled 
‘You Make Me Feel Mighty Real’, the art critic Jan Verwoert describes affective 
labour as follows: ‘[t]he field of affective labour [...] is always also a form of 
witnessing, in that it is a continuous endeavour of taking on board and bearing the 
weight of the emotions of others, be they pain- or joyful. The labour of affect is the 
sustained effort of keeping oneself exposed to feelings’ (271-72). In its simplest 
figuration, affective labour refers to witnessing premised on some kind of affective 
exchange; but affective labour might also be tied into more complex, biopolitical 
systems of exchange. To understand how this is so, it proves fruitful to think 
genealogically about the concept of affective labour.  
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I have already noted some important differences between affect and emotion, 
but the notions of affective labour and emotional labour tend to be highly compatible 
in their various iterations. However, for present purposes and drawing on chapter one 
and the introduction: affective labour might be broadly defined as a labour process 
involving towardness or awayness from something or someone. Emotional labour 
also involves towardness or awayness from something, as its affective component, 
but emotional labour specifically engages emotion as a work site in this process. 
Emotional labour must involve affective labour, but not necessarily the other way 
around.  
To the best of my knowledge, the sociologist Arlie Hochschild was the first 
to identify and define emotional labour in The Managed Heart. For Hochschild, 
emotional labour ‘requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the 
outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others [...]. This kind 
of labour calls for a coordination of mind and feeling, and it sometimes draws on a 
source of self that we honor as deep and integral to our individuality’ (7). She gives 
an example of a flight steward/ess providing an air of welcome and warmth to airline 
customers. The forced smile does more than offer a service: ‘it estranges workers 
from their own smiles and convinces customers that on-the-job behaviour is 
calculated’ (5; cf Klingmann 23). This notion of estrangement from emotional 
signals is a vital part of Hochschild’s account of emotional labour. For Hochschild, 
the estrangement of the contemporary worker in the service industries finds its 
counterpart in the alienation of workers from their bodies in nineteenth-century 
industrialism (17). An implication of emotional labour is a conflation of privacy and 
public demeanour; not only is emotion effectively co-opted by business enterprise 
within increasingly competitive markets, where competition itself is the driving force 
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behind emotional co-optation when businesses look to stand apart from competitors, 
but the private also increasingly ends up as something to be displayed.  
Bound into Hochschild’s examination of emotional labour is an approach that 
owes as much to Erving Goffman as Constantin Stanislavski; social roles, such as 
that of bride, wife or mother, establish ‘a base line for what feelings seem 
appropriate to a certain series of events’ (74), whereas ‘feeling rules’ provide 
‘standards used in emotional conversation to determine what is rightly owed and 
owing in the currency of feeling’ (18). In chapter one, I was insistent on 
underscoring that emotional disposition by no means stands alone, but is rather 
something that emerges in dynamic relation with autobiography and social 
experience. What Hochschild emphasises here are the socially responsive elements 
to emotion. She is constructing a language to address how emotional engagement 
and display are tied into a set of social mores. In the context of the book as a whole, 
this opens up space to consider how a number of institutions – including those of 
business – might affect how emotion functions. As such, the individual ends up as a 
permeable subject open to the biopolitical forces noted by Hardt and Negri. Whether 
pitched as an integral part of offering a service, or as something more lasting and 
affective, emotion is revealed through Hochschild’s work on the subject as 
something prone to co-optation.  
An effect of the theoretical approach to emotion – and affect, for that matter 
– that was detailed in chapter one, is to open up space for compressing the social and 
the personal. To recall Ahmed, emotion is what allows us to distinguish an inside 
from an outside in the first place – but this recognition still relies on permeability. 
Hochschild encourages another look at this permeability in the context of market 
relations. She rightly suggests that ‘[i]t does not take capitalism to turn feeling into a 
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commodity or to turn our capacity for managing feeling into an instrument. But 
capitalism has found a use for emotion management, and so it has organized it more 
efficiently and pushed it further’ (186). This is also echoed in the writing of Eva 
Illouz who, in Cold Intimacies, puts forward her notion of ‘emotional capitalism’ to 
describe  
a culture in which emotional and economic discourses and practices mutually 
shape each other, thus producing what I view as a broad, sweeping movement 
in which affect is made an essential aspect of economic behaviour and in 
which emotional life – especially that of the middle-classes – follows the 
logic of economic relations and exchange. (5) 
She traces this mutuality back to the emergence of psychiatry and what she calls the 
‘therapeutic emotional style’ in the first half of the twentieth century, following 
Freud’s influential promotion of psychoanalysis (6). What this helped to foster, she 
claims, was a preoccupation with emotional life and especially the possibility of 
managing emotions (6-7). Not only that, but ‘[b]y making personality and emotions 
into new forms of social classification, psychologists not only contributed to making 
emotional style a social currency – a capital – but also articulated a new language of 
selfhood to seize the capital’ (65). Indeed, this recognition has even led to ‘emotional 
intelligence’ being thought of as an indicator of successful work competencies (see 
Goleman). Reminiscent of Sennett, Illouz suggests that a consequence of the decline 
of the Victorian era’s strict division between public and private life, coupled with the 
increasing influence of the therapeutic emotional style, paved the way for a 
reshuffling of boundaries between the public and the private spheres, making the 
entrance of emotional life into the workplace a distinct possibility (16, 23-24). So 
with the possibility having emerged of rendering emotion a source of capital, 
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coupled with the conflation of, or confusion between, public and private spheres, 
emotional labour was free to rise as a site for integration within capitalist practise. 
To recall the example of the airline steward/ess, what ends up marketed to potential 
customers is not just air travel, but the emotional engagement of the airline’s staff. 
What this marketability necessitates is the dissolution of strict boundaries between 
privacy and the public and the conflation of interiority and exteriority. The 
workplace in such a context is not just an airplane cabin, but the human body. 
Consequently, affect and emotion are rendered as biopolitical work sites.   
Emotion, as something to be potentially co-opted, has demonstrably been 
taken on board by governments, an example being the government of Bhutan’s 
measurement of its population’s happiness through the Gross National Happiness 
(GNH) index since 1972. Closer to home, as Ahmed writes (who I also thank for 
drawing attention to the GNH), David Cameron ‘talked about happiness as a value 
for government, leading to a debate in the media about New Labour and its 
happiness and “social well-being” agenda’ (Promise of Happiness 3-4). Happiness, 
as with emotion more generally, is apt to be incorporated within a government’s 
value system, in a comparable way to emotional warmth among staff being 
incorporated within the value system of an airline. But this remains an effect of the 
neoliberal ethos. As a value, affect has no intrinsic relation to the neoliberal ethos, 
but it nonetheless seems to be deployed as a political value compatible with that 
ethos, without being explicitly integrated into it, for businesses and even 
governments. Affect’s relationship to the neoliberal ethos is incidental, which is not 
to undermine that relationship’s significance.  
For Ahmed, the promise of happiness is a directive that, ultimately, is 
normalising and hegemonic. What the promise or directive of happiness rubs over is 
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the subversive appeal of unhappiness, or political frustration, that contravenes an 
accepted definition of happiness. There is a sense of obligation to feel an emotion 
like happiness, just as there is of being disinclined towards unhappiness. These kinds 
of influence, I believe, are usefully approached as additional forms of emotional 
labour and what this kind of emotional labour helps to enforce is cultural hegemony. 
The consequence of this enforcement is political stultification as digression from the 
directive of emotional ideals is policed in daily interaction. As Ahmed suggests – 
and this will prove significant towards the end of the next chapter and in part three: 
‘[w]e might need to attend to bad feelings not in order to overcome them but to learn 
by how we are affected by what comes near, which means achieving a different 
relationship to all our wanted and unwanted feelings as an ethical resource’ (Promise 
of Happiness 216, original emphasis). 
 To draw this commentary on neoliberalism to a close and to sum up: what 
this concluding remark of Ahmed’s reveals, I suggest, is a potential for emotional 
labour to be counteracted by affective labour. Emotional labour might involve the 
co-optation of happiness as a value and a promise in the rhetoric of government, or it 
might refer to the biopolitical absorption of emotion and the personal as productive 
sources of capital in economic exchange, through the forced smiles of airline staff, 
for instance. Affective labour is broader than this, referring to processes of 
towardness or awayness from something, or someone. This is also understood as the 
affective component of emotion and might just as well be co-opted. But by focusing 
on how we are attracted to or repelled by something, or someone, we must engage in 
a kind of affective labour by objectifying that towardness or awayness as a subject of 
scrutiny. If this towardness or awayness is itself bound up in emotional labour, then 
attending to affective labour may help to reveal that emotional work as work. 
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Whatever the case, affective labour – despite the fact that it is prone to biopolitical 
co-optation – might also carry within it a political potential for resistance in the form 
of subverting otherwise inchoate relations between people and systems of 
governance and control.  
 This section has spent time introducing and defining neoliberalism, charting 
some important junctures in its evolution. Key neoliberal values were identified and 
explored, along with the co-optation of affect as a biopolitical effect of these values 
being practised. What remains to be seen is what relevance this has for immersive 
theatre. The next section compares the neoliberal ethos with audience participation in 
Punchdrunk’s The Masque of the Red Death. My intention is to establish what 
politics of participation is at stake in this performance by identifying what 
participatory values are favoured and addressing how that favouring might impact on 
an audience’s capacity to participate freely, particularly as that capacity can be seen 
to tie into disposition.  
 
The Masque of the Red Death and Neoliberal Value 
In Artificial Hells, in a chapter that updates an earlier, influential article called ‘The 
Social Turn’, Bishop notes how New Labour ‘deployed a rhetoric almost identical to 
that of the practitioners of socially engaged art in order to justify public spending on 
the arts’ (13). At the same time, she also touches on how the neoliberal ethos might 
tally with the artistic sphere through the deployment of governmental rhetoric. I have 
already described this rhetoric as emphasising active citizenship, responsibility, 
accountability and, by implication, participation. In attempting to subsume all social 
sectors within the neoliberal ethos as ‘included’ citizens, largely defined by and 
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through social mobility, in an effort to forge social competency in a privatised world, 
participation came to take centre stage. ‘In this logic’, writes Bishop, ‘participation 
in society is merely participation in the task of being individually responsible for 
what, in the past, was the collective concern of the state’ (14). She goes on to suggest 
that this is an ongoing issue not confined to New Labour, but persistent under the 
current coalition government, especially through David Cameron’s vision of the ‘big 
society’ (14). The big society takes personal responsibility and active citizenship to a 
new level through its advocacy of volunteerism and personal investment in the 
welfare of communities. The point to be underlined, though, is that participation is 
now a political battleground and, much with the more general institution of the 
neoliberal ethos before it, the participation of citizens in actively contributing to the 
welfare of communities and society – where previously this would have been a task 
of the state – has now become a point of departure for successive governments. The 
extent to which this might be questioned through the persistence of public services 
and the welfare state, through the universal benefit, for instance, ought not to be 
overlooked. Again, the tendency in discourses addressing change in its various 
guises is to hyperbolise. However, the fact remains that a political ideology 
promoting participation in society remains a persistent force in government rhetoric.  
 In the light of this, it seems important to consider how participation is being 
deployed in immersive theatre by: questioning how audiences are encouraged to take 
responsibility for their own participatory experience of immersive theatre; 
addressing how a participatory theatre environment might be framed as a site of 
intimacy and privacy; identifying how audiences of immersive theatre may parallel 
the new individualism associated with neoliberalism; thinking through how 
participants might be encouraged to adopt something of the spirit of 
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entrepreneurialism that typifies neoliberal ideology; and examining how they might 
be encouraged to take risks and at what potential costs. What is more, it is worth 
returning to an effect of the neoliberal ethos just recounted: namely, the co-optation 
of affect. How might practising participation in immersive theatre relate to this co-
optation of affect and what impact might this have on how a politics of participation 
is to be formulated? 
 In response to these points and questions, I will be reflecting on my own 
experience of Punchdrunk’s The Masque of the Red Death. This reflection will be 
nuanced and coloured by allusions to my more recent experience of the New York 
run of Sleep No More in February 2013 as a means of establishing a sense of 
consistency across Punchdrunk performances.  
As with many Punchdrunk performances, The Masque was loosely based on 
a canonical literary text: in this case, the short stories of Edgar Allan Poe. At the 
beginning of The Masque, the audience is asked to wear a beaked white mask and 
they are given an instruction to find a purveyor of cloaks within the performance 
world. Adorned with both cloak and mask, the audience is free to wonder through 
the surprisingly vast number of rooms inside the Battersea Arts Centre, each one 
decadently detailed appropriate to the haunting worlds of Poe’s short stories. At 
various intervals throughout the performance, the cast walk solemnly up the BAC’s 
main stairway in the foyer in a communal, trance-like exodus which perhaps offers a 
cue to help synergise the various performances within this performance that take 
place on a looped basis. Audiences might witness an increasingly manic evening 
meal with characters apparently plucked from Poe’s ‘The System of Doctor Tarr and 
Professor Fether’. ‘The Black Cat’ from another of Poe’s tales prowls the space. 
Audiences might also find themselves in grim catacombs reminiscent of ‘The Cask 
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of Amontillado’, or in a claustrophobic bedroom space for the disturbing murder of 
the old man from the ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’. These are all performances within the 
performance. Macabre murders are repeatable in the performance loops over the 
course of an evening, resurrecting not only murdered characters, but performance 
itself.  
Audiences are encouraged to be forthright in seeking out performance in The 
Masque. If they are of an outgoing disposition, or perhaps spurred to be outgoing by 
wearing the mask and cloak, they might venture through a fireplace in an effort to 
find more of the performance in this labyrinthine world, a venturing that typifies how 
audiences are to engage with an environment that holds secrets. If audiences venture, 
they discover more of the performance. If they risk stepping into the unknown, then 
they are rewarded with more to experience. This is theatre for those who want to 
invest in a performance by taking risks, testing the limits of what can and cannot be 
entered, opened, touched, or eaten.  
The performance as a whole, with the exception of one-on-one performances 
for participants singled out from the broader audience, largely took place without the 
actors acknowledging the presence of spectators. For the one-on-ones, which usually 
took place in locked rooms, audiences might be asked to remove their mask to 
engage in dialogue with a performer, or they might be asked to perform a task – such 
as eating the eyes (made from olives) from a figure of a cat made from a napkin.
29
 
With these one-on-ones aside, there are rare instances elsewhere in the performance 
where a performer might catch an audience member’s eye – in a mirror, for instance, 
rendered all the more haunting by a pianist in the same room playing Eric Satie’s 
                                                 
29
 For this particular one-on-one, I make reference not to my own experience, but that of Chloe 
Veltman. See Veltman, ‘The Masque of the Red Death’.  
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Trois Gnossiennes: Gnossienne No. 1 – but, for the most part, the audience remain 
voyeurs. For instance, while acknowledged in the mirror by the ghostly presence of 
another performer, I was ignored by the pianist when I joined her in playing the 
melody to this well-known Satie piece in the upper octaves of the piano (presuming 
that this was not the consequence of incompetent playing on my part, but perhaps the 
consequence of participating inappropriately). Discovering and exploring 
performance spaces, as an expected and in many ways demanded participatory 
mode, takes much greater precedence over more explicit kinds of audience-instigated 
performer-audience activity. Audiences are acknowledged by performers to the 
extent that they subscribe to these golden participatory rules of discovery and 
exploration, provided that exploration subscribes to the coherence of the world that 
is entered into.  
The participatory element of The Masque, then, primarily comes through the 
audience’s ability to move freely through the various spaces of the performance. Not 
once do they step outside of a coherent immersive landscape until the moment they 
leave the building. This sense of coherence was especially prominent at the Palais 
Royale, a cabaret bar hosted by Roderick Usher from Poe’s ‘The Fall of the House of 
Usher’: a character that was more reminiscent of both the Kit-Kat Club host from the 
film Cabaret (1972) and the UK celebrity magician Derren Brown. In the Palais 
Royale, the audience could remove their mask and enjoy a drink while watching 
vaudeville acts. Audiences were also able to venture backstage as the vaudeville 
performers prepared for their next show. By opening up the backstage area of this 
performance space within a performance space, the rest of the immersive landscape 
was granted even more of a coherent reality. Even the productive processes of 
making a performance event were theatricalised, or at least absorbed within the 
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performance as a whole. The performance ends in an homage to the Poe tale from 
which the production takes its title, with Prince Prospero’s ball taking place in a hall 
accommodating every audience member. An energetic dance begins which features a 
number of duets performed in unison. The red death, a mysterious cloaked figure, 
eventually appears before miraculously disappearing in a feat of magical trickery 
that still baffles me.  
In the following subsections, I will be looking to identify what values are 
shared between audience participation in The Masque and the neoliberal ethos. In the 
two final subsections, on risk and affect respectively, this discussion reaches a 
pivotal point, for it is here, most explicitly, that an aesthetics of audience 
participation identified in part one is addressed in explicitly political terms.  
  
Privacy 
It is worth dwelling on Punchdrunk’s insistence that audiences wear a mask and 
cloak. As Machon writes, ‘[t]hese masks at once allow for anonymity and a sense of 
(role)play within the performance itself. As an audience member, the mask allows 
you to take risks, to step outside of yourself and enter into the adventure of the 
event’ (‘Space and the Senses’ n.p.). For Felix Barrett, the mask is there to remove 
the audience’s sense of trepidation: ‘whatever baggage you’re bringing in, it’s 
neutralized by the mask. So you can be a timid person, but crazy in the show world’ 
(qtd. in Machon, (Syn)aesthetics 90). What the mask helps to provide is confidence. 
Literally cloaked from view and rendered anonymous, audiences are freed from the 
glare of a potentially judgmental public. Participants are consequently encouraged to 
exercise free movement within the various spaces without being recognised, thus 
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severing potentially guilt-ridden social convention that may put off participants from 
engaging in voyeurism in particularly sexually charged moments, for instance, or in 
being seen to run through a space in public, or perform some kind of act that might 
otherwise be taken to be embarrassing outside of the secluded intimacy and privacy 
of the one-on-ones. The point I want to make is that even the more public 
experiences in this performance are rendered private. The cloak and mask closes off 
audiences from one another, with the exception of anonymous eyes glaring out from 
behind the mask. Participating audiences are rendered monads. Affective facial 
expressions are concealed within a private space behind the mask, known only to the 
audience member and those performers who temporarily remove the mask for one-
on-one performances. Indeed, these one-on-ones are dependent on closing off fellow 
audience members from the performance space, locking them out from the intimacy 
bestowed on a selected audience member within a locked room. These one-on-ones 
epitomise the cultural cache associated with an experience of the performance and 
might even become a potential source of envy among those who were not fortunate 
enough to have experienced such privilege.  
Scorched the Snake is filled with requests from visitors to the site as to how 
these one-on-ones might best be secured in Sleep No More, but Cobb remains 
reluctant to offer this particular kind of advice (although he does have a tendency to 
leave breadcrumbs). What this suggests is that the one-on-one is potentially, 
depending, of course, on the audience member, an enviable thing: the locus of 
participatory one-upmanship. Indeed, in my own experience of Sleep No More, I 
remember feeling distinctly dejected when another audience member was selected 
from a group of three to pass through a locked door for a one-on-one. The fact that 
there were only three of us there was itself the consequence of heading the other way 
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to a much larger group of participants once we clocked and followed a solitary 
female character wandering between rooms. Outside of a locked door, she stared at 
each of us in turn, finally selecting the person next to me. This moment was thrilling, 
knowing that selection was a possibility as the product of an opportunity, albeit a 
failed one, that was self-made. Like a limited edition collector’s item, this kind of 
experience is apt to be rendered enviable for the have-nots and a source of pride for 
the haves. Consequently, it can be seen to thrive on privacy. As such, Punchdrunk’s 
use of one-on-one performance can be seen to be exclusory and, indeed, their 
exclusory nature is surely part of an appeal that encourages the lucky audience 
member to feel special for being singled out (later in the performance I had the 
‘privilege’ of feeling this sense of speciality). What must be recognised, though, is 
that the use of one-on-ones valorises privacy once rendered exclusionary and 
exclusive.  
 
Individualism 
By promoting private experience, the cloak and mask also foster a profoundly 
individual experience. Fine art discourse on participation has a tendency to celebrate 
togetherness and community among fellow participants (Kester; Bourriaud), 
although there are notable exceptions, most explicitly articulated in Bishop’s article 
‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’. Theatre audiences have also been framed as 
a coherent entity coming together in a hopeful, transformative community (see 
especially Dolan; Fischer-Lichte). However, if togetherness can be said to exist at all 
in The Masque – with the possible exception of the Palais Royale, where cloak and 
mask are removed – it is a togetherness aroused through a necessary acceptance of 
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individualism. If an audience-as-community can be said to exist, it is an audience of 
individuals sharing in anonymity. Indeed, this is echoed in a response to a F.A.Q on 
Punchdrunk’s website: ‘[w]hy do you describe your work as immersive? [...] 
Although our work is necessarily structured from a practical and safety perspective, 
the non-linear narrative content coupled to the high degree of viewer freedom of 
choice make it a singularly intense and personal experience’ (Punchdrunk.org.uk).  
 In Giddens’s third way, the new individualism was taken as a point of 
departure for founding a new centrist politics. As noted above, rather than opposing 
the new individualism, the third way applied value to it that might potentially be 
shared. By rendering individualism as a value, premised on the rewards which 
individual enterprise might afford, it became possible to institute structural changes 
to the economy and the welfare state which helped to solidify individualism as an 
institutionalised value. I believe that something comparable is taking place in The 
Masque. If an audience can be said to exist as a coherent entity at all, it is an entity 
premised on exploiting individualism as a shared value premised on ‘freedom of 
choice’ and ‘a singularly personal and intense experience’. The performance is 
premised on encouraging audiences to go it alone by wearing the cloak and mask, 
crafting their own individual journey through the performance. While experiences of 
the performance might be shared after the event, or even during the event in the 
Palais Royale, this sharing is premised and even thrives on treating individualism as 
a value. In The Masque, the immersive theatre audience, as a group, is a group that is 
primarily brought together through expressions of individualism and shared 
recollections of individual endeavour.  
 Alan Read, drawing on Rancière, suggests that it is ‘in the audience’s 
decomposition that the threat to hierarchies of organisation begins [...]. Here the 
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consensual fantasy of a phantasm called “audience” gives way to the interruptive 
dissensus of a multitude among whom individuals make themselves variously 
known’ (179, original emphasis). I want to flag the importance of recognising that 
individualism has a very potent political history. It is important to recognise, as 
indeed others have, what a defence of a decomposed or dissensual audience of 
individuals might lead to.
30
 One of the primary claims arising from part one was that 
an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre, manifested in affect 
production and risk perception, derives from individual productivity. This individual 
productivity is now being revealed as manifesting in far more explicit ways through 
the practise of participation in its individualised form and not, or at least not so 
much, as a dialogic practise taking place between interacting participants. I agree 
with Read that there is space to formulate a potentially redemptive politics of 
individualism: this is something to be explored in part three. But, for the time being, 
it is worth highlighting that individualism has a darker side, at least as it appears in 
The Masque. By encouraging audiences to be opportunistic and, as I argue below, 
entrepreneurial, prompted by a clear valuing of individualism, inequality seems 
highly likely to emerge. By inequality, I refer to an unequal distribution of 
participatory opportunity premised on a number of factors, including: familiarity 
with immersive theatre participation and the anticipations that might procure (for 
instance, of mastering participatory protocol through experience of comparable 
performances); familiarity with the performance, especially through attending the 
performance several times (either by having the money to afford to do so, coupled 
with the savvy attitude of buying tickets far enough in advance of a sold out run, or 
by volunteering as an usher and receiving free tickets in return); being of an outgoing 
                                                 
30
 For instance, Shannon Jackson has offered an insightful critique of Bishop’s notion of ‘relational 
antagonism’ (53-56). 
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disposition, or aspiring to be so once the cloak and mask is worn; and even, as 
Cobb’s blog suggests in the case of Sleep No More, a rehearsed awareness of how to 
go about securing the best possible experience prior to entering the performance. In 
each case, it is the individual that must bear responsibility for maximising self-made 
opportunity.  
 
Shifting Responsibility 
What all this amounts to is a clear shift of responsibility for maximising the best 
possible experience of The Masque from the theatre makers to the theatre receivers, 
now rendered as partial co-producers of the theatre event. This is not to downplay 
the painstaking work that must go into the creation of such incredible and vast 
performance spaces, not to mention the time and energy invested by the performers 
in maintaining vivacious physicality night after night. Rather, my point is to stress 
that forthrightness is a prerequisite of participation in The Masque. It is up to the 
audience to help foster self-made opportunity as an aesthetic surplus to an immersive 
environment.  
 It is worth recalling Giddens’s insistence that ‘[w]e have to make our lives in 
a more active way than was true of previous generations, and we need more actively 
to accept responsibilities for the consequences of what we do and the lifestyle habits 
we adopt’ (Third Way 37). The introduction to this thesis troubled the deeply 
problematic binary of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ spectatorship. Nonetheless, it was also 
pointed out that immersive theatre tends to amplify latent elements of more 
traditional theatre spectatorship, an example here being the extent of ‘active’ 
participation in The Masque associated with, for instance, venturing through 
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fireplaces and seeking out cabaret bars. Comparable to Giddens’s championing of 
‘active citizenship’ is the ‘active participation’ encouraged in this performance. The 
amplification of active participation has consequences, an example being the transfer 
of at least partial responsibility onto the shoulders of individuals. Borrowing from 
Giddens above, what this transfer entails is an acceptance of the consequences 
arising from what participants do. The Masque is democratic in the third way sense; 
once pitched as a group of individuals investing in the shared value of individualism, 
set against a seemingly accessible backdrop of looped performances in performance 
spaces that audiences are free to discover, a kind of democracy emerges that depends 
on realising this shared value. However, as with the third way, in defending this 
strange breed of democracy, a democracy that sheds a defence of equality in favour 
of marrying right with obligation, The Masque obliges audiences to seek out the 
‘right’ to the experiences that they have paid for. Recalling Boltanski and Chiapello, 
autonomy is in many ways demanded of audiences in this performance. And that 
demand poses its own restrictions on participation for those without the disposition 
or capacity to participate opportunistically. In both the third way and The Masque, 
equality is pitched not as a right without obligation, but as something to be attained 
by exercising initiative. As such, the acceptance of personal responsibility, premised 
on exercising initiative, ends up enshrined as a value. Perhaps affective thrills are 
rendered all the more satisfying if initiative bears fruit; at the same time, the 
frustrations accompanying failure in this task are likely to be rendered equally 
amplified.  
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Entrepreneurial Participation 
In charting the evolution of neoliberalism from the Mont Pelerin Society to its 
institutionalisation under Thatcher, I commented on both entrepreneurial initiative 
and the liberation of entrepreneurial opportunities as being two of its defining 
characteristics. I then went on to identify entrepreneurialism as a key neoliberal 
value. The previous subsections have all been building towards a model of 
participation at work in The Masque: a kind of participation that I call 
‘entrepreneurial participation’. This refers to audience participation that demands 
entrepreneurial initiative. The entrepreneur was identified above in a twofold sense: 
firstly, as ‘a thrifty and sharp individual who aptly capitalises on the profitable 
opportunities afforded by enterprise’; and, secondly, as an ideal that, particularly in 
the New Labour years, ended up extending to include all citizens. The entrepreneur 
was no longer restricted to the activity of business enterprise in these years, but 
became valorised as a state of being to which all should subscribe. Applied to 
audience participation, the entrepreneurial participant might function as a savvy 
individual who capitalises on profitable participatory opportunities. Entrepreneurial 
participation might also function as an ideal extending to all participants: as a state of 
being to which all should subscribe. Both cases, I contend, are in play in The 
Masque.  
It is the entrepreneurial participant that is most likely to walk through a fire 
place, discover the most performances within the performance and secure the most 
one-on-ones. It is the entrepreneurial participant that is likely to rehearse 
participatory protocol, or familiarise themselves with the best tactics to deploy prior 
to entering the space – by brushing up on recent superfan blog posts, for instance. 
But entrepreneurial participation is also inscribed as something far more 
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fundamental, in the second sense noted above. Entrepreneurial participation is the 
participatory mode expected of audiences as well, for without exercising at least a 
degree of entrepreneurialism, especially by practising risk, the participant is likely to 
minimise the number of opportunities made available to them. For instance, it 
constitutes a risk for audiences to move in the opposite direction to crowds of 
spectators who may have communally followed a character on a loop. Taking this 
risk may increase the chances of securing a more intimate experience, as, indeed, so 
nearly happened in my own experience of Sleep No More outside that locked door. 
This opportunity, albeit a failed one, is far less likely to have arisen were the 
decision not made and the risk not taken to ignore the hurried pacing of the crowd on 
the tail of another performer. While the latter may well have led to an engaging 
encounter and was perhaps a more secure option that must at least have resulted in 
something to watch, the entrepreneurial decision to go my own way bettered the 
odds of securing a more intimate and ultimately more memorable experience. More 
so than anything else in this performance, it was this failed encounter that remained 
one of the most exciting, thrilled at the time by the prospect that it could have been 
me that she selected.  
 It should now be clear that the neoliberal ethos and audience participation in 
immersive theatre have much in common, but there still remains another element of 
that ethos, as well as an effect, that must still be noted: risk, as the element, and 
affect, as the effect. So far I have been looking at how participation is practised in 
The Masque. I now want to directly address these two themes in the remaining two 
subsections: themes that have been established as the bedrock of an aesthetics of 
audience participation in immersive theatre in part one. In doing so, I explicitly look 
to evaluate that aesthetics in political terms. 
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Risk 
I commented on The Great Risk Shift in the introduction and in the previous chapter: 
a shift that has been firmly tied into the institutionalisation and evolution of 
neoliberalism. Indeed, it is this shift that can be seen to have prompted Lyng to 
reflect on risk-laden social conditions as a stimulus for both his first and second 
edgework frameworks. My examination of this framework led to an address of 
Giddens and his insistence that risk-taking is an inherent element of entrepreneurial 
activity. By idealising entrepreneurship and extending it as a value across an entire 
citizenship, the institution of this value in the policy decisions of New Labour also 
valorised risk. Something similar is at stake in The Masque. Through a comparable 
extension of entrepreneurial participation to all participants, as a value to be aspired 
to, risk-taking, by implication, ends up being valorised as well. As with the third 
way, the goal of this valorisation may well be to render entrepreneurship and risk-
taking as inclusive values. Indeed, implementing the mandatory wearing of a cloak 
and mask, as has already been demonstrated, would seem to support this claim. It 
should be noted that Colin Nightingale, Punchdrunk’s senior producer, claimed that 
it is far from an intention of Punchdrunk to promote exclusivity in their work 
(personal interview). Barrett’s comments on the mask above would also seem to 
substantiate the idea that Punchdrunk seek the opposite: namely, inclusivity. 
However, in raising entrepreneurial participation and risk-taking to the status of 
values to be aspired to, as an implicit consequence of the kinds of participation 
favoured through their approach to space and the audience’s free roaming within 
spaces, Punchdrunk end up producing exclusionary forms of participation as a 
consequence of the grounds on which inclusion is premised. To be specific: 
entrepreneurial participation and risk-taking are these exclusionary forms.  
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This kind of observation is what led Owen to express wariness of treating 
risk as a positive value (329), just as it leads me to approach the valorisation of risk-
taking in immersive theatre participation with scepticism as to its political 
ramifications. While the rewards of acting upon risk as a participant may be high – 
maximising participatory experience and its experiential rewards – the costs are also 
high, in political terms, for these rewards come with the obligation of assuming risk-
taking and entrepreneurship. Free roaming in an immersive theatre environment, 
then, might not be quite as free as the term implies. Rather, it is worth asking: who 
gets left behind?  
It is important to note that the likelihood of encountering risk is something 
that may well decrease over the course of a live event, or with repeat attendance. 
Indeed, after a few hours of wandering around the various spaces of Sleep No More, 
I soon became familiarised, or at least better acquainted, with the map of the space 
and where the looped performances were likely to be taking place at particular times. 
The risk of missing out might consequently be seen to decrease, just as repeat 
attendance to different immersive theatre events and the consequent bettering of 
knowledge regarding participatory protocol might work in much the same way. Not 
only that, but a developing awareness of that participatory protocol, as well as a 
growing familiarity with the kind of performance being presented over the course of 
one performance and over the course of several years of experiencing Punchdrunk’s 
work, also seemed to decrease my own experience of risk perception. Nonetheless, 
risky choices were still made: do I follow the crowd, or do I go it alone? Do I take 
the hand of this performer and risk humiliation under the gaze of others, or do I 
decline? Do I remain in one space and hope that the action comes to me, or do I 
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wander? While they may seem trivial, these are still risks to be negotiated in 
performance: not by choice, but by necessity.  
 
Affect 
Punchdrunk use space to generate a particular atmosphere appropriate to whatever 
text(s) provide the point of departure for a performance. Barrett insists that the 
creative stimulus behind the creation of each show comes from an engagement with 
space: significantly, the architecture of the space that will house whatever immersive 
world is to be created. Barrett claims to log his own feelings when first encountering 
a given space and that the subsequent challenge is then to fix those feelings ‘and 
accentuate them so that we can guarantee for any audience member that they’ll feel 
that same impact’ (qtd. in Machon, (Syn)aesthetics 92). This implies that space 
functions first of all as an independent producer of feeling which is then harnessed 
and manipulated. Machon describes how Punchdrunk use space to allow ‘the text to 
be opened up on a multi-dimensional level. In this way, the text itself becomes 
entirely visceral’ (‘Space and the Senses’ n.p.). While the entirety of this viscerality 
should be approached with caution, both comments nonetheless allude to a tendency 
in Punchdrunk’s work to throw audiences into immersive worlds that attempt to 
provoke an authentic sense of atmosphere appropriate to the text being used, by 
manipulating affective stimuli as a means to that end.  
In The Masque, audiences might find themselves nestled, for example, in an 
opium den adorned with Persian pillows, rugs and paraphernalia for various forms of 
consumption. In creating this kind of environment, Punchdrunk allude to the sense of 
disorientation and otherworldliness affiliated with the dream-like landscapes crafted 
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by Poe through his literature. It is in this sense that atmosphere is forged within 
Punchdrunk’s world, largely manipulated through lighting, architecture, mise en 
scène and anything else that might guide the audience’s senses in some way to help 
induce feeling. Central to Punchdrunk’s work, then, is the production of affect, as 
something that can even be seen to provide an incentive for an audience’s 
entrepreneurial participation.  
In closing this comparative analysis of The Masque and the neoliberal ethos, 
I want to focus on this production of affect, specifically as it relates to neoliberal 
value. As specified above, I do not consider affect as a part of the neoliberal ethos; 
the neoliberal co-optation of affect arises as an effect of the neoliberal ethos. Affect 
is not a neoliberal value, but it has become a biopolitical site of negotiation for 
entrepreneurial business enterprise following the rise of the service economy, 
especially. Affective labour and emotional labour have become imbricated within 
neoliberalism as a consequence of the incessant need for businesses to expand not 
only their business interests in a highly competitive free market, but the means of 
securing those interests as well. What remains to be seen is how this imbrication of 
affect production and neoliberalism might contribute to the comparative analysis of 
the neoliberal ethos and The Masque being eked out so far. Politically speaking, 
what does it mean for affect production to be a central component of an aesthetics of 
audience participation in immersive theatre?  
In approaching this question, it proves fruitful to introduce two additional 
terms to the current discussion, both drawn from Hurley. Hurley’s notion of ‘feeling 
technologies’ was introduced in chapter one: ‘mechanisms that do something with 
feeling’, which might include, in the current context, costuming the audience in a 
mask and cloak. Feeling technologies involve the direction of sentience and 
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consequently function as instruments that help to stimulate and manipulate feeling. 
Feeling technologies are thoroughly bound up with what Hurley calls ‘feeling-
labour’, which refers to ‘theatre’s solicitation, management, and display of feelings’ 
(Hurley 4; see also 29). By using a term like ‘feeling-labour’, then, Hurley intends 
‘to capture the work theatre does in making, managing, and moving feeling in all its 
types (affect, emotions, moods, sensations) in a publicly observable display that is 
sold to an audience for a wage’ (9). To manage and elicit feeling from an audience is 
to engage in feeling-labour, as an extractive form of production, just as the display of 
feeling on the part of the performer is to put feeling to work, as a service – not too 
dissimilar from the airline steward/ess performing warmth for a customer. But where 
experience, particularly affective experience, is something to be discovered and 
worked for, as is the case in The Masque, feeling-labour becomes explicitly 
accommodated by a participating audience. Whether formulated as affective labour, 
emotional labour or feeling-labour, this kind of activity is not simply purchased or 
received, but worked for: both as a consequence of the participant’s implicitly 
creative role in the production of affect, as explored in chapter one, and also as a 
consequence of their having to search for it.  
As a participant engaging in a form of affective labour, audience members in 
The Masque are revealed even more clearly as co-producers, or especially productive 
participants. Audiences are affectively worked upon through feeling technologies, 
but they also exert affective labour through their inherent productivity and the more 
explicit productivity of entrepreneurial participation. As such, a crux emerges: on the 
one hand, audiences are manipulated by feeling technologies; on the other, they 
engage in affective labour. However, in evaluating the politics of this latter form of 
affective labour, it is important not to jump to the conclusion that entrepreneurial 
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activity leads to autonomy. Rather, this productivity remains premised on the 
potentially exclusory forms of entrepreneurial participation and risk-taking explored 
in the previous two subsections.  
In discussing affective labour, I suggested, drawing on Hardt and Negri, that 
affect is rendered a biopolitical site for the negotiation of power. This may well have 
rang alarm bells given my suggestion in part one that affect is rendered a site of 
aesthetic attention for the immersive theatre participant in both Cold Storage and 
Rotating. In a comparable way, the wearing of cloaks and masks in The Masque 
work to heighten focus on the production of affect. In The Masque, the audience’s 
mask and cloak works as a feeling technology by turning attention towards the 
audience’s interior. Not only this, but by virtue of the privacy it affords, the mask 
and cloak both become mechanisms that help to generate affect and emotion, 
especially if the confidence that might come with anonymity prompts the audience to 
take risks. The mask and cloak helps to produce affect as well as draw attention to an 
experience of affect. This particular feeling technology, then, hints towards a 
potential for the participant’s affective labour to be revealed as just that: labour. 
However, there is an equal risk of this labour remaining inchoate, or at least 
unrecognised, given the fetishisation of affective experience at play in rendering 
such experience the privileged reward of entrepreneurial participation. So long as 
something is thrilling, enjoyable or otherwise pleasurable, a potentially damaging 
question may emerge: who cares? What this question helps to erase, or keep hidden, 
is how audiences are worked upon by affect, or how audiences have no option but to 
subscribe to a particular value set that has already been identified as aligning with 
the neoliberal ethos.  
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In sum: affect production in The Masque relates to the neoliberal ethos, not as 
a part of that ethos, but as an effect. As a consequence of privacy, individualism, 
personal responsibility, entrepreneurial participation and risk-taking, affect manifests 
not only through the exertion of affective labour on the parts of participants, but also 
as a reward for such labour, exercised through practising neoliberal values. It is in 
this sense that affect production can be seen as an effect of the neoliberal ethos in 
The Masque: an effect that does not do away with the significant contribution of 
autobiography to the production of affect, but rather pushes the individualism 
associated with it to an extreme form. Consequently, a politics of participation in The 
Masque might best be understood through the identification of a value set shared 
with neoliberalism that does not exclude the possibility of togetherness, so long as 
the inclusion associated with that togetherness is itself recognised as exclusory, 
premised as it is on privileging the entrepreneurial participant.  
 
Product Placement and the Unpaid Marketer in The Black Diamond 
Over the course of this chapter I have been arguing that there is something integral 
about participating in Punchdrunk’s work that correlates strongly with the neoliberal 
ethos. If there is a politics of participation in The Masque, it is a politics that is at 
least partly premised on neoliberal values. With this compatibility in mind, it is 
perhaps no surprise that Punchdrunk, by making performances with, or on behalf of 
corporate businesses, have come to demonstrate what might be framed either as a 
feeding off, or absorption within such emblems of capitalist culture as Sony, Louis 
Vuitton and Stella Artois Black. However, this relationship with business enterprise 
is not just the result of compatibility based on a shared value set between audience 
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participation and neoliberalism; it is also based on Punchdrunk’s production 
strategies. In this section, I will be looking at how Punchdrunk’s production 
strategies end up affecting audience participation in the first scene of their second 
corporate performance for Stella Artois Black, The Black Diamond. In particular, I 
will be addressing the positioning of audience participants in this performance as 
unpaid marketers of a product placed in performance and assessing the political 
implications of this positioning.  
Colin Nightingale, Punchdrunk’s senior producer, suggests that given the 
company’s growing popularity they can be increasingly picky about which corporate 
businesses they want to work with while exercising greater authorial independence 
(personal interview). This is a view that resonates with Alvin Toffler’s book, The 
Culture Consumers, published in 1964. Toffler suggests that collaboration between 
arts and business ‘increases the manoeuvrability of the artist. It puts him [sic] in a 
better bargaining position’ (107, original emphasis). Toffler and Nightingale are 
advocating greater independence on the part of artists to choose among funding 
streams. In particular, Nightingale is effectively advocating Toffler’s suggestion that 
artists, or at least Punchdrunk, are free to manoeuvre within a funding field 
comprised of a range of different funding sources, achieving greater bargaining 
status through systems of exchange, with potentially mutual benefits, in a 
competitive market for both businesses and artists. It is this kind of manoeuvrable 
production strategy that can be read as being prized in post-2010 UK arts funding. 
Chapter five will address how the assumption of manoeuvrability, as an option, is 
simply not open to every artist and is therefore both selective and exclusive. For the 
time being, though, I hope to demonstrate that this strategy has consequences for 
audiences of Punchdrunk’s work, especially those performances, like The Black 
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Diamond, that are strategic performances geared towards the generation of capital on 
the parts of both those making and funding the work. 
Nightingale is clear about another motive behind Punchdrunk’s work with 
corporate businesses. Not only does such work help to fund other productions that 
are expensive to mount, while also offering performances that are free to attend for 
audiences, but it helps to keep Punchdrunk’s actors in paid work, especially in the 
potentially long interim periods between large-scale productions (personal 
interview). Decisions to work with corporate businesses do not occur in isolation 
from an economic context, but react to it. It is not as simple as suggesting that 
Punchdrunk are somehow selling out to corporate interests. Decisions to work with 
corporate businesses are informed by a number of valid ethical concerns regarding 
the welfare of their performers, as well as important political manoeuvring alongside 
the UK’s primary public funding body for the arts, Arts Council England (ACE).  
 What this introduces is an additional set of considerations that demonstrate 
how Punchdrunk are imbricated within a very particular economic context that 
directly affects what work is produced and how work is produced. ACE’s former 
chair, Alan Davey, was clear about supporting mixed economic funding in ACE’s 
2010 publication Achieving Great Art for Everyone: that is, funding initiatives that 
make public money stretch by integrating private funding streams (7). It is no 
accident that Punchdrunk’s corporate funding drives were rewarded in April 2012 
with national portfolio organisation (NPO) status, solidifying their regular ACE 
funding from 2009 with a public funding rise of 141 per cent in real terms, despite 
significant cuts in public funding to former regularly funded organisations (ACE, 
‘National Portfolio Organisations’ n.p.). Punchdrunk were – and now, to an even 
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greater extent, are – working in a funding climate in the UK that explicitly supports 
mixed economic funding models.  
In Achieving Great Art for Everyone, ACE advocates a mixed economy 
through their arts funding decisions, claiming, as Davey writes, to work hard ‘to try 
and deliver more from the private sector, by improving fundraising skills and the 
overall culture of giving to the arts’ (7). In other words, ACE is attempting to help 
artists to become entrepreneurial, approaching arts funding not so much as a public 
financial support mechanism, but as a tool for investing in the arts in ‘sustainable’ 
ways – where sustainability is premised here on the part-privatisation of arts funding. 
This is not just an echo, but an amplification of the spirit of privatisation championed 
under Thatcher and further institutionalised through New Labour and into the 
contemporary moment.  
 Nightingale suggests that Punchdrunk’s mixed funding model certainly 
helped with their successful bid for ACE funding, but that reliance on public funding 
is too risky (personal interview). A mixed funding model at least offers a degree of 
security to continue making work should one or other of the public or private 
funding strands prove compromised. He also suggests that Punchdrunk has needed to 
be entrepreneurial in sourcing funds for their large-scale work for some time, 
claiming that money is always an issue at the forefront of production, particularly a 
lack of it to meet the financial requirements of a given show (personal interview). So 
while Punchdrunk’s reward of a rise in public funding at a time of funding crisis 
came to emblematise ACE’s funding strategy, they had already been practising what 
was to become ACE mantra as articulated in Achieving Great Art for Everyone. 
Punchdrunk may well have become increasingly imbricated with a public funding 
ideology nudging ever closer toward privatisation, but their own funding initiatives 
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were already demonstrating entrepreneurialism – a prime example being their early 
reliance on Gideon Reeling.  
 A funding initiative worth mentioning before focusing in on The Black 
Diamond is Punchdrunk’s Key Holder scheme. This scheme ‘embodies exciting 
opportunities to support the company as it continues to innovate and push the 
boundaries of theatrical experiment. There are six levels at which you can support 
the company, each with a different key unlocking access to exclusive information 
and experiences’ (Punchdrunk.org.uk). These six levels – recently reduced to four – 
begin with the £30 annual Valet Key membership, which ‘[u]nlocks limited access to 
the company's plans with priority booking for some Punchdrunk productions and an 
occasional letter’ (Punchdrunk.org.uk). In the closing weeks of my PhD research, the 
fifth and sixth keys seem to have been dropped from the Key Holder scheme, at least 
from its public face on the website. The range of prices used to almost be topped 
with a £25,000 biennial Skeleton Key membership, which, in addition to priority 
booking and unveiling the secrecy which surrounds the company, as the £250 Bow 
Key bestows, unlocks ‘a bespoke opportunity of the most exclusive and exhilarating 
nature, a once in a lifetime trip with Punchdrunk Travel Company’ 
(Punchdrunk.org.uk). The sixth key was an access all areas Master Key for 
unspecified larger donations. The current most expensive option is a £5000 Abloy 
Key, allowing key holders access to a ‘personalised service from the Punchdrunk 
team as they develop and nurture a close relationship with the company’ 
(Punchdrunk.org.uk). The former upper echelons of this system, then, seem to have 
given the company cause for reflection, which I interpret as signalling unease about 
the exclusivity inherent in the Key Holder system. This may also be the consequence 
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of Punchdrunk Travel Company being moved onto the company’s backburner 
(Balfour, personal interview).  
 In addition to regular ACE funding, Punchdrunk are funded by the 
independent Esmée Fairbairn Foundation and the mass media corporation, 
Bloomberg. Punchdrunk also have a director of brand partnerships, Connie Harrison. 
The ‘partnerships’ pages on Punchdrunk’s website states: ‘[o]ccasionally we are able 
to collaborate with like-minded, imaginative organisations to bring original and 
extraordinary ideas to life. We have many interests and ideas outside the company's 
core work and we’ll always be pleased to hear from people who might help us realise 
some of our creative ambitions’ (Punchdrunk.org.uk). This chimes with 
Nightingale’s insistence on a compatibility of interests between Punchdrunk and the 
corporate businesses that they pick to work with, again echoing Toffler’s suggestion 
that working with private funding streams may in fact better the bargaining position 
of artists that might otherwise be wary of sacrificing authorial control.  
Nightingale suggests that one such realisation of creative ambitions – 
immersive theatre that steadily integrates with the real world (that is, the world 
outside of an artistically rendered performance space) – came with The Black 
Diamond (personal interview). Punchdrunk performers Hector Harkness and Raquel 
Meseguer directed the show, although Nightingale suggests that Barrett had a hand 
in the creative decisions as well (personal interview). While functioning as a 
marketing tool for Stella Artois Black, the partnership in this instance was with the 
advertising agency, Mother: the entrepreneurial and edgy marketing giants behind 
the Pot Noodle musical at the 2008 Edinburgh Festival and Acer’s interactive 
dolphin aquariums pitched in shopping centres around Europe in 2012 (the 
interactive dolphins, thankfully, were not real, but convincing animations).  
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The Black Diamond was rapidly booked to capacity and played to an 
audience of 3000 non-paying audience members over the course of six weeks, 2200 
more than this performance’s forerunner, The Night Chauffeur (Punchdrunk.org.uk). 
The Black Diamond was split into seven scenes, with scene one taking place on a 
different day to the remaining six. The first scene was where Stella’s presence was 
most prominent. Audiences would enter a building playing host to an engagement 
party for two characters called Jacques and Cecile in East London’s Blackall Street. 
This converted living space was furnished appropriate to the 1960s. The music of 
Juliette Greco floated through the cosy complex’s various rooms, very much in 
keeping with Stella’s brand aesthetic. Performers intermingled with audience 
members in an effort to integrate them as a part of the celebration, effectively 
interpolating them as characters sharing in festivity. On entering the space, audience 
members were handed beer tokens which could be exchanged for pints of Stella 
Artois Black in branded glasses in the bar upstairs – an exchange that, due to the 
volume of glasses that then trickled throughout the building, provided a branded 
backdrop to the frolicking of performers. The bulk of scene one of this performance 
involved, quite simply, being in such a cool, convivial space, although this scene 
culminated in the revelling audience and performers heading outside where Jacques 
brought out the black diamond from his pocket to formalise the engagement, only for 
a thief to explode from the crowd and steal the diamond. The performers dispersed, 
leaving the audience outside to reach the conclusion that scene one was over.  
In the latter scenes of this performance, performed at a later date, there was 
much more of an onus on narrative development as considerably smaller groups of 
only a few audience members were led or driven through the streets of East London 
as the story of the black diamond and its whereabouts gradually unfolded. But in 
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what follows, it will be scene one that pulls focus, for it was this scene that most 
explicitly raises the issue of an audience’s positioning as an unpaid marketer of 
Stella.  
In my definition of immersive theatre articulated in the introduction, I 
suggested that there tends to be an aspiration towards the formation of other worlds. 
For theatre companies with small budgets, the site beneath the immersive landscape 
is more likely to be visible or at least pose a nagging presence, especially if the space 
itself is too big for the resources available – for instance, pipes and chipped paint 
may be visible beneath or next to Persian fabrics and velvet curtains, puncturing the 
degree of immersion and escape that a given immersive environment aims to create. 
In The Black Diamond, permeation of an immersive world took place, but not as a 
consequence of a lack of resources; rather, the resources were themselves the 
problem, functioning as an uncomfortable surplus. The problem was product 
placement and posed a twofold set of effects which rendered the boundary between 
constructed immersive landscape and the world outside of it as a two-way membrane 
that seems antithetical to immersive theatre.  
On the one hand, the Stella Artois Black brand, through the vehicle of the 
branded glasses dispersed throughout the space, was absorbed within the immersive 
aesthetic. Anna Klingmann uses the term ‘brandscape’ to describe the physical 
manifestations of a brand identity that demarcates ‘culturally independent sites 
where corporate value systems materialize into physical territories’ (83). Punchdrunk 
are helping to create such a brandscape for Stella and the sea of branded glasses 
within the performance space are part of the vehicle for doing so – albeit a vehicle 
reliant on a more complex aesthetic arena crafted by Punchdrunk. The immersive 
experience then functions as a contagious entity which, especially in the minds and 
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comments of those who experience it, is likely to end up being associated with the 
branded identity of Stella. Mother’s marketing campaign consequently thrives on 
Punchdrunk’s provision of a brand experience. Immersive theatre then emerges as a 
co-opted medium to aid the development of a brand identity while fostering brand 
awareness by affiliating Stella with an emerging theatre style supplied by immersive 
theatre pioneers, Punchdrunk.  
On the other hand, the immersive world is itself coloured by the Stella brand. 
The permeation and contagion works both ways. Not only is Stella affiliated with a 
great immersive experience, but The Black Diamond and, by implication, 
Punchdrunk, are affiliated with corporate branding. Audiences are rendered not only 
as consumers of theatre, but much more literal consumers of a branded drink as well, 
along with the aesthetic that Stella hope to have affiliated with their brand. This is 
where the political implications for audiences of this kind of brand partnership come 
into play most prominently, for audiences end up, effectively, as unpaid marketers of 
Stella Artois Black. Perhaps their payment is the reward of experiencing this work 
for free, in which case the audience functions not unlike a volunteer, paid in kind. 
But my point is that a form of work – i.e. advertising – is disguised as leisure, 
adapting Deborah Rapuano’s fear that this disguise ‘obscures the private 
appropriation of profit’ (618).31  
Audiences, particularly if they enjoy the free performance that is offered to 
them, end up positioned, at least potentially, as what Max Lenderman calls ‘brand 
evangelists’: the bringer of glad tidings and ‘progenitors to the new consumer’ (167). 
                                                 
31
 Rapuano offers an ‘ethnographic case study of Irish traditional music pub sessions’ (617). Many of 
the session musicians in her study were paid. None of the audience participants in The Black 
Diamond, to the best of my knowledge, were paid. As such, I believe that Rapuano’s subject of study 
– a form of work disguised as leisure – is even more applicable to The Black Diamond, where the only 
remuneration for audience participants is the reward of experiencing a performance at no financial 
cost.  
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The brand evangelist, writes Lenderman, ‘love[s] the brand because it provides them 
with an experience no other brand can deliver. That experience will be translated by 
word-of-mouth to peers and family on their own terms’ (168). In the case of The 
Black Diamond, it is not just the experience of drinking Stella that is potentially 
evangelised. Brand evangelism is taken as a point of departure for Stella, via Mother, 
to capitalise on, via word-of-mouth hype surrounding the performance (tickets were 
in extremely high demand for this performance), alongside the positive contagion 
bestowed on Stella via integration within an immersive world provided by 
Punchdrunk. Whether they like it or not, audiences end up functioning as a kind of 
brand evangelist for Stella simply by attending the performance and especially once 
they discuss the work with friends, or on online blogs. They may not have to buy a 
ticket, but they certainly buy into this advertising campaign by simply attending and 
are even depended upon to make that campaign efficacious. So the permeation of an 
immersive world works both ways; the brand benefits from the positive contagion of 
being associated with an experience purveyed by Punchdrunk and the performance 
itself is significantly coloured by branding, positioning audiences as brand 
evangelists. This latter, especially, exerts political pressure on an audience by fairly 
covert means. By inviting audiences to participate in a marketing campaign with the 
attractive offer of free tickets, despite whatever compatibility might play into 
Punchdrunk’s interests at that period in time, audiences end up positioned as 
marketers of a product. The performance and the audience along with it end up being 
co-opted by corporate enterprise that has become ever more alert to the marketing 
potential of cultural cache and the buzz affiliated with a hot ticket.  
And what is at the heart of this business venture? Marketable experiences. In 
part one I staked the claim that experience, particularly affective and risky 
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experience, is at the centre of immersive theatre’s participatory aesthetics. It seems 
to me that advertising agencies such as Mother are wise to this and have 
consequently looked to co-opt this integral aspect of Punchdrunk’s immersive theatre 
work. Indeed, ‘experiential marketing’ is a practise that has come into its own over 
the past ten years as businesses search for means of standing out within saturated 
markets. In many ways The Black Diamond can be seen as a moment of culmination 
for innovations towards capitalising on attractive experiences. This is why the next 
chapter will be directly addressing the increasing marketability of experiences, as, I 
believe, the ongoing evolution of neoliberal business practises should impact on how 
we approach an experience-centred style of theatre such as immersive theatre.  
To draw this section to a close: The Black Diamond can be seen to bring risk 
into play in a very different sense to that explored so far in this thesis. The kind of 
risk in operation is covert. Audiences may not be aware – or care – that they are at 
risk of being used. It may be that this is a fairly trivial, perhaps inconsequential form 
of using. However, the fact remains that the lure of an immersive experience by 
Punchdrunk masks the peculiar breed of a risk-bearing audience’s productivity: a 
form of affective labour which is fetishised and instrumentalised as a means for 
accumulating capital by those funding this affective labour.  
 
Conclusion: Punchdrunk and Exclusivity 
This chapter has staked the claim that the participatory values enshrined in the kind 
of participation that Punchdrunk asks of its audiences in The Masque shares much 
with the neoliberal ethos, particularly with regard to privacy, responsibility, 
individualism, entrepreneurialism and risk-taking. It was also demonstrated that an 
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effect of how these values operate through neoliberal business practise has been the 
absorption of affect as a form of labour and as a productive source of capital 
production. This absorption ought to at least colour an evaluation of the centrality of 
affect in immersive theatre’s aesthetics of participation, especially if immersive 
theatre is not treated as an isolated entity but, rather, approached as something that 
operates in close relation to social, economic and political contexts. The lure of 
affective thrill and the excitement that surrounds participation in Punchdrunk’s work 
was revealed, through my examination of the partnership between Punchdrunk and 
Mother, as something that can be capitalised upon and even co-opted. The audience 
in this performance function as unpaid marketers of Stella, or at least as volunteers 
paid in kind in return for their brand evangelism, encouraging reflection on the uses 
to which productive participants might be put in such immersive theatre 
performances.  
In conclusion, a politics of participation in The Masque has its counterparts in 
the kinds of civic participation that successive governments have been asking of the 
UK citizenship since at least the 1980s – a correlation that helps to illuminate a 
politics of participation in The Masque. The distribution of risk-taking and risk-
bearing subjectivities, especially as a distribution that responds so sensitively to the 
production of affect, and even more so once affect is approached as a form of labour, 
might then be questioned by asking: who gets left behind? These are political 
concerns, for at their heart lies the production of a value system that necessarily 
favours some – particularly the entrepreneurial participant – over others less 
disposed towards entrepreneurialism. The fact that audiences are encouraged to be 
entrepreneurial participants by wearing a mask only serves to institute further this 
element of the neoliberal ethos, as both an encouragement and an expectation.   
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 My point in this chapter has not been to criticise the artistic merit of 
Punchdrunk’s work. Punchdrunk remain one of the most exciting and impressive 
immersive theatre companies working today and their work rarely ceases to affect 
me in profound and intensely stimulating ways. Rather, my point has been to critique 
the kind of qualities that are present in the participatory modes that are expected of 
their audiences. It is in addressing this nuance that I locate a politics of participation 
in Punchdrunk performances as an exclusive politics that is all the more thrilling 
because of exclusion. Exclusion provides a counterweight to the privileges of those 
that buy into Punchdrunk’s Key Holder scheme, at its various levels, not to mention 
the corporate performances with restricted audience access. But it is also tied into the 
values that are prioritised in the kind of participation that is both asked and expected 
of audiences in their performances more generally. In evaluating the thrill and sense 
of amazement or excitement that might come with, for example, being selected for a 
one-on-one, or being one step ahead of the crowd in discovering something within a 
performance, it is also worth reflecting on the implications of valuing this implicitly 
exclusionary practise. What emerges is an isolated audience, responsible for the 
generation of self-made opportunity through practising spectatorship as an 
entrepreneurial participant.  
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Chapter Four: Shunt and the Experience Economy  
Throughout this thesis, I have staked and sought to substantiate the claim that affect 
production and risk perception significantly contribute to an aesthetics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre. In the last chapter, I also suggested that the risk-
laden affective labour of participating audiences contributing to the production of 
aesthetic experiences in Punchdrunk’s work is framed as an expectation, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, is susceptible to co-optation. I then suggested that this 
expectation and susceptibility carries important political ramifications for the 
positioning of participating audiences. This chapter reorients this discussion by 
charting points of alignment between immersive theatre and the experience economy 
so as to define further how both an aesthetics and politics of participation in 
immersive theatre might be coloured by context.  
The experience economy refers to a paradigm shift largely instigated by 
businesses recognising, especially over the past decade, that experience production 
among potential and existing customers might bolster sales, establish brand loyalty 
and contribute to the formation of a brand identity. I will be exploring how the 
proliferation of marketable experiences provides a context that might help to inform 
an evaluation of immersive theatre’s aesthetics and especially its politics. If 
experience production is so central to immersive theatre’s aesthetics of participation 
and if experience production is also proliferating as a marketing strategy deployed by 
contemporary businesses, then how should this impact on theorising audience 
participation in immersive theatre? What are the consequences of this participatory 
aesthetics for the political positioning of audiences within an event, be it a theatre, or 
marketing event?  
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This chapter focuses on the work of the London based theatre collective, 
Shunt. Shunt formed as a group of ten artists in 1998 and until 2004 were based in 
railway arches in Bethnal Green, where they performed The Ballad of Bobby 
François (2000) and Dance Bear Dance (2003). They then moved to the London 
Bridge Vaults: premises accessed through an unmarked door in London Bridge 
station. As well as the Shunt Lounge, which functioned as a curatorial project in this 
location between 2006 and 2010, the Shunt Vaults, as they came to be called, 
provided a venue for both Tropicana (2005-06) and Amato Saltone (2005-06). After 
a brief stint at a nearby former tobacco warehouse on Bermondsey Street for Money 
(2009-10), Shunt took over the Biscuit Factory for The Architects (2012-13) – a 
large former industrial space which dominates what is now the V22 artists’ studios 
complex in Bermondsey (Shunt.co.uk). 
 In contrast to Punchdrunk’s work, where audiences are largely free to move 
around a range of spaces of their own accord on individual journeys, audiences in 
Shunt’s performances tend to have their movements guided and also tend to remain 
as a group, although there may still be moments of discovery for participating 
audiences. As one member of the Shunt collective, David Rosenberg, suggests: if 
there is too much responsibility handed over to an audience, ‘then an audience can 
choose not to enter some of the difficulties of that performance; an audience can 
choose not to see the thing that is going to upset them or confuse them, or surprise 
them, or revolt them’ (qtd. in Machon, (Syn)aesthetics 106). For Shunt, there is a 
show to be presented and a journey to be taken through and that onus on being taken 
through something, on being guided, is what most distinguishes their work from the 
entrepreneurial participation expected of an audience in, for instance, Punchdrunk’s 
The Masque. Entrepreneurial participation is not at stake in Shunt’s work; rather, 
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what is at stake is much more of a submission to an experience, be it thrilling, 
uncanny, upsetting, confusing or frustrating. 
In Shunt’s two most recent performances, Money and The Architects, 
performances that will pull focus in this chapter alongside the Shunt Lounge, 
audiences spend the most part seated within immersive environments, interspersed 
with brief moments of promenade to enable transition between several highly 
controlled aesthetic spaces. In Money, a performance based on Émile Zola’s 
L’Argent, audiences enter into a huge machine reminiscent of some horrific remnant 
of a dystopian factory, complete with dripping liquids and the groans and sounds of 
pumping pistons that at once pinpoints outmoded Victorian industrialism and the 
smoggy progress of technology. Once inside the machine – a remarkable feat of 
immersive design – the audience enters a strange antechamber. They are plunged 
into darkness as the groans of the machine begin to overwhelm the space while wind 
machines blast air across the bodies of the audience. Taken together, this promotes a 
sense of being transported somewhere at rapid speed. The audience then find 
themselves inside a wooden panelled chamber where they take seats at either side of 
a traverse space. Performers sit in among the audience, one of whom plays an 
entrepreneur seeking investment. The audience follow his progress across the three 
floors of the machine, celebrating his rise to fortune with glasses of champagne and 
catching glimpses of covert exchanges through transparent panels fitted in the floors 
above and below the audience. A strange, spider-like human creature clambers all 
over the machine and can be watched through these transparent panels. Despite 
being seated, or at least fairly stationary for most of the performance, the audience is 
encouraged to crane their necks to look up, across and down within this immersive 
space which, as a consequence of these transparent panels, extends the immersive 
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environment beyond walled spaces. The effect can be disorienting, not least because 
of the oddness of experiencing such multidimensionality.  
In The Architects, based on Jorge Luis Borges’s The House of Asterion, 
audiences are free at the beginning of the performance to navigate their way through 
a maze. The maze also functions as a funnel that pumps arriving audiences into a 
cabaret-bar space. Inside this space, audience members are able to sit at small tables 
and take in their surroundings, or perhaps order a drink from the bar. A band begins 
to play as a prologue to very brief, episodic moments of performance that take place 
around the seated audience. ‘This is your trip of a lifetime’, we are told by one of 
four Scandinavian characters – characters that appear to be hosts on a cruise ship 
within which the audience is immersed. These characters also double as obscene 
doppelgängers, god-like in their elevated status as characters mediated via film 
projection on screens above the audience’s heads at either end of the space. The 
resources and activities that our hosts claim are available to us in these brief, 
episodic scenes, interspersed by alienating periods of blackout, are gradually 
revealed as decaying. A passenger is found to have taken a shit by the BBQ and a 
human finger has been discovered without an owner to claim it. The audience – 
interpolated as passengers on a cruise ship – must sit, watch and listen as their 
disintegrating trip of a lifetime is only ever relayed through narrated text. The 
experience of the ship’s star attraction, for instance – a machine that is entered into 
involving sex with a dolphin – is, of course, never engaged with through interactive 
participation. Such acts of potential participation, however ludicrous, are discussed 
by the cruise ship’s hosts or, in the case of the dolphin, by the godlike figures on the 
projector screens: but they remain unfulfilled in participatory action, posed always as 
an anticipation that is never satisfied.  
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After what seems like an eternity of such fragmented episodes, the audience 
is asked to evacuate the space with men and women exiting through different doors. 
In the first of two remaining spaces, the male audience – and here I write as a part of 
the male audience – is asked to obey the commands of scrolling text that appears on 
a television screen, mostly encouraging audiences to shout out simple yes and no 
responses, or to make nonsensical noises such as the sound of monkeys screeching, 
as though mocking the participatory impulse itself. If told to squeal, the audience 
squeals. A final space, revealed after a curtain is pulled back, hosts a volatile 
acrobatics routine and the massacre of a surreal Minotaur figure on one end of a 
broken bridge. This provides a false ending after the Minotaur’s slaughterers take a 
bow to audience applause. The performance concludes with the godlike characters 
from the video projections appearing on an elevated platform in various states of 
undress, hobbling about their enclosure as if enduring the last vestiges of a party that 
the audience were never a part of. Drawn by the sound of the band starting up back 
on board the cruise ship, the audience are finally encouraged to leave the 
performance by following a red thread, perhaps that of Ariadne, back through the 
labyrinth and into the outside world.
32
  
In what follows, the bewildering content of these performances – posing 
something of a challenge to represent in summary – will not draw focus so much as 
the immersive feeling technologies used to produce experience among audiences. 
The machine that is entered into in Money, for instance, functions representationally 
as a menacing consequence of industrial modernity; at the same time, though, it 
functions critically, as an experience machine for an exponent of the cultural 
industries. It is a designed space that is entered for the purpose of encountering the 
                                                 
32
 This element of the performance – the red thread – was not used in the preview performances, but 
was added during the run (the altering of material over the course of a run is common with Shunt).  
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Shunt experience: a confusing, complex and cool theatrical experience that thrives 
on the sensuous and absorbing fact of the live moment. In both Money and The 
Architects, there is a sense that the immersive environments on offer are intended as 
much as experience machines as they are as a vehicle for transmitting coherent 
meaning. In The Architects, this onus on the production of the experiential was 
perhaps subject to critique through the constant negation or trivialisation of 
participatory opportunities and anticipations. Nonetheless, even here the various 
spaces were clearly designed to produce an experience of some kind: whether that 
experience be the intended disorientation of the labyrinth, or the sensation of 
temporal distortion while on the cruise ship as repetitive episodes incessantly 
followed on from one another.  
With this in mind, while both Money and The Architects took place in periods 
of financial turbulence – Money after the 2008 global financial crisis and The 
Architects in the midst of the coalition’s austerity measures – and clearly make 
reference to the perils of financial turbulence, it is the experiential qualities of 
encountering their work that seem to take centre stage. While the narrative content of 
these works ties the performances into very particular contemporary moments – into 
very particular economic and political contexts – it is the stylistic elements of 
performance, the performance as experience machine, that pulls focus in my analysis 
as binding each performance to such contexts. It is Shunt’s experimentation with 
theatrical style and design – style and design that, I believe, is best characterised as 
immersive – that will consequently take critical precedence in what follows.  
The last chapter introduced the idea that the kinds of experiences produced 
for audiences in immersive theatre were ultimately marketable and prone to co-
optation. In what follows, through an analysis of Shunt’s work, I will be considering 
222 
 
the ways in which an experience-centred style of producing theatre ties into 
experience-centred styles of producing capital in contemporary business. In the next 
section, I explore the experience economy as a genre of economic output that is 
enjoying increasing pervasiveness. In doing so, I provide a context to re-evaluate the 
centrality of experience production in immersive theatre’s aesthetics of participation. 
The section after that, ‘Shunt in the Experience Economy’, is split into three sub-
sections: the first conducts a comparative analysis of the Shunt Lounge and the 
London Dungeon as cultural forms that either correlate with, or subscribe to the 
marketable curation of immersive experiences; the second considers Money’s 
immersive environment as a contemporary manifestation of the fairground funhouse, 
addressing both as components of the experience industry and the potential triviality 
that this may impose on the kinds of experience produced in each; and the third 
looks at The Architects as ‘postdramatic theatre’ and argues that the frustration of 
participation within an immersive environment that seems to invite it might in fact 
function as an effective critique of the participatory impulse in the experience 
economy.  
In conclusion and in transition to part three of the thesis, I offer an evaluation 
of Shunt’s work as being profoundly self-conscious of audience manipulation. I 
suggest that audiences are not patronised by the offering of vaguely customisable 
experiences, but are instead confronted by the annoyance of anticipated participation 
either being denied, or being without efficaciousness. Consequently, a critical 
support of negative affects is considered in relation to the fun environments that help 
to stimulate them as a potential battle ground for a subversive politics of 
participation in immersive theatre. 
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What is the Experience Economy? 
Hesmondhalgh usefully identifies three main ways in which capitalist industry was 
radicalised between the 1970s and 1990s: a shift towards service industries, 
internationalisation and organisational innovation (88). The first of these is most 
relevant to current concerns and merits clarification. In identifying a shift towards 
service industries, Hesmondhalgh refers to a transition between different stages of 
economic output. The first of these stages refers to the extraction of commodities, 
such as the mining and agricultural industries (the primary sector); the second refers 
to the industrial transformation of these commodities into manufactured goods, an 
example being the automobile industry (the secondary sector); the third refers to ‘the 
various industrial sectors which deal primarily with services: distributive, producer, 
social and personal services’ (the tertiary sector) (88).33 Hardt describes the advent 
of these different sectors as paradigms; he suggests that the paradigm shift from 
extractive to industrial production constituted a period of modernisation and the 
paradigm shift from manufacturing to service provision, most notably from the 
1970s, heralded postmodernisation (90-91).
34
 This latter shift, to some extent, 
remains dependent on outsourcing a significant part of the manufacturing industries 
overseas (Castells 220). However, Hardt insists that manufacturing is not so much 
                                                 
33
 This third stage might be usefully nuanced with a brief aside on ‘post-industrialism’. As Castells 
explains, while expressing scepticism about the appropriateness of the term (219), the notion of post-
industrialism combines three statements and predictions: firstly, ‘[t]he source of productivity and 
growth lies in the generation of knowledge, extended to all realms of economic activity through 
information processing’; secondly, ‘[e]conomic activity would shift from goods production to 
services delivery’; and thirdly, ‘[t]he new economy would increase the importance of occupations 
with a high information and knowledge content in their activity’ (218-19). Whether defined as ‘post-
Fordist’, ‘post-industrial’ or as a ‘service economy’, the point to be underlined is that in the second 
half of the twentieth century, in advanced capitalist societies including the UK, an increasing 
prominence seemed to be placed on service industries, alongside their organisational and managerial 
structures. Fully exploring these alternative terms and notions would be more applicable were my 
focus, at this point, placed less on a shift towards service industries and more on organisational 
innovation.  
34
 See also David Harvey, who uses alternative terminology to describe, in more detail, this latter shift 
in terms of ‘flexible accumulation’ (The Condition of Postmodernity 147). 
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removed from service economies, as transformed, blurring the divisions between 
manufacturing and services: ‘[j]ust as through the process of modernization all 
production became industrialised, so too through the process of postmodernization 
all production tends toward the production of services, toward becoming 
informationalized’ (92). One consequence of the developing service economy has 
been the increasing prevalence of immaterial labour – ‘labour that produces an 
immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or 
communication’ (Hardt and Negri 290) – one aspect of which is affective labour.35 
As the last chapter suggested, there are biopolitical implications associated with this 
shift, not least because of the possible co-optation of human experience as a 
productive source of capital.  
I now want to address a fourth stage of economic output: what B. Joseph Pine 
and James H. Gilmore identify in their influential book, The Experience Economy, as 
‘an existing but previously unarticulated genre of economic output’: namely, the 
production of experiences (ix, original emphasis): 
[e]xperiences are a fourth economic offering [after commodities, goods and 
services], as distinct from services as services are from goods, but one that 
has until now gone largely unrecognised. [...] When a person buys a service, 
he [sic] purchases a set of intangible activities carried out on his behalf. But 
when he buys an experience, he pays to spend time enjoying a series of 
memorable events that a company stages – as in a theatrical play – to engage 
him in a personal way. (2) 
                                                 
35
 It is worth nuancing this remark; such immaterial goods, as they are produced in the service 
economy, oftentimes are inextricably linked with some kind of material good, such as a computer 
chip, thus ‘making it impossible to distinguish the boundaries between “goods” and “services”’ 
(Castells 221). The extent of this ‘impossibility’, however, is contestable, as it remains useful to flag 
how labour practises have increasingly come to incorporate non-material qualities.  
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Pine and Gilmore trace the origins of the experience economy to Walt Disney, most 
notably through Disney’s inauguration of the theme park (2). Disneyland, in 
California, opened in 1955 and revolutionised what an amusement park came to 
represent by synergising everything within it through a coherent theme which, in 
Disney’s case, related to the characters and narratives from Disney animations. As 
Klingmann writes, Disneyland constitutes a prime example ‘of a completely 
constructed environment, one that is based not on traditional principles of 
[architectural] composition but rather on the choreography of scripted sequences that 
are compounded with the identity of a brand’ (69). For Klingmann, Disneyland’s 
success partly resides in the integration of such sequences, making up ‘a holistic 
environment’ (75). What the theme park came to typify and what Disney helped to 
found through Disneyland was an escapist world: a coherent landscape, cut off from 
the environments outside of its boundaries, premised on the production of 
memorable and pleasurable experiences. The theme park synergises multiple spaces 
through attending to scenographic detail and executing a legible and consistent 
design. In other words, it relies on offering an other-worldliness that resonates 
strongly with immersive theatre environments. Not only is Disneyland populated 
with role playing performers that interact with audiences, but it also presents 
immersive landscapes that can be freely roamed within. As such, immersive theatre 
finds a historical correlate in a popular origin of the experience economy.  
 The Experience Economy looks at a number of different industry sectors that 
have come to embrace experience production within highly competitive markets. 
Pine and Gilmore consider the international successes of themed restaurants like 
Planet Hollywood and shops such as Niketown as noteworthy examples of 
experience-driven businesses that revolve not just around customers purchasing 
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goods or services, but also a more holistic experience that is at once entertaining and 
memorable (3). For instance, on a reluctant visit to Niketown’s Oxford Street store in 
London, I learned that customers could ‘steam fit’ their Nike Flyknit trainers in-store 
to achieve a customised fit. Of course, this is not much different to a tailor 
customising a suit, but the experiential qualities of this personalising process go 
much further. In Niketown, customers are able to try out their steam fitted shoes on 
running machines to ensure a customer satisfaction that is as much premised on the 
quality of the good as it is on buying into an experience of customisation.  
This example also demonstrates how experience, as a genre of economic 
output, extends to the goods themselves. While the framing of how goods are sold is 
an important element of the experience economy, as it is with the service economy, it 
is also the nature of the good that is changing. One need only think of the 
comparative success of the iPod and iPad over rival MP3 players and tablets to 
realise how important the experience of using a good has become for many 
consumers. Design features that foster interactive experiences while using a product 
are clearly doing well in the market. Experience has come to function as an ideology 
in contemporary business across a wide and diverse range of commercial sectors and 
this ideology is as much geared towards experientially minded design as it is toward 
a memorable and preferably interactive experience of liveness.  
 Recognising the importance of how a good or service feels – recognising the 
significance of its experiential qualities – has been a driving force behind the 
emergence of experiential marketing. Bernd Schmitt, in particular, has been 
influential in propagating this marketing technique in his book Experiential 
Marketing. Schmitt writes in much the same vein as Pine and Gilmore about the 
rising importance of the commodification of experiences, but from the more focused 
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perspective of utilising experience as a marketing strategy. He identifies four 
‘Strategic Experiential Modules’ (SEM) that might be utilised in marketing 
something: SENSE marketing, to promote value via sensory appeal (111); FEEL 
marketing, which looks to attach affect to a company or brand (118); THINK 
marketing, which looks to engage the creative faculty of potential customers via 
intrigue or provocation (153); ACT marketing, which relies on promoting customer 
interaction and transformation in lifestyle preferences (154); and RELATE 
marketing, which looks to relate the discrete self of a customer to the wider socio-
cultural context reflected in a brand (171). ‘Holistic experiences’ are referred to by 
Schmitt as a goal of these SEMs (193).  
As Max Lenderman, another advocate of experiential marketing, suggests, 
the emergence of these kinds of marketing strategies is the result not just of 
marketers to ‘break through the ad clutter and counteract the growing ineffectiveness 
of mass marketing’, but also to respond to ‘the consumer desire to be connected to 
brands through memorable communication’ (10). ‘Consequently’, writes Lenderman, 
‘experiential marketing is a marketing philosophy that views the typical consumer as 
everything but a set of eyeballs’ (51). The universality of ‘consumer desire’ in this 
instance should be questioned, as there are undoubtedly many who would consider 
this kind of desire wholly antithetical to their own values and beliefs and the 
attribution or assumption of such desire somewhat implausible, patronising and even 
offensive. Nonetheless, as these authors demonstrate, there are a growing number of 
observers who appear to be identifying and even celebrating not only the increased 
successes of experience-driven marketing techniques, but also an apparent demand 
that renders these techniques successful.  
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 One of the most fascinating aspects of the literature on experiential 
marketing, particularly Schmitt’s writing on SEMs, is the choice of terminology. It is 
remarkably applicable to immersive theatre, particularly with regard to the 
engagement of audiences. Relationality, arousal of feeling, sensory engagement that 
stimulates more than just the eyes… These terms are strongly reminiscent of those 
encountered in part one of this thesis, as well as the introduction. Pine and Gilmore 
go even further in The Experience Economy when they describe four different 
dimensions of experience that businesses should acknowledge when producing 
experiences for potential consumers. They provide two axes forming two different 
spectrums of experience that are relevant to the crafting of experiences in the 
experience economy. The first axis positions passive participation in opposition to 
active participation, while the second axis, which intersects the first, positions 
absorption in opposition to immersion (30). Passive participants are aligned with 
sedentary, or static spectators, while active participants are aligned with customers 
who ‘personally affect the performance or event that yields the experience’ (30). The 
other axis refers to  
the kind of connection, or environmental relationship, that unites customers 
with the event or performance. At one end of this spectrum lies absorption – 
occupying a person’s attention by bringing the experience into the mind – at 
the other end immersion – becoming physically (or virtually) a part of the 
experience itself. (31, original emphasis)  
These two axes, particularly regarding their intersection, come to define what Pine 
and Gilmore define as four ‘realms’ of experience: entertainment, educational, 
aesthetic and escapist. These are defined as ‘mutually compatible domains that often 
comingle to form uniquely personal encounters’ (31). The personal element of this 
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encounter seems likely to be derived from the role played by autobiography in the 
production of experience, integrating narcissism within an encounter, striving to 
achieve the ideal of making the consumer feel special, wanted, important and 
necessary.  
 These axes and realms provide a taxonomy for identifying particular kinds of 
experience that are sold by experience-mongering businesses, but they might just as 
well provide a taxonomy for identifying particular kinds of experience in immersive 
theatre. Throughout this thesis so far I have referred to participation in both its active 
and passive forms, troubling how these two forms are polarised, and have called 
upon immersion as a means of defining the other-worldliness of immersive theatre. 
What is more, the four realms of experience hit upon by Pine and Gilmore, with the 
possible exception of education, at least in its explicit form, have provided at least a 
subtext for my analysis of immersive theatre in the preceding chapters. Immersive 
theatre’s feeling technologies also resonate with the SEMs identified by Schmitt, for 
both experiential marketers and immersive theatre makers seem to be engaging with 
SENSE, FEEL, THINK, ACT and RELATE as strategies for engaging audiences. By 
virtue of a shared interest in the experiential qualities of audience engagement, 
particularly as those qualities relate to some form of participation, it seems that 
immersive theatre and the experience economy bear a strong resemblance to each 
other. 
 There is a further analogy that demands special attention, particularly as it 
pertains to a politics of participation: the efficaciousness of participation within a 
participatory framework. Pine and Gilmore provide another taxonomy to address 
customisation premised on degrees of participation. They observe four different 
models of customisation in looking to establish the potential formation of customer-
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unique value: collaborative customisation, adaptive customisation, cosmetic 
customisation and transparent customisation. Collaborative customisation allows 
customers to ‘explore ways to obtain what they desire in one dimension of the 
product without having to sacrifice in another dimension’ (87; cf Klingmann 32). In 
adaptive customisation, ‘neither the product itself nor the representation of the 
product is changed for the individual customer; rather, the customer customises the 
good or service as desired using customizable functionality embedded into the 
offering’ (88-89). Cosmetic customisation ‘presents a standard good or service 
differently to different customers. The product is not customized (as with 
collaborative) or made customizable (as with adaptive); instead, a standard offering 
is packaged specially for each customer. [...] [E]ach customer obtains the ego-
gratifying experience of seeing the item personalized “just for me”’ (90, original 
emphasis). Finally, transparent customisation provides ‘individual customers with a 
tailored offering without letting them know explicitly (through representational 
changes) that it is customized for them’ (92, original emphasis).  
 At the heart of this taxonomy is an attempt to locate dissatisfaction among 
contemporary consumers with standardised goods and commodities that might 
otherwise be associated with Fordism and early- to mid-twentieth century capitalist 
enterprise. A defining attribute of the experience economy and the emergence of 
experience as a fourth genre of economic output is a movement ‘from a one-size-fits-
all economy to a customization-for-all economy’ (Klingmann 1). The experience 
economy is supposed to herald an end, or at least a challenge to the standardisation 
of goods and services under mass production and consumption. Pine and Gilmore’s 
taxonomy detailed above presupposes an increase in demand for personalised 
products, foregrounding desire and self-interest over functional need. The fact that 
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suppliers seem to be responding to this demand, or even creating the demand in an 
effort to beat competitors in competitive markets, suggests that the emerging 
experience economy is bringing with it changes in economic production and 
consumption. In short, the advent of the experience economy would seem to sit 
comfortably alongside the new individualism explored in the previous chapter.  
 The taxonomy provided by Pine and Gilmore is particularly apt as a tool to 
aid in the evaluation of immersive theatre work. To what extent might collaborative 
customisation be seen as an ideal in immersive theatre – particularly one-on-one 
theatre? And to what extent might this ideal be undercut by the actual presentation of 
cosmetic customisation, or adaptive customisation? It seems to me that, more often 
than not, collaborative participatory practise may well pose as offering some form of 
tailored experience, whereas the appearance of unique functionality in fact veils a 
fairly repeatable and fairly standardised theatrical offering. As Philip Auslander 
writes, interactive plays  
commodify the very aspects of live performance that are said to resist 
commodification. Because they are designed to offer a different experience at 
each visit, they can be merchandised as events that must be purchased over 
and over again: the ostensible evanescence and nonrepeatability of the live 
experience ironically become selling points to promote a product that must be 
fundamentally the same in each of its instantiations. (47-48) 
While Auslander is specifically discussing ‘franchise’ interactive play successes 
such as Tamara (1981) and Tony ‘n’ Tina’s Wedding (1985), his observation might 
just as well apply to much contemporary immersive theatre. This is especially so in 
the two one-on-one performances discussed in part one of this thesis. In both those 
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cases, the theatrical offering is itself fairly repeatable, but the narcissistic 
participation of audiences invests the work with a surplus which is unique to them, 
promoting the illusion of tailored functionality. This is not to undermine, as a 
consequence of how autobiography figures in the production of experience, that the 
experience itself is unique – this is not so much open to question as it is inevitable. 
But, I believe, it is questionable to extend the source of this uniqueness to the 
production.
36
  
This leads back to the role of autobiography in the production of affective 
experience. Indeed, it prompts the need to look again at the theme of affect and 
authenticity that was introduced in chapter one. The experience economy seems to 
thrive on the production of affective experiences, particularly in relation to the 
marketing of products that are reputedly tailored, in a number of different ways, to 
the particular subject, despite the fact that this customisation may in fact hide a fairly 
standard offering. Experiential marketers, in particular, seem aware that there is a 
narcissistic impulse to be exploited among potential customers who might encounter 
an experiential marketing strategy and invest such a standard product as being 
authentic. Authenticity emerges not as something that is necessarily essential to a 
product, but as something that is perceived to be attributable to it. As Boltanski and 
Chiapello acknowledge, while the inauthenticity associated with mass production 
provided one important basis for anti-capitalist critique, responses to that basis have 
since become incorporated within capitalist enterprise (37, 449). Paradoxically, 
authenticity is something that can be manufactured as a consequence of how 
participation in customisable procedures works: that is, through the narcissistic 
                                                 
36
 Opposing the influential thesis of Peggy Phelan that ‘[p]erformance’s only life is in the present’ 
(146), this point can be seen to tie into a strand of performance studies discourse that concerns itself 
with the reproducibility of theatre and performance as it appears in the repertoire (Taylor), or in re-
enactment (Schneider). I will return to this in the conclusion.  
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participation of a customer and the attribution, via imaginative projection, of 
autobiographical relevance onto a standardised product that, despite mass 
production, nonetheless seems to be made just for the customer. Condensed to an 
oxymoron, what emerges is customisable standardisation.  
If, for Pine and Gilmore, ‘the customer is the product’ who cries ‘change me’ 
(Experience Economy 172, original emphasis), then the autobiographical emerges as 
something apt to be inscribed within marketing strategies. What is more, this shift of 
emphasis from the product to the customer’s experience of the product, treating the 
experience itself as the thing sold, positions the participant’s own creativity as the 
seat of an authentic experience (Pine and Gilmore, Authenticity 12-13). By turning 
towards experience, particularly affective experience, and acknowledging my earlier 
claim that there is no such thing as an unauthentic affect, the experience economy 
has found a means of perpetuating customisable standardisation. Pine and Gilmore, 
in their follow-up book to the experience economy, describe ‘rendering authenticity’ 
as the ‘primary new source of competitive advantage’ (Authenticity 3, original 
emphasis). By integrating customer participation in the production of a good, service 
or experience, no matter how efficacious that customisation is, ‘the output 
automatically qualifies as authentic for the consumer. It turns each individual into 
what Alvin Toffler calls a “prosumer,” that is, a producing consumer’ (12-13). What 
is more, it also plays into the authenticity of affect production and the reality of risk 
perception as aesthetic means to bring about competitive advantage. In other words, 
these two elements of an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre are 
apt to be instrumentalised as aesthetic means toward non-aesthetic ends: i.e. capital 
accumulation.  
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There is something of the prosumer mentality that is at play for participating 
audiences in immersive theatre, particularly in Punchdrunk’s work. In preference to 
experiencing a performance from a theatre auditorium, participating audiences are 
maximising participatory opportunities by choosing to go to a theatre event where 
such opportunities, especially self-made opportunities, are likely to be available to 
those able to exploit them. At its most basic level, experience production in 
immersive theatre seems unlikely to involve an aesthetics of audience participation 
that is different in kind from the kinds of experience production that are operating 
elsewhere in the experience economy. And this lack of clear difference seems likely 
to tie into a potentially shared politics.  
The terms and phrasing deployed in this account of the experience economy 
clearly chime with the rhetoric of this thesis. What remains to be seen is how the 
experience economy specifically ties into immersive theatre practise. In the next 
section I conduct a comparative analysis of the experience economy and the work of 
Shunt. The intention is to consider how experience production in Shunt’s work ties 
into the experience economy more generally, while also reflecting on how 
experience production in immersive theatre might in fact prompt pause for thought 
on how personal experience is being absorbed within the marketing strategies of 
business. If experience has indeed emerged as a biopolitical site, then what hope is 
there for immersive theatre to promote a politics of participation that does something 
other than mimic the pervasive production of experiences in the experience 
economy? 
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Shunt in the Experience Economy 
This section is split into three subsections, each of which explores a different Shunt 
project in relation to other experience-centred exponents of the cultural industries, or 
in relation to discourse on the experience economy: the first compares the Shunt 
Lounge with the London Dungeon by exploring comparable immersive strategies; 
the second compares the production of experience in Money with the fairground 
funhouse; and the third approaches The Architects as postdramatic theatre. The third 
subsection addresses how the transmission of meaning via narrative means is 
positioned as being of secondary importance, as a communicative medium, 
compared with the affective experience of a theatrical world. This subsection looks 
again at the primary argument underlying part one – that the production of 
experience is central to an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre – 
this time exploring how immersive theatre might frustrate and trouble the 
biopolitical integration of experience within the experience economy.  
 
The Shunt Lounge and the London Dungeon 
The Shunt Lounge was based in the Shunt Vaults: a vast complex of vaulted arches 
beneath London Bridge Station. It was founded in September 2006 and ran for four 
years, with a brief period of inactivity towards the end of 2009 before the closure of 
the Vaults in 2010 due to renovation of London Bridge Station. In addition to the 
1500 artists and arts organisations that presented work there, the Lounge provided a 
platform for the ten members of the Shunt theatre collective and their associated 
artists to continue presenting work to a public (Shunt, ‘Finance Manager’ 1).  
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As a curatorial project, the Lounge presented a diverse set of performance 
practises ranging from cello sonatas and DJ sets, to circus acts, acrobatic displays, 
live art, monologues and physical theatre. The bar was open between and during 
performance events that would take place over the course of an evening and there 
were plenty of tables and chairs creating social bunkers to encourage chatting with 
friends and new acquaintances. These bunkers were not so much a refuge from the 
festival-like art programming, as they were an integral part of the social experience 
of the Shunt Lounge.  
Since their inception, Shunt have been avoiding theatre buildings and have 
instead sought out potentially site-sympathetic, or what I would call Shunt-specific 
sites: locations that the theatre collective treat as their own residence and define on 
their own terms. The Vaults, for instance, as one might expect from subterranean 
vaulted arches, had a clandestine feel to them and provided a ready-made canvas to 
work with in producing atmospheric environments. Mischa Twitchin, one member of 
the Shunt collective, is clear about the company’s relationship to the spaces that they 
take over, especially regarding a denial of site-specificity:  
there’s a relation to a space that has atmosphere, but which is, in a sense, 
neutral in theatrical terms – such as a railway arch. It can be more or less 
atmospheric, which already gives you something, but we’re not making a 
show about railway arches. We’ve not made a show at the Vaults about the 
construction of the railway in London. We’ve made fictional worlds for an 
audience that nevertheless are, of course, informed by, and produced in 
relation to, the space that we are in. (n.p.) 
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The Shunt Lounge, in particular, seemed at home in the ready-made vaulted arches, 
without treating those arches as a thematic point of departure for making 
performance. The experience of attending a curated event that took place behind an 
unmarked door in London Bridge Station was a particular appeal of the Shunt 
Lounge: to be in on the secret that lay behind the door. The space itself was at the 
heart of this exclusive appeal and significantly coloured the work that was performed 
there. For instance, when Curious Directive took Return to the Silence to the Shunt 
Vaults in 2009, a company that I devise and perform with, we had to deal with the 
hustle and bustle of a bar that was situated within the same set of vaulted arches as 
our performance. And there was no escaping the dank and grimy fact of the vaults, 
together with the rats that could occasionally be seen scuttling across the space 
during brief rehearsal periods that were tightly scheduled in a busy venue. The space 
itself was wholly out of keeping with our show – a physical theatre performance 
exploring neurological disorders based on the writing of Oliver Sacks – and yet the 
Lounge provided an opportunity to perform to a diverse, but primarily young 
audience that might otherwise have never attended our work. There was something 
appealing and edgy about performing in the Shunt Vaults that is clearly reflected in 
the 3000 strong audience that walked through its unmarked door each week (Shunt, 
‘Finance Manager’ 1). 
 In what follows, I will not be commenting on specific performances that were 
performed at the Shunt Lounge. I will be looking instead at the space itself as a 
curatorial site that provides a ready-made immersive theatre environment. The 
Vaults function as a pre-existing feeling technology that ‘already gives you 
something’, to recall Twitchin, in the way of affective potential. This ‘something’, an 
affective atmosphere, to borrow from Ben Anderson and to recall Böhme, emerges 
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from space but is activated by an experiencing subject (Anderson 78-79). The 
production of affect that emerges from this kind of activation is one lure of the 
experience economy. It is the thing that renders marketable experiences potentially 
lucrative. Thrill, excitement or any form of pleasurable or challenging affect, as 
something potentially stimulated by feeling technologies, is an integral part of 
participating in such experiences, just as the production of affect is an integral part of 
an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive theatre.  
In what follows, I will be comparing an aesthetics of participatory experience 
at the Shunt Lounge with a nearby counterpart: the London Dungeon. Formerly 
based in vaults beneath the London Bridge Station area, the London Dungeon 
specialises in providing memorable experiences for customers. The difference is that 
the experiences on offer at the Lounge are framed as art and those on offer in the 
Dungeon are framed as entertainment. Despite these distinctions, I hope to 
demonstrate that both the Dungeon and the Lounge chime with one another as 
emblems of an experience industry, defined by Wouter Hillaert as referring to 
‘theme parks, amusement centres, strip-clubs, role-play adventures’ and even theatre 
(434). The experience industry can, in many respects – particularly where its 
archetype, Disneyland, is concerned – be considered as the experience economy’s 
most valuable touchstone, as alluded to above.  
The London Dungeon is currently based, as of 1 March 2013, in London’s 
South Bank. However, in what follows, I will be referring to their former home next 
to the Shunt Vaults in London Bridge, up until its closure on 31 January 2013. The 
London Dungeon opened its doors to the public in 1975. It was the brain child of 
Annabel Geddes and the consequence of her frustration at the lack of information 
and insight offered by Madame Tussauds’ Chamber of Horrors and the absence of 
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atmosphere she felt at the Tower of London.
37
 The Dungeon features themed 
installations depicting a number of episodes from the city’s gory and disturbing 
history, both real and mythic: from the Great Plague to Sweeney Todd. These 
installations house actors, usually one actor for each installation, costumed 
appropriate to the period being represented and complete with enthusiastically 
rendered, but wavering cockney-inflected accents. The integration of actors within 
the Dungeon became critical following the installation of their Jack the Ripper 
feature in 1992. Now nearly every attraction within the Dungeon is actor-led. The 
London Dungeon favours visitors disposed towards courting the perception of risk – 
particularly the perception of threat – and has consequently prompted many (usually, 
but not always children) to flee either in floods of tears, or wide-eyed and anxious.  
Within the Dungeon, promenading audiences are shifted through regimented 
pathways while adhering to tightly scheduled routines. With upwards of 700,000 
visitors per year, the actors are required to keep the stragglers pumping through the 
installations, or else face a backlog of punters. There is something mechanistic about 
the routine each actor is expected to perform, in a cycle, throughout the day. Despite 
the limitations on free-roaming, audiences might still select observational strategies 
to absorb as much, or as little, of the environments which surround and immerse 
them as possible, although to fully remove oneself is only possible by leaving the 
Dungeon entirely through one of several escape doors.  
In addition to walking through mapped routes in the London Dungeon, 
various actor- and technically-led experiences are offered at stations en-route. 
Audiences might have water, masquerading as the contents of a chamber pot, 
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 I am grateful for the useful information offered by Mark Oakley via email interview. Oakley is, at 
the time of writing, PR representative for the London Dungeon. 
240 
 
chucked at them from the window of a London townhouse (I managed to receive a 
good dowsing on my last visit). They might experience the Long Drop, otherwise 
known as the Extremis Drop Ride: a ride within the Dungeon designed to simulate 
what it is like to be hanged by raising audiences on a roller coaster-like set of seats 
before letting them plummet back down again. There is also a 5-D cinema 
experience representing a séance at 50 Berkeley Square, reputed as being London’s 
most haunted house. In addition to 3-D visuals, audiences have water vapour blown 
at them (4-D), spin on a revolving platform and shoot various ghouls and monsters 
with laser guns (5-D, apparently).  
All of this typifies so much of what we might call immersive theatre, the 
differences being the nuances which work within that description. An aspect of the 
Dungeon’s spaces worthy of particular note, though, are the smells, not just as a 
consequence of deliberate infusion within the spaces, but also arising from the damp 
and mouldy vaults. The vaults in both the Shunt Lounge and the Dungeon, while still 
resident in London Bridge, were separated by metres, not miles. A smell pervaded 
both which seemed to envelop audiences, functioning as its own ready-made 
immersive quality: an important contributor to be activated by audiences in 
generating an affective atmosphere. Both spaces also shared a complete absence of 
natural light, rendering the potential for crafting atmosphere particularly strong, 
either through use of pitch-black, or through guiding the audience’s attention via 
stage lighting. It is no wonder that both Geddes and Shunt found these vaults so 
appealing – they reeked in such a way that audiences were pulled into their 
catacombs. Perhaps this is a reason why so many immersive theatre companies and 
venues have set up camp in vaulted spaces and arches, including Punchdrunk’s 
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Tunnel 228, Debut Theatre’s Coming Up Festival (2011) and Goat and Monkey’s 
Reverence: A Tale of Abelard and Heloise (2007). 
The points of convergence do not end there. There was a bar in one of the 
many alcoves in the Shunt Vaults where the screams from those in the Dungeon, 
most probably on the Extremis Drop Ride, could be heard through the walls. For 
those arriving early enough, those screams seemed uncannily appropriate, especially 
if the association with the Dungeon next door was not made. It was all part of ‘the 
experience’. What comes to the fore is not only the sense of a shared space, a space 
shared by an immersive theatre company and a much more explicit component of the 
experience industry, but also of how these two bleed into one another and have the 
capacity to complement. Those screams did not seem out of place in the Shunt 
Vaults. They contributed to an aesthetic of the uncanny, the mysterious and even 
ghostly. 
In discussing points of alignment between the London Dungeon and the 
Shunt Lounge, particularly as those points of alignment relate to feeling 
technologies, space and their effects on audience immersion, I have not been 
suggesting that these two distinct cultural forms are somehow collapsed into one 
another. As curatorial experiments, there are clearly different aesthetic intentions at 
stake. Nonetheless, the Shunt Lounge is not alone in its attempts to deploy feeling 
technologies and audience immersion as tools to aid in the production of experience. 
Indeed, as Alison Griffiths argues, this deployment might just as well be traced back 
to the solemnity of cathedrals, the magnitude of nineteenth century panoramas, awe-
inspiring early- to mid-twentieth century planetaria, and the technologically 
impressive mid- to late-twentieth century IMAX cinemas (Shivers; cf Grau, Virtual 
Art; Lorentz, ‘Immersive Experience’). Precursors of immersive theatre, as well as 
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contemporaneous counterparts, might be identified not just in theatre and art history, 
but in the experience economy more generally – especially in the experience industry 
(cf Nield, ‘Character Named Spectator’: 531). The Shunt Lounge is part of a 
pervasive experience paradigm, made especially telling through its deployment of 
audience immersion as a curatorial tool that is shared with comparable curatorial 
tools in, for instance, museums and pseudo-museums such as the London Dungeon. 
In both cases, the production of experiences is the goal, where experience production 
is itself privileged as an end in itself over and above the meaningfulness of an 
aesthetic stimulus that contributes to its production. This is not to discredit the 
aesthetic intentions of the various artists appearing in the Shunt Lounge. Rather, my 
point is to underscore the difference between a curatorial experiment that seems to 
subscribe to an aesthetic premised on experience production and the various 
performances that, over the course of a given evening, contribute towards a spectator 
experience that is greater than the sum of its parts. In the cases of both the London 
Dungeon and the Shunt Lounge, it is not so much an artefact, a sculpture, a piece of 
narrative or a convincing and moving display of acting or choreography that ends up 
being the centrally significant thing, as the holistic and synergised experience of 
each as a unified whole. 
 
Money and the Funhouse 
The experience of fun is not something to be underestimated in Shunt’s work. Fun 
tends to be both enjoyed and undermined, just as efficacious interactive participation 
is seemingly offered but ultimately negated. Fun tends to be produced in Shunt’s 
work, but it is a very particular, two-fold sense of fun that incorporates risk. To have 
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fun is to enjoy or experience pleasure of some kind; this is the first sense. But fun, as 
the late Middle English fon suggests – ‘make a fool, be a fool’ – also denotes 
trickery and hoax (OED 700). To produce fun in this latter sense is to craft an 
experience in such a way that the experiencer may not be able to perceive the 
productive source of fun. They are made fun of, even if this ‘making fun’ is without 
malicious intent.  
To have fun, then, is also potentially to be at risk of being made fun of, 
provided fun is approached as an affective state that must involve a relationship with 
an affective source, albeit one that retains the integrity of autobiographical affect 
production. There is a politics to fun as it relates to the positioning of subjects, 
especially with regard to the perception of risk-laden tricks and hoaxes and their 
affective potential. It is something that can be produced and that can exert strong 
affective influence over a subject. As such, fun relates to the distribution of power 
between those caught within a fun matrix: a system of power relations that may be 
either recognisable or unrecognisable, tending toward the latter for the experiencer of 
fun who, more than likely, may not care all that much about what stimulates fun, 
provided the experience is pleasurable.  
In my description of Shunt’s Money, I described the immersive structure that 
audiences enter into as an experience machine. This experience machine houses the 
performance, but it also functions as a literal productive mechanism for generating 
experience among immersed audiences. The box in Cold Storage functions in much 
the same way. But the experience machine in Money is comparable with the 
fairground funhouse, especially as the funhouse relates to the twofold understanding 
of fun described above: both as a source of pleasure and enjoyment and as a space of 
trickery. In the funhouse, warped mirrors, revolving walls and doors and undulating 
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floors are all designed to trick audiences and in so doing produce fun. In both the 
funhouse and Money, immersed audiences experience disorientation in a space that 
misleads. In both cases, there is an onus on the structure’s secrets only gradually 
unfolding and that gradual unfolding is ultimately premised on the fun experience of 
being tricked.  
It seems to me that the funhouse is by no means an outmoded medium. It 
finds contemporary manifestations in the experience industry and the London 
Dungeon provides an especially clear example. For instance, one of the first 
installations encountered by visitors to the London Dungeon, at least when it still 
stood in London Bridge, was the ‘Labyrinth of Lost Souls’: a disorienting mirror 
maze which seemed to be directly pulled from the funhouse. Groot Nibbelink rightly 
suggests that ‘labyrinthine staged environments’ are a common characteristic of 
experientially driven theatre practises (416). Punchdrunk framed It Felt Like a Kiss 
as being like ‘the disorienting whirl of a fairground ghost train’ 
(Punchdrunk.org.uk); they seem to be explicitly referencing the spirit of the 
funhouse, of the fairground and the experience industry which, at least in part, stems 
from these kinds of recreational attraction. The London Dungeon, the funhouse and 
immersive theatre events like It Felt Like a Kiss and Money are all of a part. What 
they share in is the stimulation of experiences complete with all their affective 
potential – the promotion of thrill, exhilaration, fear, trepidation, nervousness, 
anxiety, joy and countless other affective goings on, all of which might impact on the 
capacity of participating audiences to think and act within prepped spaces, even and 
especially when that thinking and acting is anticipated by the experience makers. 
These cultural forms pander to the demand for experiences identified by Pine and 
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Gilmore: they satisfy a want. And this satisfaction is, ultimately, one that a fairly 
standardised offering can procure. 
Shannon Jackson describes the Berlin-based theatre company Rimini 
Protokoll’s Call Cutta in a Box (2008) and Cargo Sofia (2006) as being reminiscent 
of the funhouse: ‘[t]he funhouse has historically installed moving spectators within 
an interactive landscape, placing triggers and cuing surprises that altered the 
environment as receivers walked, sat, and touched elements around them’ (177). It 
seems entirely appropriate to refigure this assertion in the context of immersive 
theatre, as one continuing on from Nield’s correlation of immersive theatre with 
experiential museum curation and adding to my alignment of immersive theatre with 
the experience economy. The London Dungeon and immersive theatre can be seen to 
stem from the same spirit as the funhouse of which Jackson speaks, not least as she 
continues: ‘[t]he thrill of the funhouse comes in the precarity of the receivers’ sense 
of control of the environment they activate, its ability to propel them between 
curiosity and fear, risk and safety as they explore its alternate reality and seek 
strategies of escape’ (177; see also Griffiths 279).  
I quoted Rosenberg earlier in the chapter expressing reservations about 
handing over too much responsibility to audiences. In Shunt’s Money, the capacity 
for audiences to control the trickery is always at a distance and only ever a seeming 
control. Experiential stimuli are offered to audiences within functional and carefully 
constructed environments and the audience’s pathway within these environments, as 
with the London Dungeon, tends to be carefully monitored. In both cases, there is the 
same sense of being propelled through an environment, fluctuating between curiosity 
and fear, perceived risk and safety.  
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What is so fascinating about Shunt’s work is an almost paranoid self-
consciousness about how audiences are to be manoeuvred through immersive 
environments that would seem to undercut the misleading triviality of fun 
experiences. While immersive theatre shares a great deal with its counterparts in the 
experience industry, there is, I believe, much greater potential to problematise affect 
production in immersive theatre. This is not to ignore the persistent threat of fun’s 
political side being rubbed over or shrouded and controlled to the point where 
subversive potential is rendered void. For example, risk and the subversive potential 
of fun might be tamed, as indeed it frequently is in the experience industry, 
particularly through, for instance, adventure companies that ‘provide excitement and 
other intense emotions while guaranteeing the safety of those who do not wish to 
actually risk their lives experiencing these sensations’ (Holyfield, Jonas and Zajicek 
174). This taming of risk might downplay the subversive potential of edgework 
practises, subsuming Lyng’s first edgework framework within the second. Given the 
points of alignment between immersive theatre and the experience industry explored 
so far in this chapter, it follows that the subversive potential of practising risk or fun 
in immersive theatre will need to be wary of the ways in which risk perception might 
in fact stand against a highly controlled state of affairs that negates the political 
efficacy of such practise. Nonetheless, I will be working towards an argument that 
asserts a greater capacity in successful immersive theatre performances to make 
feeling technologies and the power they exert over audiences distinctly 
uncomfortable, despite the fun-as-pleasure that they might elicit. The real test, as far 
as a politics of participation is concerned, will be the extent to which fun itself ends 
up questioned, as both a pleasurable experience and as trickery. In addressing a 
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possible instance of this questioning, though, I turn to another of Shunt’s experience 
machines: this time a cruise ship in The Architects.  
 
The Architects as Postdramatic Theatre 
The Architects can be seen to engage with the experience economy in a number of 
direct and indirect ways. First of all, the bulk of the performance is spent inside an 
immersive set representing an entertainment area on a cruise ship. Audience 
members are hailed by Scandinavian hosts as pleasure seekers and are consequently 
introduced, via narrative description in brief episodic scenes, to hedonistic symbols 
of leisure activity that are reputedly available on board. A Jacuzzi, a pub quiz and the 
bedroom of the one male host are all introduced as symbols of experiential 
engagement. But as interpolated subjects, the audience are only ever told, via 
imagined recollection, of their own hailed characters’ antics that are meant to have 
taken place in the past. So when informed that someone has taken a shit by the BBQ, 
the hailed audience is inferred as a potential culprit, the potential perpetrator of an 
act that has taken place in a past moment that is called into being within the dramatic 
logic of the performance. While of course this past moment has never taken place, as 
a consequence of a claim it is called into existence within the fictional cosmos 
generated in the live moment that is invested in by both the characters and an 
audience that chooses to temporarily believe in, or become absorbed within this 
fictional cosmos. This is what Maurya Wickstrom has described as ‘the truth of the 
make-believe’, where observers, or experiencers, ‘bring invention into facticity, and 
vice versa’ (19). Of course, such investment is by no means peculiar to this kind of 
theatre, but the interpolation of the audience as characters within an immersive event 
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does, as I hope to demonstrate, alter the functioning of this most fundamental quality 
of the theatre.  
While much of Punchdrunk’s work might be framed in strictly dramatic 
terms as involving coherence and the representation of a unified world, particularly 
with regard to character (see Worthen), Shunt’s The Architects might be usefully 
approached as an example of postdramatic theatre.
38
 It should be noted first of all 
that wholeness, illusion and world representation – key features of dramatic theatre 
identified by Hans-Thies Lehmann – are undoubtedly in play in immersive theatre 
and The Architects, at least at first, appears to be no exception (22). And yet, what 
emerges in this performance is a ‘rift between the discourse of the text and that of 
theatre’ (46). The Scandinavian characters are calling into existence through a 
linguistic text a past that is aroused through a performance text, or live theatrical 
situation.
39
 This past is attributed to the audience’s imposed fictional character of 
cruise ship pleasure seeker. The imposition of a role, in relation to the linguistic text 
that helps to impose it, sits uncomfortably within a space that seems to invite 
participation, while at the same time, for the most part, depriving audiences of 
opportunities to participate. What is more, these moments of narration are 
themselves fragmented, cut off by blackouts, sometimes mid-sentence. Narrative is 
something that is constantly disrupted. Significantly, what these moments of 
disruption allude to is a strange sense of indefinite time passing. Many of Borges’s 
short stories engage with warped senses of time, or duration, particularly with regard 
to the author’s apparent obsession with the infinite. It seems to me that these 
incessant episodes are meant to help produce just this sense of warped time among 
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 Rachel Fensham has also made the link between immersive theatre and postdramatic theatre. See 
‘Postdramatic Spectatorship’.  
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 See Lehmann for more on the linguistic text and the performance text (Lehmann, H. 85).  
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audiences, as a performance text that is always in surplus of the linguistic text. The 
narrative content is of secondary importance to the promotion of this feeling. As 
such, narrative functions as a feeling technology, but not in the sense of attempting 
to solicit pathos, necessarily, or catharsis, or some other emotional purging; rather, 
this particular feeling technology seems intended to produce among audiences the 
experience of distorted time: time running on its own, constructed terms; more 
Bergsonian duration than clock time. As Lehmann writes:  
[i]f time [in postdramatic theatre] becomes the object of ‘direct’ experience, 
logically it is especially the techniques of time distortion that come to 
prominence. For only an experience of time that deviates from habit provokes 
its explicit perception, permitting it to move from something taken for 
granted as a mere accompaniment to the rank of a theme. (Lehmann, H. 156) 
This elevation of time to the rank of a theme is precisely what is at stake in The 
Architects and is very much in keeping with the durational atmospheres that Borges 
tends to craft in his short stories. 
 Peter Boenisch describes something similar in a critical reflection on Shunt’s 
Money. For Boenisch, performances like Money no longer locate the ‘principle of 
meaning’ in the interpretation of a given text, such as Zola’s L’Argent. Instead, ‘[t]he 
dramatic text and its (dramatic and narrative) textures function as an indispensible 
dramaturgic mediator’ that energises what he calls the ‘relational components of 
dramaturgy’: that is, anything within the live theatrical event, which includes an 
audience and especially the actions of an audience, that impacts on the generation of 
meaning between what is produced and received (‘Acts of Spectating’ n.p.; cf 
Boenisch, ‘Towards a Theatre of Encounter’). ‘As a result’, he writes, ‘the focus 
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shifts from the representation of meaning to the “sense” generated’ (‘Acts of 
Spectating’ n.p.). Comparable ‘relational components of dramaturgy’ seem to be in 
play in The Architects, where there is, to borrow from Boenisch, a ‘fluid shifting 
between materiality and semioticity’ (n.p.), between the material fact of the live 
theatre event and the multiple meanings which are drawn from an immersive theatre 
environment and the actions that take place within it. But for The Architects, as well 
as Money, I contend that this fluidity is nonetheless goal oriented. It is experience 
which ultimately functions as a meaningful site which is potentially drawn into an 
aesthetic world via the audience’s creative acts of reception. In other words, 
narcissistic participation is raised to the status not just of a participatory mode, but a 
thematic point of interest.  
 This is of the upmost significance to the concerns of this chapter. In 
producing a rift between the discourse of the linguistic text and that of the theatre, 
apparent through the techniques deployed to distort the perception of time, Shunt are 
treating the experiential as a site for the transmission of meaning. It is the experience 
of warped time that takes precedence, as opposed to a description of it. Perhaps the 
narrative content of this production is of less significance than the treatment of 
experience, particularly affective experience, such as boredom, or frustration, as a 
meaningful site for engaging with performance. As Lehmann suggests, ‘time as 
such’ is turned into ‘an object of aesthetic experience’ (Lehmann, H. 156, original 
emphasis). I would add that this object of aesthetic experience in The Architects is an 
affective experience of time. It is the affective experience of time that is 
aestheticised, in much the same vein as I have been describing an aesthetics of affect 
production. As such, The Architects can be seen to share much with postdramatic 
theatre performances like Forced Entertainment’s Exquisite Pain (2005), where 
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incessantly repeated narrative episodes also arouse feelings of boredom, frustration 
and annoyance in the spectator. In both cases, narrative is used not so much as a 
semiotic vehicle, but as a feeling technology contributing to the performance text. 
The arousal of affective experience is consequently treated as an aesthetic site for 
communication and the transmission of meaning.  
 The point unfolding here is that the experience machine presented in The 
Architects even treats narrative as a feeling technology designed to elicit experiential 
engagement from audiences in this immersive event and that something similar is 
also at work elsewhere in postdramatic theatre. While Forced Entertainment, for 
instance, do not create immersive theatre, they nonetheless make use of a technique 
that might be identified as immersive – albeit edging towards the ‘absorption’ end of 
Pine and Gilmore’s second axis of experience. While theatre is virtually synonymous 
with arousing feeling, there still tends to be, in dramatic theatre, a fairly coherent 
stimulus that provides a meaningful source for the arousal of feeling, but feeling 
emerges as being secondary to that meaningful source. In Shunt’s postdramatic 
immersive theatre, as with other instances of postdramatic theatre, while there may 
still be identifiable meaningful stimuli, it is the immersive experience itself that is 
drawn into the performance text as a vehicle for the communication of something to 
an audience. In The Architects, this communicable something is a warped sense of 
time, immersing audiences within a disorienting experiential world appropriate to 
Borges. 
 This important postdramatic shift in immersive theatre practise might be 
usefully approached as being symptomatic of a pervasive tendency towards the 
elicitation of experience across the experience economy: not just in immersive 
theatre practise, or postdramatic theatre practise, or even the experience industries 
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more generally, but as a dominant paradigm within the experience economy.
40
 As 
this section has looked to demonstrate, Shunt are by no means alone in looking to 
engage and captivate audiences through experience: just as meaningful experience 
can be crafted to adhere to a desired brand identity, so might theatre be designed to 
induce an experience deemed appropriate to the communication of something as 
abstract as time; just as experiential marketers might use SENSE, FEEL, THINK, 
ACT and RELATE marketing strategies, so might these same markers be utilised as 
means of engaging audiences in immersive theatre, as well as critically approaching 
that engagement; just as customisable experiences might be fetishised to the point 
that participatory efficacy is rendered virtually obsolete, so might invitations to 
participate in immersive theatre turn out to be fairly redundant, albeit in a potentially 
efficacious mode of revealing to an audience their participatory inadequacy. In 
purchasing a ticket for a performance such as The Architects, audiences are 
effectively purchasing an experience which is sold by a theatre company. While such 
an experience may be challenging or even productive in its capacity to frustrate – an 
important aspect of Shunt’s work that I explore in the conclusion to this chapter – the 
fact remains that this is not all that different from the purchasing of marketable 
experiences elsewhere in the experience economy.  
 
Conclusion: Fun and Frustration 
Or is it? On 12 February 2013, I organised a small research event on The Architects 
involving Sophie Nield, Louise Owen, Gareth White and Daniel Oliver. Oliver, a 
postgraduate researcher and live art practitioner, suggested at this event that Shunt’s 
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work promotes a critical paranoia that is suspicious of participation: a paranoia that I 
would describe as a heightened self-awareness of not participating in an environment 
that seems to invite participation.
41
 This is a useful means of describing the meta-
theatrical critique of the performer-audience relationship that is often at stake in 
work like Money and The Architects. What appears to be addressed alongside the 
content of these two performances, especially, is participatory expectation, or 
anticipation. In Money, for instance, there is a moment when plastic balls are 
released to bounce over a large table around which the audience stands sipping 
glasses of champagne. This becomes the most explicitly participatory moment of the 
performance, when audience members take to chucking the balls at one another in 
pleasingly childish fits of glee and sanctioned naughtiness. And yet, what does the 
chucking of these balls accomplish? It is a trivial, patronising invitation to contribute 
as a participant to the performance. But that, as I see it, is the point. Audiences are 
not meant to be empowered at this, or any moment of the performance. They are 
meant to be controlled and an awareness of this control is rendered all the more 
apparent when such futile participatory endeavours are practised.  
Part one of this thesis approached audience participation in immersive theatre 
primarily in isolation from the contexts in which it operates. This was a useful means 
of establishing some important aesthetic hallmarks of immersive theatre 
participation. However, immersive theatre does not occur in an isolated aesthetic 
bubble, but is rather framed and informed by the pervasive production of experiences 
in the experience economy. This pervasiveness ought to at least colour how an 
aesthetics and politics of audience participation in immersive theatre is to be 
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theorised and evaluated. It would be a shame if the arrival of experience production 
in the experience economy emerged the first time as history and the second time as 
farce in immersive theatre, without critiquing where such points of comparison 
might be made and then challenged.  
And yet, perhaps rendering experience production as something like a farce 
is, potentially, a useful means of jeopardising the pervasive production of 
experiences. The first application of the term ‘farce’ to theatre originally referred to 
comic interludes ‘stuffed’ into the otherwise coherent structure of religious plays 
(OED 626). The farce was an interruption of a metanarrative: a comic caesura that 
disrupts the coherence of a dramatic text. Whether intentionally so or not, farces 
deployed fun as a rupturing device. As such, the force of farce’s capacity to rupture 
rested on its affective potential to produce mirth. Immersive theatre might be said to 
produce farcical moments, where farce here refers to an affective rupture of an 
otherwise coherent immersive world. Affect has the capacity to function as an 
irruption of the real within a closed fictional cosmos, as Lehmann would have it (see 
chapter one). Such an irruption of the real has the capacity, at least, to deploy 
authentic affect as a critical device that works outside of the organising principles 
put to work in creating an immersive environment. Affect might consequently 
function as a critical tool to reveal to audiences how they are manipulated by a 
performance: a revelation that simultaneously depends on manipulation and at the 
same time promotes scepticism towards the participatory claims to efficaciousness 
arising elsewhere in the experience economy.  
Rosenberg is clear to defend the centrality of the audience experience in 
Shunt’s work: 
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I think an important thing about the Shunt aesthetic is that there’s often a 
functional approach taken to the design because there are experiences that we 
want to give the audience, or ways that we want to place the audience in 
relation to the action or ways that we want the audience to see the action or 
see each other. (qtd. in Machon, (Syn)aesthetics 102) 
Shunt’s immersive environments are strikingly functional, perhaps most explicitly in 
Money, where the vast machine that is entered into gradually reveals its mechanistic 
tricks, such as transparent floors revealing a multidimensionality to the space and the 
use of pitch black, soundscapes and wind machines to help synergise the 
immersiveness of the environment. This functionality, though, while appearing to 
invite interactivity, ends up frustrating that invitation. The kind of functionality at 
play is one that depends on the theatre makers’ retention of their authorial capacity 
and responsibility for the presentation of an artwork. What audiences are presented 
with is an experience machine: a feeling technology, or, rather, a group of synergised 
feeling technologies, designed to produce the kinds of experiences that Rosenberg 
refers to above. While audiences might not be so free to participate by roaming a 
space, as in Punchdrunk’s work, complete with the hidden limits of that supposed 
freedom, they nonetheless remain central to the design of immersive spaces. And 
while audiences may be watching theatre more than interacting with it in shows like 
Money and The Architects, scenography is nonetheless tailored towards the 
experiential. But this tailoring preserves the potential to engage experience 
production as a postdramatic communicative medium, treating affect as a potentially 
meaningful site for engaging with a performance that contradicts immersion by 
inspiring criticality towards it. It is in this sense that Shunt’s immersive work can be 
seen to promote a form of participation that is self-conscious and farcical, in the 
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sense of providing a rupture between the presentation of an immersive world and its 
potential troubling through an affective irruption of the real.  
There is a case to be made for The Architects being somewhat savvy towards 
the thirst for experience that the experience economy would appear to respond to, on 
the one hand, and help to construct, on the other. The experience machines provided 
by Shunt tend to make no qualms about the potential for audiences to collaborate. 
Neither Money nor The Architects are collaborative. In The Architects, especially, the 
participatory impulse is something that emerges as a subject of critique. Audiences 
are confronted with empty participatory offers, hollowed out in fairly meaningless 
episodic scenes, in their own right, on board a represented cruise ship. When the 
male and female audiences are segregated and explicitly invited to participate by 
reading out words from a television screen, it is participatory desire that is mocked 
and ridiculed. It is farcical and fun participation: a hoax and a joke. There is no 
collaborative efficacy to be had in screaming like monkeys at the command of an 
automated scrolling text. In Lyn Gardner’s review of the show, she writes: ‘it doesn’t 
just feel as if it is the gods who are laughing at us, but the company, too’ (Rev. of 
The Architects n.p.). I agree, but Shunt’s mirth is a critical mirth. There is a sense of 
self-righteousness about such critical mirth that might rightly be read as arrogant, but 
at the same time audiences gleefully scream and wilfully submit to something so 
utterly pointless that such arrogance is perhaps justified, if only to prompt 
frustration.  
To recall Rosenberg, an audience should be presented with the difficulties of 
a performance in a way that might upset, confuse, surprise, or revolt them. In the 
case of The Architects, perhaps frustration and annoyance might in fact generate a 
necessary criticality towards participatory impulses. Why is it that audiences seem so 
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willing to submit to participatory invitations? Just what is it that audiences 
participate in when they joyfully applaud the slaughter of the Minotaur? If the 
audience are interpolated as cruise ship leisure seekers on a trip of a life time, in 
what ways might the purchase of drinks in the ship’s bar and participatory responses 
to scrolling text demonstrate a fairly passive acceptance of this role?  
In The Promise of Happiness, as touched on in the previous chapter, Ahmed 
defends the right to be unhappy, annoyed, anxious and frustrated. These ‘bad 
feelings’ are not so much in the way of some better, more hopeful future, as they are 
productive obstacles. ‘We might need to attend to bad feelings not in order to 
overcome them’, she writes, ‘but to learn by how we are affected by what comes 
near’ (216, original emphasis). If frustration accompanies pitiful participatory 
invitations that sit alongside, or, at best, aid the presentation of theatre, then perhaps 
it is worth questioning the source of that frustration. Perhaps it is worth questioning 
the terms on which participatory invitations rest in relation to the motives that might 
underlie participatory desire – if desire is in play at all. In an experience economy 
that seems increasingly bent on the proliferation of marketable experiences, perhaps 
a performance that positions audiences on an archetypal consumerist trip of a life 
time, a cruise ship, might promote a critical, affective reflexivity that treats anxiety 
about participation in positive terms. It is in this sort of questioning – this critical 
reflexivity that is generated through the potentially risky affects accompanying 
audience participation in immersive theatre – that I locate a potentially subversive 
politics of participation in the final part of this thesis.  
 
 
258 
 
 
 
 
Part Three 
Aesthetics and Politics  
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Chapter Five: Transaction in the Theatre 
Marketplace 
Punchdrunk have set a referential benchmark for identifying immersive theatre. 
Shunt, while not themselves identifying with the stylistic label, have nonetheless 
been associated with and can be seen to embrace elements of the immersive theatre 
aesthetic. Both these companies create primarily large scale work and have had time 
to hone their respective crafts. Both have received large amounts of ACE funding: 
Punchdrunk, as explored in chapter three, and Shunt, for instance, having received 
£150,000 to help fund Money (Cavendish n.p.). And both have benefited from 
association with the National Theatre, despite their respective performances taking 
place off-site, including Punchdrunk’s latest work, The Drowned Man: A Hollywood 
Fable (2013) and Shunt’s The Architects. Both, then, are positioned as 
representatives of British theatre culture. These companies, either directly or 
indirectly, have helped to craft how the immersive theatre style is defined and how 
that style participates in the development of a contemporary theatre landscape in the 
UK. As influential powerhouses, these companies can be seen to impact on the 
perception and understanding of immersive theatre: what it designates, how it looks 
and how it functions as a contemporary theatre style.  
Theatre makers like Ray Lee and Lundahl & Seitl have been stretching the 
breadth of applicability of a term like immersive theatre over the past few years. 
Lundahl & Seitl, in particular, by stripping their audiences of sight, pose challenges 
to the time-consuming and expensive attention to scenographic detail and complex 
design that might otherwise seem characteristic of immersive theatre. The emergence 
of new companies and artists that do not subscribe to a newly developing immersive 
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theatre convention, a convention that is still trying to find its feet, provide important 
interventions that help to prevent this broad and malleable style from becoming dry, 
or predictable. There are important institutional bastions for these new companies, 
the BAC being one notable example. Another would be the Camden People’s 
Theatre (CPT), most notably its annual Sprint Festival. Both venues are willing to 
give young and emerging companies the time, space and opportunity to develop 
work that, increasingly frequently, stems from a rapidly developing immersive 
theatre scene in the UK. What is more, many of these companies present work on 
shoestring budgets that defy the need to gobsmack audiences with eccentric and 
flamboyant displays of scenographic extravagance. This is not to belittle the value of 
inspiring awe, nor is it to degrade the admirable craft, particularly design, that is so 
praiseworthy in the work of both Punchdrunk and Shunt. However, it is to map out 
alternative, arguably more accessible, particularly financially accessible, routes into 
the creation of immersive theatre for an increasing number of artists and companies, 
especially young and emerging artists and companies.  
In the institutional fostering of creative activity, a potential emerges to re-
draw heuristic lines that might otherwise limit how immersive theatre comes to be 
defined. What ends up being instituted is a platform for artists and companies to 
partake in the early evolution of a theatre style. To be more precise, this partaking 
refers to how that style is made sense of through the neologism ‘immersive theatre’. 
This partaking means levelling out, on however small a scale, a playing field of 
sense-making: a playing field that deals with sense-making in a two-fold sense of the 
term, to recall Machon, both as a making sense of immersive theatre and as 
producing sensual experiences among participating audiences. It involves offering a 
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part to those who might not otherwise have a part to play in the formation of a 
cultural form, as well as a chance to speak and be heard within an artistic framework.  
This kind of platform, I suggest, finds its most notable foothold in a fairly 
young theatre company that have come to blur the boundaries between making, 
producing, curating and housing theatre. Theatre Delicatessen was formed as a 
theatre company in 2007 by directors Roland Smith, Jessica Brewster and Frances 
‘Effie’ Loy. Their early work included performances of A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream (2008) and The Winter’s Tale (2009), but they achieved their first notable 
success with Pedal Pusher (2009). All three of these productions were performed at 
a disused Boosey & Hawkes office space at 295 Regent Street. In 2005, Boosey & 
Hawkes relocated to Aldwych House. A property developer in charge of the empty 
complex was happy for Theatre Deli to make use of the building as a rehearsal space 
and, ultimately, as a venue for these performances in the interim period between 
business occupations. This kind of temporary occupation, or pop-up theatre, has 
come to define the company’s approach to producing theatre; it is nomadic and 
dependent on a fluctuating commercial property market. Smith suggests that there 
are ‘many ideological choices that we’ve made and many that are simply pragmatic. 
As Lenny Bruce says, “I’m a hustler. If they’re giving, I’ll take”’ (Brewster and 
Smith, personal interview). As such, Theatre Deli functions at the interface between 
pragmatism, dependency, entrepreneurialism and uncertainty. The result is a working 
environment without the support of reliable infrastructure that at the same time 
provides an opportunity to create work that might not otherwise have the 
opportunity.  
Despite numerous applications for ACE grants, Smith asserts that the 
company have only received around £8000 of ACE funding since its formation. I 
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will dwell on the company’s funding structure in due course; suffice to say that they 
approach the creation of work from a difficult financial position. So far, the company 
have only applied for small ‘Grants for the Arts’ ACE funding, primarily to fund the 
wages of performers, and have not applied for long-term NPO funding.
42
 This 
suggests that the company edge closer towards entrepreneurial funding initiatives 
than it does towards public funding.  
By 2010, time was up at 295 Regent Street and Theatre Deli moved to the 
former home of the Uzbekistan Airways offices at 3-4 Picton Place in West London. 
After a production of Phillip Ridley’s Mercury Fur (2010), the company would 
embark on their first curatorial experiment: Theatre Souk (2010). This was very 
much the brainchild of Brewster although, like most of Theatre Deli’s projects, all 
three directors contributed to the development of the event. A modest cover charge 
to enter the building could be bought in advance of the event, but even this act was 
theatricalised as audiences entered the building via a make-shift box office. Once 
inside, the gesture of transacting became incessantly reiterated. Spread across five 
floors and a stair well, independent young and emerging theatre companies sold their 
performance wares to wandering audiences. Audiences were invited to negotiate 
payment with the artists for each short performance that they chose to experience – 
some lasting a few minutes, others around fifteen. Haggling was encouraged and a 
typical price would be around £3 per person. The handing over of money was at once 
a functional gesture of exchange, paying the artists in question, as well as an 
aestheticised gesture of exchange. The money collected directly by the performers 
                                                 
42
 At the time of writing, the company are in the process of raising £10,000 to match an ACE funding 
bid for their forthcoming work, The Great White Unknown. They have consequently inaugurated the 
Theatre Delicatessen Friends Scheme, not so dissimilar from Punchdrunk’s keyholder scheme – only 
with membership costs ranging from £25 to £1000. So Smith’s claim that the company have only 
received £8000 of ACE funding should be read in the light of a possible boost to that funding for this 
forthcoming project.  
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was theirs to keep, while the money collected at the door was firstly Theatre Deli’s 
and secondly incorporated as a part of a start-up budget for future theatre 
marketplaces and other Theatre Deli initiatives (Brewster and Smith, personal 
interview). I derive the term ‘marketplace’ from the Souk programme and the term 
‘theatre marketplace’ seems apt in describing how the collected performances were 
curated. What the term underscores is the audience’s act of paying for the labour of 
theatre making, curating and producing in a way that foregrounds payment: whether 
at the make-shift box office, or outside the doors of the individual performance 
spaces.  
The performances were a mixed bag. Flabbergast Theatre’s Puppet Poker Pit 
(2010) featured entertaining and witty puppet manipulation and some verbal 
audience interactivity, while Half Cut’s Half Cut (2010) presented a simple, but 
effective encounter between a single participating audience and a performer. The 
performer in the latter wore nothing but a pair of Emporio Armani boxer shorts and 
the audience was invited to pay money to pluck, cut, shave, or wax hair from his 
body. The objectifying nature of Half Cut’s invitation to audiences summed up much 
of the curatorial spirit behind Theatre Deli’s curation of Souk: payment for labour, 
particularly how that payment can be seen to objectify the labourer. At the same 
time, the performers are forced to confront how their work is being financially 
valued by audiences, especially if that valuing takes place after the performance. A 
payment that might otherwise be forgotten about is drawn into the space of 
performance and, at least in the case of Half Cut’s Half Cut, rendered uncomfortably 
present.  
While these two performances had much to praise regarding the quality of 
humour (Flabbergast Theatre) or interaction (Half Cut), it seemed to me that others – 
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which shall remain nameless due to the fruitlessness of naming in this context – 
lacked the same degree of aesthetic merit or critical interest. This was also the case 
with Theatre Deli’s second such theatre marketplace: the Bush Bazaar (2012). This 
took place at the newly re-located Bush Theatre in the old Shepherd’s Bush Library 
on Uxbridge Road in West London. As with Souk, the Bush Bazaar took over an 
entire building, including a stairwell and toilets. Again, there was a reasonable cover 
charge to enter the building which was foregrounded by a temporary box office set 
up in the bar (although it should be noted that this temporary box office has become 
a more stable fixture at all Bush Theatre events I have been to since). Audiences 
were then free to haggle and negotiate the value of each chosen performance. 
Likewise, while some performances were both engaging and interesting, others were 
very much edging towards the ‘scratch’ end of the spectrum – although not intended 
as such – coming across as either incomplete or without that much critical depth. 
Indeed, Brewster and Smith have expressed dissatisfaction with both Souk and the 
Bazaar and are open about this, but they nonetheless argue that the theatre 
marketplace remains an interesting curatorial form that is worth pursuing and 
developing (Brewster and Smith, email interview).  
The fact that both Souk and the Bazaar provide a platform for young 
companies to enter into public performance is admirable. Smith suggests that Theatre 
Deli embrace the opportunity to give young artists a home – albeit, primarily, a 
nomadic residence in temporary spaces. He suggests that these events enable young 
artists to take risks with the kind of work they produce that may not otherwise be 
produced (Brewster and Smith, personal interview). There is a danger here of an 
authorial Theatre Deli stamp covering over the individual identities of these young 
companies, as well as a danger of valorising risk. To some extent, the former 
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reservation seems a likely consequence of the curatorial space itself being rendered 
immersive, where a shared building housing diverse performances becomes a 
coherent immersive environment, or marketplace, for free roaming audiences. 
Nonetheless, an aesthetics of audience participation deployed in both events can be 
seen to function as a valuable political interruption. In what follows, I hope to 
unpack just what this interruption might mean for participating audiences. 
Interruption in relation to what? And political in relation to what?  
What interests me is how aesthetics and politics are drawn together in both 
events, particularly with regard to a politics of aesthetics. Where part one focused on 
aesthetics and part two on politics, this third part of the thesis looks at how both 
might feed into and out of one another. The theatre marketplace, as a total event, 
brought the immersive element into play as something bearing down on the reception 
of each performance. Additionally, both Souk and the Bazaar offered a forum for 
young theatre makers who might not otherwise have had a meaningful or memorable 
part to play in the contemporary theatre landscape: to give voice and be heard; to 
provide attempts at aesthetic intervention and to challenge the kind of value 
judgments that I have just put into play; and perhaps to put politics to work within a 
theatricalised funding structure that foregrounds the labour of performers as a labour 
that is explicitly and directly paid for, complete with a potentially uncomfortable 
performer-audience dynamic that may or may not ensue from this payment. Souk 
and the Bazaar functioned neither as a platform for amateur theatre, nor as a space 
for polished performance; both rest in an uncategorisable zone between these two 
poles that encourages a questioning of who might contribute to an aesthetic 
landscape and who does not fit the grade of intelligibility and supposed aesthetic 
merit. This kind of consideration engages the politics of aesthetics and encourages a 
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closer look at how aesthetics and politics relate to, impact on and grow out of one 
another.  
Both Souk and the Bazaar encouraged participating audiences to consider 
how they value experiences which are offered to them. At the same time, audiences 
are framed as being guardians of their own experience, which seems to acknowledge 
the vitally important role of audiences in the production of experience, as well as the 
responsibility of audiences for the partial generation of their own satisfactory 
experience. As such, the aesthetic spaces which are entered into in both Souk and the 
Bazaar – marketplaces which house and colour individual performances – can be 
seen to be tied into a political agenda: value, responsibility and agency are all 
summoned as themes to be negotiated between performers and audiences in a way 
which is inescapably framed by the curation of both events. The task of this chapter 
is to unpack what this might mean for an understanding of how an aesthetics and 
politics of audience participation in immersive theatre might align.  
The rest of this chapter is split into four sections and a conclusion: the first 
looks to represent Rancière’s thinking around aesthetics and politics, in particular 
how they can be seen to relate to one another; the section after that reconsiders and 
departs from this thinking by explicitly incorporating affect production within it; the 
third section sketches the economic context and ideological decisions informing 
Theatre Deli’s production practises and, particularly, Souk and the Bazaar – this will 
end up being of special significance when approaching the theme of transaction in 
these events and its relevance to audience participation; the fourth section focuses in 
on Half Cut’s Half Cut, arguing that its political potential resides in the 
performance’s capacity to aesthetically disrupt; and the conclusion evaluates the 
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significance of approaching the political potential of Souk and the Bazaar through 
analysis of a participatory aesthetic.  
 
Rancière 
As far as the structure of this thesis is concerned, it has proved necessary to leave a 
detailed account of Rancière’s writing to this fairly late stage in the thesis. The 
previous two parts of the thesis were both geared towards different ends: 
examinations of aesthetics and politics, respectively. Although points of overlap 
were touched on, the specific terms of that overlap still need to be identified and 
thought through. This structural strategy has given me space to develop my own 
vocabulary to help examine both aesthetics and politics in immersive theatre, 
introducing narcissistic and entrepreneurial participation as participatory modes, for 
instance, and reflecting on productive participation as it specifically applies to 
immersive theatre. In this regard, exploring Rancière in any depth in parts one and 
two would have proved more of a hindrance than a help. As the introduction 
suggested, Rancière would resist segregating productive participation in immersive 
theatre from productive participation as a de facto requirement of spectatorship. 
There is significant slippage, then, between our respective means of thinking about 
audience participation. Nonetheless, in identifying and theorising how aesthetics and 
politics can be seen to feed into and out of one another, Rancière’s work proves 
especially enlightening.  
In turning to Rancière as a means of elucidating the consubstantiality of 
aesthetics and politics in immersive theatre, then, it should be clear that I will be 
appropriating his writing, as opposed to fully subscribing to it. Now that my own 
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vocabulary and modes of theorising audience participation have been introduced and 
developed, for the most part, it is possible and necessary to account for a significant 
claim of this thesis, a claim that, in many ways, the last two parts of the thesis have 
been building towards: that a politics of audience participation in immersive theatre 
is likely to be derived from its aesthetics. With this specific task in mind, it now 
proves useful to consider Rancière’s philosophical work in the detail it not only 
merits, but demands. While this section introduces and reflects on Rancière’s 
approach to aesthetics and politics, the following section departs from the specificity 
of his thinking, advancing towards a more autonomous articulation of their 
interrelationships.  
Rancière uses very particular and original definitions of both aesthetics and 
politics in his work. However, the ways in which these definitions are approached in 
his various articles and books, particularly those emerging in the mid-1990s through 
to the mid-2000s, occasionally throw up subtle nuances. In what follows, I will be 
drawing most explicitly on: Dis-agreement, first published in French in 1995; 
Dissensus, a collection of articles, most significant of which is ‘Ten Theses on 
Politics’, written between 1994-96 and first published in French in 1998; The 
Politics of Aesthetics, a series of interviews first collated and published in French in 
2000; and Aesthetics and its Discontents, first published in French in 2004. I will 
also be touching on a number of other works by Rancière, as well as a growing 
literature on his various publications. What I hope will emerge from this is a sense of 
a consistent theoretical approach to political philosophy that, nonetheless, has 
expanded to include a wider range of understandings implied in his deployment of 
terms like aesthetics and politics. It will be shown that this partly relates to the 
growing space given to aesthetics in Rancière’s work. Dis-agreement marks an early 
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engagement with how aesthetics and politics might speak to one another in 
theorising what equality might mean. But a decade later, in Aesthetics and its 
Discontents, the influence of Rancière’s thinking around aesthetics can be shown to 
impact, even more explicitly, on how he conceives of politics as well. This will 
prove significant when considering how Rancière’s writing might inform 
examination of an aesthetics and politics of participation in immersive theatre.  
 In the following subsections, I will steadily introduce a number of terms used 
by Rancière. This section functions both as a lexicon and as a platform for theorising 
the relationships between aesthetics and politics. Some of the terms that follow will 
be familiar to those unacquainted with Rancière’s writing, but nonetheless uniquely 
defined; others are of Rancière’s own making. What I hope will emerge from this is 
a working vocabulary that might add to my own in thinking through the relationships 
between aesthetics and politics in immersive theatre.  
 
Politics and the Police 
In approaching aesthetics and politics as they appear in Rancière’s writing, it is 
useful to begin with politics. In Dis-agreement, he draws on Plato to make an 
impassioned call for acknowledging what democracy overlooks: a ‘miscount, which 
is, afterall, merely the fundamental miscount of politics’ (10). In thinking about 
politics and democracy, Rancière challenges us to consider what it is that the notion 
of ‘a people’ rubs over, particularly as it manifests in an abstract concept through 
democratic processes such as voting, or going on demonstrations. As Todd May 
suggests, Rancière’s deployment of the word ‘politics’ in this book refers to equality 
as it arises ‘only when the traditional mechanisms of what are usually called politics 
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are put into question’ (108; cf Hinderliter et al., ‘Introduction’ 7). This draws on 
Rancière’s claim in Dis-agreement that ‘the presupposition of the equality of anyone 
and everyone, or the paradoxical effectiveness of the sheer contingency of any 
order’, ought to function as a foundational point of departure for politics to emerge 
(17; cf Rancière, Shores 51-52). Politics then appears not as something concerning 
equality of liberty, or equality of opportunity, but equality per se as something pre-
existing, for instance, the distribution of liberty or opportunity. Fundamentally, in 
this book, politics is understood as existing only ‘when the natural order of 
domination is interrupted by the institution of a part for those who have no part’ 
(11). As such, a narrow understanding of politics is put forward, where politics can 
only be said to exist once those excluded from supposedly democratic processes – 
processes which stand for the whole, as a consensual representation, to the detriment 
of some individuals – are able and recognised as being able to interrupt that 
exclusion. Understanding what this ability and recognition entails for Rancière is 
where aesthetics comes in, but there is more to be said, for the time being, about 
what Rancière means by the word ‘equality’.  
An important claim of Rancière’s is that equality must function as a 
foundational presupposition for politics: a precondition of possibility that also 
functions as a point of departure for thinking about politics. The notion of liberty 
being distributed then emerges as being antithetical to equality. To clarify: ‘[w]here 
there is distribution there must be a distributor’ that, more often than not, is likely to 
be government, or some form of governance (May 109). This is evident in 
immersive theatre, especially in those instances where audiences are assigned roles. 
What is more, this reference to immersive theatre is potentially enlightening, for 
Rancière seems to be suggesting that something like a role and its assignment to 
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subjects is at work whenever liberty is distributed. Bound into this assignment is a 
concept that is crucial to Rancière’s whole philosophy: ‘the police’.  
Where equality is distributed – such as equality of liberty or opportunity – it 
is not politics which is at stake, as Rancière understands the term in Dis-agreement, 
but what he calls ‘the police’. He distinguishes this from the ‘petty police’ on the 
beat, or the secret police, or the policing of parades and protests by guardians of the 
law. The petty police, for Rancière, ‘is just a particular form of a more general order 
that arranges that tangible reality in which bodies are distributed in community’ 
(Dis-agreement 28). This more general order is what Rancière calls the police and he 
aligns this order with a commonly, though, for Rancière, mistakenly understood 
notion of the political. In using the term ‘the police’ to refer to this more general 
order, the parameters of which are still to be identified, Rancière rejects an 
understanding of the political which is premised on ‘the aggregation and consent of 
collectivities [...], the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, 
and the systems for legitimizing this distribution’ (Dis-agreement 28). For Rancière, 
in Dis-agreement, politics opposes the police, but at the same time it comes into 
being as something dependent on it as a consequence of being opposed to it.  
 In short, this seminal book pitches the police as an antithesis to politics. 
Where the police is understood as an ordering process which figures subjects in 
particular roles and assigns – or distributes – to them certain capacities, politics 
interrupts this distribution. But to fully grasp what this distribution means, it is 
necessary to incorporate Rancière’s second key theme into our thinking around 
politics: namely, aesthetics.  
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Aesthetics and the Distribution of the Sensible 
Drawing on Kant, Rancière defines one sense of aesthetics as referring to ‘the system 
of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense experience’ (Politics of 
Aesthetics 13). This goes some way towards clarifying what he means by the police: 
i.e. a concept which is first and foremost aesthetic and concerned with aesthetic 
order. For Rancière, the police concerns what is sensible, or open to apprehension by 
the senses – hence the need to consider politics and the police in relation to 
aesthetics. Moreover, the police is concerned with how what is open to apprehension 
might be structured: i.e. aesthetically ordered. Crucially, though, this assertion must 
be read alongside Rancière’s elaboration of his definition of aesthetics, where he 
marks out original territory that asserts aesthetics to be at the core of politics: 
aesthetics denotes neither art theory in general nor a theory that would 
consign art to its effects on sensibility. Aesthetics refers to a specific regime 
for identifying and reflecting on the arts: a mode of articulation between 
ways of doing and making, their corresponding forms of visibility, and 
possible ways of thinking about their relationships. (Politics of Aesthetics 10) 
This should be understood in terms of what Rancière calls the ‘distribution of the 
sensible’. The distribution of the sensible ‘simultaneously discloses the existence of 
something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and 
positions within it’ (12). For instance, to have an occupation ‘determines the ability 
or inability to take charge of what is common to the community; it defines what is 
visible or not in a common space, endowed with a common language, etc.’ (12-13). 
This ability or inability, then, relates to the stake which an individual can be said to 
have in governance, especially self-governance.  
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Idiosyncratically, Rancière turns towards the Ancient Greeks as a means of 
elucidating his point. Drawing on Aristotle, he suggests that a slave’s ability to 
understand the language of rulers is not tantamount to ‘possessing’ that language 
(Politics of Aesthetics 12). This lack of possession begins to flesh out what the 
distribution of the sensible might mean. The ability to perceive something in 
common, such as language, does not necessarily correlate with an ability to change 
the terms on which that supposed commonality operates. The same might be said of 
law; the ability to understand the legal system, especially the modes of writing and 
speaking that exist within, for instance, court procedures, does not necessarily mean 
that any one individual has the capacity to alter the terms on which that system 
operates. In this instance, there are some occupations – such as politicians, lawyers 
and judges – who will have a much greater influence over the operation of that 
system in comparison to others, despite the ‘commonality’ of law. There are some 
that might be able to speak, but not be listened to and understood in quite the same 
way as others, just as there are some that might be able to listen, but not speak in a 
way which will have the same valence or efficaciousness as others. While some are 
presumed to be qualified to speak, others are presumed not to have qualities that hold 
equal validity and are therefore excluded.  
Of course, there may well be exceptions to this rule. Rancière, for instance, 
describes the 1832 trial of the revolutionary Auguste Blanqui as being just such an 
example. In this trial, Blanqui referred to his profession as ‘revolutionary’, a 
profession initially unrecognised by the magistrate. But once informed that this was 
‘the profession of thirty million Frenchmen who live off their labor and who are 
deprived of political rights’, the judge is forced to acquiesce (Dis-agreement 37). 
Blanqui takes possession of the term ‘profession’ by re-inscribing it as ‘a profession 
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of faith, a declaration of membership of a collective [...] the class of the uncounted’ 
(38). Rancière does, then, give an example as to how exclusions in the specific case 
of a law court might be countered and counted: that is, countered because the 
excluded is counted on terms that conflict with a prevailing order, an order of 
appearing and being understood that is, ultimately, aesthetic.  
What is emerging here is a particular vocabulary that might help in 
establishing how aesthetics and politics relate to one another, not just in law courts, 
or in master-slave relationships, but in a variety of contexts. Audience participation 
in immersive theatre provides just such a context. In what follows, I will be honing 
in on how Rancière considers the inter-relationships between aesthetics and politics 
through terms like ‘the police’ and ‘the distribution of the sensible’, alongside his 
particular understandings of ‘aesthetics’ and ‘politics’. This will open up space to 
return to the aesthetics of audience participation considered in this thesis as already 
containing within it a deeply political formula, at least as a potentiality. In one sense, 
this formula will mark a turn away from Rancière’s particular focus on political 
disruption, or interruption, by focusing on the fairly ordered aesthetic frameworks 
that tend to occur in immersive theatre practise; however, in another sense, it may 
still be possible to adopt Rancière’s critical vocabulary and appropriate some of his 
thinking as a means of critically approaching an aesthetics and politics of audience 
participation.  
 
Aesthetics and Politics 
The idea that modes of perception are susceptible to exclusivity is at the heart of 
Rancière’s notion of the distribution of the sensible – a notion that, at the same time, 
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arises from recognising that its operation is ultimately aesthetic. To appreciate what 
this aesthetic operation is for Rancière, it is worth returning to his writing on the 
police. ‘The police’, he writes, ‘is not a social function but a symbolic constitution of 
the social. The essence of the police lies neither in repression nor even in control 
over the living. Its essence lies in a certain way of dividing up the sensible’ (‘Ten 
Theses’ 36). Hence, for Rancière, there is an aesthetic core to politics, defined in 
Dis-agreement as ‘conflict over the existence of a common stage and over the 
existence and status of those present on it’ (26-27). This stage refers to the playing 
space of privileged modes of appearance which obscures an underlying equality 
between subjects. In that sense, it is an aesthetic playing space. It is aesthetic because 
it is concerned with modes of appearing and being seen to appear, or heard. Politics 
then emerges as that which reconfigures the existence of this stage and its entry 
points, affecting how things and people appear to one another, or are heard and 
understood.  
It has been argued that, in Rancière’s later writing, he puts forward a broader 
definition of politics, at least as it might relate to art, that is ‘first of all a way of 
framing, among sensory data, a specific sphere of experience’ (Rancière qtd. in 
Rockhill 199). As such, it is claimed, while his earlier, more widely understood 
definition of politics – in Dis-agreement, especially – refers specifically to a break in 
the traditional mechanisms of politics, or the police, his later definition approaches 
the police as already containing within it a form of the political as a consequence of 
the heterogeneous relationship of politics to it. ‘In other words’, writes Gabriel 
Rockhill, ‘the epithet “political” would be better understood neither in terms of what 
Rancière earlier defined as politics qua subjectivization (la politique) or the police 
order (la police), but according to what he sometimes calls “the political” (le 
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politique), that is, the meeting ground between la politique and la police’ (200). 
Rockhill finds this most evident in Rancière’s Aesthetics and its Discontents: ‘[i]n 
emphasizing – at least implicitly – the police process in politics and the dissensual 
elements in the distribution of the sensible, Rancière breaks down the rigid 
opposition between stable structures and intermittent acts of reconfiguration’ (202, 
my emphasis).  
However, I would argue that there remains in Aesthetics and its Discontents a 
very strong emphasis on politics involving some kind of aesthetic redistribution, or a 
disruption to what Rancière calls the distribution of the sensible, understood there as 
a ‘distribution and redistribution of places and identities, this apportioning and 
reapportioning of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, and of noise and 
speech’ (24-25). As such, while the onus on political subjectivisation is not so 
prominent in this book, as it was in Dis-agreement, his definition of politics is 
nonetheless consistent with aligning it alongside an aesthetic intervention of some 
kind, now defined as a direct engagement with and redistribution of the sensible. 
‘Politics’, writes Rancière, ‘consists in reconfiguring the distribution of the sensible 
which defines the common of a community, to introduce into it new subjects and 
objects, to render visible what had not been, and to make heard as speakers those 
who had been perceived as mere noisy animals’ (Aesthetics and its Discontents 25). 
As such, while Rockhill is right to claim a change of emphasis in Rancière’s writing, 
where the concept of the distribution of the sensible gains increasing traction and 
specificity, there is a maintenance of thought concerning an aesthetic core to politics 
– a core that is ripe for breaking – and a politics of aesthetics that emerges from 
seeing both aesthetics and politics as ‘two forms of distribution of the sensible’ 
(Rancière, Aesthetics and its Discontents 26). 
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On this basis, what is it, exactly, that immersive theatre can offer in terms of 
introducing new subjects and objects into an aesthetic situation? How can it render 
visible what had not previously been? Can it make participants heard and understood 
as speakers, or does it leave audiences behind while remaining deaf to their 
protestations? If Rancière’s thinking is to be applied to immersive theatre, it is 
necessary to clarify two further points: firstly, the relationship between a participant 
and the thing participated in; secondly, whether or not a primarily non-political 
theatre – i.e. a style of theatre that tends to have no clear political message or goal – 
can promote an aesthetic interruption that is at the same time a political interruption. 
The remaining two subsections address each question in turn, before highlighting 
some important reservations about applying Rancière at his word to an examination 
of audience participation in immersive theatre.  
 
Political Zones 
Rancière can be interpreted as identifying a potentially troubled political zone, a 
zone troubled by the very idea of something being common to sense (as perception) 
and sense (as understanding). This zone might usefully bear down on how we 
approach the production of experience in immersive theatre. I will return to this 
interpretation in the next section, as Rancière has voiced reservations about such 
readings of his writing (‘Thinking of Dissensus’ 1). For now, though, it is worth 
addressing work where Rancière has been explicit in opposing ‘sense and sense’: 
‘common sense does not mean a consensus but, on the contrary, a polemical place, a 
confrontation between opposite common senses or opposite ways of framing what is 
common’ (‘Afterword’ 277). As such, common sense is being deployed here as a 
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philosophical idea that is at odds with an assumed, shared understanding of 
something. In fact, Rancière’s reading of common sense refers to just the opposite of 
an obviously common understanding of something: that is, multiple understandings, 
or senses, that rub up against one another, common only to the degree that they hold 
equal, polemical claims. This is also the ‘common’ political equality to be 
presupposed. For immersive theatre audiences, the question then would be how an 
assumed commonality premised on a sensory order might be put into question, or 
upset. How can immersive theatre unearth and unsettle modes of sense-making? 
How can immersive theatre stage the gap between the police and the political?  
 The third of Rancière’s ‘Ten Theses on Politics’ suggests that politics must 
involve a specific break with the logic of arkhê, meaning beginning or originating: as 
in an originating source of power and consequently leadership and sovereignty (30-
31, 29; Dis-agreement 13-15). In this third thesis, Rancière contests the idea that 
there exist subjects with dispositions specific to such leadership roles that somehow 
qualifies their authority (‘Ten Theses’ 30). This is about challenging the submission 
of individuals to the sovereign authority of notions like ‘community’ or 
‘democracy’, as abstract, unifying ideals. Rancière is therefore reiterating an 
invitation to his readers that is also present in Dis-agreement: to acknowledge, first 
of all, that politics exists ‘simply because no social order is based on nature, no 
divine law regulates human society’ (Dis-agreement 16). In the absence of any such 
natural authority, law, or arkhê to politics, competing political claims emerge as 
having equal valence. This observation is what grounds Rancière’s defence of 
politics as necessarily including a part for those who have no part, for any political 
system that excludes even a minority from having a political stake, he suggests, has 
no legitimate authority to do so. 
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Thinking about this in the context of immersive theatre, Rancière might then 
be seen to contest the very idea of an authoritative participatory protocol expected of 
participating audiences, particularly one based on prioritising modes of sensory 
engagement (the police): or if not expected of them, then assumed by participating 
audiences disposed to formulating such an assumption. In this instance, it would not 
be the case that an audience can participate rightly or wrongly, for this would 
involve a value judgment premised on an originating source of authority that might 
come from any one of a number of inappropriate sources, such as those articulated 
by the theatre company in question, or those drawn from a particular audience’s 
horizon of expectations. The expectations and assumptions involved in 
entrepreneurial participation undoubtedly tie into both. Indeed, these expectations 
and assumptions can be seen to put into play what Rancière might call 
‘archipolitics’, where an ethos – in this case, the neoliberal ethos – constructs, in 
ideal form, a possible community premised on that ethos (Dis-agreement 65-70). 
This kind of politics is tantamount to what Rancière calls ‘archipolicing’, where 
ways of doing, thinking and feeling are submitted for ratification to an order. As 
such, an important reason why entrepreneurial participation excludes some audience 
members, along with the neoliberal ethos from which it emerges, can be seen to be 
because of the arkhê, or sovereign participatory law, inscribed at its heart: a law that 
fails to provide points of entry into a political engagement with the piece for some 
audience members.  
What Rancière encourages is a challenge to an idea of politics that 
presupposes a subject already disposed to participating rightly, or in the ‘best’ 
possible way. For Rancière, we need to dig much deeper, beyond such an ethical line 
of enquiry and into a notion of the political. How are prioritisations established as 
280 
 
priorities and who gets left behind? While it might be argued that a ‘“recalibration of 
the senses” is impossible in an ethically neutral space’ (Charnley 51), it might also 
prove useful to interpret Rancière’s rejection of ethical enquiry as a refusal to 
enslave political interrogation to a sovereign moral code. So it is not just a mode of 
enquiry which shifts (as in a political, or ethical mode), but a subject of enquiry. This 
is why Rancière speaks of equality as something to be presupposed and taken as a 
point of departure when thinking about political relations – i.e. positioning politics as 
that which much exist before ethics – a point of view largely inspired by the early 
nineteenth century pedagogue Joseph Jacotot and explored most fully in Rancière’s 
book, The Ignorant Schoolmaster. The question which now arises is significant: 
what scope is there for the political to emerge through audience participation in 
immersive theatre, especially when the theatre style is so susceptible to its 
contradiction?  
 
Dissensus 
Rancière’s notion of ‘dissensus’ provides one possible answer. Dissensus identifies 
an approach to democracy in support of those who, otherwise conceived, have no 
part in the political. It is important not to confuse dissensus with antagonism, or 
mere articulations and actions of oppositional dissent or disquietude. Dissensus 
refers to something much more specific to Rancière’s theoretical approach to 
politics: ‘[d]issensus is not a confrontation between interests or opinions. It is the 
demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself’ (38). In other words, 
dissensus is fundamentally an aesthetic intervention: a reordering of what can or 
cannot be said, done and/or understood by others. This reordering may well 
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necessitate a ‘confrontation between opposite common senses’, where the common 
element is not coherence or consensus, but a divergence of understandings and a lack 
of coherence: in other words, a degradation of sense’s incorrectly supposed 
commonality.  
 This aesthetic approach to conceiving of and examining politics, in particular 
an understanding of equality as a presupposition, has come under critical scrutiny, 
most notably in an insightful and lucid article for the New Left Review by Peter 
Hallward. A damaging concern raised by Hallward draws on Rancière’s disregard 
for and indifference to ‘questions of organisation and decision’, leaving ‘little place 
for direct engagement with the issues that pose the most obvious and direct challenge 
to his egalitarian stance – those bound up with the forms of knowledge, skill or 
mastery required for effective political action, as much as for artistic innovation or 
appreciation’ (126). On the one hand, Rancière dismisses the kinds of political and 
artistic organisation that come with consciously attempting to provide a political 
intervention; on the other, though, he supports a kind of improvisatory, anarchic, 
dissensual intervention. But Hallward asks: does this not also require skill or 
experience (126)?  
This question is an apt one to ask in the context of this chapter, particularly 
with regard to the potential usefulness of turning to Rancière as a means of 
theorising how an aesthetics and politics of audience participation in immersive 
theatre might speak to one another. A point raised in part two of this thesis was that 
audience participation in immersive theatre is indeed something that arguably 
benefits from both skill and experience. Not only that, but the very kinds of 
disposition that are so central to Rancière’s notions of the police and the distribution 
of the sensible are fundamentally present in both narcissistic and entrepreneurial 
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participation: modes of participation that, first and foremost, are premised on the 
rewards and/or challenges of aesthetic engagement. Hallward is inviting his readers 
to consider how even the most potentially disruptive or dissensual acts of political 
intervention, to be truly efficacious, are surely premised on the nurture of skill and 
expertise. This is particularly the case if they are to be lasting and if they are to avoid 
the ephemerality of political sequences arguably advocated by Rancière; indeed, 
such ephemerality is another of Hallward’s concerns about Rancière’s political 
philosophy (123). However, while these are valid concerns, it seems to me that 
Rancière’s writing on aesthetics and politics can, nonetheless, prove enlightening 
with regard to an aesthetics and politics of audience participation in immersive 
theatre. But for the extent of this applicability to reach its full potential, it proves 
useful to depart slightly from that writing. 
With the possible exception of Shunt, the theatre makers commented on in 
this thesis so far are not making political theatre, or theatre that deliberately invites 
reflection on the political. But Rancière encourages us to reconsider the relationship 
between art and politics: ‘[i]f there exists a relationship between art and politics, it 
should be cast in terms of dissensus [...]: artworks can produce effects of dissensus 
precisely because they give neither lessons nor have any destination’ (Dissensus 
140).
43
 Perhaps it is in the very lack of an overt political message that immersive 
theatre does its best political work, despite the potential lack of political influence 
that concerns Hallward. That is not to say, I would add, that a political intention 
cannot play into the reasons behind a theatre maker’s decision to create a piece of 
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 This perspective might be usefully read alongside Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, where 
Adorno criticises politically engaged art as art which integrates ‘into the reality it opposes’, diluting 
the potentially subversive otherness of art (119). Likewise, the social efficacy of art, for Adorno, is 
efficacious not because it heals social wounds, but because art stands in opposition to society: ‘[b]y 
crystallizing in itself as something unique to itself, rather than complying with existing social norms 
and qualifying as “socially useful,” it [art] criticizes society by merely existing, for which puritans of 
all stripes condemn it’ (308).  
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immersive theatre; rather, drawing on Rancière, it is to suggest that the political 
efficaciousness of that theatre event is likely to rest on an aesthetic intervention that 
cannot be calculated, as opposed to a political intention (Dissensus 143). Recalling 
Rancière’s particular deployment of the term ‘dissensus’, the questions then would 
be: in what ways might immersive theatre disrupt an aesthetic order, or participation 
within immersive theatre disrupt its own aesthetic order? How might sense – or, for 
me, affective experience – be felt less as something expected or safe and more as 
something out of the ordinary, or uncomfortable? This latter throws risk into the mix, 
for risk is then introduced both as the inverse of security and as an entering into the 
infinite realm of the unknown. In responding to these questions, I depart from a strict 
Rancièrian approach to aesthetics and politics: a departure that nonetheless works 
with his vocabulary, while at the same time detracting from its specificity.  
 
Rancière Revisited 
It is now possible to return to my interpretation of Rancière’s thinking around the 
opposition between sense and sense as an opposition between perception and 
understanding. In his opening remarks in a 2003 conference paper titled ‘The 
Thinking of Dissensus’, Rancière suggests that this opposition ‘is not an opposition 
between the sensible and the intelligible’ (1). Rather, as the paper goes on, it signals 
oppositions between senses as they appear among a people or group, along the lines 
accounted for in my discussion of Rancière’s critique of ‘common sense’. But why 
might Rancière have felt the need for this explicit framing?  
For Rancière, a ‘dis-agreement of sense and thought’ – particularly as it 
appears in Jean-François Lyotard’s writing on the sublime – implies an 
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‘enslavement’ of reason and the mind ‘to the law of otherness’ (Rancière, ‘Thinking 
of Dissensus’ 10; cf Aesthetics and its Discontents 128; Lyotard). This reduces, for 
Rancière, the politics of an aesthetic experience to an ethical interpretation of it 
(‘Thinking of Dissensus’ 10). For Rancière, the evasiveness of the sublime 
experience binds an experiencing subject to a law that cannot be understood and that 
binding simultaneously marks enslavement: hence, his trouble with the notion of an 
opposition between sensory perception and understanding.  
 Departing from the specificity of Rancière’s thinking, I want to reclaim a 
potential dis-agreement between sense (perception) and sense (as understanding) as 
being politically charged. I do not necessarily mean this in the sense of nullifying the 
mind’s capacity to understand something arising from sense perception implied in 
the notion of the sublime, as Rancière fears might plague such a project; rather, I 
mean it in the sense of addressing how communicative pathways derived from 
sources other than sight and sound might impact on an engagement with something, 
or someone – pathways that are, fundamentally, both aesthetic and political. This 
means inputting corporeality into Rancière’s writing on aesthetics and politics.  
Rancière’s writing on aesthetics and politics, particularly the politics of 
aesthetics, tends to focus on two senses: sight and sound. Bishop is right to point out 
the significance of Rancière’s reworking of the term ‘aesthetic’ so that it concerns 
‘aisthesis, a mode of sensible perception proper to artistic products. Rather than 
considering the work of art to be autonomous, he draws attention to the autonomy of 
our experience in relation to art’ (Artificial Hells 27, original emphasis; cf Rancière, 
Aesthetics and its Discontents 29-30). She also neatly summarises his view that ‘this 
freedom suggests the possibility of politics (understood here as dissensus), because 
the undecidability of aesthetic experience implies a questioning of how the world is 
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organised, and therefore the possibility of changing or redistributing that same 
world’ (Artificial Hells 27). This seems to me a very appropriate reading of what 
Rancière is getting at in his charting of the politics of aesthetics. However, what is 
missing is an acknowledgment of how aisthesis is conceptually limited in his writing 
to include only ways of seeing and hearing, visibility and audibility. This limitation 
is worth revisiting for present purposes.  
In what ways might a definition of aisthesis be expanded to include what is 
feelable? Moreover, how might this expansion and inclusion affect a politics of 
aesthetics? In Dissensus, Rancière chooses not to subscribe to this expanded 
understanding of aisthesis. He chooses instead to focus on what exists in surplus to 
the idea of a bios politicos, or ‘the essence of a mode of life’ (92). This surplus, for 
Rancière, is ‘a property that is biologically and anthropologically unlocatable, the 
equality of speaking beings’ (92). On the basis of this position, it would be fair to 
assume that he is likely to be wary of seeing affect as forming any kind of basis for 
the political. His scepticism is directed towards viewing the body as an object of 
power, as it appears in Foucault’s writing, for this perspective, according to 
Rancière, erases any possibility for the political to emerge (92-93; cf May 115). In 
many respects, affect production potentially rests on a similar objectification of the 
body as an object of power. However, given my account of affect production 
articulated in chapter one, the production of affect does not just emerge from top-
down affective impositions upon bodies, so much as from the dynamic interrelations 
between a particular subject and such authorial impositions. Conceived as such, and 
noting the onus on aesthetics and sensibility in Rancière’s writing, it seems to me 
worth asking how a more general approach to experience that takes into account the 
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affective and what is feelable might at least take us close to Rancière’s 
understanding of the political, even if it does not align with it fully.  
 This desire to reformulate Rancière’s approach to aisthesis stems from a note 
of surprise articulated by Groot Nibbelink: ‘I think it is remarkable that Rancière’s 
distribution of the sensible hardly pays attention to the possibility of corporeal 
intelligence: knowledge that is present in affects and sensations. [...] Rancière seems 
caught into a distribution of the sensible of his own, which borders on logocentrism’ 
(418, original emphasis). I would rephrase this observation as knowledge that might 
be reached through affect as it is produced in relation to and through particular 
individuals. While the remarkability of this observation might be tamed on the basis 
of Rancière’s concerns about the biopolitical just accounted for, it nonetheless seems 
right to question how these two central ideas of Rancière’s – the distribution of the 
sensible and the politics of partaking (including the presupposition of equality) – 
might take on board how something like affect could be woven into the aesthetics 
reputedly at the core of his politics. If politics begins with a break in the logic of 
arkhê, then perhaps affect seems an odd place to start given the fact, to risk 
tautology, that it affects people and therefore arguably detracts from their capacity to 
exercise independent political expression. It poses a risk. However, if the experience 
economy is enjoying increasing influence across a range of sectors and practises, 
then perhaps affect, over and above what can be seen or heard, provides the very site 
in need of disruption, or perceptual shock. If immersive theatre is particularly 
susceptible to absorption within the experience economy and co-optation by 
neoliberal markets and even if its value system can be seen to align with the 
neoliberal ethos, then surely affect production is one of the most apt subjects of 
enquiry to begin thinking about a politics of its aesthetics? And if affect and, more 
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generally, the production of experience, is indeed central to an aesthetics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre, particularly when addressed against such a 
context, then surely this part of its aesthetics is a good place to start questioning how 
the distribution of the sensible and the police function in this kind of work, asking 
what capacity there might be for dissensus to emerge?  
 The remainder of this chapter is split into two core sections. The first looks in 
more detail at Souk and the Bazaar. Both will be treated as events curated by Theatre 
Deli, where curation functions as an immersive strategy to aid the disruption of a 
sensible regime, particularly with regard to the foregrounding of transactions 
between artists and audiences. The second focuses on Half Cut’s Half Cut, honing in 
on one particular example of such transaction, analysing and evaluating how affect 
production and risk perception – i.e. an aesthetics of audience participation in 
immersive theatre – can be seen not just to impact upon, but form the core of a 
politics of participation.  
 
Recession, Recession, Recession: Disrupting Austerity 
As Brewster explained in a personal interview, the initial idea for Souk came from a 
love of festival culture, especially Glastonbury Festival of Contemporary Performing 
Arts in the UK. She reminisced about the festival’s ‘magical’ qualities: bleary eyed 
delirium; ‘open conversations’ between live bands and screaming audiences; and 
happenstance stumblings upon oddities, such as a ‘hidden’ ballroom, complete with 
brass band greeting red-eyed revellers at 10am in what was Glastonbury’s Lost 
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Vagueness (Brewster and Smith, personal interview).
44
 The constructed mayhem of 
Glastonbury and comparable festivals was perhaps dimly echoed in Theatre Deli’s 
un-muddy and sober curation of Theatre Souk. However, there is something 
fundamentally different between these two iterations of festivity. The pricey cost of a 
festival ticket is something that might easily be forgotten in the hedonic excesses of a 
festival like Glastonbury. Consumable products aside, the ticket purchased well in 
advance of the festival remains largely set apart from the art and entertainment 
within it, excluding the obligatory, but largely forgettable wristband branding right 
of access. This is one reason why I find the music festival only dimly echoed at Souk 
and the Bazaar. Payment was an omnipresent theme in both theatre marketplaces in a 
way that is far less evident at music festivals; it became a source for experiential 
engagement and affect production.  
The particular form of affect production aroused through this experiential 
source for engagement must be primarily contingent on the individual, but there was 
nonetheless a potential for an embarrass that may be present across a range of 
affective encounters. As Ridout explains: ‘[s]haring origins with the word embargo, 
an embarrass is “an obstacle”, and “embarrasser” is “to block” [...]. So to embarrass 
might be to do something to someone by speech or action, to act or speak in such a 
way as to introduce obstacles or complications’ (81). Understood in this way, an 
embarrass resonates with what Rancière might call dissensus, as a disruption of, or 
blockage to, a coherent sensory fabric. On the one hand, it should be noted, to be 
affected by embarrassment might emerge from an understanding of breaking with 
social convention, or whatever it might be that has been disrupted, therefore 
                                                 
44
 Lost Vagueness is no longer a part of Glastonbury Festival following a dispute over 
commercialisation between Michael Eavis, Glastonbury’s founder, and Roy Gurvitz, founder of Lost 
Vagueness.  
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functioning as a mechanism that sustains the operation of that convention given the 
Pavlovian corrective discomfort that may ensue while embarrassed; on the other 
hand, embarrassment might alter the way in which that convention is understood to 
be just that – a convention – as a consequence of being perceived as such. In other 
words, embarrassment might enable an unearthing of something that is otherwise not 
perceivable, or an unmasking of something that is perceivable, or knowable, but is 
then open to be perceived or known differently. It might interrupt aesthetic stability. 
What is more, an embarrass need not necessarily refer to embarrassment, but any 
such disruption of, or obstacle to, what can be sensed and made sense of. In the case 
of Souk and the Bazaar, the embarrassing source in question is transaction: 
specifically, a financial transaction. Both events encourage audiences to question 
who or what they are paying for, why they pay for it and the corresponding value 
between monetary value and aesthetic value.  
A more resonant backdrop to the emergence of Souk and the Bazaar was the 
2008 global financial crisis and the long economic recession which shortly 
afterwards ensued in the UK. Brewster was explicit in interview about the financial 
crisis providing a central theme for Souk (Brewster and Smith, personal interview). 
Recession, crisis and austerity: from the double-dip to funding cuts, the current 
coalition government has deployed an increasingly familiar vocabulary to try to 
make sense of financial instability, or else identify approaches aimed at its 
resolution. Since the coalition rose to power in the UK in 2010, a conceptual rubric 
has been implemented, typified in this kind of language, that has reordered the 
symbolic constitution of government authority. Volunteerism, Big Society, the 
welfare trap: these terms do not just describe, but help to define who in society has a 
right to partake in welfare and who is expected to benefit from self-governance. 
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Significantly, with time, this kind of language does not just label, but affects the 
political positioning of the labelled. At the same time, it would not be too big a leap 
to consider how such labelling might be matched with perceiving a world and one’s 
part within it. As such, a means of making sense of the world can be seen to affect, at 
least potentially, sensing the world: i.e. thinking about political participation can be 
seen to align with perception. It is this kind of alignment that Rancière might 
describe as an aesthetic core to politics. It presupposes that politics refers to what 
can, or cannot be sensed and how that sensing relates to what can and cannot be 
made sense of. In other words, it suggests how aesthetics feeds into the stake a 
subject can be said to have in a political field.  
  Following a hung parliament without any one party winning the necessary 
326 seat majority in the House of Commons, the coalition was formed in May 2010, 
comprised of both Conservative and Liberal Democrat members of parliament and 
with a Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, at the helm and a Conservative 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, in charge of the budget. Coalition 
rhetoric provided a linguistic field from which a biting series of cuts to public 
services and funding could be framed as justified, particularly with regard to the 
construction of perceived necessity. ACE was far from exempt from these cuts. ‘In 
passing on overall government cuts of 15%’, write Charlotte Higgins and Mark 
Brown in a report for The Guardian, ‘[m]ore than 200 arts organisations’ lost their 
ACE funding ‘on a day of wildly mixed fortunes for English Arts’: ‘[o]f the 1,330 
organisations that had applied for funding for 2012-15, 638 were disappointed. Of 
those, 206 had been regularly funded by ACE’ (n.p.).  
 One sense in which Souk and the Bazaar can be said to have made political 
interventions is through an explicit drawing on and troubling of this unsettling 
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economic context. Without sufficient public funding, Theatre Deli have pursued 
alternative avenues in order to fund contemporary theatre. Against the context of 
cuts to arts funding and despite austerity, but arguably because of instability and 
insecurity in business and the empty office blocks left in its wake, Theatre Deli 
persevere. But before this perseverance is evaluated or mindlessly celebrated as 
some heroic triumph in the face of adversity, it is worth reflecting on an important 
and unnerving question: does Theatre Deli end up sustaining the dissolution of a 
stable funding system for immersive theatre? In what ways might a pop-up aesthetic 
debunk an attempt to theorise a disruptive politics? Might pop-up theatre merely 
sustain the heteronomy of immersive theatre as an art form dependent on private 
enterprise?  
 
Pop-up Theatre 
Immersive theatre has, to some degree, become closely associated with non-theatre 
spaces. As chapter three identified, all of Punchdrunk’s major work, with the 
exception of The Masque, has been performed in disused factories, or abandoned 
industrial or municipal off-casts. Likewise, Shunt also perform in spaces susceptible 
to limited duration, as the sacrifice of their home in the London Bridge Vaults made 
painfully apparent. Of course, there are theatre institutions which offer temporary 
residence to immersive theatre artists and companies, such as the BAC and CPT. 
But, despite this, immersive theatre makers do still tend to operate outside of theatre 
buildings and it is worth questioning what the implications of this operation might 
be.  
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Jen Harvie has persuasively argued for the validity of such questions with 
regard to socially engaged art in an article for Performance Research. In this article, 
she addresses Roger Hiorns’s Seizure (2008-10): an Artangel commissioned 
installation in a council housing block, scheduled for demolishment, near Elephant 
and Castle in the London Borough of Southwark. ‘The Borough of Southwark’, 
writes Harvie, ‘is an area of comparative deprivation: in 2007, it was the twenty-
sixth most deprived borough overall in England (of 354), the eighteenth most 
deprived on the income scale’ (114). For Seizure, Hiorns and Artangel filled a three 
room flat in this housing block with copper sulphate solution. Three weeks later, the 
solution was drained to reveal a sparkling interior with every surface covered in 
vibrant blue crystals. Art savvy visitors were then free to experience the installation. 
 While acknowledging the potential social and aesthetic worth of 
interventions like Seizure, Harvie maintains a number of significant reservations. 
The most pertinent of these for the current context addresses the maintenance of 
heteronomy: ‘one of the risks of a spatially responsive art practise such as Seizure is 
that its maker’s volition is more than limited by what is available (or, what is 
available to the art market) and that the work is necessarily significantly determined 
by that dependence’ (120). For Theatre Deli, something similar is at stake. Where 
Seizure intervened in former social housing – social housing that was, Harvie notes, 
to be destroyed ‘to create space for a new, larger and much more densely-populated 
development of mixed social and part-private housing’ (114-15) – Theatre Deli 
remains dependent on the interim periods between a business vacating a premises 
and another business taking over the premises. This interim period can sometimes 
last up to a year. What is more, it is an interim period that can be mutually beneficial 
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in a way that benefits, to some degree, both the company that currently owns the 
unused premises and Theatre Deli. As Smith explains: 
[i]f you have a commercial property, the owner or tenant of the commercial 
property has to pay business rates, which is the commercial version of 
council tax. [...] Councils have to give charities an 80% mandatory relief on 
their business rates. And the council can give a discretionary reduction of 
100%, so you’re not paying any business rates. Theatre Delicatessen is a 
charity. (Brewster and Smith, personal interview) 
Even if a commercial building is left empty, the owner of that building must still pay 
business rates. If a charity like Theatre Deli inhabits the building in an interim period 
between the purchase of the property and redevelopment by and for a given business, 
then the owner can receive a substantial discount in business rates. In the case of 
Theatre Deli’s occupation of Marylebone Gardens at 35 Marylebone High Street 
between 2012-13, the former BBC London headquarters, this meant striking a deal 
with the new owners, Scottish Widows Investment Partnership (SWIP). By virtue of 
Theatre Deli’s ratified occupation of the building, SWIP pays only a fraction of its 
business rates. In return, Theatre Deli have no need to pay anything other than power 
bills with regard to the building itself. They are also in a position to ask SWIP for a 
proportion of what they have saved to cover these bills and to fund artistic activity.  
 Smith and Brewster view this kind of relationship as pragmatic and a 
comparable approach has been utilised to enable all of their pop-up projects. After 
all, without public funding, it is difficult (but of course not impossible) to see how a 
young company like Theatre Deli could function or provide the kind of platform that 
they do for other young and emerging theatre companies without this kind of 
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initiative. However, on the other hand, Harvie encourages us to be wary of the 
alleged availability of such spaces, for that availability, at least in the case of Theatre 
Deli, relies on market volatility, the precarious interim between business 
inhabitations, and the private revenue of a business like SWIP that, ultimately, will 
be the force that sustains their nomadism.  
 Posing even more cause for concern, Harvie notes further dangers that pop-
up theatre makers must ultimately confront:  
[t]hough artists’ responsiveness to such opportunities testifies to their 
abilities to be creative, innovative and resilient – as well as entrepreneurial – 
it may also naturalize what is otherwise lacking or underfunded: a stable, 
‘purpose-built’ arts infrastructure that allows for long-term support and 
planning rather than simply opportunistic and usually short-term 
responsiveness. (121) 
I would suggest that Harvie is only criticising the artists exploiting pop-up theatre 
opportunities to the extent that they help to sustain, indirectly, the lack of a 
sustainable arts infrastructure. As such, her concern is not so much levelled at the 
perseverance of the artists in question, so much as the context they find themselves 
in and the ensuing effects of their pop-up activities. Without public arts funding to 
support their work, Theatre Deli must either perform different work that is not so 
dependent on large spaces in buildings – and arguably forego the rehearsal and 
performance platform they offer to other young companies – or embrace explicitly 
private, commercial, corporate, or philanthropic funding initiatives, or squatting, all 
of which have their own compromises. It is in this context, I believe, that Brewster 
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and Smith consider their enterprise in terms of pragmatism, however compromised 
that pragmatism might be.  
 
Pop-Up Theatre as Interstice 
Theatre Deli’s production practises can be seen to naturalise the dissolution of a 
sustainable arts infrastructure for the work of young and emerging companies, 
particularly those creating immersive theatre. At the same time, in the midst of 
recession, austerity and cuts to public arts funding, they are able to curate small scale 
work within the larger scale curated events of Souk and the Bazaar, despite all of 
these obstacles. Theatre Deli are challenging the distribution of parts within a 
contemporary theatre landscape that, partly because of a reduced public arts funding 
pot, has become even more limited with regard to enabling artists to contribute to 
such a landscape. On the one hand, Theatre Deli are sustaining a working 
relationship with private enterprise that will also sustain their nomadism; on the 
other, their resilience, in many ways because of the seemingly compromised 
‘quality’ of the work they produce, can be seen to disrupt the ordered distribution of 
parts within a creative arts structure, opening up opportunities for other theatre 
makers to participate in the creation of theatre. This means that audiences will be 
coming into contact with work that has not been ratified, at least to any great extent, 
by ACE, or been supported by permanent and respected institutions such as the BAC 
– the latter excluding the Bazaar, which took up residence in the Bush Theatre. The 
artists that work with Theatre Deli are, in an important sense, represented by them as 
well and the fact that the Bush Theatre ended up hosting the Bazaar marks an odd 
shift towards institutional representation. However, especially as far as Souk is 
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concerned, this work can still be seen to bubble up from within the infrastructural 
cracks of British theatre making and producing. In many ways, it stems from a 
company that takes as a point of departure the entrepreneurialism, opportunism, risk 
and responsibility that characterises the neoliberal ethos, asking ‘where do we go 
from here?’ As such, there is something uncannily third way about Theatre Deli, but 
only to the extent that pragmatic responses to the supposed facticity of neoliberalism 
are adopted, stopping far short of an embrace of neoliberal values.  
 There is little that is radical about Theatre Deli’s working practises. Harvie’s 
reservations and their applicability suggest as much, for they reveal how the root 
cause of the problems provided by the context they find themselves caught within 
remain largely unchanged. But perhaps those practises might still function as an 
interstice, albeit in counterintuitive form. Bourriaud describes the interstice as a term 
used by Karl Marx to describe trading communities that elude the capitalist 
economic context by being removed from the law of profit: barter, 
merchandising, autarkic types of production, etc. The interstice is a space in 
human relations which fits more or less harmoniously and openly into the 
overall system, but suggests other trading possibilities than those in effect 
within this system. (16) 
At Souk and the Bazaar, barter was clearly a defining attribute. What is more, the 
capitalist economic context is hardly eluded if we focus on the spaces used by 
Theatre Deli alone. These are spaces that benefit exponents of this context through 
reduced business rates and arguably the cultural capital that accrues with ‘helping’ a 
fairly young theatre company like Theatre Deli. The capitalist economic context, 
then, at least in this sense, is supported, not eluded. What is more, the transaction at 
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stake in the trading community presented to audiences was clearly defined 
financially. Audiences were asked to hand over real money in return for a 
performance that has been valued in monetary terms.  
However, while this kind of transaction mirrors the capitalist economic 
context, the reflected image ends up warped. The kind of metaphorical mirror in play 
is tantamount to those of the funhouse. The capitalist economic context that the 
interstice seeks to elude is indeed eluded, so long as elusion is understood as a crafty 
undermining of compliance and is here distinguished from Theatre Deli’s 
transactions with the owners of the buildings they inhabit. The kinds of transaction 
which take place between audiences and performers sit within a curated event that 
itself sits within an economic context governed by a mutually beneficial contractual 
relationship between a theatre company and a future corporate resident of the space 
inhabited. But these transactions between performers and audiences nonetheless 
trouble that stability: they make it appear awkward. They are embarrassing. 
Bartering may of course be fun and that fun may end up fetishising the relation 
between a paying audience and an earning labourer; but fun may also be seen to exist 
in the sense of hoaxing explored in the previous chapter. The audience is rendered 
prone to being made fun of if the payment ends up being rendered as a source of 
embarrassment. As I hope to demonstrate in the next section, this was especially 
clear in Half Cut’s Half Cut. The point is that an obstacle – an embarrass – is 
uncomfortably presented to audiences in a way that blocks the masking of a 
potentially objectifying relation between purchaser and the purchased.  
 Souk and the Bazaar, then, function as interstices in a very particular sense: 
both operate in spaces functioning within an economic context that, if anything, 
works to sustain that context, while at the same time disrupting the smooth operation 
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of transaction within temporarily inhabited spaces. The efficacy of these two curated 
events does not lie in creating sustainable and ambitious alternatives to an existing 
economic order; rather, it can be seen to lie at the interface between a curator, 
Theatre Deli, performers assigned to young and emerging theatre companies and 
audiences that necessarily participate as soon as the transaction takes place. In other 
words, it can be seen to lie in ‘a space in human relations’ which is constructed at the 
centre point of such an interface.  
 This space is first and foremost an aesthetic space: a space of appearance. It 
is a space that is concerned with aisthesis. This does not just mean a space that is 
concerned with what is seeable or sayable, although it may involve what is seen and 
said while a performer and audience negotiate a transaction. Rather, in this context, 
aisthesis refers to all that is experientially understandable: knowledge that is derived 
from affects and sensations, or at least recognised as being so by a thinking, feeling 
subject. The transaction is incorporated within the aesthetic space of the 
performance, but it also plays on the centrality of affect production in an aesthetics 
of audience participation within an immersive theatre marketplace. At least 
potentially, the transaction might become a source of embarrassment. It might just as 
well become a source of shame, or mirth. Whatever the case, the transaction itself, 
along with the human relation caught within it, is raised into the realm of aisthesis 
and, hence, perception.  
It is in this sense that an aesthetic disruption, or dissensus, can be said to take 
place, for something otherwise left largely condemned to what cannot be perceived 
is made sensible and therefore open to sense. As noted in the introduction, Machon 
has pointed out how immersive theatre draws together ‘sense (semantic “meaning 
making”) with sense (feeling, both sensation and emotion)’ and ‘establishes a 
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double-edged rendering of making-sense/sense-making’ ((Syn)aesthetics 14, original 
emphasis). I want to re-direct this claim toward those of Rancière’s and suggest that 
Souk and the Bazaar, as experiments in immersive theatre curation, jeopardise how 
the relationship between perceiving and making sense of something can be seen to 
function. What is made available to perception in the first place is an oddity – a 
human relationship – that might otherwise be fetishised in the financial transaction 
outside of these aesthetic spaces: i.e. the police. What is supposedly common to 
sense perception and therefore common sense is revealed as a commonality 
contingent on aesthetic framing. That is what has been re-ordered, or re-distributed. 
That is the embarrass to be negotiated. And, as Rancière might have it, that is where 
a politics of participation might be found: at its aesthetic core.  
 
Aesthetics and Politics in Half Cut’s Half Cut 
Half Cut is a young theatre company with three artistic directors: Astor Agustsson, 
Dan Ball and Joe Iredale. Half Cut was their debut performance, performed at Souk. 
In this performance, perhaps more than any other at Souk, transaction was raised to 
the level of a theme. Audiences were enticed into a small annex where they met a 
shady barterer. Using an illustrated stick-figure attached to a wall, with arrows 
pointing to different parts of its anatomy, the barterer explained the varying prices 
associated with plucking, cutting, shaving or waxing hair from his model’s body. 
The model, he assured, was waiting next door. In my case, £1 a pluck seemed a fair 
deal – although the barterer was keen to shunt the invasiveness and therefore the 
monetary value of my epilatory efforts up a couple of notches. I withdrew a solitary 
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pound coin from my pocket and handed it over before the door was opened to 
another room.  
The model, standing to my left, greeted me with a smile, brandishing red 
marks from recent epilation. To my right was what looked like a surgeon’s tray, 
complete with razors, tweezers, scissors and waxing strips. The transaction which 
had just taken place in the room next door seemed to weigh down on the scenario. It 
was an utterly ridiculous circumstance to be in, trivial and laughable, but the kind of 
laughter that follows a faux pas: part defensive, part guilty, part tactic to make light 
of a situation. At the same time, that transaction seemed to prompt a commitment to 
pluck. A performance contract had materialised the moment that pound coin was 
handed over. Of course, the contract could be broken. I was free to walk out. But 
then again, why else was I there? Grabbing the tweezers, I approached the model and 
located a hair that seemed particularly lonely on his left breast. Pluck. I thanked him, 
despite the feeling that I was not particularly thankful for the situation that had just 
ensued.  
 I would discover later that this scenario was filmed and live streamed to a 
television screen in the third floor bar designed by Half Cut. The bar was run by one 
of the three directors: whoever was running low on available hair at the time. 
Consequently, the three members of Half Cut rotated roles between barterer, model 
and bartender. The live streaming itself I found deeply compromised. This was not 
made an explicit part of the transaction and for many it would remain a hidden 
element of the ‘sphere of interhuman relations’ that Bourriaud suggests characterises 
the interstice. The camera finds its correlate in the instruments of epilation, only it is 
the audience that ends up exposed to its objectifying glare. A space which is set up 
as a private space for the objectification of an other is later revealed as a publicly 
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observable space: an other, it should be noted, that has chosen to create the work and 
perform in it, while incorporating that decision, for himself, implicitly, in the 
transaction that is set up before any act of epilation takes place. The lack of 
transparency for audiences that this shift entails is problematic, for it potentially 
scuppers the terms of the transaction between a paying audience and a paid for 
performance, albeit it a scuppering that nonetheless echoes the audience’s potential 
objectification of another human being. 
 The camera certainly rests uneasily in my recollection of the event, but it had 
no bearing on the live experience as I was completely unaware of its presence at the 
time. Perhaps its presence should nonetheless pull ethical focus in what follows. 
There is certainly scope for this to take place, but I fear it would detract, as might 
Rancière, from this chapter’s primary engagement with aesthetics and politics. 
Without condoning the camera, what I want to focus on is how the theme of 
transaction presents an aesthetic intervention, insofar as a transaction is perceptively 
re-ordered. What is more, the two primary streams of an aesthetics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre identified in part one – affect production and risk 
perception – appear to be the battle ground on which this re-ordering occurs.  
The transaction itself takes place in an annex adjacent to the epilation room. 
The contents of that room remain largely anticipated and imagined for potentially 
participating audiences prior to entering. In my case, I remember feeling struck by 
the reality of the model in the room next door, convinced as I was that the 
transaction would lead to a different kind of hoax. Maybe an empty room, or a room 
inhabited by a mannequin. In negotiating the transaction with the barterer, I was 
negotiating an uncertain performance contract, albeit a contract that was more 
uncertain for audiences than it was for the performers. It was only upon entering the 
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room that risk perception was finally fully mustered, despite the fact that risk, as an 
operative potential, was already set in motion while negotiating the monetary 
transaction. Risk, manifested in risk perception, became fully realised and fully 
realisable on entering the realm of aisthesis. It was through aesthetic experience that 
the risky nature of that transaction and the unpredictable set of affective responses 
that might ensue from it manifested, as an embarrass: i.e. as an obstacle to the 
otherwise smooth, fetishised and ultimately hidden operation of risk within a risk-
laden transaction. In my case, risk was rendered feelable through awkwardness and 
embarrassment. It was also made apparent through an annoyance at having been 
made fun of, of being gulled by the misleading supposition that there could not 
possibly be a human model next door. The financial transaction, through the 
disruption of risk’s aesthetic ordering, became an annoying, embarrassing, awkward 
presence in the room, hanging between audience and performer like a foul, but 
vaguely amusing stench. It made uncomfortably palpable a social relation that may 
otherwise remain masked (see Harvie, ‘Witnessing’ 72). It is in this sense that Half 
Cut can be seen to affect the distribution of the sensible: as an aesthetic rupture in the 
operation of interhuman risk relations. In Rancièrian terms, this is also why Half Cut 
can be seen to provide a political provocation, as a consequence of aesthetic 
disruption.  
The triviality of this intervention may in fact be one of its strengths. The 
seemingly trivial encourages us to reconsider what it is that makes something appear 
trivial. It encourages us to reconsider who, or what, has the right and the capacity to 
partake in aesthetic re-distribution. And it has the capacity to take us by surprise as a 
disruptive potential.  
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 However, this claiming of the political demands qualification, not least 
because of Rancière’s vital presupposition: the presupposition of equality. Half Cut 
thrives on power and unsettling the distribution of power between participating 
parties. The performing model in Half Cut is first and foremost a labouring 
performer. The money that audiences hand over to the barterer will ultimately be 
owned by Half Cut – it is not Theatre Deli, but the theatre companies involved with 
Souk that pocket these monetary contributions. The thing paid for is the performance 
that ensues from the monetary transaction: i.e. the potential objectification of the 
model. The thing that is sold to audiences, in many respects, is the labour which is 
explicitly bound up in the model’s objectification.  
The explicit here does not necessarily refer to sexual gratification, but it does 
engage sexuality. What is purchased is the opportunity to use a male actor’s body in 
a prescribed way, plucking, cutting, shaving or waxing hair from his body. This is a 
particularly charged potential source of affect production that must, of course, be 
contingent on the individual participant. Their gender and sexuality, but more 
importantly their culturally, socially, ethically, politically or religiously inflected 
views of both, may well bleed into the encounter between audience and performer 
and fundamentally contribute to the generation of affect in this risk-laden scenario. 
The performer is of course subject to objectification, but the audience, depending on 
the audience, is also prone to being objectified – and not just under the glare of the 
camera. This results from an aesthetic incorporation of their experience into the 
performance. At the same time, this incorporation is potentially troubled through a 
refraction of narcissistic participation: that is, as a potentially uncomfortable, 
objectified encounter with one’s own experiencing being. Audiences may feel 
culpable for a situation that they are not wholly culpable for and responsible for a 
304 
 
relationship for which one is only partially responsible. In short, the performer-
audience relationship, along with the power dynamic operating between them, is 
messy, unclear and elusive of complete intelligibility. It is a disruptive relationship 
that is perhaps rendered most resonant, paradoxically, through introspection.  
There is a danger here of rubbing over a historically loaded human 
relationship between performer and audience. There are numerous and deeply 
troublesome historical links between the ocular availability of the (usually female) 
actors’ body on the stage and their sexual availability off the stage. As Hurley 
suggests, commenting on the historical research of Kirsten Pullen: the prostitute, as 
an ‘age-old metaphor for the actress’, can be traced back at least to the Greek 
‘auletrides, who entertained and then sexually gratified the hosts of the symposia as 
early as the fifth century BCE’ (65). This correlation between the ocular 
objectification of the actor on the stage and an assumed sexual availability off the 
stage has consistently emerged in a number of guises for centuries, from the 
commedia dell’arte, to ‘the early modern French theatre, the English Restoration 
stage, and pre-twentieth-century Chinese theatre’ (65). A significant consequence of 
this correlation ‘thus negatively marked actresses’ gender exceptionalism as much as 
it slurred their affecting emotional and physical labour – in other words, their acting’ 
(66). What this undermines is the possibility of presupposing equality between an 
objectified performer and an objectifying audience. What gets in the way of this 
presupposition, to begin with, is perception. What is made available to sense 
perception is co-opted as potential sensory pleasure (experience), as a consequence 
of how it is made sense of (understanding). What gets in the way, then, is an 
aesthetic order that is phallocentric and possessive.  
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It seems that Half Cut is explicitly engaging this history and this issue from a 
critical standpoint. First off, the model is male. The gender and sexuality of the 
audience, together with their views on both, will fundamentally impact on how the 
male model is both perceived and, subsequently, interacted with. This does not alter 
the framing of that model as being prone to objectification; rather, that vulnerable 
identity is limited by the contingency of particular audiences. Nonetheless, the male 
model’s body remains something that is paid for prior to entering the epilation room 
and that financial relation fixes him as a labourer and the audience as one who pays 
for labour. The relations of power and objectification set up in this scenario are 
contradictory and elusive of universally explanatory conclusions, particularly those 
derived from an ethical order, not least because of the shared presence of various 
audiences and the performer in a repeatable context. But the presentation of a figure 
that is at least comparable to the prostitute, complete with the provocations this 
poses for the political, must nonetheless be confronted.  
Commenting on Jules Styne, Stephen Sondheim and Arthur Laurents’s 
Broadway show Gypsy (1959), a musical about the burlesque stripper Gypsy Rose 
Lee, Hurley notes scope for drama to lay bare ‘a theatrical service economy in which 
female performers are the primary feeling-technology’ (67-68). Half Cut seems to 
aspire to this ‘laying bare’ of a theatrical service economy, albeit through the 
presentation of a male performer that seems to invert the gendered structure of this 
economy. The male performer is placed in an explicitly objectified and objectifiable 
role: objectified through the monetary transaction and objectifiable through the 
realisation of the invitation to epilate. At the same time, the audience is positioned in 
a way that demands affective labour: a further and significant element of the 
theatrical service economy that is particularly applicable to participatory theatre 
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styles. For the audience, this affective labour is something paid for and may even be 
desired, as opposed to something engaged with to maintain subsistence and the 
development of craft and artistic exploration. Nonetheless, it remains an important 
consideration, for it emerges as an aesthetic vehicle through which the weight of a 
questionable transaction might be felt.  
Both performer and audience in Half Cut are subject to affective labour, 
albeit very different forms of it, in a context that raises that labour to the level of 
aisthesis. Transaction, labour and objectification, in a typically postdramatic shift, 
become objects of direct experience; they deviate from habit to promote its explicit 
perception, ‘permitting it to move from something taken for granted as a mere 
accompaniment to the rank of a theme’ (Lehmann, H. 156). What is put into play 
here is an aesthetic rupture that simultaneously defines this work’s political status. 
The equality presupposed in the relationship between audience and performer stems 
from a potentially mutual vulnerability. In some respects, the ethically compromised 
imposition of the camera ensures at least a degree of this vulnerability on the parts of 
both performers and audience. Perhaps this potentially mutual vulnerability marks 
the limitations or nullification of politics in terms that are strictly applicable to 
Rancière. However, at the same time, the uncertainty of the situation, as a 
consequence of its contingency on the responses of different audience members, 
avoids consensus, particularly ethical consensus. While the participatory invitation is 
fixed – to epilate, or not to epilate – the aesthetic web operating between performer 
and audience is at least potentially volatile; it is to be negotiated through affect 
production in an affective framework that neither performer nor audience can fully 
anticipate or determine. And within this affective framework, a human relationship is 
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raised to the status of a stench, like a body odour that one hopes, but fails to keep 
masked: a potentially awkward, annoying, frustrating stench that embarrasses.  
 
Conclusion: Aesthetic Disjuncture 
Rancière defines ‘critical art’ as ‘a type of art that sets out to build awareness of the 
mechanisms of domination to turn the spectator into a conscious agent of world 
transformation’ (Aesthetics and its Discontents 45). Is Half Cut an iteration of 
critical art? Is it trying to teach us something? Does it make assumptions as to the 
audience’s ignorance of political relations? I do not believe that it does, at least with 
regards to a politics of exchange. Systems of exchange are incorporated within the 
work and are even oriented toward the end of critiquing objectification. And yet, I do 
not believe that this is meant to turn the participant into a conscious agent of world 
transformation. There is nothing so grand at stake in Half Cut.  
 For Rancière, critical art kills ‘the strangeness of the resistant appearance that 
attests to the non-necessary or intolerable character of a world’ (Aesthetics and its 
Discontents 45). In Half Cut, this killing is avoided because it is not political art, in 
the sense of it being critical art; it is political in the sense that it redistributes a 
sensory mode of participation. It resists appearance insofar as a mode of appearance 
– i.e. an intolerable affect – emerges as something strange in the encounter between 
model and participant, as well as the transaction on which that encounter is based. 
The intolerable element is an aesthetic element which is, at the same time, the crux 
on which a politics of participation in this work rests. Something is not so much 
made visible, as Rancière might characterise a political intervention in the 
distribution of the sensible, as it is made feelable, as an affective intervention that is, 
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at the same time, risky. It is risky because the affectivity of the situation unfolding 
between a performer and a participating audience that can only ever be anticipated in 
an abstract, generalised guise by the performer, is deeply uncertain. The format of 
the exchange itself might be fairly predictable and fairly repeatable, but the 
functioning of affect in that exchange, given its fundamental dependency on the 
subjects that participate in its production, cannot be so, at least to the same extent. 
The politics of participation in Half Cut that is being considered here, therefore, 
resides in a participating audience’s affective and risky aesthetic experience of the 
work.  
In the introduction to this chapter, I suggested that a potential to re-draw the 
heuristic lines that might otherwise limit how immersive theatre comes to be defined 
might arise through the institutional fostering of creative activity. Theatre Deli was 
then held up as being emblematic of this fostering. The work of young and emerging 
theatre companies was framed as posing challenges to the kinds of company and 
performance that have a right and capacity to partake in a cultural milieu. At the 
same time, through disparities in what is perceived to have aesthetic or critical merit, 
this work prompts reflection on what constitutes merit in the first place. This is 
especially important once merit, particularly of the aesthetic kind, is taken to be 
synonymous with the right or capacity to participate in artistic creativity in spaces 
accessible to the public: i.e. what Rancière would call the police.  
In chapter three, I raised the issue of immersive theatre’s exclusivity, where 
exclusivity among theatre audiences, particularly as it arises through entrepreneurial 
participation, was described in terms of prioritising some participatory dispositions 
to the exclusion of others. In this chapter, I have been looking at exclusivity as it 
applies to immersive theatre makers and curators and how they attempt to 
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circumnavigate barriers to inclusion within a contemporary theatre landscape posed 
by, for instance, public funding. But this is also of relevance to audience 
participation in immersive theatre. By carrying on regardless of public support, 
despite attempts to secure public financial backing, Theatre Deli present audiences 
with participatory opportunities that are not ratified by a public funding 
infrastructure. In fact, drawing on Harvie, they can even be seen to undermine it, 
both inadvertently and dangerously for a sustainable future for such an infrastructure. 
My aim has not been to support or even praise the production practises of Theatre 
Deli with regard to pop-up theatre. With Harvie, I am concerned about the 
implications this may have for public arts funding in the future. However – and this 
is consistent with how I interpret Harvie – it is the economic context and not directly 
the pop-up company in question which should provide the primary cause for 
concern, not least because of the highly limited windows of opportunity that are 
made available to the likes of Theatre Deli, short of making different work and 
potentially sacrificing the rehearsal and performance platform they offer to other 
young companies. In persisting, they make a contribution – however small – to the 
terms on which immersive theatre might be defined and, consequently, the terms on 
which audience participation in immersive theatre might be defined.  
The theatre companies involved with Souk and the Bazaar suggest that 
immersive theatre can take place with limited resources, on a modest scale and can 
be created by artists at the very outset of their professional careers. They also 
challenge the notion that, in the introduction, I identified as being an idiosyncratic 
characteristic of immersive theatre: namely, that immersive theatre environments 
create stable and coherent ‘other worlds’. For the likes of Half Cut, as well as Souk 
and the Bazaar more generally, the various other worlds on offer are subsumed 
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within a curated immersive event – a theatre marketplace – where the reality of 
labour relations rupture both the stability and cohesion of immersion. What this 
presents is a contradiction; while an immersive environment is identifiable as such, 
that environment is nonetheless revealed to thrive on aesthetic disruption. Drawing 
on Rancière, it is possible to view this kind of aesthetic disruption as being deeply 
imbued with the political, provided that aesthetics is regarded as a core to politics.  
I noted a concern of Hallward’s regarding Rancière’s disregard for and 
indifference to ‘questions of organisation and decision’. Rancière may well dismiss 
the kinds of political and artistic organisation that come with Theatre Deli’s 
transaction ethos, for instance, or their production processes more generally. 
Ultimately, the companies, many of which would later become associate companies 
of Theatre Deli, must subscribe by association to Theatre Deli’s ideological approach 
to pop-up theatre and means of financing the making of immersive theatre. It is 
difficult to see in this context where the dissensual intervention so beloved of 
Rancière can emerge. As far as theatre production and curation is concerned, Theatre 
Deli thrives on consensus among the community of artists that are increasingly 
affiliated with them. However, that is not to say that the artwork produced through 
Theatre Deli must act in the same way. Over the course of this chapter, I have argued 
that Souk and the Bazaar can be seen to operate as interstices, raising labour 
relations, primarily, but also objectification, into the realm of aisthesis. In that 
raising, an aesthetic disruption can be seen to take place that reorders, or 
redistributes, what can be perceived and made sense of. It is in this sense, of 
approaching politics through aesthetics, that Theatre Deli and companies like Half 
Cut associated with them can be seen to make political interventions. This is the 
dissensus that takes place in their work. It is not antagonism between performers and 
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audience or between performers and curators – although it may just as well involve 
this – but an aesthetic disjuncture with the mistakenly supposed commonness of 
sense that might be characterised here as defining a politics of participation in 
immersive theatre. Sense, either as perception or understanding, has the potential to 
be common, but that commonality resides in upsetting a mistakenly supposed level 
playing field premised on an exclusive aesthetic order.  
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Conclusion 
22 March 2013. One minute past midday. A confirmation email lands in my inbox 
for a preview performance of Punchdrunk’s latest show, The Drowned Man: A 
Hollywood Fable. Tickets went on sale as the clock struck twelve and were bookable 
through the National Theatre via an online queuing system. The queue shot up to the 
thousands a minute or two after my successful purchase, signalled by a counter 
indicating your place in virtual line and an onslaught of desperate comments on 
social media websites. Despite its unlikelihood given a three month run, I was 
convinced that tickets for the production would sell out in hours. Either that, or the 
National Theatre website might have crashed, as it did for the English National 
Opera once tickets for The Duchess of Malfi were released. Neither worry 
materialised. But given the online queue of thousands, it would appear that this was 
not an isolated concern. We bought into the buzz.  
A surge of publicity for the show and media coverage was released only the 
day before tickets went on sale, resulting in hype that was brief, but effective. Critics 
were invited to a dilapidated shop on Kingsland High Street in Dalston, just prior to 
the release date. Inside, having meandered through corridors and down stairs, they 
would meet Andrez, busy repairing film equipment, but wanting, nonetheless, to tell 
them a story. This turned out to be a ten minute ‘live trailer’ for the performance and 
certainly proved effective. The sense of excitement produced by the novelty of this 
publicity stunt bled into the media hype reported in, for instance, The Telegraph and 
The Guardian. The live trailer was made open to the public, but Punchdrunk asked 
critics to keep the precise whereabouts under wraps. This was a trailer to be 
discovered. As Daisy Bowie-Sell reports: ‘[t]he man you encounter in the tiny 
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section that’s being played out over the next two weeks has advice for you and will 
appear himself in The Drowned Man, which opens in June. Pay attention to what he 
tells you, says [Felix] Barrett, as it may prove useful’ (n.p.). In other words, for those 
willing to go the extra mile, to risk heading to Dalston and finding nothing, but to 
risk nonetheless, there is an opportunity to get a head start in the immersive world 
that awaits you. That is, so long as you pick the right door and make the appropriate 
leap of faith.  
I took the risk. On a Thursday afternoon, a week after the tickets were 
released, I made the trip to Dalston Junction and headed up Kingsland High Street, 
past unmarked brown doors, grocers and shop fronts with missing sign lettering. I 
was unsure what I was hoping to find or where to find it, but I was confident, 
nonetheless, that if there was something to be found it would be recognisable. Sure 
enough, I noticed an unmistakably out of place shop front. In bright neon lettering, 
suspended in a window framed by red curtains, was the word ‘Psychic’. 
Unfortunately, in a glass door panel, there was also a sign which read ‘closed’. A 
young woman was sat at a desk behind the door and I called through the pane of 
glass: ‘when do you open?’ Her response was inaudible, so I repeated and she 
replied by raising four fingers, mouthing that I should return in one hour. I returned 
after forty five minutes and a coffee in a nearby Turkish sweet shop, only this time 
there was a small queue of hipsters, students and one or two dapper looking couples. 
I counted along the line, knowing that the experience was to last around ten minutes 
for each individual audience member and calculating how long I was likely to have 
to wait – probably an hour and a half which, for a three hour round trip to make it to 
Dalston, seemed manageable.  
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I peered through the window and saw a crystal ball and some tarot cards. 
Passers-by wandered past and mocked the queue in utter disbelief that a ‘witch’, as 
one of them suggested, could attract so much attention. A pungent smell of incense 
accompanied the opening of the door and Katy Balfour, a Punchdrunk Associate 
Artist who I had interviewed three weeks previously, came out onto the pavement 
and called the name of someone in the queue one place behind me. A critic, I 
supposed. Then the first one or two members of the queue filed in. Five minutes after 
four o’clock, Katy came out again and regretfully informed us that they were too 
busy to allow anyone else to enter that afternoon – but come back tomorrow.  
This was an annoying turn of events, to say the least. And annoying in a 
somewhat unfruitful sense of the word, lacking subversion of a participatory 
promise, as might be expected in, for instance, a Shunt performance, instead 
fetishising a participatory experience as something to yearn for. There was certainly 
a childish delight and sense of pride to be had in finding the location. Initiative was 
rewarded on that front. But that initiative, or entrepreneurialism, ended up being 
scuppered by a faux public façade. Was I not entrepreneurial or savvy enough? Or 
was I not meant to take the instruction of the inaudible woman at face value? Should 
I have ignored her suggestion and waited outside the door for the full hour? 
Whatever the case, for those critics invited to attend, there was an opportunity 
reciprocated in publicity; for the rest of us, or at least for most of us in the queue on 
that day, Andrez’s secrets remain a mystery. But a mystery that I, for one, wanted to 
discuss with others. The lack of eventfulness nonetheless allowed for an unlived 
experience to persevere as something more in my mutterings to friends afterwards, 
most of whom, pedants and misanthropists aside, marvelled at what could have been.  
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Punchdrunk’s pop-up intervention could not quite escape the fact that it 
intervenes in private space. This was an intervention in the misleadingly public space 
of a London high street. Its status as an intervention – of posing some kind of 
aesthetic rupture to the coherence of the high street – was overridden by the presence 
of the queue. This was not a door to be stumbled upon; it was a door to be found by 
people in the know. Anyone stumbling across the door would have access barred 
either by a closed sign or a queue. In this respect, Punchdrunk are victims of their 
own popularity. What is more, an out of the ordinary appearance, potentially holding 
an out of the ordinary experience, was tamed by familiar indicators of cultural 
capital: the queue and the checklist. These exclusionary indicators, upon reflection, 
seemed at home in a space revealed to be private and, for those of us in the queue 
that day, inaccessible.  
What was promised in the publicity for the live trailer was an experience: an 
experiential taster of The Drowned Man. But the mere promise of an experience 
proved enough to render it an effective marketing tool. Perhaps the company have 
learned from Mother and Stella Artois Black. Comparable to The Black Diamond, 
they have created a theatre event in a pop-up space as a means of marketing their 
theatre product, The Drowned Man. Both critics and audience end up marketing the 
performance on Punchdrunk’s behalf, in return for a free mini performance for those 
lucky few who actually get to experience the live trailer. The first-hand experience of 
these few ends up traveling through numerous communicative pathways, promoting 
what I would call an experiential contagion: a viral marketing strategy premised on 
the production of experiences that thrives on hype and buzz, but does not depend on 
first-hand experience. Despite offering an experience to a potential public, this offer 
only depends on a small number of people experiencing the event for the desired 
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publicity to be maximised. An experiential product is consequently able to enter an 
experience economy where lived experience is no longer a necessary requirement for 
the experience economy to function effectively, at least with regards to experiential 
marketing. The materially encountered lived experience need only touch a few 
before its contagious capacity bursts through innumerable immaterial pathways. And 
the result is an online ticketing queue running up into the thousands in minutes.  
Punchdrunk’s live trailer, then, embraces much of what this thesis has been 
addressing: an immersive experience is offered to a lucky few that thrives on 
affective potential, particularly as that potential spills out through the experience 
economy. It challenges audiences to take the risk of coming to Dalston on the off-
chance that they will not only discover the venue (entrepreneurial participation), but 
gain entry (individualistic privilege). As such, it can be seen to draw into play 
elements of the neoliberal ethos that characterises the kinds of participation that 
Punchdrunk tends to ask of audiences in a not-so-freely available free performance. 
Finally, the live trailer took place in a pop-up theatre venue, which can be seen to 
trouble the aesthetic coherence of the high street. However, whatever aesthetic 
disruption occurs through this potential troubling of aesthetic coherence ends up 
forming another kind of aesthetic coherence through familiar signals of the theatre 
and commercial entertainment, such as the queue and the checklist. The kind of 
politics at stake is not one of aesthetic re-distribution, then, but a recognisably 
hierarchical and exclusive distribution of parts among those who can and cannot 
participate in the ‘freely’ available live trailer. The performance is free of monetary 
charge, but that does not equate to freedom of access. Even among those who can 
participate having found the location, which poses its own, potentially intimidating, 
or off-putting obstacle, there remain many who are simply not allowed to participate, 
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despite their best efforts. The restrictive one-on-one format thrives on privilege. But 
married to popularity, that privilege also ensures exclusion.  
In short, affect production, risk perception, the neoliberal ethos, the 
experience economy and the twinned notions of aesthetics and politics are all 
brought together here and that bringing together crystallises how an aesthetics and 
politics of audience participation in immersive theatre might be approached. By 
treating affect and risk perception as aesthetic inputs coded through experience 
production and by comparing the kinds of value and exchange at stake with those 
operating elsewhere in political ideology and the economy, it is possible to locate 
what a politics of audience participation might look like in a particular iteration of 
immersive theatre.  
In ‘Historicizing Untimeliness’, Kristin Ross articulates an illuminating 
summary of Rancière’s approach to politics as ‘an event that cannot be predicted any 
more than its end can be apocalyptically announced. It is always circumstantial, 
local, and entirely contained in its singular manifestations’ (29). While Ross is 
primarily commenting on politics – as disruption – as it emerges in history, she 
might just as well be describing politics as it emerges in an artistic practise such as 
immersive theatre. What this means is that a singular theory of the politics of 
participation in immersive theatre, as well as its aesthetics, fails to understand what 
politics is, at least for Rancière: that is, a circumstantially bound disruption of any 
such singularity. Nonetheless, while the foregoing theorisations of immersive theatre 
participation have all been firmly rooted in particular case studies, it seems that a 
number of conclusions can be drawn that might usefully carry over into a much 
wider and more general evaluation of an aesthetics and politics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre.  
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First of all, certain aspects of immersive theatre participation considered in 
this thesis have emerged from analyses of specific immersive theatre performances, 
or companies, but with limited applicability to work by other companies. For 
instance, the notion of entrepreneurial participation was introduced as an implicit 
participatory expectation in Punchdrunk’s work of significant consequence for 
political evaluation. However, this notion is clearly not as relevant to participating in 
a Shunt performance, for instance, or in Ray Lee’s Cold Storage, where much less 
emphasis is placed on seeking out performance within an immersive environment 
that is structured and controlled and where the audience’s experience can be 
carefully manipulated. This is where Ross’s insistence on the circumstantial and 
singular manifestations of politics is most fruitfully considered and where my 
rejection of the definite article in exploring an aesthetics and a politics of 
participation throughout this thesis reveals its hesitancy as a necessary hesitancy. 
That being said, it is possible to put forward some assertive conclusions regarding 
the peculiarity of immersive theatre’s particular breed of productive participants that 
usefully bears down on how an aesthetics and politics of participation might be 
evaluated. 
This thesis has identified and examined how audience participation tends to 
operate in immersive theatre, particularly with regard to the audience’s creative or 
productive role in relation to immersive theatre environments. Narcissistic 
participation was coined and introduced as a potentially fruitful participatory model 
that might help with thinking through how participation operates in immersive 
theatre, especially as it relates to experience production as both a participatory 
incentive and an aesthetically central characteristic of immersive theatre 
performances. Narcissistic participation, both as it relates to affect production and 
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risk perception, seems to be at stake in all of the immersive theatre performances 
considered in this thesis, at least as narcissism was defined and approached in part 
one: as an introspective turning inwards of aesthetic attention towards one’s own 
experience, coupled with a projective turning outwards of attention towards the fruits 
of one’s own participatory activity in an immersive environment. This dyad, 
coupling introspection and projection, finds fertile grounding in what I have framed 
as the aesthetic characteristics of affect production and risk perception, narrowing 
aesthetic focus to aesthetic experience and how aesthetic experience is produced in 
immersive theatre. Individual participants fundamentally contribute to that 
production within the immersive environments surrounding them. Narcissistic 
participation engages risk through an affective encounter with an immersive 
environment that can only ever be partially known. In that partiality, together with 
demands that might be made of audiences within immersive theatre environments – 
either directly, as a demand from an actor, or indirectly, through, for instance, 
entrepreneurial participation – a kind of audience productivity arises that is not just 
imaginative, as might be expected of audiences more generally, but attentive to both 
interiority and exteriority, as well as experience and participatory activity that 
projects out into a space that surrounds audiences.  
With this in mind, it is therefore the manifold nature of productivity that 
renders immersive theatre audiences as especially productive participants, 
magnifying and multiplying an audience’s inherent productivity in spaces that are 
peculiarly conducive to productive participation. This may well prove a useful 
observation as a counterbalance to the more hesitant definitions of immersive theatre 
and, specifically, audience participation in immersive theatre, which interrogate and 
challenge the appropriateness of the immersive metaphor. What needed to take place 
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in scholarship dealing with immersive theatre was clarity regarding what the style 
shares with drama and theatre more generally – a sharing that, for instance, has been 
identified by Worthen – but that nonetheless demarcates immersive theatre as a 
distinct theatre style, thus opening up terrain for a critical examination of aesthetics 
and politics as both apply, specifically, to audience participation in immersive 
theatre. The definition of immersive theatre and an approach to audience 
participation identified and theorised in this thesis took up this task. Points of 
alignment between immersive theatre and drama were implicitly challenged by 
considering immersive theatre’s postdramatic features, without rubbing over the 
important and useful demarcations that maintain the stylistic integrity of immersive 
theatre as a distinctly identifiable theatre style with distinctly identifiable modes of 
audience participation.  
This definition encourages reflection on the kind of politics that emerges 
from especially productive participation, as well as a questioning of how this 
supposed productivity might relate to dispositions, or capacities, for exercising 
participation productively. Moreover, it is worth considering where such productive 
participants might find their counterparts outside of the theatre. In this thesis, I have 
made the claim that there are strong compatibilities between audience participation 
in immersive theatre and participatory experiences offered or marketed in the 
experience economy. I have also suggested that the participatory values operating in 
many immersive theatre performances, but particularly in Punchdrunk’s work, are 
typically neoliberal. It therefore seems important to think politically about audience 
participation in immersive theatre, considering what consequences might arise from 
accepting alluring invitations to secure a given experience, while maximising the 
best possible experience. It is worth asking what the political cost of aesthetic 
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experience in immersive theatre might be. It is striking that this task has, until now, 
remained largely unaccounted for as far as immersive theatre, specifically, is 
concerned.  
This is why I believe it is so important to consider an aesthetics and politics 
of audience participation in unison. The primary conclusion to be drawn from this 
thesis is that immersive theatre’s aesthetics of audience participation is also, 
potentially, a possible site for its politics. Elsewhere, it has been argued that a 
politics of participation in contemporary theatre and performance is not reducible to 
the realm of aesthetics and that, if anything, political demands for participation are 
transformed into aesthetic responses in such circumstances (Bala 238). But in 
immersive theatre, particularly once approached using the vocabulary of Rancière, 
an aesthetics and politics of audience participation appear profoundly interrelated 
and mutually constitutive. Before elaborating this point, it bears fruit to revisit 
reasons why immersive theatre might also dispel the likelihood of political dissensus 
emerging.  
First of all, immersive theatre is a prescriptive art form. This is particularly 
evident in a great deal of one-on-one theatre, where the sheer inflow of theatre 
consumers tends to reveal the theatre scenario as being at least fairly repeatable. The 
fact that this repeatability, or reproducibility, can be said to exist depends on coming 
to terms with the overriding tendency towards a performance structure of some kind 
being in play, be it a script, or a more general scripted framework that leaves open 
some space for improvisation: i.e. cosmetic, or adaptive customisation. Either way, 
there tends to be something coherent that can be shared between participating 
audiences after the event, in some cases more so than in others, that testifies to 
precisely this kind of structure. There may also be a participatory protocol, the rules 
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of which are either clear or ambiguous. This, too, can be said to identify immersive 
theatre as a prescriptive art form. The intentions of immersive theatre makers may 
deem a particular aim, goal or message to be at the forefront of their artistic 
concerns, which factors in attempts to guide audiences towards an understanding of 
these intentions. Theatre design might also work to help realise these intentions. 
What all this amounts to is an establishment of immersive theatre as a consensual art 
practise which, in Rancière’s sense of the term, is to be understood as ‘an agreement 
between sense and sense, in other words between a mode of sensory presentation and 
a regime of meaning’ (Dissensus 144). Clearly, then, if Rancière is to be drawn 
upon, we need to look elsewhere for immersive theatre’s capacity to disrupt such 
consensus. That elsewhere, I contend, is affect production.  
 As the last chapter suggested, in making this claim I am departing from 
Rancière’s sceptical thoughts on bodily objectification at the expense of the political 
subject that, he believes, comes with focusing on the corporeal. But I have deployed 
in this thesis a very particular understanding of affect production that takes the 
subject and his or her role in the production of affect as a given, albeit in a way that 
operates in dynamic relation with an uncertain outside. Indeed, this very dynamism 
provides a possible line of enquiry to think through what a disruption, or rupture, in 
the distribution of the sensible might look like, especially when that disruption 
affects the otherwise smooth operation of neoliberal value or the fetishisation of 
experience and participation in the experience economy. While affect production can 
be guided, it can never be fully controlled given its contingency on the subjects who 
feel it and necessarily help to produce it. In that sense, it is unpredictable, or at least 
it cannot be predicted with absolute certainty. This is about inputting the corporeal 
into a regime of sensibility in Rancière’s writing that, otherwise, is limited to 
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visibility and audibility, the capacity to see and speak and be seen and be heard. As 
such, what is being added to that formulation is the capacity to affect and be 
affected. It is such a capacity that, I believe, provides a potential locus for the 
political in immersive theatre, provided affect is experienced as something 
unsettling, frustrating, annoying, uncomfortable, out of place, or out of the ordinary: 
that is, especially as it might relate to risk. This is not to limit attention to negative 
affects, such as shame, although shame might just as well be considered as 
potentially political in the context of immersive theatre. Pleasure, even hedonic 
pleasure, might work in this sense as being politically disruptive if rendered as a 
dubious, challenging sensation: that is, as an embarrass. The point is that there are 
many guises that the political might inhabit in immersive theatre – guises that are, 
first and foremost, aesthetic. 
Based on the definition of affect production offered in chapter one, it is affect 
that provides the clearest potential for dissensus to emerge through audience 
participation in immersive theatre. This is so for two reasons: firstly, affect draws on 
the participant’s unique autobiography in a way that will always be in excess of the 
anticipations of theatre makers; secondly, while affect might be drawn on as a 
postdramatic medium for the transmission of something meaningful, it nonetheless 
depends on a host – a particular participant – that can only ever be partially 
anticipated as a generalised participant in advance of the event. The same can be said 
of risk perception given its fundamental dependence on the individual, as well as its 
close relationship with affect production. It may well be that affect production and 
risk perception, via affect, can be biopolitically worked upon and co-opted, but it is 
not something that can be owned, nor ever fully controlled. There must be space 
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within it to at least allow for the possibility of unpredictability, risk and therefore 
dissensus.  
There are undoubtedly restrictions on this space. In Performing Consumers: 
Global Capital and its Theatrical Seductions, Wickstrom looks at the ways in which 
Nike, Disney and a range of other corporate businesses co-opt not only affect within 
the experience economy, but theatre and performance as well, particularly with 
regard to mimesis. ‘Mimesis’, she writes, ‘is a capacity that allows us to travel a 
spectrum along which we encounter, or live, the truth of the make-believe’ (19). 
Drawing on my argument that there is no such thing as an unauthentic affect, it is 
clear to see the attraction of co-opting bodies into marketing strategies, utilising the 
biological fact of the human subject as a means of injecting authenticity into 
theatrically constructed brands. In immersive theatre, affect might likewise be used 
to draw audiences into an immersive world that is partly of their own making. In 
both instances, individual productivity, via affect production, works upon 
audiences/customers as they are at once set apart from a theatre event/brand, while at 
the same time providing the basis for its grounding as a truthful form of make-
believe that can be valued as such.  
This co-opting of bodies ultimately correlates to the utility of aisthesis. I am 
not alone in underscoring the aesthetic centrality of experience production in 
immersive theatre. I have explored how Machon’s (Syn)aesthetics has put forward 
comparable observations through study of corporeal, or visceral audience 
engagement. What I have done in this thesis, though, is articulate the centrality of 
experience production in starkly different terms, looking at affect production and risk 
perception, in particular, before orienting that articulation toward starkly different 
ends: that is, endeavouring to establish a politics of audience participation in 
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immersive theatre. This is where the utility of aisthesis begins to resonate most 
strongly as an important subject of study.  
In an immersive theatre performance like Shunt’s The Architects, this utility 
equates to the centrality of the performance text, as opposed to the linguistic text, 
particularly as the performance text works through affective experience as a potential 
harbinger of a meaning that appears to be all of one’s own. In the case of branding, 
particularly in Punchdrunk’s corporate performances, or in experiential marketing, 
that utilisation works on a similar principle. But as my discussion of The Architects 
makes clear, this similarity might just as well be critiqued. The impulse of 
narcissistic participation, of turning attention inwards towards one’s own 
experiencing self, as well as a projecting outwards towards the fruits of one’s own 
participatory labour, might be rendered troublesome. Breaking, scuppering, 
frustrating, or embarrassing a participatory assumption or expectation, defined in 
terms of physical prowess or intervention within an aesthetic space, might reveal the 
dangers and susceptibilities of that impulse, or at least its status as an impulse. 
Likewise with Half Cut’s Half Cut, as well as the curatorial projects of Theatre Souk 
and the Bush Bazaar, there is a potential for immersive theatre to play upon and 
frustrate the familiarity of aesthetic coherence – to inject an embarrass into whatever 
transactions might take place between audience and performer and to raise from its 
hidden status an uncomfortable human relation that may not be visible, or audible, 
but at least feelable through aisthesis. It is in these kinds of frustrations that 
immersive theatre’s most valuable politics of participation can be seen to occur: in 
the apparently trivial, against the consensual or comfortable, and from within its 
aesthetic core.  
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 A number of further research avenues are opened up by some of the claims 
put forward and explored in this thesis. One such claim taps into an on-going 
academic interest in the liveness of theatre and performance in theatre and 
performance studies, in particular the recent trend in challenging the supposed non-
reproducibility of performance that Diana Taylor, Joseph Roach and Rebecca 
Schneider have, in their own ways and among others, been exploring over the past 
decade (Taylor, Archive and the Repertoire; Roach, Cities of the Dead; Schneider, 
Performing Remains). I have suggested that the immersive theatre event, especially 
one-on-one theatre, in many ways depends on being at least fairly reproducible. The 
non-reproducible element can be seen to come from the specificities of narcissistic 
participation, but the theatre event that is designed prior to the audience’s arrival 
nonetheless presupposes a format or structure that might be presented to different 
audiences with a strong degree of consistency.  
 Secondly, my discussion of an aesthetics and politics of audience 
participation in immersive theatre certainly resonates with the later work of Bishop, 
in particular her discussion and application of Rancière’s theoretical writing to 
participatory scenarios in Artificial Hells. I specify later work, as this book departs 
from her earlier notion of ‘relational antagonism’ explored in her article 
‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’, instead focusing on the significance of an 
aesthetic return as an important alternative to the ethical turn in socially engaged art 
practises. What my thesis adds to this discussion is in a certain respect a rejuvenation 
of her concept of relational antagonism, but in a way which fundamentally departs 
from the sense of aggressive confrontation implied within it. Rather, in the third part 
of this thesis, I have been exploring Rancière’s notion of dissensus in a way that 
prescribes neither antagonism nor conviviality, but, rather, refers to an aesthetic 
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reordering that is fundamentally political. This kind of reordering could take place in 
annoying, frustrating or embarrassing circumstances, just as it might in a pleasurable 
zone of apparent triviality, provided an aesthetic disruption of some kind takes place, 
even if that disruption is simply premised on who has a capacity to take part in 
artistic creation and participation. In this regard, there is space to apply the approach 
to audience participation put forward in this thesis to other styles of theatre, 
performance and the fine and visual arts, particularly participatory styles, as an aid to 
the identification and examination of aesthetics and politics.  
 Finally, there is a larger project opened up from the foregoing regarding the 
figuration of an audience-as-community. In part two, I charted a number of 
important political shifts that can be seen to have contributed to an atomisation of 
society. This ‘new individualism’ was approached through commentary on the 
increasing hegemony of the neoliberal ethos, particularly as it has been inscribed in 
the policy decisions and political strategies of UK government since 1979, 
especially. The kind of participant described in this thesis is one that Rancière, 
despite his resistance to such explicit forms of physical participation, may well have 
at least some sympathy with. Individual productivity and the individual narrative 
journey of audiences were themes reiterated time and again through discussion of 
affect production and risk perception. But – and this is perhaps where Rancière’s 
sympathies might cease – the counterparts of this individualism, particularly as it 
might be inscribed through experience, were found to be in operation in the 
experience economy and through elements of the neoliberal ethos. The immersive 
theatre audience, particularly as it appears among Punchdrunk’s masked and cloaked 
participants, or in one-on-one theatre, is profoundly individualistic. Once the notion 
of narcissistic participation is taken into account, this individualism can be seen to 
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extend, potentially, to many different participatory theatre styles, suggesting that 
contemporary theatre audiences may well be unsettling the notion of an audience-as-
community. Given the compatibility of value and aesthetic systems operating 
between immersive theatre, the neoliberal ethos and the experience economy, it is 
perhaps worth asking what causative links, as opposed to parallels, might be 
proposed between the possible rise of individualism among theatre audiences and the 
economic and political shifts, or continuities, promoting the disintegration of the 
audience-as-community, at least as an ideal – a mythic ideal, perhaps, but a 
metamorphosing mythic ideal. This thesis has not been the place to tackle this 
specific line of enquiry, but it does seem a potentially pressing area for future 
research. 
 In drawing this thesis to a close, I want to return to the key notion of an 
aesthetically disruptive politics, particularly as it might arise not just from annoying, 
or frustrating audiences, but also from excitement, or pleasure. In chapter four, I 
commented on Ahmed’s positive support of unhappy feelings, along with their 
political worth, in cultures that position happiness as an end to which all else must be 
subservient. I also noted her frustration at what this ‘promise of happiness’ can be 
seen to rub over, or leave behind, in its march towards hegemony. But an 
aesthetically disruptive politics might also embrace exhilaration, joy and celebration: 
characteristics that so often characterise the most memorable immersive theatre 
experiences. In Performance Affects, James Thompson makes an impassioned call 
for an ‘end of effect’ in applied drama (5-6). Drawing on the anarchist Emma 
Goldman, Thompson invites us to consider the value of experiencing ‘beautiful 
radiant things’ as an affective end in itself (1, original emphasis). Alternatively, Jill 
Dolan introduces the notion of ‘utopian performatives’, in a critical mode 
329 
 
reminiscent of Herbert Marcuse’s The Aesthetic Dimension, to describe a possible 
marriage of affect and effect. Utopian performatives celebrate those ‘small but 
profound moments in which performance calls the attention of the audience in a way 
that lifts everyone slightly above the present, into a hopeful feeling of what the world 
might be like if every moment of our lives were as emotionally voluminous, 
generous, aesthetically striking, and intersubjectively intense’ (Dolan 5). Whether 
posed as an end of effect, or a marriage of affect and effect, these perspectives 
encourage us to re-consider the political value of enjoying beautiful radiant things in 
immersive theatre, or the ways in which immersive theatre might be able to generate 
utopian performatives. Too much of a focus on aesthetic disruption, as it arises from 
frustration, or annoyance, may be seen to quench celebratory moments. But an 
understanding of the political offered by Rancière in his later writing does, indeed, 
leave space to consider such celebratory moments as being politically relevant, 
provided some kind of aesthetic re-distribution takes place. As such, it has not been 
an intention to exclude such possibilities from an approach to an aesthetics and 
politics of audience participation in immersive theatre; rather, my intention has been 
to focus, in part three, on especially clear instances of aesthetic rupture that 
challenge participatory engagement with immersive theatre. This challenge may be 
annoying, just as it may be celebratory, or fun. But, I believe, the most valuable 
political contribution of such a challenge is likely to emerge from the aesthetic terms 
that are put into play in an immersive theatre performance, together with how those 
terms open up, or restrict modes of participatory engagement.  
Over the three year course of this PhD research, the definitional stability of 
immersive theatre has been put into question time and again. What was raised as a 
defining characteristic in the introduction – the provision of coherent other worlds 
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that surround participating audiences within an aesthetic environment – has since 
emerged as a useful heuristic, but a heuristic that is open to question. Punchdrunk 
have recently been exploring boundaries between the street and the street as the stage 
in a fascinating collapse of aesthetic orders, an example being The Borough (2013). 
This was a site-responsive headphone performance based on Benjamin Britten’s 
opera Peter Grimes and George Crabbe’s poem The Borough, performed on the 
streets, beach and marshes of Aldeburgh in Suffolk, UK – a site which resonated so 
very strongly with Britten’s score and former place of residence, despite the entrance 
of uncontrollable quotidian factors, from passing cars to snoozing sunbathers. Shunt 
seem to embrace this definitional heuristic of immersive theatre without explicitly 
identifying with it, while, for the most part, keeping their audiences seated within 
environments that productively frustrate participatory expectations. Ray Lee and 
Lundahl & Seitl reveal how affective irruptions of the real within immersive theatre 
environments might unsettle, or at least divert attention away from their 
representational function. And Theatre Deli create pop-up theatre that depends on a 
system of finance and support that ensures their nomadism. Theatre Deli depends, in 
an explicit way, on a world that is far from otherworldly: on a business world that 
acts as both giver and evictor. But this is a world that can become critically 
incorporated within an immersive theatre interstice, existing within a far from perfect 
cultural and economic infrastructure, depending on it, even supporting it, but at the 
same time revealing its inadequacies.  
The functioning of the political in the case studies explored in this thesis is 
far from radical. In many cases, exclusionary practises mar the potential for the 
political to be fulfilled in all of its disruptive potential. But there remains the 
possibility of intervening, of breaking with an aesthetic order while at the same time 
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existing within it, and engaging an aesthetics of audience participation in immersive 
theatre as its most effective political potential.  
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